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SUMMARY 
The bulk of the matrimonial property regimes operating in Botswana 
were inherited from the country's colonial past. Since independence 
there has not been any realistic attempt to reform them. thesis set 
out to appraisal the legal regimes governing the determination of 
matrimonial property on divorce to ascertain their efficacy in realising 
the legitimate aspiration of married couples. Comparisons were made 
with similar countries to determine how these have tackled problems 
relating to determination of matrimonial property on divorce. 
The study found that where there is a dispute about matrimonial 
property in marriages out of community, the courts have no discretion 
to readjust the rights of the parties. This situation adversely affect non-
working wives who spent most of their time looking after their 
husbands and children without being able to acquire capital assets. 
Recognition is not given to such domestic contribution to the welfare 
of the family. It was also found that the exercise of the marital power 
by husbands of marriages in community of property deprives wives of 
those marriages the right to administer the joint estate. The patriarchal 
nature of customary law, which governs the majority of disputes about 
u 
matrimonial property, discriminates against women. 
Consequently, the following, inter alia, are suggested as reform 
measures. 
The courts should be given a wide discretionary power, 
circumscribed by statutory guidelines, to reallocate matrimonial 
property on divorce irrespective of the matrimonial property regime that 
governs the marriage. The underlying principle should be equality of 
sharing but this may be departed from where the circumstances of the 
particular case warrant it. 
(b) A spouse's domestic contribution towards the welfare of the family 
should be recognised. 
( c) The marital power of husbands should be abolished. 
( d) The provisions of the Matrimonial Causes Act should be made 
applicable to customary marriages. 
KEY TERMS 
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1 
INTRODUCTION 
1. PRELIMINARY CONSIDERATIONS 
Matrimonial property as a concept for this study will be taken to have 
the same meaning as that used to describe "matrimonial" or "family" 
assets in the English case of Wachtel v. Wachtel. 1 In that case, Lord 
Denning M.R. said: 
"The phrase 'family assets' is a convenient short way of 
expressing an important concept. It refers to those things which 
are acquired by one or other or both of the parties, with the 
intention that they should be continuing provision for them and 
their children during their joint lives, and used for the benefit 
of the family as a whole ... The family assets can be divided into 
two parts: (i) those which are of a capital nature, such as the 
matrimonial home and the furniture in it; (ii) those which are of 
revenue producing nature, such as the earning power of 
husband and wife. When the marriage comes to an end, the 
[1973] 1 All E.R. 829 (C.A.) at p. 836. 
2 
capital assets have to be divided: the earning power of each has 
to be allocated. "2 
The term "family assets" as used in the above dictum was criticized in 
P. v. P. 3 in that it did not form part of s. 25 of the English Matrimonial 
Causes Act 1973 under which section the court is to decide the 
proprietary rights of spouses on divorce. Despite this criticism, it is 
respectfully adopted as the meaning of "matrimonial property" in this 
thesis. Why is this definition appropriate? The present legal regimes 
regulating this type of property in Botswana, allow for the acquisition 
of individual or joint property by spouses married, for instance, out of 
community of property or under customary law. The property of those 
2 
3 
See also H. Marsh Jr. Marital Property in Coriflict of Laws Seattle, 
University of Washington Press, 1952 at p. 11 where a similar term is 
defined as signifying an interest which accrues to one spouse, with respect 
to things owned or acquired by the other spouse, solely by virtue of the 
existence of the marital relation, but excluding from it the prospect of 
inheritance upon the intestate death of the other. For the reasons given in the 
text Lord Denning's defmition is adopted for this thesis. 
[1978] 3 All E.R. 70 at p. 73 per Ormrod L.J. See also Lord Upjohn in 
Pettitt v. Pettitt [1970] A.C. 777 at p. 817F. 
3 
spouses married in community of property is regarded as joint property 
under the management of the husband.4 
Thus, the definition not only takes care of the interests of spouses under 
all three marriage regimes, but it encapsulates the type of property 
which spouses in a marriage in Botswana may usually acquire. For, as 
aptly noted by the English Law Commission5, in family life, such 
property frequently takes the form of the matrimonial home, its 
furniture and contents, the car and savings (cash, insurance policies, 
bank account, savings certificates, shares etc.). 
4 
5 
In South Africa, a country with which Botswana shares a common Roman-
Dutch common law tradition, there is uncertainty as to the meaning of 
"matrimonial property." J. Sinclair assisted by J. Heaton The Law of 
Marriage vol. I, Kenwyn, Juta & Co., 1996 at p. 373 submit that the term 
refers to the joint estate where the spouses are married in community, and to 
their separate estates where they are married out of community. However, 
D.J. Joubert Law of South Africa vol. 16 "Marriage" (revised by A. de W. 
Horak), Durban, Butterworths, 1992 (first reissue, 1998) argues that, in a 
marriage out of community of property, only property acquired during the 
marriage by the joint efforts or contributions of the spouses would fall 
within the meaning of the term. In a marriage in community of property, he 
submits that all the property of the spouses will be "matrimonial property." 
See Working Paper No. 42 published on 26th. October 1971 titled Family 
Property Law at p. 3. 
4 
It must be noted that the word "family", the institution through which 
this type of property is accumulated, when used in the African context 
may not coincide with the European meaning of the term. In the 
African context, "family" generally means a large social group of 
people all tracing descent from a common ancestor, male or female. 6 
The social group, the members of which are lineally descended in a 
direct female line from a common ancestor is known as the matrilineal 
family. That in which the members are lineally descended in a direct 
male line from a common ancestor is known as the patrilineal family. 
The general rubric for these types of family is the extended family. In 
the European context "family" generally refers to all members of a 
household, including husband, wife and children.7 This is the sense in 
6 
7 
See for example, J.M. Sarbah Fanti Customary Laws (3'd ed.), London, 
Frank Cass, 1968 at p. 33, N.A. Ollennu The Law of Testate and Intestate 
SuccessioninGhana, London,Sweet&Maxwell, 1966atpp.139-143, 171-
174, N.A. Ollennu& G.R. Woodman Principles of Customary LandLaw in 
Ghana, Birmingham, Cal Press, 1985 Chap. 10, K. Bentsi-Enchill Ghana 
Land Law, London, Sweet & Maxwell, 1964 at p. 25, A.KP. Kludze Ewe 
Law of Property, London, Sweet & Maxwell, 1973 at p. 32 and J.C. Bekker 
"Interaction between constitutional reform and family law" (1991) Acta 
Juridica 1 at pp. 2-3. See also the Ghanaian cases of Amarfio v. Ayorkor 
(1954) 14 W.A.C.A. 554 and Mills v. Addy (1958) 3 W.A.L.R. 357. 
See P .M. Bromley & N. V. Lowe F amity Law (8'h ed.) London, Butterworths, 
1992 at p. 1. See also H.J. Eramus et al Lee & Honore Family, Things and 
Succession (2"d ed.) Durban, Butterworths, 1983 para. 4. 
5 
which "family" is used in the context of matrimonial property in this 
thesis. This latter meaning had not, in the main, attracted the attention 
of African jurists until recent times, while the former has had a 
distinguished record of exposition in African sources. 8 
The study of matrimonial property is important because the family is 
not only of immense social importance but it is also an important 
economic unit. As stated by Miller:9 
8 
9 
"A consideration of the principles relating to family property 
and financial provision for a family is dominated by problems 
which arise on a break up of a family unit based upon marriage, 
for generally, it is only then that the law is called upon to play 
See E.K. Quansah "Ownership of matrimonial property under African 
customary law - A search for criteria" (1988) University of Calabar Law 
Journal 109; G.R. Woodman "Acquisition of family land in Ghana" (1963) 
Journal of African Law 136; M.I. Jegede "Nature and extent of a family 
member's rights and interest in family land in Nigeria" ( 1970) 3 East African 
Law Review 229; M.I. Jegede "The changing features of family ownership 
ofland in Nigeria" ( 1971) 5 Nigeria Law Journal 19 and A.B. Kasunmu and 
R.W. James Alienation of Family Property in Southern Nigeria, Ibadan, 
University Press, 1966. 
J.G. Miller Family Property and Financial Provision (2°d ed.) London, 
Sweet & Maxwell, 1983 at p. 1. 
6 
an active role in seeking to reconcile the conflicting financial 
and proprietary interests of its members. In the case of a family 
based upon a successful marriage these principles do not often 
have to be considered, for the law is rarely called upon to play 
an active role in regulating the management of its financial 
affairs and the allocation of its resources as between its 
members, except on the death of one of the spouses." 
Another important reason for studying the family as an economic unit 
is that Botswana has experienced the most dramatic economic 
development in the last few years. From a poverty-stricken agrarian, 
largely pastoral base at independence, the country has evolved into one 
of the most impressive economies in Sub-Saharan Africa. By 1992 the 
World Bank characterised it as one of the richest countries in Sub-
Saharan Africa with a per capita national income of almost $3,000 -
about even with that of South Africa. 10 With such tremendous 
economic achievements many a family's economic circumstances have 
been improved dramatically, thus enabling them to accumulate property 
IO See World Bank Report No.11267-BT - Opportunities for Industrial 
Development in Botswana: An Economy in Transition dated 28th. April 
1993 at p. i. 
7 
they previously only dreamt of.11 This economic advancement, coupled 
with the steady increase in the divorce rate will pose an increasing 
challenge to the courts to resolve the rights of the spouses when a 
marriage ends. 12 
2. STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM 
Before the enactment of the Married Persons Property Act 1970, 13 the 
Roman-Dutch common law concept of community of property was the 
primary matrimonial property regime that governed marriages 
contracted underthe Marriage Act unless an antenuptial contract, which 
provided for an alternative regime, preceded the marriage. 14 The 
11 
12 
13 
14 
It must be noted that the Report mentioned in note 10 supra did 
acknowledge that income distribution remains highly skewed. The fruits of 
economic growth and social transition have been disproportionately shared 
among the citizens of Botswana. See also K. Good "At the ends of the 
ladder: Radical inequality in Botswana" (1993) 30(1) Journal of Modern 
African Studies 127. 
Records of the High Court in Lobatse indicate that in 1994, 1995 and 1996, 
279, 316 and 258 divorce cases were recorded respectively. 
Cap. 29:03. 
See E.K. Quansah "Determining property rights between spouses on divorce: 
A tale of two jurisdictions (Ghana and Botswana)" ( 1993) 5 African Journal 
of International and Comparative Law 3 89. 
8 
community of property concept entails the pooling of all the assets and 
liabilities of the spouses in co-ownership, in equal undivided shares, 
under the sole control of the husband. The wife could not exercise any 
rights over her share until death or divorce dissolved the community. 
In such an event the assets are divided equally between the spouses 
subject to the possibility of an order of forfeiture of benefits against the 
guilty party upon divorce. 15 There was also, and still is, the customary 
law regime, which subscribes to separate property of spouses. 
The community of property concept came under severe criticism, 
especially from women's groups. A typical example of such criticism 
was that made by Molokomme:16 
15 
16 
H.R. Hahlo, The South African Law of Husband and Wife (5th. ed.) Cape 
Town, Juta & Co., 1985 at pp. 157-161. Hereinafter referred to as 
"Husband and Wife" 
A. Molokom.me, "Marriage: What every woman wants or a declaration of 
'civil death'? Some legal aspects of the status of married women in 
Botswana" (1984) 1 Pula - Botswana Journal of African Studies at p. 76. 
See also A. MolokommeLegal and cultural barriers which prevent women's 
participation in national development, Report on the national conference for 
women, Ministry of Home affairs, Gaborone, 1984 and "A summary of 
women's legal status under Botswana family law" in Women and the Law 
in Botswana Report of the proceedings of a seminar held in the University 
of Botswana, 3rd -51h July 1987, Emang Basadi/Women's Affairs Unit, 
Ministry of Home Affairs. For similar criticism see Children, Women and 
Development in Botswana: A Situation Report, Government of 
9 
"Although the property aspect of the marital power may be 
excluded under common law by an antenuptial contract or by 
merely marrying out of community of property after January 1'1 
1971, its automatic inclusion in marriages in community of 
property is equally objectionable. Jn Botswana, this is 
especially so because it retains its arbitrary common law 
flavour, it is an absolute power allowing the husband to do 
what he likes with the matrimonial property or his wife's 
separate property without consulting her." 
In answer to such criticism the Legislature enacted the Married Persons 
Property Act 1970. S. 3 of this Act provides that all marriages 
contracted after 1st. January 1971 (the date of commencement of the 
Act) are deemed out of community of property, unless the spouses 
before the marriage execute a written instrument exempting their 
marriage from the provisions of the Act. Thus, the marriage of persons 
who are. not subject to customary law will be out of community of 
property. Should they wish to be married in community of property, the 
Botswana/UNICEF Report Oct. 1989. 
10 
same section permits them to fill in the form specified in the first 
schedule to the Act to do just that. 
The property of persons subject to customary law will generally be held 
according to customary law. A ''person subject to customary law" is 
not defined but can be ascertained from the following statutory 
provisions. S. 2 of the Customary Courts Act17 defines customary law 
as: 
"In relation to any particular tribe or tribal community, the 
customary law of that tribe or tribal community ... " 
This definition shows that customary law is applicable to members of 
a tribe or tribal community. Therefore, to be subject to customary law, 
one has to belong to a tribe or tribal community. Such a person is called 
a "tribesman'', a term defined by the same s. 2 as one who is a: 
17 Cap. 4:05 1987 Rev. 
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"member of a tribe or tribal community of Botswana or of any 
other African country prescribed by the Minister by order 
published in the Gazette for the purposes of the Act." 
The Minister has as yet issued no prescription of an African country for 
the purposes of the Act. Consequently, the term ''person subject to 
customary law" is presently limited to persons who are members of a 
tribe or tribal community within Botswana. If such persons do not wish 
customary law to govern their property rights but wish to avail 
themselves of the common law property regime, they may, if they wish 
to marry out of community of property, fill in Form A under the second 
schedule to the Act. If they wish to exclude customary law but be 
married in community of property they would fill in Form B also under 
the second schedule. 18 
Once a particular form of property regime is chosen, altering it during 
the marriage is not possible. This is the result of the application of the 
immutability principle of Roman-Dutch common law by which parties 
to a marriage cannot by postnuptial agreement change their matrimonial 
18 See s. 7 of the Act. 
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property system. 19 The main reason usually given for this is that there 
should be certainty as to the property rights of spouses so that third 
parties (creditors) can know where they stand. However, a concession 
was made to those who were married in community of property before 
the inception of the Act to opt out of it by notarial deed, notice of which 
must be published in the Government Gazette and registered in the 
Deeds Registry within 28 days of its execution. As s. 4 of the Act 
permits the parties "at any time ... [to] express their wish that this Act 
shall so apply," the concession is open-ended as to time. 
The effect of the 1970 Act was merely to reverse the pre-1970 position 
without substantially addressing the main criticism of the earlier law. 
Though the memorandum to the Bill, which preceded the 1970 Act 
stated that "community of property should in general disappear, and be 
replaced by a matrimonial regime which puts the wife in the same 
19 See the South African cases of ExparteSmuts 1914 C.P.D. 1034 atp. 1037 
per Kotze J., Union Government (Minister of Finance) v. Larkan 1916 A.D. 
212 atp. 224perlnnes C.J., Edelstein v. Edelstein NO& Ors. 1952 (3) S.A. 
1 (A) at 15 per Van denHeeverJ.A.,Sperlingv. Sperling 1975 (3) S.A. 707 
(A) at p. 721 per Corbett J.A. and Honey v. Honey 1992 (3) S.A. 609 at p. 
611 per Du Plessis J. The situation in South Africa has been changed bys. 
21 of the Matrimonial Property Act 88of1984 under which spouses may, 
in exceptional cases, and with the permission of the High Court, amend the 
matrimonial property system under which their marriage falls. 
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position as any adult, "20 this aim has not been realised because the 
marital power was not abolished. 
Be that as it may, the primary matrimonial property regime is now one 
of out of community of property. The effect of this is to place the 
spouses in the same patrimonial position as they were before the 
marriage. Each spouse retains his or her separate estate, which he or 
she possessed before the marriage and continues to do so with any other 
property acquired during the subsistence of the marriage.21 This 
situation will in the main work to the disadvantage of a wife. In many 
marriages the natural division of economic functions makes the husband 
the breadwinner, and deprives the wife who devotes hertime and energy 
to looking after the husband and children, of an equal opportunity to 
acquire property. Thus, when the marriage ends in divorce she may be 
left destitute because she has not acquired any property of her own.22 
20 
21 
22 
See Government Gazette No. 50 of 1970. 
See D.S.P. Cronje & J. Heaton South African Family Law Durban, 
Butterworths, 1999 at p. 117 and Hahlo "Husband and Wife" op. cit., at pp. 
287-288. 
See A. Molokomme "Women's law in Botswana and research needs" in The 
legal situation of women in Southern Africa - Women and law in Southern 
Africa vol II Stewart and Armstrong (eds.) Harare, University of Zimbabwe 
14 
As will be seen later,23 the courts have interpreted the power given to 
them to determine the mutual property rights of spouses on divorce so 
that ownership is ascertained according to the strict principles of the law 
of property. Unless it is proved that the wife has made some kind of 
financial contribution towards the acquisition of the matrimonial 
property, she acquires no proprietary interest in such property. 
Moreover no economic value is attached to the domestic services 
rendered by the wife, which services enabled the husband to exploit his 
earning potential to the fullest. Consequently, years of devoted service 
to the husband and the children will go unrecognised. She even has no 
claim, under common law, for maintenance against her deceased 
husband's estate.24 However, under the Succession (Rights of Surviving 
Spouses and Inheritance Family Provisions) Act25 such a spouse may 
23 
24 
25 
1990 at p. 18. 
See Chapter Two infra. 
See the South African case of Glazer v. Glazer 1963 (4) S.A. 694 (A) at p. 
707 per Steyn C.J. The case is criticized by B. Beinart in ( 1965/66) Acta 
Juridica 285. See also B. Beinart "Liability of a deceased estate for 
maintenance" (1958) Acta Juridica 92. The situation has now been rectified 
in South Africa by the Maintenance of Surviving Spouses Act 27of1990. 
Cap. 31:03. 
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ask the High Court to make reasonable provision for her upkeep from 
her deceased husband's estate.26 
It is therefore imperative that some legal mechanism should be put in 
place to enable the court to determine and adjust matrimonial property 
in case of divorce. The Matrimonial Causes Act 197327 attempted to do 
this by giving the courts power to "determine the mutual property rights 
of husband and wife" on divorce.28 However, the courts have 
interpreted this power to mean that they have no discretion to adjust 
matrimonial property equitably between spouses on divorce. 29 The lack 
of a discretion in such circumstances is compounded by the fact that 
customary law governs the proprietary consequences of the marriage of 
26 
27 
28 
29 
See Herholdt v. Fraenkel N.O. & Ors. Civil cause 5/1971 unreported (261h 
February 1971 ), High Court, Lobatse, where the applicant successfully 
applied for reasonable maintenance out of the estate of her deceased 
husband. The husband had bequeathed R 100 per annum out of his estate for 
the maintenance of the wife. This was varied to Rl 00 per month. The South 
African currency unit, the Rand, was legal tender in Botswana until 1976. 
Cap. 29:02. 
See s. 13 of the Act. 
See for example, Molomo v. Molomo [1979-80] B.L.R. 250. 
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persons subject to customary law who marry under the Marriage Act, 30 
subject to their opting out of it under the Married Persons Property Act. 
Customary law is not known for its benevolence towards women. If 
anything, it generally treats women inequitably regarding property 
rights.31 Tswana society is predominantly patrilineal. Descent is traced 
through the father and property and rank normally passes to the son, or 
the next male member of the lineage.32 Thus, the regulation of the 
proprietary consequences of marriage of persons subject to customary 
law by that law, will not enhance women's rights. 
It is true that the Dissolution of Marriage of Persons Subject to 
Customary Law (Disposal of Property) Act 1926 allows a court to apply 
30 
31 
32 
Sees. 2 of Dissolution of Marriage of Persons Subject to Customary Law 
(Disposal of Property) Act 1926. 
See P.E. Kidd et al Botswana Families and Women's Rights in a changing 
environment, Gaborone, Women and Law in Southern Africa Research 
Trust, 1997 at pp. 47-57 and 0. Gulbrandssen Access to agricultural land 
and communal land management in Eastern Botswana, Gaborone, Ministry 
of Local Government and Lands, 1984. 
On the organization of Tswana society see I. Shapera A Handbook of 
Tswana Law and Custom, London, Frank Cass, 1938 Chap. 1 and A. 
Molokomme "Children of the Fence" - The maintenance of extra-marital 
children under law and practice in Botswana, PhD. thesis, University of 
Leiden, 1991, deposited at the University of Botswana Library. 
17 
the common law instead of the customary law to the disposal of 
property where it would appear unjust and inequitable to apply 
customary law.33 The criteria for the exercise of this discretion are not 
clear and in the rare occasion when it has been exercised, the criteria 
adopted seemed artificial. In Molomo v. Molomo34 the discretion was 
exercised because the couple, in the words of the court, were 
"sophisticated people"35, a concept which the court did not elaborate 
upon. It seems from the facts however that persons who have attained 
tertiary-level education and have more or less lived an urbanised 
lifestyle, qualify to be called "sophisticated". Consequently, it may be 
deduced from this case that this mode-of-life exemption will only 
benefit those who have lived such a "sophisticated" lifestyle. 
Accordingly, the "unsophisticatecf' Motswana,36 that is one who has 
little or no formal education and has lived a rural lifestyle, will hardly 
benefit from the exercise of this discretion. This will create a very 
33 
34 
35 
36 
See note 30 supra. 
Supra. 
Ibid at p. 256. 
A word used to describe one citizen of Botswana, more than one is referred 
to as Batswana. 
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unsatisfactory situation bearing in mind that the majority ofBatswana 
live in the rural areas.37 
At present a situation exists in Botswana where the three possible 
matrimonial regimes have inadequate schemes for resolving disputes as 
to the rights of spouses in respect of matrimonial property in case of 
divorce. The thesis will critically analyse the existing legislative 
regimes in the light of contemporary social and economic changes to the 
structure of the family and assess their impact on married couples. A 
suggestion will be made for a socially responsive regime to bring the 
law as near as possible to the social reality. 
3. OBJECTIVE OF THE STUDY 
The study is intended to analyse the present matrimonial property 
regimes and how they are applied to determine di vision of matrimonial 
property on divorce. An assessment will be made as to their efficacy as 
legal tools for the redress of conflict about division of matrimonial 
property. A comparative study will consist of matrimonial property 
37 Of the total population ofl ,325,291 ( 1991 Population and Housing Census) 
1,008, 944 lived in the rural areas whilst 316,347 lived in the urban areas. 
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regimes in South Africa, England and Ghana to ascertain how the 
problem has been dealt with in those jurisdictions. This is in the belief 
that matrimonial problems transcend national boundaries. The first two 
jurisdictions were selected because they have had a long historical 
connection with Botswana. In fact, the British introduced the bulk of 
the existing matrimonial property regimes into the country. 38 Ghana was 
chosen because it has had a colonial experience, which is similar to that 
of Botswana. Finally a suggestion will be made of a matrimonial 
regime, which will be flexible enough to avoid the shortcomings of the 
present system. 
The study will be done under the following main headings: 
(a) The nature and development of the matrimonial property regimes 
in Botswana. 
38 See The General Law Proclamation of 1909, s. 19 of which applied the laws 
in force in the colony of the Cape of Good Hope on the lO'h of June 1891 to 
Botswana. These laws included matrimonial laws which became the 
foundation of the present community of property regime. 
20 
(b) The application of the matrimonial property regimes to (i) marriage 
in community of property, (ii) marriage out of community of property 
and (iii) marriage under customary law. 
( c) An assessment of the efficacy of the regimes in resolving conflict 
between spouses. 
( d) A comparative study of matrimonial property regimes in South 
Africa, England and Ghana. 
( e) A suggested matrimonial regime that will be flexible to fit the social 
reality of Botswana. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
THE NATURE AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE 
MATRIMONIAL PROPERTY REGIMES IN BOTSWANA 
1. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND 
The evolution of the present matrimonial property regimes 1s 
inextricably bound with the development of the legal system as a whole 
from the declaration of the Protectorate over Bechuanaland39 in 1885 to 
the attainment of independence in 1966.40 The declaration of the 
39 
40 
The bulk of this territory became Botswana at independence in 1966. 
For a detailed explanation of the development of the legal system of 
Botswana during this period, see E.K. Quansah Introduction to the 
Botswana Legal System Gaborone, University ofBotswana, 1998, Chap. l; 
B. Otlhogile The History of the Higher Courts of Botswana 1912-1990 
Gaborone, Mmegi Publishing House, 1994, A. Aguda "Legal developments 
in Botswana from 1885 to 1966" (1973) 5 Botswana Notes & Records 52; 
B. Foster "Introduction to the history of the administration of justice in the 
Republic of Botswana" (1981) 13 Botswana Notes & Records 89; J.R. 
Crawford "History and nature of the judicial system of Botswana, Lesotho, 
and Swaziland etc." (1969) 86 & (1970) 87 South African Law Journal 485 
and 76 respectively; and J.H. Pain "The reception of English and Roman-
Dutch law in Africa with reference to Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland" 
(1978) IX Comparative and International Law Journal of Southern Africa 
137. 
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Protectorate came about because of the fears of the Bechuanaland 
tribesmen about the expansionist intentions of the Boers of Transvaal. 
Formal steps were nottak:en until 18 85 when a Proclamation was issued 
declaring that the southern part of the territory should be British 
territory and that the northern part should, in the words of the 
Proclamation, "continue to be as at present under Her Majesty's 
protection".41 The former was subsequently annexed to the Cape of 
Good Hope in 189542 and became part of the Republic of South Africa. 
The constitutional implication of the declaration of the Protectorate was 
that the territory's defence and external affairs and the internal 
administration came under the unlimited jurisdiction of the British 
Govemment.43 This omnipotence of the British Government was later 
41 
42 
43 
See Order in Council of January 27, I885; Proclamation of September 30, 
1885, and State Papers, vol. 76 at pp. 982 and 986. See also H. Zins "The 
international context of the creation of the Bechuanaland Protectorate" 
(I 997) I I Pu/a-Botswana Journal of African Studies 54. 
See British Bechuanaland Order in Council, 1895, S.R.O. & S.I. Rev. XXI, 
323. 
See Robert-Wray Commonwealth and Colonial Law London., Stevens, 
1966, at pp. 47-48. 
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challenged in Tshekedi Khama v. High Commissioner44 in which the 
validity of certain Proclamations was called into question. The British 
Secretary of State certified under s. 4 of the Foreign Jurisdiction Act, 
1890 that Her Majesty had unfettered and unlimited power to legislate 
for the government and administration of the Protectorate and that treaty 
or agreement did not limit this power.45 This notwithstanding it was 
agreed that the chiefs were to be allowed to continue to administer their 
internal affairs according to native law and custom provided these were 
not openly incompatible with good government. 
The most significant date in the development of the legal system was 
the 9th of May 1891. On this date, in exercise of powers conferred upon 
her under the Foreign Jurisdiction Act,46 Queen Victoria of Great 
Britain established a rudimentary form of government for the 
Protectorate by the Bechuanaland Protectorate Order in Council 1891. 
Under the Order, the High Commissioner was authorised to exercise on 
44 
45 
46 
(1936) [1926-1953] H.C.T.L.R. 9. 
For a commentary on the case see B. Otlhogile "Tshekedi Khama and Anor. 
v. High Commissioner: The making of the court" (1993) 25 Botswana Notes 
& Records 29. 
See ss. 53 and 54 Vic. C.37. 
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Her Majesty's behalf all powers and jurisdiction, which Her Majesty 
had, or might have had, subject only to such instructions as he might 
from time to time receive from Her Majesty.47 In a pursuance of this 
Proclamation, the High Commissioner issued, on the 10th of June 1891, 
a Proclamation, section 19 of which reads: 
"Subject to the foregoing provisions of this Proclamation, in all 
suits, actions, or proceedings, civil or criminal, the law to be 
administered shall, as nearly as the circumstances of the 
country will permit, be the same as the law for the time being in 
force in the Colony of the Cape of Good Hope: Provided that no 
Act passed after this date by the Parliament of the Colony of the 
Cape of Good Hope shall be deemed to apply to the said 
territory." 
In 1909, this section was repealed and replaced by one which provided 
that: 
47 See Art.2 of the Order in Council. 
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"Subject to the provisions of any Order in Council, in force in 
the Bechuanaland Protectorate at the date of the taking effect 
of this Proclamation, and to the provisions of any proclamation 
or regulation in force in the said Protectorate at such date ... the 
laws in force in the Colony of the Cape of Good Hope on the 
l<Jh of June, 1891, sfzall mutatis mutandis and so far as not 
inapplicable be the laws in force and to be observed in the said 
Protectorate, but no statute of the Colony of the Cape of Good 
Hope, promulgated after the 10th. day of June, 1891, shall be 
deemed to apply, or to have applied, to the said Protectorate 
unless specifically applied thereto by Proclamation."48 
This section effectively imported the common law and statutes of 
general application existing on the stipulated date in the Cape Colony 
into Bechuanaland. Consequently, the Roman-Dutch common law - or 
48 The use of the word "laws" in the section led to some uncertainty as to 
whether or not there was proper authority for the application of both the 
common law and the statutes of the Colony of the Cape of Good Hope in the 
Protectorate. This question was resolved by the General Law (Cape 
Statutes) Revision Proclamation 1959 which confirmed that the Roman-
Dutch common law was applicable but provided that all Cape statutes except 
those already expressly applied and a further list of 36 Acts contained in a 
schedule, should cease to have force in the Protectorate. 
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what has been dubbed "Cape colonial law"49 - became part and parcel 
of the Botswana legal system. After this Proclamation it became the 
practice, especially after the establishment of the Union of South Africa, 
to incorporate South African statutes in Bechuanaland by Proclamation 
with almost no modification. 
2. THE CUSTOMARY LAW PROPERTY REGIME UNDER COLONIAL 
RULE 
Before the imported Roman-Dutch law of marriage is looked at, it must 
be pointed out that the 1891 Proclamation stressed that in making 
Proclamations the High Commissioner must: 
49 
50 
" .... respect any native laws and customs by which the civil 
relations of any native chiefs, tribes or populations under Her 
Majesty's protection are now regulated, except so far as such 
may be incompatible with the due exercise of Her Majesty's 
power and jurisdiction". 50 
See LG. Brewer, "Sources of the Criminal Law of Botswana" (1974) 18 
Journal of African Law 24. 
See Art. 4 of the 1891 Order. 
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The courts established under the Proclamation were denied jurisdiction 
over matters in which natives were concerned "unless in the opinion of 
such court, the exercise of such jurisdiction is necessary in the interest 
of peace, or for the prevention or punishment of acts of violence to 
person or property". The combined effect of these provisions was to 
alienate the natives from these courts and confine them to their 
traditional institutions especially in family matters. Although a 
Proclamation in 189651 gave the common law courts jurisdiction over 
and against all persons in civil and criminal cases, the natives continued 
to use their traditional institutions of adjudication to resolve their family 
matters. 
The effect of tribal marriage on ownership of property at this period 
may be gleaned from the writings of Schapera who notes that: 
51 
"There is no 'community' of property between husband and 
wife. Any property a woman possesses at marriage, or acquires 
during the marriage, is never looked upon as part of the 
husband's estate, but must be looked after separately by him; 
No. 2of1896. 
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and the wife has full right and say in the disposal of such 
property. If there is a good understanding between husband 
and wife, he can freely use her cattle, but in doing so he is 
always bound to recognize that they actually belong to her and 
not to him. Such property can never be seized to pay the 
husband's debts. In case of divorce the wife is entitled to take 
it all back with her."52 
This view suggests that the principle of separate property form the basis 
of the law of matrimonial property under customary law. However, 
Roberts has suggested that the situation was more complicated than 
this. 53 He pointed out that although a woman can acquire property 
rights, such rights were usually exercised for her by her guardian - the 
guardian being her father before her marriage and after that her 
husband. The woman cannot dispose of or otherwise deal with the 
property without her guardian's consent. At the time of his research, 
Roberts found evidence of women increasingly dealing with their 
52 
53 
I. Schapera op. cit., at p. 153. See also B. Morton "The evolution of 
women's property rights in colonial Botswana, 1890-1966"( 1998) 12 Pula-
Botswana Journal of African Studies 5 at pp. 6-10. 
Restatement of African Law: Botswana I Tswana Family Law, London, 
Sweet & Maxwell, 1972 at p. 41. 
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separate property without the consent of their guardians. He stated that 
it was unclear whether this phenomenon was due to social change or to 
dereliction of duty by such guardians. This view may suggest that while 
the principle of separate property existed under customary law, the 
husband exercised some power over the wife's separate property. This 
is reminiscent of the husband's marital power under common law. A 
similar view is held by Molokomme who has stated that there is no 
specialised matrimonial property regime in customary law. Household 
property is in theory accessible to all members of the household but it 
is the husband who controls property of value, mainly cattle and land, 
over which the wife has only usufructuary rights. 54 
3. THE IMPORTATION OF THE ROMAN-DUTCH LAW OF MARRIAGE 
S. 22 of the 1891 Proclamation provided that: 
54 
"Any marriage celebrated by any Minister of the Christian 
Religion according to the rites of the same, or by any civil 
marriage officer, duly appointed by the High Commissioner to 
See "Women's law in Botswana and research needs" op. cit. at p. 16. 
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solemnize marriages, shall be taken to be in all respects as valid 
and binding, and to have the same effect upon the parties to the 
same and their issue and property as a marriage contracted 
under the marriage laws of the Cape Colony." 
By this section the marnage law of the Cape Colony was made 
applicable to Bechuanaland. 
An insight into the early Cape law of marriage can be gleaned from the 
writing ofBotha,55 who said that the requisites for a valid marriage then 
were: 
(a) The parties had a general capacity of marriage or can marry each 
other. 
(b) They had to obtain the consent of their parents. 
55 C.G. Botha "Early Cape matrimonial law" (1914) 31 South African Law 
Journal 250. 
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( c) Certain ceremonies had to be observed, for example, the parties had 
to appear before the Matrimonial Court, 56 banns had to be published and 
the marriage had to be celebrated by a religious ceremony in church. 
In 1804, Commissary General J.A. de Mist passed an Ordinance to 
allow the performance of a secular ceremony. This was to be conducted 
before the Landdrost and two Heemraden of the district in which the 
bride had lived for three weeks before the ceremony. The Ordinance 
also gave the Commissioners of the Matrimonial Court a discretion to 
allow the marriage ceremony to take place in private houses. Sir David 
Baird annulled this Ordinance in 1806 but in 183 8 the Marriage Order 
in Council restored the secular ceremony. Thus by the time the Cape 
colonial marriage laws became part of the law of Botswana because of 
the 1891 Proclamation, secular and religious marriage ceremonies had 
been established. 
The Marriage Proclamation 191757 repealed s. 22 of the 1891 
Proclamation and was made applicable to all marriages solemnised in 
56 
57 
This court was setup on 28th December 1676 by a Resolution of the Council 
of Policy. See Botha op. cit., at p. 251. 
No. I of 1917. 
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the Protectorate except those under customary law. 58 The Proclamation 
maintained the basic prerequisites for contracting a marriage, which 
applied under the law of the Cape Colony. It provided for a procedure 
for the publication of banns, the issue of licences, the appointment of 
marriage officers, solemnisation and registration of marriages, 
prohibited degrees of consanguinity and affinity, and penalties for the 
infringement of the provisions of the Act. These were based on 
Christian notions of marriage. 
Africans were for the first time provided with an alternative to 
customary marriage but this option could not be reconciled with the 
jurisdictional limitations imposed upon the common law courts. The 
African was faced with a dilemma about which court could give him 
matrimonial relief ifhe were to marry under Christian rites or by a civil 
ceremony under the Marriage Proclamation of 1917. The common law 
courts were not allowed to hear cases involving Africans and the 
customary courts were ill-equipped to deal with matters governed by the 
common law.59 To solve this dilemma, but only partially, the Native 
58 See s. 2 of the Proclamation. 
59 See Roberts op. cit., at p. 9. 
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Marriage Proclamation of 192660 was passed to give Resident 
Magistrates jurisdiction in actions for divorce where the spouses were 
Africans married according to the Marriage Proclamation.61 This 
jurisdiction however did not extend to other forms of matrimonial relief, 
such as maintenance or claims relating to children born to Africans who 
contracted a marriage under the Marriage Proclamation. However, s. 
4(1) of the 1926 Proclamation as originally enacted provided for 
division of property on divorce. The said section provided that: 
60 
61 
"Where at the taking effect of this Proclamation a marriage 
subsists between native spouses having been duly solemnised by 
a marriage officer or according to the rites of the Christian 
religion if contracted before the first day of April, 1917, and if 
contracted on or after that date having been solemnised by a 
marriage officer appointed under Chapter 117 [The Marriage 
Proclamation], and where on the dissolution of such marriage 
by decree of a competent court or by death of one of the spouses 
a question arises as to the disposal or devolution of any 
No. 19of1926. 
See s. 2 of the 1926 Proclamation. 
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property of either or both of the spouses such question shall be 
heard and determined in accordance with the law of the 
Bechuanaland Protectorate by the court of a Resident 
Magistrate having jurisdiction in ordinary civil cases unless it 
shall appear to that court on application made to it that regard 
being had to the mode of life of the spouses or to any disposition 
of the property made by either of the spouses during the 
subsistence of the marriage it would be just and equitable that 
such property should be dealt with according to native law and 
custom." 
The traditional authorities took exception to the above section and after 
they made representations to the High Commissioner, the Secretary of 
State authorised the rephrasing of the section.62 The new phraseology, 
which affected the latter part of the section, read as follows: 
62 
" ... if it shall appear to the court on application made to it that 
regard being had to the mode of life of the spouses or to any 
disposition of the property made by either of the spouses during 
See Roberts op. cit., at p. 10. 
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the subsistence of the marriage it would not be just and 
equitable that such property should be dealt with according to 
native law and custom. "63 
In 1942 another Proclamation64 amended the 1926 Native Marriage 
Proclamation in relation to property of tribesmen married under the 
1917 Marriage Proclamation by providing that: 
63 
64 
"Such form of marriage shall not, in the absence of an 
antenuptial contract duly registered in the Deeds Office, affect 
the property of the spouses which shall be held, may be 
disposed of and, unless disposed of by will, shall devolve 
according to Tswana law and custom." 
This amendment was published in Proclamation No. 6 of 1928. See 
Tlametlo Maranyane v. Olebile Maranyane Special Court of the 
Bechuanaland Protectorate unreported ( 121h August 1937) where Millin K.C. 
held that where no application has been made under the section the property 
of the spouses must be referred to the appropriate native court for division 
of the property in accordance with native law. The amendment is now 
contained in s. 2 of the Dissolution of Marriage of Persons Subject to 
Customary Law (Disposal of Property) Act (Cap. 29:05). 
No. 18of1942 amending s. 19 of the principal Proclamation. 
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The Marriage Proclamation 191 7, now styled the Marriage Act, 65 still 
governs the statutory marriage in Botswana today with minor 
amendments. 
4. THE LEGAL CONSEQUENCES OF MARRIAGE UNDER THE 
MARRIAGE PROCLAMATION 
As is evident from the provisions of s. 22 of the 1891 Proclamation and 
its subsequent affirmation by the Marriage Proclamation of 191 7, the 
legal consequences of a Roman-Dutch-law marriage were those 
applicable in the Cape Colony on the reception date. These 
consequences fall into two categories, namely, invariable consequences 
and variable consequences. The former is personal in nature and 
includes, inter a/ia, the spouses' obligation to cohabit with one another, 
to reserve to one another exclusive conjugal rights, support one another 
65 Cap. 29:01 1987 Rev. This statute is about to be repealed and re-enacted 
with amendments by the Marriage Bill No. 16 of2000. The proposed Act, 
inter alia, will make it obligatory for Customary, Muslim, Hindu and other 
religious marriages to be registered, raise the marriageable age to 18 years, 
and allow minors to apply to the court for consent to marry, where the 
consent of one parent is given but that of the other is refused. 
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and not to marry anyone else during the subsistence of the marriage. 66 
These consequences automatically apply to the marriage by operation 
of law when the marriage is concluded and the parties cannot exclude 
them.67 
The variable consequences of the marriage are more germane to this 
study. These involve the proprietary consequences of the marriage and 
are community of property and of profit and loss (universal community 
of property) and the marital power. These would apply to the marriage 
unless expressly excluded by an antenuptial contract entered by the 
parties before their marriage. They must notarially execute and register 
the contract in the Deeds Registry Office. 68 Thus, their application 
depended on whether the parties chose to marry "in" or "out" of 
community. 
66 
67 
68 
For a detailed discussion of these consequences reference should be made 
to the leading South African texts of Hahlo "Husband and Wife" op. cit., 
chap. 9; Boberg's Law of Persons and the Family (2nd ed.) by B. Van 
Heerden et al,( eds.) Cape Town, Juta & Co., 1999 at pp. 170-188; Cronje & 
Heaton op. cit., chap. 5 and Sinclair assisted by Heaton op. cit., chap. 11. 
See Sinclair assisted by Heaton op. cit., at p. 415 and Cronje & Heaton op. 
cit., at p. 57. 
See ss. 4 and 6 of the Antenuptial Contracts Act 1891 (Cap. 29:02). 
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(a) Marriage in community of property 
The exact origin of the concept of universal community is shrouded in 
mystery but a South African authority has asserted that by the end of the 
thirteenth century the concept had taken roots in Holland and Zeeland. 69 
It could therefore be confidently asserted that by the time the 1891 
Proclamation was enacted for Bechuanaland, the concept of universal 
community was operating in the Cape Colony and so, by virtue of s. 22 
of that Proclamation, was applicable to the then Bechuanaland 
Protectorate. 
The nature of universal community has been described by Hahlo70 as 
follows: 
69 
70 
"Community of property is a universal economic partnership of 
the spouses. All their assets and liabilities are merged in a joint 
estate, in which both spouses, irrespective of the value of their 
financial contributions, hold equal shares." 
Cronje & Heaton op. cit., at pp. 83-84. See further Chapter Four infra. 
"Husband and Wife" op. cit., at pp. 157-158. See also VanHeerdeneta/ op. 
cit., at pp. 182-188. 
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He states that although there has been some controversy about the exact 
legal nature of community, the above view of it is generally accepted as 
correct.71 An accompanying right attached to the universal community 
was the exercise by the husband of the marital power of the marriage. 72 
This power in its widest sense embraced three elements namely: 73 
(a) The husband's power as the head of the family. By virtue of which 
he had the decisive say in all the matters concerning the common life of 
the spouses and determined, inter alia, where and in what style they 
were to live. 
(b) The husband's power over the person of his wife, including her 
representation in legal proceedings and 
71 
72 
73 
See Hahlo "Husband and Wife" op. cit., at p. 158 and Cronje & Heaton op. 
cit., at pp. 85-86. See also pp. 148-151 infra. 
See Hahlo "Husband and Wife" op. cit., chap. 12 and Cronje & Heaton op. 
cit., chap. 7. 
See Hahlo "Husband and Wife" op. cit. at p. 189 and A. van Aswegen 
"Transactions between a spouse and a third party: The effect of the 
Matrimonial Property Act 88of1984" (1984) 6 Modern B~iness Law 140 
at p. 141. 
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( c) The husband's power over the property of the wife. This enabled the 
husband in his absolute discretion to deal with the joint estate as its 
administrator and to do the same with the separate assets of his wife, 
which did not form part of the joint estate.74 
The power under (a) was one of the invariable consequences of 
marriage and could not be excluded by antenuptial contract. 75 The 
powers under (b) and_ ( c) however were variable and they together made 
up the narrower sense in which the term was used. The overall effect 
of the husband's use of the marital power was to subject the wife to the 
husband's guardianship, effectively making the status of a married 
woman analogous to that of a minor.76 Nevertheless, as rightly pointed 
74 
75 
76 
This aspect of the husband's marital power was reiterated in Madise v. 
Madise Misca. 49/91 unreported (16th. September 1991) High Court 
Lobatse in which Livesey Luke C.J. approved the dictum of Vieyra J. in the 
South African case of Strausz v. Strausz 1964 (1) S.A. 720 (W) at p. 722. 
See also Govender v. Chetty 1982 (3) S.A. 1078 (C) at p. 1080 per Berman 
J. and Cronje & Heaton op. cit., at p. 95. 
See the South African cases of Webber v. Webber 1915 A.O. 239 at p. 246 
and King Confections (Pty.) L!d v. Harris 1955 (3) S.A. 545 (E) at p. 546 
See Hahlo "Husband and Wife" op. cit., at p. 191. See also Joina & 
Associates v. Bakwena Modikwa and Jane Ndome v. Mpiwa Komboni infra. 
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out by Hahlo, 77 whereas the guardianship of a minor serves the interests 
of the minor, the marital power primarily serves the interests of the 
husband. It is therefore no surprise that the marital power became a 
symbol of oppression in the eyes of many a married woman. It 
inevitably attracted criticism from commentators.78 Attempts were 
made in South Africa by statute to improve the unacceptable face of the 
use of the marital power. The Matrimonial Affairs Act No. 3 7 1953, for 
example, restricted the husband's power of disposition in respect of 
certain classes of immovable property and diminished his power in 
respect of certain classes of movable property, especially the wife's 
wages, savings and bank account. The marital power was eventually 
abolished. 79 
77 
78 
79 
Op. cit., at p. 194. 
See for example, the South African Law Commission's Report on the 
Matrimonial Property Law No. RP 26/1982 paras. 13.1.3- 13.1.4, 
Molokomme "Marriage: What every woman wants ... " op. cit. and 
Government of Botswana/UNICEF Report op. cit., at pp. 208-209. 
Sees. 11 of Matrimonial Property Act 88of1984, s. 1 (e) of the Marriage 
and Matrimonial Property Law Amendment Act 3 of 1988, General Law 
Fourth Amendment Act 132 of 1993 and Justice Laws Rationalisation Act 
18 of 1996. See infra note 282. 
42 
In Botswana, however, universal community and the marital power are 
applied in their pristine purity without any attempt to curb the excess of 
the marital power.80 Although the common law provided some 
safeguards against the abuse of the marital power, 81 there were 
difficulties in the way of their use. For example, in Moisakamo v. 
Moisakamo82 an ex-wife applied for a common law interdict to restrain 
her ex-husband from disposing of property pending the division of their 
joint estate. The interdict was refused on the ground, inter alia, that she 
80 
81 
82 
See Joina & Associates v. Bakwena Modikwa CA 811998 unreported (23'd 
July 1999) where the Court of Appeal reiterated that a woman married in 
community of property and subject to her husband's marital power cannot 
sue or be sued without the consent of her husband. In Jane Ndome v. Mpiwa 
Komboni Civil Case No. Fl931/95 unreported (81h September 1998) High 
Court, Francistown, the court held that if a woman married in community of 
property sues her husband for divorce on account of his adultery and in the 
same action sues his paramour, she need not be assisted by her husband. 
However, if she brings an action for damages against her husband's 
paramour without suing for divorce, she must be assisted by her husband 
unless given leave by the court to sue unassisted. 
For example, by giving a wife or her estate recourse against her husband 
where he had made a donation out of the joint estate to a third party in 
deliberate fraud of his wife - see the South African case of Merrington & 
Adams v. Welt (1898) 15 S.C. 313. 
[1979-80] B.L.R. 131. 
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had failed to show an actual or well-founded apprehension of great 
loss.83 
In 1970 the legislature tried to rectify some of the perceived 
shortcomings of universal community by the enactment of the Married 
Persons Property Act. When presented to Parliament, the object of the 
Bill was said to be: 
83 
" ... to amend the law relating to the ownership and control of the 
property of married persons ... [U]nder the common law the 
property of married persons, who are not Africans, falls into a 
common pool which, although jointly owned by the spouses, is 
entirely controlled by the husband unless the spouses execute an 
antenuptial contract before marriage. This places the wife, in 
relation to the property of the marriage, in almost the same 
position as a minor child. This is considered to be inconsistent 
with the status of women today. The Bill makes provision for 
The South African case of Maroudus v. Curich 1924 W.L.D. 249 was relied 
upon by the court. Cf Mokoba v. Mokoba Misca. F 190/96 unreported (21st. 
March 1997) High Court, Francistown, where a rule nisi, later made 
absolute, was made against a husband to restrain him from selling a motor 
vehicle which formed part of the joint estate and to release a car for use of 
his wife pending the conclusion of the divorce proceedings. 
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community of property to disappear after r 1 January 1971 
unless the spouses wish to be married in community. "84 
Despite this prediction of the withering away of community of property, 
what the Act does in effect is merely to reverse the previous 
presumption in favour of community in the absence of an antenuptial 
contract, to one in favour of marriage without community. S. 3(1) of 
the Act provides that community of property and community of profit 
and loss and the marital power or any liabilities or privileges resulting 
from it shall not attach to any marriage solemnised between spouses 
whose matrimonial domicile is in Botswana, which is entered on or 
after the commencement of the Act. Provision is however made for the 
couple to opt for community if they so wish, by filling in the form 
specified in the first schedule to the Act. 85 
This development notwithstanding, the proprietary consequences of 
Africans ( a term later to be styled "persons subject to customary law") 
84 
85 
Hansard vol. 34 1970 at p. 16 per Hon. Masisi, Minister of State. 
For a commentary on the Act, see F.X. Rooney "A decade oflegal reform 
in Botswana" (1975) 92 South African Law Journal 97 at p. 101. 
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married under the Marriage Proclamation continue to be governed by 
customary law unless they specifically opt out of that law. 86 
Two modes for opting out of customary law are provided in the second 
schedule to the 1970 Act. The first mode enables persons subject to 
customary law who wish to exclude customary law and be married 
"out" of community of property, without the marital power, to fill in 
Form A. Mode two is for those who wish to exclude customary law but 
be married "in" community of property with the marital power to fill in 
Form B.87 
The rationale for granting these options to persons subject to customary 
law was "that most Africans here still prefer their customary law to be 
applied as far as their property is concerned. "88 Thus, a situation now 
exists where, on the granting of a divorce of couples who are subject to 
86 
87 
88 
Sees. 7(1) of the 1970 Act. 
See Set/hare v. Set/hare MC F115/95 unreported (31st. July 1997) High 
Court, Francistown, where Cotran J. held that, to be excused from s. 3(1) of 
the Married Persons Property Act, spouses have to sign the requisite 
instrument. 
Hansard vol. 34 1970 at p. 17 per Hon. Masisi. 
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customary law, the High Court usually remits the division of the 
matrimonial property to a customary court. 89 Nevertheless, when the 
division of the property proves unsatisfactory, as it usually is, the 
parties, especially the wife, again institute proceedings in the High 
Court for the division of such property. It must be pointed out that the 
High Court possesses the power to divide the property of such couples 
as such division is clearly an ancillary matter to the divorce. The 
practice of remitting the case to the Customary Court was born out of 
convenience as, more often than not, such matrimonial property is 
situated where these customary courts are and the couple will likely be 
residing within the area of the jurisdiction of the customary court. 90 
The 1970 Act was the only attempt in the last three decades to reform 
a matrimonial property regime inherited from the colonial government 
but it was only a superficial reform. 
89 
90 
See for example, Moisakamo v. Moisakamo (2) [1981] B.L.R. 126. For the 
historical background to this practice, see B. Morton op. cit., at p. 15. 
See remarks of Hayfron-Benjamin C.J. in Moisakamo v. Moisakamo (2) 
[1981] B.L.R. 126 at p. 135. 
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(b) Marriage out of community of property 
As has been pointed out above, before the enactment of the Married 
Persons Property Act 1970, the general presumption relating to marriage 
under the Marriage Proclamation was that it was in community of 
property in the absence of an antenuptial contract. The purpose of such 
. an antenuptial contract was to exclude either all, or some of, the 
common law consequences of marriage under the Proclamation.91 
In deciding the type of matrimonial regime one wishes to marry under, 
care must be taken for, once it has been chosen, it cannot later be 
altered. The opportunity given to married South Africans to alter their 
matrimonial property regime bys. 21(1) of the Matrimonial Property 
91 The concept of the "antenuptial contract" is said by Cronje & Heaton op. cit. 
at pp. 107-108 to be misleading because the "contract" may have such a 
varied content. "Contract", they say, is a word used to denote an agreement 
which is entered into with the intention of creating an obligation(s). While 
this is true of the antenuptial contract, the primary object of the agreement 
is not to create obligations but to determine the matrimonial property system 
between the marriage partners by excluding either partially or wholly the 
normal consequences of marriage. Viewed in this light, they conclude that 
the antenuptial contract is by no means a contract but the usage of the term 
is so entrenched in common parlance and legal terminology, that its 
continuous usage is not only desirable but highly convenient. For provisions 
relating to antenuptial contracts in Botswana, see the Antenuptial Contracts 
Act 1891, Cap 29:02. 
48 
Act 198492 is not available to Batswana.93 The principle of 
immutability, by which the matrimonial property system chosen by the 
spouses cannot be changed after the marriage, applies to the 
matrimonial property law in Botswana although s. 4(1) of the Married 
Persons Property Act 1970 allowed a limited relaxation of this 
principle. This section permits parties married in community of 
property prior to 1st January 1971 to change their matrimonial property 
regime to that of out of community at any time by entering into a 
notarial deed expressing their wish that the provisions of the 1970 Act 
should apply to their marriage. Such a notarial deed is to be published 
in the Government Gazette and registered in the Deeds Registry.94 
92 
93 
94 
Under this section a husband and wife who married either before or after the 
commencement of the Act on 1'1 November 1984 may jointly apply to the 
court for leave to change the matrimonial property system applicable to their 
marriage. For the court to grant such a change, the spouses must set out the 
proposed new system in a notarial contract for the court's approval. Notice 
of the proposed change must be given to all creditors of the spouses. The 
court will only approve the change if sound reasons exist and the change will 
not prejudice third pfil1ies. See Ex parte Lourens 1986 (2) S.A. 291 (C) and 
Ex parte Le Roux; Ex parte Von Berg 1990 (2) S.A. 70 (0) for guidelines 
for application under the subsection. 
See note 36 supra. 
Seep. 12 supra. 
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The legal consequence of marriage out of community is that it creates 
two separate estates, each comprising the separate assets and liabilities 
of one party. Everything that each party had before the celebration of 
the marriage and everything that he or she acquires during the 
subsistence of the marriage, with their liabilities, belongs to the separate 
estate of that party.95 This matrimonial regime, though conferring full 
legal capacity on the wife, is not free from criticism. A housewife, who 
does not earn an independent income outside the home, is deprived 
from sharing in the matrimonial property at the end of the marriage.96 
This, coupled with the fact that the power of the court to determine the 
mutual property rights of the spouses on divorce has been narrowly 
interpreted to exclude a discretion to adjust property rights equitably, 
makes any attraction that this matrimonial property regime may appear 
to have for women illusory in practice. 
95 
96 
See Hahlo "Husband and Wife" op. cit., at p. 287 and Cronje & Heaton op. 
cit, at p. 117. 
See the Government of Botswana/UNICEF Report, op. cit., at p. 209. 
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5. DIVORCE AS AN EVENT FOR THE DETERMINATION OF 
PROPERTY RIGHTS OF SPOUSES 
Roman-Dutch law recognised only two grounds of divorce, namely, 
adultery and malicious desertion although from the records of the old 
Court of Justice in the Cape Colony, it appears that perpetual 
imprisonment or banishment also grounded a divorce.97 In South 
Africa, the legislature intervened in 193 5 to extend the existing grounds 
of divorce by an additional two grounds. These were incurable insanity 
and long imprisonment. 98 These additional grounds were inapplicable 
in Botswana, the South African Parliament being incompetent to 
legislate for the then Bechuanaland Protectorate. The High 
Commissioner, uncharacteristically, did not enact a Proclamation to 
make the additional grounds applicable to Bechuanaland. Thus 
Bechuanaland and later Botswana continued to apply the unchanged 
Roman-Dutch law grounds as inherited from the Cape Colony until 
1973. 
97 See Botha, op. cit., at p. 258. 
98 Sees. 1 of Divorce Laws Amendment Act 32of1935. 
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In that year the Botswana legislature took steps to break the umbilical 
cord, which had tied the divorce law of the country to that of South 
Africa by the enactment of the Matrimonial Causes Act 1973. 99 The 
provisions of the Act were based entirely on the English Divorce 
Reform Act 1969. The intention was to replace the common law with 
the provisions of the Act as was evident from the parliamentary 
proceedings during the passage of the Bill through Parliament. On the 
second reading of the Bill the then Minister of Labour and Home 
Affairs said the following: 
99 
100 
"As stated in the memorandum, the proposed law makes for the 
first time in Botswana statutory provision as to the 
circumstances in which marriages can be dissolved by divorce 
or annulments and for matters incidental to such dissolutions. 
The difference will be that, all these matters which hitherto, 
have been governed by Roman Dutch Law, will now be dealt 
with under the provisions of the new Act."100 
See E.K. Quansah, Law of Marriage and Divorce in Botswana znd ed. 
Gaborone, University of Botswana, 1998 pp. 3-7. 
Hansard vol. 41 1972 at p. 15 per Hon. M.P.K. Nwako. 
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Despite the professed intention to supplant Roman-Dutch law with the 
provisions of the Act, questions abound about how successfully this has 
been achieved. 101 To take but one example, s.13 of the Act gives the 
court the power to make an order "determining the mutual property 
rights of the husband and the wife" but what amounts to those property 
rights is not explained in the Act. One could therefore conclude that the 
Roman-Dutch law still governs these property rights as the legislature 
is deemed not to intend a change in the common law without express 
words to that effect. 102 If that is correct, conflict between the principles 
of Roman-Dutch and English property law in the determination of the 
spouses' mutual property rights is likely as the Act is based on English 
law. 
Nevertheless, the Matrimonial Causes Act 1973 altered the Botswana 
common law of divorce by stating the sole ground of divorce to be the 
IOI 
102 
See C.M.G. Himsworth "Effects of matrimonial causes legislation in 
Botswana" (1974) 18 Journal of African Law 173 and A.J.G.M Sanders, 
"Ten years of Botswana Matrimonial Causes Act - Further proposals for 
divorce reform" (1982) 26 Journal of African Law 163. 
See G.M. Cockram, Interpretation of Statutes (3rd ed.), Cape Town, Juta & 
Co., 1987 at pp. 98-99. 
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irretrievable breakdown of the marriage. 103 Thus the emphasis was 
shifted from the apportionment of blame for a marital breakdown to the 
recognition of the fact of such a breakdown no matter whose fault it 
was. In that event s.13 empowers the court to determine the mutual 
property rights of the spouses. Previously the effect of divorce on the 
property rights of the spouses depended upon whether they were 
married in or out of community of property and whether they were 
subject to customary law. It further depended upon whether the court 
made an order for forfeiture of benefits against the defendant. When the 
plaintiff claimed forfeiture, the court had no discretion to withhold the 
order. 104 These factors still apply to the determination of the mutual 
property rights under the 1973 Act. Himsworth105 however contends 
that because the forfeiture ofbenefit order is incompatible with the new 
statutory provisions, its revocation must be implied. It is respectively 
submitted that this should be the case. 
103 
104 
105 
Sees. 14 of the Act and Mombala v. Mombala [1976] B.L.R. 31. 
See Murison v. Murison 1930 A.D. 157 at p. 161 per Curlewis, J.A.; 
Anthony v. Anthony 1946 C.P.D. 871 at p. 877 per Searle, A.J. and Bhengu 
v. Bhengu 1949 (4) S.A. 22 (N) at pp. 24-25 per Broome, J.A. 
Op. cit., at p. 176. 
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In applying the above factors to the determination of the matrimonial 
property on divorce, the courts did not have a discretion to vary the 
quantum of property to be given to either spouse. 106 The 1973 Act did 
not rectify this lack of discretion to adjust the mutual property rights of 
the spouses. Rather, the courts' narrow interpretation of s.13 of the 
1973 Act has confirmed it. 107 The effect of this interpretation on the 
courts' power to adjust the property rights of the spouses on divorce 
will be discussed in the next chapter. 
106 
107 
Cf the present position in South Africa under the Matrimonial Property Act 
No. 88of1984, s. 36 of which inserted ss. 7(3) to 7(6) into the Divorce Act 
No. 70 of 1970. Under those subsections the courts are empowered, in 
specified circumstances when the parties are married out of community of 
property, to make an order that all or some of the assets belonging to one of 
the spouses, be transferred to the other spouse. See pp. 207-226 infra. 
See Molomo 's case op. cit. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
JUDICIAL APPLICATION OF THE MATRIMONIAL 
PROPERTY REGIMES 
1. INTRODUCTION 
The survey of the historical evolution of the matrimonial property 
regimes in the previous chapter shows that the various regimes 
developed within separate compartments. In practice however, this is 
not entirely true, there is some interaction between them. For example, 
s. 7(1) of the Married Persons Property Act108 makes customary law the 
governing legal regime for the proprietary consequences of a marriage 
contracted under the Marriage Act by persons subject to customary 
law. 109 In respect of such marriages the High Court has power under s. 
13 of the Matrimonial Causes Act to determine the mutual property 
108 
109 
Cap. 29:03. 
This application of customary law is subject however to the discretion to 
apply common law given bys. 2 of the Dissolution of Marriages of Persons 
Subject to Customary law (Disposal of Property) Act (Cap. 29:05). S. 7(2) 
of the Married Persons property Act also enable the spouses to opt out of the 
application of customary law to the proprietary consequences of their 
marriage by signing an instrument to that effect prior to the marriage. 
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rights of the spouses. In determining these mutual property rights the 
court applies customary law, and it awards the spouses only that which 
they would be entitled to under customary law. 110 If however the parties 
to a marriage under the Marriage Act are not subject to customary law, 
then the common law will determine the proprietary consequences of 
the marriage. Thus marriages contracted under the Marriage Act can be 
governed either by the common law or the customary law depending on 
whether or not the parties are subject to customary law. 
This chapter will take a detailed look at how the courts apply these 
regimes in practice to determine the division of matrimonial property on 
divorce and how they interact with one another. It must however be 
pointed out that there have not been many opportunities for the courts 
to apply the regimes to resolve matrimonial property disputes. The 
reason for this is difficult to fathom, but one can speculate that this is 
because many couples can agree to their property rights at the pre-trial 
stage, which agreement is usually made an order of court. 1ll 
IIO 
Ill 
See Moisakamo v. Moisakamo (2) 1981 B.L.R. 126. 
See for example, Marumo v. Marumo MC No. F95/l 994 unreported (201h 
June 1997) High Court, Francistown and Mathiba v. Mathiba MC No. 
FI00/1995 unreported (22"d November 1996) High Court, Francistown. 
Experience at the University ofBotswana Legal Clinic, where the bulk of the 
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Alternatively, this may be due to the lack of property to quarrel about 
to enable the court to be called upon to intervene. 
2. JURISDICTION - APPLICABLE LAW 
Before the discussion on the courts' application of the regimes, their 
jurisdiction to decide matrimonial causes and a fortiori to determine 
matrimonial property rights will be briefly discussed. As a prelude to 
the discussion it must be noted that the applicable law for the 
determination of the spouses' property rights is the law of the country 
of the husband's domicile at the time of the marriage. This is an 
absolute rule of Roman-Dutch common law112 to which Botswana 
subscribes. When the applicable law has been ascertained, the specific 
rule of that law to be used to determine the proprietary rights of the 
spouses must also be ascertained. If the husband was domiciled in 
Botswana at the time of the marriage, the next issue would be to 
112 
work is matrimonial causes, also bears this out - see G.M. Kakuli, 
"Experimenting in clinical legal education in Botswana" (1989) 5 Lesotho 
Law Journal 433. 
See the South African cases of Brown v. Brown 1921A.D.478 at p. 482, 
Frankel's Estate v. The Master 1950 (I) S.A. 220 (A.D.) at p. 24land 
Sperling v. Sperling 1975 (3) S.A. 707 (A) at p. 716. 
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ascertain which system of Botswana law, customary or general law, 
applies to the case. The type of marriage entered into by the parties 
determines the applicable law. Thus, as indicated above, where the 
parties are subject to Botswana customary law the customary law will 
apply to the proprietary consequences of the marriage irrespective of 
whether the marriage is customary or under the statute.113 Where the 
parties are not subject to customary law and they marry under the 
Marriage Act the common law will govern the proprietary consequences 
of the marriage. 114 
3. JURISDICTION IN MATRIMONIAL CAUSES 
As is evident from the discussions in chapter one, the law of Botswana 
recognises two types of marriages, that is, marriage contracted under the 
various customary laws and that contracted under the Marriage Act. 
113 
114 
See note I 09 supra. 
Seep. 56 supra. In terms rule 2 of the internal conflict rules provided for by 
s. 6 of the Common Law and Customary Law Act 1969, it is possible for a 
person not subject to customary law to agree to a transaction, which the rule 
says includes marriage, of which he is a party, to be governed by customary 
law. 
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Jurisdictions over these two types of marriages seem to be concurrently 
vested in the Customary and High Courts. 
(a) Jurisdiction over customary marriage 
Jurisdiction over this type of marriage at first instance, appears to be 
conferred on customary courts. S. 10 of the Customary Courts Act115 
provides that: 
115 
"Subject to the provisions of section 12 and of subsection (2), a 
Customary Court shall have and may exercise civil jurisdiction 
over causes and matters in which -
(a) the matter is justiciable under any law administered 
by the court under section 14, and-
(i) all the parties are tribesmen, or 
Cap. 04:05. For a more detailed discussion of these courts, see C.M.G. 
Himsworth "The Botswana Customary Law Act 1969" (1972) 16 Journal 
of African Law 4, S. Roberts "The survival of the traditional Tswana courts 
in the national legal system ofBotswana" (1972) 16 Journal of African Law 
102 and D. Manga "Customary courts in the judicial system of Botswana" 
in The Law, The Convict and the Prisons, (K. Frimpong ed.) Gaborone, 
University of Botswana, 1987. 
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(ii) the defendant consents in writing to the 
jurisdiction of the court; 
(b) the defendant is ordinarily resident within the area 
ofjurisdiction of that court, or the cause of action arose 
wholly therein ... " 
The provisions of s. 12 referred to in the above section relate to matters 
excluded from the ordinary jurisdiction of customary courts. One such 
matter is any cause or proceedings by which divorce, a declaration of 
nullity of marriage, or an order for judicial separation is sought where 
such marriage has been contracted other than "in accordance with 
customary law". 116 Thus, by this provision customary marriages come 
under the jurisdiction of the customary courts. It has been held that 
once a claim for divorce or nullity in respect of a marriage under the 
Marriage Act is included in an action, s. 12 not only denies jurisdiction 
to grant the order for divorce or nullity but also ousts the jurisdiction of 
116 See s. 12(b) of the Customary Courts Act 1986. See also Mafokate v. 
Mafokate MC 166/2000, unreported (291h November 2000) High Court, 
Lobatse at pp. 14-15 of the transcript. 
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the customary courts over the whole proceedings despite the nature and 
number of ancillary reliefs claimed.117 
The jurisdiction conferred on customary courts to adjudicate over 
customary marriages is not exclusive. The High Court, it has been held, 
has concurrent jurisdiction. In Moisakamo the court emphasised this by 
overruling a preliminary objection that the High Court has no 
jurisdiction to hear a case in which a division of property on divorce is 
governed by customary law. 118 This conclusion is based on the 
provisions of s. 95 of the Constitution of Botswana which confers 
unlimited jurisdiction over any matter, civil or criminal, on the High 
Court. 119 This constitutional provision seems to override s. 4 of the 
Matrimonial Causes Act, which apparently ousts the jurisdiction of the 
117 
118 
119 
Per Hayfron-Benjamin C.J. inMoisakamo v. Moisakamo(2) supra, at p. 13 7. 
See 1981 (1) B.L.R. 126 at p. 135. 
See Botswana Railways Organization v. Setshogo & Ors. CA No. 51/1995 
unreported at p. 60 of the transcript and Mafokate v. Mafokate op. cit. where 
a three-panel High Court (Nganunu C.J, Lisimba and Kirby JJ.) held that by 
virtue of s. 95( 1) of the Constitution the High Court has jurisdiction over 
customary marriages and thats. 3 of the Matrimonial Causes Act 1973, 
which provides that the Act shall not apply to any marriage contracted in 
accordance with customary law, is not an impediment to the Court exercising 
jurisdiction over customary-law marriages. 
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High Court over polygamous marriages. 120 Thus, both the Customary 
Court and the High Court have jurisdiction over customary marriages. 
Nevertheless, it is acknowledged that the dissolution of customary 
marriages and ancillary matters arising therefrom are matters eminently 
suited to be brought before customary courts than the High Court. The 
Customary Courts have special advantages compared with the High 
Court in ascertaining the proper grounds for divorce in the tribe to 
which the couple belong. Furthermore, Customary Courts are spread 
throughout the country within easy and convenient reach oflitigants and 
it can generally be said that a divorce hearing would be faster and less 
expensive than an action in the High. It is therefore submitted that 
actions for divorce of a customary marriage at first instance will usually 
120 The said section reads as follows: "Nothing in this Act shall authorize any 
court to pronounce a decree of divorce, nullity, judicial separation or 
presumption of death and dissolution of marriage or to make any other 
order than an order dismissing an action unless the marriage to or in 
respect of which the decree or order relates was a monogamous marriage." 
The High Court acknowledged this restriction on its power in Mafokate v. 
Mafokate op. cit. supra when it said, (at p. 8 of the transcript), "It is true that 
section 4 of the Act curtails the jurisdiction of the High Court to grant 
divorces in any polygamous marriage, but that is not the case here." The 
court however, neither ruled on the effect of the section on its power to 
adjudicate over customary marriage nor its validity in the light of s. 95(1) of 
the Constitution. 
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be brought in the Customary Court while the High Court will concern 
itself with appellate matters. 121 
One aspect of the jurisdiction of Customary Courts over customary 
marriages needs to be highlighted. This is that only tribesmen are 
amenable to that jurisdiction, although in a rare case a defendant may 
consent in writing to the court's jurisdiction although he is not a 
tribesman. 122 Who is a "tribesman" for this purpose? The answer 
appears from the definition of the word in s. 2 of the Act. That section 
defines a tribesman to mean: 
121 
122 
"any member of a tribe or tribal community of Botswana or of 
any other country in Africa prescribed by the Minister by order 
in the Gazette for the purposes of this Act." 
See Andries Kangooyui v. Commissioner of Customary Courts & Ors. 
Misca. No. F16/1996 unreported (261h September 1996), High Court, 
Francistown where the High Court, on appeal from the Customary Court of 
Appeal, confirmed the customary divorce and distribution of the joint assets 
of the parties. See also the remarks ofNganunu C.J inMafokate v. Mafokate 
op. cit. supra at p. 15 of the transcript. 
Sees. 10 of the Customary Courts Act 1986. See also rule 2 of the choice 
of law rules ins. 6 of the Common Law and Customary Law Act 1969. 
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Eight principal tribes are recognised in Botswana. 123 However, this 
does not disqualify members of any minority tribes being subject to 
customary law. At present other tribes from Africa are not included in 
the definition as the Minister has not yet prescribed any of them as 
envisaged by s. 2 of the Act. In its exercise of jurisdiction over 
customary law marriages, the Customary Court is obliged to apply 
customary law, 124 hence, customary law marriages are governed purely 
by customary law. 
123 
124 
See s. 77 of the Constitution of Botswana 1966 which provides, inter alia, 
that the House of Chiefs shall consist of eight ex-officio members and s. 78 
which specifies that the ex officio members shall be such persons as are for 
the time being performing the functions of the office of Chief in respect of 
the Bakgatla, Bakwena, Bamalete, Bamangwato, Bangwaketse, Barolong, 
Batawana and Batlokwa tribes respectively. Thus only these eight tribes can 
be represented ex officio in the House of Chiefs. This provision has given 
rise to allegation of discrimination against other tribes not specifically 
mentioned. Consequently, a Commission of Inquiry has been instituted by 
the State President to determine the appropriate construction of s. 77 and 
other sections of the Constitution to ensure a non-discriminatory position of 
the Constitution on tribal matters. See Government Notice No. 274 of2000 
in Government Gazette (Extraordinary) of 31 '1 July 2000. 
See s. 14 of the Customary Court Act 1986. Apart from administering 
customary law, this section empowers the court to also administer any 
written law made under s. 15 by the designated Minister. The only written 
laws that have been designated by the Minister are criminal in nature - see, 
for example, Customary Courts (Enforcement of Specified Laws) Order 
1981 [S.I. Nos. 65 of 1981 and 131 of 1987.] and Establishment and 
Jurisdiction of Customary Courts (Amendment) Order 1997 [S.I. No. 99 of 
1997]. 
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(b) Jurisdiction over marriage contracted under the Marriage 
Act 
By s. 2 of the Marriage Act, the Act applies to all marriages solemnised 
in Botswana except those contracted in accordance with any customary 
law. Bys. 7(1) of the Matrimonial Causes Act 1973, a court, which is 
defined by s. 2 to include the High Court and subordinate matrimonial 
court, has jurisdiction to try an action for divorce or judicial separation 
with regard to marriages contracted under the Marriage Act. Although 
the creation of subordinate matrimonial courts was envisaged by s. 5 of 
the Act, none has yet been created.125 Thus, the High Court, for the 
moment, has exclusive jurisdiction over this type of marriage. 
125 The reason for establishing such subordinate courts was to lessen the 
distances which litigants have to travel to the High Court, to obtain 
matrimonial relief - see, for example, the view of the Hon. B.E. Gasetsiwe 
CBE (Member for Kanye South) during the second reading of the Bill -
Hansard 41 Part I 1972 at pp. 20-21. See also A Molokomme 
"Disseminating family law reforms: Some lessons from Botswana" (1990-
1991) 30&3 l Journal of Legal Pluralism and Unofficia/Law303 atp. 313. 
It is unfortunate that such a laudable facility has not yet been brought to 
fruition. 
66 
4. POWERS OF THE COURTS TO ADJUST PROPERTY RIGHTS ON 
DIVORCE 
(a) Customary marriage 
No express power is given by the Customary Court Act to Customary 
Courts for the determination of property rights on divorce. Such a 
power may however be ancillary to the jurisdiction conferred bys. 12(b) 
of the Act. Indeed Roberts126 clearly considers the division of property 
as an ancillary remedy in divorce proceedings. In his discussion of the 
N gwaketse customary law, for instance, he deals with divorce under the 
heading of"orders made in matrimonial proceedings" and states: 127 
"Apart from any compensation which may be awarded to either 
spouse on divorce, the court is also normally called upon to 
divide the household property". 
The principles for determining the property rights of spouses on divorce 
are derived from the customary rules of the tribe concerned. Because 
126 Op. cit. 
127 Atp. 224. 
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of poor record keeping in the Customary Courts, it is difficult to learn 
from court records the guiding principles used to divide matrimonial 
property on divorce. What principles there are, can be gleaned from the 
efforts of researchers. Roberts, 128 for instance, has stated that: 
128 
129 
"Traditionally, clear-cut rules determined this division. A 
woman took away with her, following divorce, little property 
which had not been derived from her own descent group, as it 
was assumed that she could rely upon members of it for her 
subsequent maintenance. Today, property disposition made on 
divorce vary widely from case to case, and any rule stated can 
be no more than a broad generalisation. However it is clear 
from the court records that the two considerations accorded 
most weight by the court in making a division are the 
matrimonial 'fault' of the respective parties and the need to 
maintain the woman and the children of the marriage following 
divorce."129 
Op. cit., at pp. 50-51. 
See Schapera op. cit., at p. 160 for similar views. 
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Griffiths confirms this situation, 130 in research among the Bakwena 
tribe. She found that if a party is judged to be overwhelmingly at fault 
that party may receive nothing on divorce. She cited, as an example of 
the customary court's attitude in such situations, the case of Busang v. 
Busang. 131 In that case, the husband was granted a divorce by the High 
Court on allegations of witchcraft and desertion. The chiefs court, 
which was to divide the matrimonial assets, accepted the decree of the 
High Court as proof of a fault by the wife and refused to give her any 
property. Sometimes however, despite the finding of a fault by a 
spouse, he is not totally deprived of a share in the matrimonial assets. 
Some property, however small, is given to such a spouse. In Leswape 
v. Leswape, 132 for example, the wife admitted adultery upon which the 
divorce was granted. However, she was awarded eight heads of cattle 
and certain household goods. On appeal to the High Court, the court 
130 
131 
132 
"Legal duality: Conflict or concord in Botswana?" (1983) 27 Journal of 
African Law 150 at pp. 152-153. 
MO 378/1982 unreported High Court, Lobatse. See also Seitshiro v. 
Seitshiro unreported cited by Griffiths in her article supra and Leswape v. 
Leswape [1976] B.L.R. 73. 
Supra. 
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acknowledged the importance of a fault in customary divorce but 
confirmed the Customary Court's award. 
Griffiths also found in other research 133 that on termination of a 
marriage the division of property was based on the concept of "family 
ownership" and the number of children (particularly male children). 
The concept of"family ownership" applies to property, especially cattle, 
which is passed down from father to son from one generation to the 
next. Such property is not to be divided on divorce because it must 
remain with the husband to be passed on to his male children. An 
application of this concept is found in Seitshiro v. Seitshiro 134 where the 
parties were married out of community of property. By s. 7 of the 
Married Persons Property Act the division was according to customary 
law. The High Court did not carry it out but by the usual practice the 
division was referred to a Customary Court. The ex-wife was amember 
of the Bakwena tribe and the ex-husband was from the Batlokwa tribe. 
There was an allegation by the ex-husband of bias by the Chief of the 
Batlokwa and consequently, the Commissioner of Customary Courts 
133 
134 
Law and family in Botswana today, a research report NIRD 94/983 kept at 
the National Institute of Research and Documentation, Gaborone. 
Unreported but cited by Griffiths "Legal duality ... " op. cit. 
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appointed Chief Linchwe of Bakgatla to do the distribution. The 
property consisted of a Bar/Cocktail Bar and Bottle Store/Butchery all 
on the same premises, plough lands, cattle and modem dwelling house. 
Mrs Seitshiro was awarded the Bottle Store/Butchery part of the 
premises, 83 heads of cattle ( 23 of which was because the ex-husband 
lied about the number of cattle they had acquired jointly and sold many 
without consulting his ex-wife), Yi share of the plough lands, 3 oxen to 
compensate her for her half share of the house, which was to be held by 
the ex-husband for their last born son. Mr. Seitshiro was awarded the 
Bar/Cocktail Bar part of the premises, Yi share of the plough lands, the 
dwelling house to hold for their last born son, 161 herd of cattle and 40 
calves (these formed part of "family property" which is not subject to 
division on divorce because it is to be passed on from father to son from 
one generation to the other). 
Chief Linchwe did not lay emphasis on the question of fault, in fact 
every time the ex-husband tried to discuss his ex-wife's failings he was 
prevented from doing so. He concentrated on the jointly acquired 
property of the spouses, which he said must be shared by the spouses on 
divorce. He is reported to have said that "a woman should not go back 
to her parents with nothing at all. A reasonable subsistence is a matter 
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to be decided by the Chief and the men who are listening and discussing 
the case at the kgotla". 135 He therefore awarded Mrs. Seitshiro four 
heads of cattle besides those which he awarded her by joint acquisition. 
He also relied on decisions of the High Court, especially Molomo 's 
case, when dealing with the divisions of the lands and the businesses. 
He said: "Jam not going to act according to my personal opinion. I 
will lean to the decisions arrived at for the cases which were referred 
to which were heard at the High Court." Molomo 's case, it must be 
noted, dealt with a marriage in community of property. In this regard, 
Griffiths has commented that the whole tenor of Chief Linchwe's 
approach here was to bring customary law division of property on 
divorce in line with that of the common law.136 
Griffiths also reported that she was frequently told that in the customary 
system property is held "in community property", but this did not mean 
that the man and the woman owned the property equally and that there 
135 
136 
See Griffiths "Legal duality ... " op. cit., at p. 157. The Kgotla is a central 
place in a ward or village where public assemblies take place and disputes 
are settled. 
See "Legal duality ... " op. cit., at p. 158. 
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would be a 50-50 split on termination of the marriage. 137 The concept 
of individual ownership was not as prominent as under the Roman-
Dutch system and the emphasis was placed on the preservation of 
property for the children within the family. This research reinforced the 
fact that distribution of matrimonial property depended on the source of 
the property and the apportionment of blame for the break up of the 
mamage. 
The application of the customary principles usually works to the 
disadvantage of the wives as they tend to be bias in favour of husbands. 
Aggrieved wives therefore invariably turn to the High Court for redress 
of what they see as unfair treatment. In Moisakamo v. Moisakamo (2), 
the High Court dissolved a marriage contracted under the Marriage Act, 
the proprietary consequence of which was governed by customary 
137 However, in Andries Kangootui v. Commissioner of Customary Courts & 
Ors. op. cit. supra , Cotran J. opined at p. 10 of the transcript, that under 
Tawana customary law "where there is only one wife (i.e. one house) as 
here, the property acquired during the marriage is divided roughly equally 
on divorce, the children, if any, getting a portion." This position runs 
counter to that of Bakwena customary law upon which the view expressed 
by Griffiths in the text wa~ based. 
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law.138 The division of the matrimonial property was referred to the 
Customary Court of the area where the parties resided. The wife being 
dissatisfied with the division by the Customary Court, applied to the 
High Court for relief. As indicated above, the court overruled a 
preliminary objection that it did not have jurisdiction to deal with the 
matter. One reason given for the rejection of the submission oflack of 
jurisdiction by the court was the large sum of money involved in that 
case, which was said to exceed the jurisdiction of the Customary Court 
concemed.139 Furthermore, the court was of the view that since it 
granted the divorce the division of the matrimonial property was 
138 
139 
Under s. 7 of the Married Persons Property Act 1970, the proprietary 
consequences of marriages of persons subject to customary law is governed 
by customary law in the absence of evidence to the contrary. A court 
however may exercise a discretion and apply the common law under s. 2 of 
Dissolution of Marriages of Persons subject to any Botswana Customary law 
(Disposal of Property) Act 1926. 
See note 117 supra. Under the civil jurisdiction of a Customary Court, 
limits as to the claim or value of the matter in dispute are usually set out in 
the warrant setting up the court. See s. l 0( I)( c) of the Customary Court Act 
1986. In Moisakamo's case the warrant of the relevant Customary Court 
limited its jurisdiction in civil matters to claims in respect of property not 
exceeding P800 in value. The valuation of the matrimonial property in the 
case was PlOO 000. In Lesotlho v. Lesotlho MC No. 227/1993 unreported 
(281h May 1998), High Court, Lobatse, Dibotelo J. abandoned the idea of 
referring the distribution of the joint estate to the customary court when he 
realized that the estate consists of, inter alia, mortgage bonds, a concept 
unknown to customary law. 
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ancillary to those proceedings and so fell within its jurisdiction. In this 
respect, the court used its power under s. 13 of the Matrimonial Causes 
Act 1973 to determine the mutual property rights in the properties 
concerned. In determining these mutual rights the parties were awarded 
only that which they would be entitled to under the relevant customary 
law. 140 The court accordingly divided the said properties by Ngwaketse 
customary law.141 
The properties involved in the case were: a restaurant in Kanye, a 
modem house and traditional yard at Kanye, plough lands/buildings at 
Mosoke/Mhudutswe, cattle posts, bore holes, 2 vans, 2 tractors, 
agricultural implements and some 1 550 cattle. Mrs. Moisakamo was 
given the following: The restaurant at Kanye, plough lands/buildings at 
Mhudutswe (originated from her descent group), Yz share of the house 
in Kanye to be paid by an award of cattle, Yz share of the cattle (725 
beasts), van, tractor and Yz share of the agricultural implements. Mr. 
Moisakamo got: The house at Kanye (Yz share to be paid to the wife in 
140 
141 
See Moisakamo's case supra at p.133. 
See also Mfa v. Mfa and Mogorosi MC No. Fl 12/1993 unreported (11th 
October 1996) High Court, Francistown, Gabanakgosi v. Gabanakgosi MC 
No. Fl 16/1994 unreported (22ru1November 1996) High Court, Francistown 
and Lesotlho v. Lesotlho op. cit. supra. 
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the form of cattle), a traditional yard at Kanye, plough lands/buildings 
at Masoke, cattle posts/boreholes, Yz share of the cattle (725 beasts), 
van, tractor, and Yi share of the agricultural implements. 
One observation made about customary law in the above case needs to 
be noted. The court observed that "custom of course plays an important 
role in how people choose to live, but changing social and economic 
conditions affect and mould customs."142 One of the changes noted by 
the court was "increasing urbanisation." In applying customary law the 
court was of the view that: 
142 
"Too much reliance on customary practices is likely to lead the 
court into making findings as to how the parties should have 
ordered their lives and not as to how their lives were actually 
ordered. The facts of each case must be ascertained. It is only 
when these facts have been ascertained, and how the 
matrimonial property was acquired has been determined, that 
Atp. 139. 
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the court applies the rules of customary law in determining 
which property should be allocated to which spouse."143 
This means that the rapid changes occurring in contemporary society 
should be taken into account in assessing the social utility of customary 
rules. In the court's opinion, "a rule that may have been just and 
suitable in a subsistence farming community may work grave hardship 
and injustice in a commercial farming economy."144 
Certain basic principles can be discerned from the above judgment. 
These are: 
(a) The maintenance needs of the wife will be taken into account, 
although in the present case it did not play a part because that need was 
settled by an agreement of the parties. 
(b) The fault of the parties, if any, may be taken into account. The 
defendant in this case admitted adultery and the divorce was granted on 
this ground. However, the court accepted the circumstances in which 
143 
144 
Atp. 140. 
At p. 147. 
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it was committed as a mitigating factor and eliminated his fault as a 
factor in the division of the property. 145 
( c) Barrenness of a spouse can in no circumstances be regarded as 
fault. 146 However, it is a frequently cited reason in actions for divorce 
under customary law. 147 In fact, in the instant case it was the wife's 
inability to have children that led to the husband committing adultery 
and consequently to the divorce action. 
( d) The maintenance needs of children of the marriage, if any, will be 
taken into account. This factor did not feature in the case because the 
purported adoption of his adulterine children by the husband was 
declared a nullity as the Customary Court before which the application 
was brought lacked jurisdiction to make the order because the 
application was not brought jointly by the spouses. 
145 
146 
147 
See p. 148 of the judgment. 
Seep. 149 per Hayfron-Benjamin C.J. 
See Schapera op. cit., at p. 159 although it is said to be dying out. In fact, 
Roberts op. cit., does not mention it as one of the justifications commonly 
advanced on a plea for divorce. 
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(b) Marriage under the Marriage Act 
With regard to divorce under the Matrimonial Causes Act, the court's 
powers to adjust the property rights of the spouses and to make financial 
provision for the wife are set out in ss. 13(1) and 25(2) of the Act. 
S. 13 provides that: 
"Any court which tries an action for divorce or for judicial 
separation under this Act shall also have jurisdiction to make 
an order-
( a) determining the mutual property rights of the husband and 
the wife; ... " 
S. 25(2) provides that: 
"On any decree for divorce or nullity of marriage, the court 
may, if it thinks fit, order-
( a) that the husband shall to the satisfaction of the court, secure 
to the wife such gross sum of money or annual sum of money for 
any term, not exceeding her life, as, having regard to her 
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fortune, if any, to the ability of her husband and the conduct of 
the parties, the court may deem reasonable; and 
{b) that the husband should pay to the wife, during their joint 
lives, such periodical sum for the maintenance and support of 
the wife as the court may think reasonable, and any such order 
may either be in addition to or instead of an order made under 
subsection (1) ... " 148 
The power under s. 13 will be dealt with first and then a look will be 
taken at the powers under s. 25(2). The latter power may have a direct 
bearing on the first for if a husband is ordered to secure a gross sum for 
his ex-wife this may affect his property rights as he may have to secure 
such a gross sum on, for instance, his house in which the wife has no 
proprietary interest. 
148 The proviso to s. 13 confers jurisdiction on a subordinate matrimonial court 
to make the orders specified in the section where the property in dispute or 
the amount claimed does not exceed P2000. Where the claim is in excess of 
this amount, the matter must be transferred to the High Court. As mentioned 
earlier, subordinate matrimonial courts have not yet been established. 
80 
5. EXERCISE OF THE POWER UNDER S. 13 OF THE MATRIMONIAL 
CAUSES ACT 
Unlike the English Divorce Reform Act 1969, which was used as a 
model for the Act, 149 no guidelines were provided for the court in the 
determination of the mutual property rights. Nor were such property 
rights defined by the Act. 150 The task therefore fell to the court, not only 
to interpret the extent of this power, but also to decide what is 
matrimonial property. In the leading case of Molomo v. Molomo 151 an 
149 
150 
151 
See the memorandum accompanying the Matrimonial Causes Bill 1972, 
which makes this reliance on the English statute clear. See also C.M.G. 
Himsworth "Effects of matrimonial causes legislation in Botswana" op. cit. 
atp. 174. 
Under s. 25 of the English Matrimonial Causes Act 1973, an Act 
consolidating the 1969 Act, the court was enjoined to have regard, inter 
a/ia, to the income and financial resources of the parties; their financial 
needs; their standard of living; their age; the duration of the marriage and 
their conduct. The section was subsequently amended by the Matrimonial 
and Family Proceedings Act 1984 and the Family Law Act 1996. The 1996 
Act does not affect the broad general principles governing the exercise of the 
court's discretion. It has however given effect to one of the cardinal 
principles which led to the enactment of the 1996 Act, namely, that fmancial 
arrangements be made before the dissolution of the marriage - see the 
English Law Commission's Report, The Ground for Divorce, Law Com. 
No. 192 (1990). 
[1979-80) B.L.R. 250 at p. 25 l. 
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opportunity arose for the court to determine the extent of the power 
conferred on it by s. 13 of the Act. Hannah, J. expressed the view that: 
"The powers of the court under section 13 are substantially the 
same as in any other proceedings where the ownership or 
possession of property is in issue. The discretion is no wider 
and no narrower than the ordinary discretion of the court in 
such cases."152 
This conclusion was arrived at after the learned judge had rejected a 
submission that the section conferred a wide power to adjust property 
rights by principles of equity and fairness. It also rejected a suggestion 
that the section should be interpreted in accordance with the rationale 
behind s. 24 of the English Matrimonial Causes Act 1973 upon which 
the Botswana statute was based.153 The learned judge ruled that there 
is nothing ins. 13, which shows an intention by the legislature to confer 
152 
153 
In Tlale v. Tlale MC No. Fl 12/1994 unreported (81h August 1997) High 
Court, Francistown, Gaefele A.J. held that the power under s. l3 can be 
exercised by the court even though there was no prayer for the division of 
property in the plaintiffs Declaration. 
The section empowers the court to make various property adjustment orders 
on the grant of a divorce. 
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such a wide and almost unfettered discretion on the court to divide 
matrimonial assets between spouses. 
Having disposed of this objection the issue that fell to be decided was 
whether the matrimonial assets were to be divided by customary law or 
the common law. Bys. 7(1) of the Married Persons Property Act, the 
proprietary consequences of a marriage of persons subject to customary 
law are to be governed by customary law unless they have expressly 
opted out of that law. This subsection is made subject to s. 2 of the 
Dissolution of Marriages of Persons Subject to Customary Law 
(Disposal of Property) Act 1926, which provides that: 
"Where at the commencement of this Act a marriage subsists 
between spouses, subject to any Botswana customary law, 
having been duly solemnized by a marriage officer or according 
to the rites of the Christian religion if contracted before the 1st. 
day of April, 1917, and if contracted on or after that date 
having been solemnized by a marriage officer appointed under 
the Marriage Act, and where on the dissolution of such 
marriage by decree of a competent court or by the death of one 
of the spouses a question arises as to the disposal or devolution 
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of any property of either or both of the spouses such question 
shall be heard and determined in accordance with the law of 
Botswana by a court presided over by a Magistrate Grade I if 
it shall appear to the court on application made to it that regard 
being had to the mode of life of the spouses or to any disposition 
made by either of the spouses during the subsistence of the 
marriage it would not be just and equitable that such property 
should be dealt with according to customary law." 
It was argued on behalf of the husband that the effect of s. 7 of the 
Married Persons Property Act is that the property of the spouses is held 
according to customary law. Since the spouses did not take advantage 
of the exempting provisions contained in s. 7 the determination of the 
respective rights of the spouses must be done by customary law. 
Furthermore, it was argued that the provision of s. 2 of the Dissolution 
of Marriages of Persons Subject to Customary Law (Disposal of 
Property) Act did not apply. 
The court had to decide whether the spouses can, without executing the 
exempting instrument required bys. 7 of the Married Persons Property 
Act, take advantage of the provisions of s. 2 of the 1926 Act. The court 
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held that on the proper interpretation of s. 2 of the 1926 Act, that section 
covers marriages solemnised both before and after the commencement 
of the Act. 154 Consequently, it was the view of the court that where the 
conditions set out in s. 7 of the Married Persons Property Act are 
fulfilled, the court can consider whether having regard to the mode of 
life of the spouses or any disposition of property made by them applying 
customary law in determining property rights when exercising its 
powers under s. 13 of the Matrimonial Causes Act would not be just 
and equitable. The court concluded that, taking account of their mode 
oflife, the couple were "sophisticated people with business acumen and 
I have no doubt that the provisions of the Dissolution of African 
Marriages (Disposal of Property) Act155 was enacted precisely to deal 
with a situation such as this." It therefore held that determining their 
mutual property rights by applying customary law would not be just and 
equitable. Accordingly the common law was applied. 
154 
155 
Cf the contrary ruling on this point by Hayfron-Benjamin C.J. in 
Moisakamo v. Moisakamo(2) infra note 170. 
The statute was re-styled Dissolution of Marriages of Persons Subject to 
Customary law (Disposal of Property) Act in 1987 when the laws of 
Botswana were revised. 
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In Moisakamo v. Moisakamo (2) Hayfron-Benjamin C.J. accepted this 
interpretation of s. 13 when he said: 156 
156 
157 
"Hannah J. in that case had excluded the application of 
customary law, and Section 13 by itself does not empower the 
Courts to alter the property rights of the parties. The question 
is whether or not the position is different where the Court is 
called upon to apply customary law. Roberts157 ([p.] 24) says-. 
'The dispositions, which are made vary very widely from case 
to case, but the two most important considerations are the 'fault' 
of the respective parties and the necessity of maintaining the 
children of the marriage following divorce. ' 
... [I] t seems to me therefore that quite apart from the 
jurisdiction conferred on the High Court under section 13 of the 
Matrimonial Causes Act to determine the rights of the parties 
in any matrimonial property consequent upon divorce, it has 
also, where the property is held in accordance with customary 
law, power to divide the matrimonial property between them 
[1981] B.L.R. 126 at pp. 147-148. 
Op. cit. 
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'according to the circumstances of the case' (See Schapera158 p. 
160). There is a discretion in the Court, where fault or any of 
the factors are established to alter the property rights of the 
spouses by allotting to one spouse what in law belongs to the 
other spouse." 
Thus, while there may be agreement that the court has no discretion to 
adjust matrimonial property rights when the common law governs the 
proprietary consequences of the marriage, it seems that this is not so 
where customary law governs the consequences. Hayfron-Benjamin 
C.J. emphasised in Moisakamo 's case that the court must always bear 
in mind that the discretion given bys. 13 of the Matrimonial Causes Act 
is extraordinary as it effects an alteration in property rights and must 
therefore be exercised only in clear cases. 
What then is the "ordinary discretion of the court" referred to by the 
court in Molomo 's case? In deciding what has been called "the cold 
legal question"159 of who owns what on divorce the court is likely to 
158 
159 
Op. cit. 
Per Lord Denning in the English case of Gissing v. Gissing [ 1969] 2 Ch. 85 
at p. 93. 
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find an answer in the question "whose is this?" rather than "to whom 
shall this be given?"160 The answer will also depend on the type of 
matrimonial regime under which the couple was married. If they were 
married in community of property, very little discretion exists to 
determine their mutual property rights because on dissolution of the 
marriage the matrimonial property is divided equally by operation of 
law unless there has been an order of forfeiture ofbenefits. 161 Such an 
order was designed to punish the "guilty" spouse who, it is said, must 
not be allowed to benefit from a marriage he has wrecked. 162 Schreiner 
J. succinctly described the effect of the order in the South African case 
of Smith v. Smith: 163 
160 
161 
162 
163 
Per Lord Morris in the English case of Pettitt v. Pettitt (1970] A.C. 777 at 
p. 798. For a discussion of this case, see J.G. Miller"Family Assets" (1970) 
86 Law Quarterly Review 98. 
See Hannah J's dictum in Molomo v. Molomo supra at p. 252. 
See Hahlo "Husband and Wife" op. cit., at p. 373, Cronje op. cit., at p. 266, 
Murison v. Murison 1930 A.D. 157 and Harris v. Harris 1949 (1) S.A. 254 
(A). Under s. 9(1) of the Divorce Act 70of1979, the South African courts 
have a discretion to order a spouse to forfeit the patrimonial benefits either 
wholly or partly. 
1937 W.L.D. 126 at pp. 127-128. 
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"What the defendant forfeits is not his share of the common 
property but only the pecuniary benefits that he would 
otherwise have derived from the marriage ... It [the order for 
forfeiture] is really an order for division plus an order that the 
defendant is not to share in any excess that the plaintiff may 
have contributed over the contributions of the defendant." 
If the "innocent" spouse requests such an order, the court has no 
discretion to refuse it. 164 The survival of this order under the 
Matrimonial Causes Act, which abolished fault-based divorce, is 
debatable. 165 It is submitted that this order is in a complete antithesis to 
the professed rationale behind the Matrimonial Causes Act that fault 
should no longer be a determinant for the granting of a divorce. 166 It is 
164 
165 
166 
See the South African case of Murison v. Murison 1930 A.D. 157. 
In South Africa, the order has been retained under s. 9(1) of the Divorce Act 
70 of 1979 although that Act abolished fault-based divorce. Hahlo op. cit., 
at p. 373 opines that the forfeiture rule under s. 9(1) of the 1979 Act has 
little in common with the pre-1979 forfeiture rule, except the word 
"forfeiture". His reasons for this view are that "substantial misconduct" 
under s. 9(1) is only one of the factors which the court may take into account 
in granting the order and that furthermore, the court has a discretion whether 
to grant the order or not, which was not the case before the 1979 Act. 
Under s. 25(1) of the Act, however, the conduct of the parties is a factor to 
be taken into account in awarding a gross or annual sum to the wife. 
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therefore submitted that the forfeiture of benefits order must be taken 
to have been impliedly abolished. 167 However, if the matrimonial 
regime is out of community of property or governed by customary law, 
there is potentially more room for the exercise of the discretion. A look 
will now be taken at how the courts have exercised the discretion 
concerning the matrimonial regimes. 
(a) Exercise of the s. 13 power in relation to marriage in community 
of property 
Subject to the doubtful application of the order of forfeiture of benefits, 
when a marriage in community of property is dissolved by a divorce 
decree, the joint estate, which the marriage brought about is divided 
equally between the spouses. In Molomo 's case, Hannah J., having 
delimited the ambit of s. 13, held that: 
167 
"It follows from my view of s. 13 that if it be held that a 
marriage was in community of property and of profit and loss 
See Himsworth op. cit., at p. 176. A similar conclusion has been reached in 
relation to s. 9(1) of the South African Divorce Act 70of1979 - see Hahlo 
and Sinclair The Reform of the South African Law of Divorce, Cape Town, 
Juta & Co., 1980 at pp. 51-52. 
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then on a dissolution the court in exercising its powers under s. 
13 will hold that the matrimonial assets with certain possible 
exceptions are in joint ownership and fall to be divided in equal 
shares168 •• .In determining the parties' mutual property rights I 
must therefore proceed on the basis that the rights in issue were 
in joint ownership and I must endeavour to effect a division in 
equal shares. " 169 
In that case a marriage in community of property of spouses subject to 
customary law was dissolved by divorce. The parties agreed that the 
corpus of the matrimonial property would devolve upon the children of 
the marriage but that the High Court should divide the usufructuary 
rights in the assets between them. The property consisted of a 
Bar/Bottle Store in Gaborone, a Bar/Bottle Store in Mogoditshane, a 
house in Gaborone, a residential yard at Mogoditshane and some 250-
290 herd of cattle. The court divided the properties as follows: Mrs 
168 
169 
[1979-80] B.L.R. 250 at p. 252. See also Aboagye J. in Set/hare v. Set/hare 
MC 207/1993 unreported (19th February 1996) High Court, Lobatse, at pp. 
4-5 of the transcript and Allanbridge J.A in Ruwona v. Ruwona CA 40/1997 
MC F35/1995 unreported (241h July 1998) Court of Appeal at p. 4 of the 
transcript. 
[1979-80] B.L.R. 250 at p. 257. 
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Molomo was given the Bottle Store part of the Gaborone Bar/Bottle 
Store, the Bar/Bottle Store in Mogoditshane, and the Gaborone house. 
The income from these properties was Pl 7,600. Mr. Molomo was 
given the Bar part of the Gaborone Bar/Bottle store, the residential yard 
at Mogoditshane and the herd of cattle. The income from these 
properties was Pl 7,580. 
Although the parties were subject to customary law, the court applied 
the mode-of-life exemption under s. 2 of the Dissolution of Marriages 
of Persons Subject to Customary Law (Disposal of Property) Act170 to 
exclude the operation of s. 7 of the Married Persons Property Act and 
the customary law. The latter section makes customary law the 
applicable matrimonial regime of persons subject to customary law who 
marry under the Marriage Act unless specifically excluded. The former 
170 Cap.29:05. In Moisakamo v. Moisakamo(2) supra at p. 131 Hayfron-
Benjamin C.J. expressed the view that the application of the statute in 
Molomo 's was per incuriam because in Frankel N. 0. and Anor. v. Sechele 
[1964-67] B.L.R. 5 at p. 11, Murray A.J.A. in the Bechuanaland Court of 
Appeal held that the opening words of the statute refer to a single point in 
time. Hence post 1st of January 1929 marriages are not affected by its 
provisions. Parties to such marriages should take advantage of the 
provisions of the Married Persons Property Act 1970. However, this view 
does not derogate from the interpretation given to the ambit of s. 13 of the 
Matrimonial Causes Act in Molomo 's case. 
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section does the same but gives the court a discretion to apply the 
common law: 
"if it shall appear to the court on application made to it that 
regard being had to the mode of life of the spouses or to any 
disposition of the property made by either of the spouses during 
the subsistence of the marriage it would not be just and 
equitable that such property should be dealt with according to 
native law and custom". 
The spouses were married prior to the coming into effect of the Married 
Persons Property Act 1970. There was no antenuptial contract and the 
spouses had not taken advantage of the provisions of s. 4 of that Act to 
make the provisions of the Act applicable to their marriage, the 
marriage was therefore in community of property. 
The "mode of life" exemption was applied because: 
"After the marriage they first lived at Molepolole and then 
Mochudi. The husband then spent two years in Canada and 
upon his return to Botswana lived at Serowe for three years and 
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from 1967 until the separation, in Gaborone. Originally both 
husband and wife were school teachers and then the husband 
became a senior civil servant in the Ministry of Education. 
More recently the husband has been engaged as a lecturer in 
Educational Psychology at the University of Botswana and 
Swaziland. The parties' matrimonial home was a three 
bedroom house in Gaborone and the principal business built up 
by them was a bar and bottle store with a substantial turnover 
in Gaborone. They were, if I may be permitted to say so, 
sophisticated people with business acumen and I have no doubt 
that the provisions of the Dissolution of African Marriages 
(Disposal of Property) Act171 was enacted precisely to deal with 
a situation such as this." 
Thus, the criterion for the application of the discretion under s. 2 of 
Dissolution of Marriages of Persons Subject to Customary law 
(Disposal of Property) Act may be evidence of such a person having 
adopted a sophisticated way of life. The features of such life 
highlighted by the court were education, travel, a modem dwelling 
171 This Act was subsequently renamed the Dissolution of Marriages of Persons 
Subject to Customary law (Disposal of Property) Act Cap. 29:05. 
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house in an urban area and business acumen. These features, it is 
submitted, may eliminate most of Batswana from the exercise of the 
discretion under s. 2 as the bulk of the population live in rural 
settings.172 
In the exercise of the discretion in relation to marriages in community 
of property the only thing the courts seem to do is to decide which of 
the matrimonial property will go to the ex-husband or the ex-wife. No 
discernible principles for the exercise of the discretion emerge from the 
case law although it seems that the needs of minor children favour the 
spouse who has custody of them. In Molomo 's case, for instance, Mrs 
Molomo was given the house in Gaborone because she had custody of 
the minor children. Also in Set/hare v. Setlhare 113 although spouses 
were awarded joint custody of the children, in dividing the joint estate, 
172 
173 
Of the enumerated population of 1,326, 796 in 1991, 54.3% lived in the rural 
areas while 45.7% lived in the urban areas. In 1981 the proportion of 
ruraVurban inhabitants was 82.3% and 17.7% respectively. The increase in 
the urban population was due to a reclassification of some rural areas as 
urban centres. See 1991 Census of Population and Housing: Population 
Composition and Distribution Central Statistics Office Brief No. 94/3, 
Gaborone, Government Printer, 1994 and 1991 Population and Housing 
Census Dissemination Seminar, Gaborone, Government Printer, 1995 pp. 
54, 60 and 65. 
MC. Fl 15/95 unreported (31'1 July 1997) High Court, Francistown. 
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the wife was given the matrimonial home because the children were so 
much attached to it. Finally, in Ruwona v. Ruwona174 the husband was 
awarded the larger of two residential plots and the bulk of the movable 
property because he had custody of three of the four children of the 
marriage. 
(b) Exercise of the s. 13 power in relation to marriage out of 
community of property 
As mentioned above, this type of marriage does not affect the 
proprietary rights of the spouses. Therefore the general rule is that on 
divorce each spouse takes his or her property. 175 If there is evidence of 
joint ownership or one of the spouse's claims to be entitled to a share 
in the other's property by virtue of a contribution, whether in cash or in 
kind, then it is the duty of the court to determine the proper share which 
each spouse has in the said property. In the light of the restrictive ambit 
174 
175 
MC No. F35/1995 unreported, (301h June 1997) High Court, Francistown. 
The husband appealed against certain aspects of the judgment of the High 
Court but the Court of Appeal did not alter the division of the joint estate as 
stated in the text. See CA40/1997 MC F35/1995 note 168 supra. 
See Hahlo "Husband and Wife" op. cit., at pp. 287-288 and Cronje & 
Heaton op. cit., at p. 117. 
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drawn by Hannah J., it seems that the mutual property rights of the 
spouses must, adopting the words of Lord Upjohn,176 be 
''judged on the general principles applicable in any court of law 
when considering questions of title to property, and though the 
parties are husband and wife these questions of title must be 
decided by the principles of law applicable to the settlement of 
claims between those not so related, while making full 
allowances in view of the relationship. " 
What then are these allowances, which the court is to make in view of 
the marital relationship between the parties? The limited powers the 
English courts had to adjust property rights on a breakdown of marriage 
before the enactment of s. 4 of the Matrimonial Proceedings and 
Property Act 1970177 demanded that a spouse establish, wherever 
possible, a beneficial interest in property such as the matrimonial 
176 
177 
Pettittv. Pettitt [1970] A.C. 777 at p. 813 and also at p. 803 per Lord Morris 
and at p. 821 per Lord Diplock. 
Re-enacted as s. 24 of the Matrimonial Causes Act 1973 which conferred 
upon the courts wide powers to adjust property rights on the granting of a 
decree of divorce, nullity or judicial separation. The position in Botswana 
is similar to that of English Law prior to the enactment of the 1970 Act. 
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home.178 Where the property had been purchased in the sole name of 
the husband, for instance, without the wife making any direct 
contribution to the purchase price or without the parties making an 
agreement or declaration regarding the beneficial interest in the 
property, there was a prima facie inference that the husband was the 
sole legal and beneficial owner. 179 That inference could only be 
displaced if the court could impute, from the conduct of the couple 
down to the date of their separation, a comn;ion intention that the wife 
was to have a beneficial interest in the property. That in turn depended 
on whether the wife had made a substantial financial contribution 
towards the expenses of the couple's household, which could be linked 
to the acquisition of the property .18° Consequently the courts resorted 
178 
179 
180 
See Button v. Button [1968} 1 W.L.R. 457 at p. 462. 
See Pettitt v. Pettitt [1969] 2 W.L.R. 966 at p. 989. The term "legal and 
beneficial owner" is used to describe ownership coupled with benefits as 
opposed to a bare title where the ownership is for the benefit of another. 
This duality of ownership is a historical development of the English 
Common Law and Equity. For further details see E. H. Burn Cheshire and 
Burn's Modern Law of Property (131h ed.) London, Butterworths,, 1982 
Chap. 3. 
See Burns v. Burns [1984] 1 All E.R. 244; Gissing v. Gissing [1971] AC. 
886 and Bernardv. Joseph [1982] Ch. 391. For the South African position 
on the point, see Hahlo "Husband and Wife" op. cit., at pp. 290-291. 
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to equitable principles to do justice in individual cases181 but this device 
was often found not to be a sound basis for resolving the problem of 
awarding a share of matrimonial property to a spouse .who had not 
contributed to its acquisition. 182 
In Botswana an opportunity arose in Rabantheng v. Rabantheng183 to 
articulate some relevant principles to resolve this issue. In that case the 
property in dispute was the matrimonial home, the title deed of which 
was in the name of the husband. The parties married on the 19th of 
October 1972 and did not take the necessary steps to opt out of s. 3 of 
the Married Persons Property Act, which abolished the community of 
property regime for marriages contracted after 1st of January 1971. 
Consequently, the marriage was out of community of property. The 
parties were found to be subject to customary law and thus,primafacie, 
customary law governed the matrimonial property regime. However, 
181 
182 
183 
See J.G. Miller Family Property and Financial Provision op. cit. Pt. I. 
See Pettitt v. Pettitt op. cit., especially Lord Upjohn's judgment. 
Developments in the English matrimonial law will be discussed in chapter 
four. 
[1988] B.L.R. 260. 
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relying on dicta in Molomo, 184 the court held that the parties lived a 
"sophisticated" way of life. It therefore exercised its discretion not to 
apply customary law to the determination of the rights of the parties. 
Hall church J ., having adverted to the cases of Mo lo mo and Moisakamo, 
said: 
184 
185 
"In this case, I find as a fact that the said parties lived a 
'sophisticated' way of life, the plaintiff/wife is an accountant by 
profession and is employed by the Botswana Building Society 
and the defendant/husband is a Civil Servant employed in the 
Information Department in Gaborone. The parties have 
acquired capital assets namely a house in Tonota, a house in 
Gaborone, cattle and furniture. Having regard to their mode of 
life, it would not be just and equitable to determine their mutual 
property rights by applying customary law. Therefore, adopting 
the reasoning by Hannah, J in Molomo 's case I propose to 
consider the division of the estate according to Common 
Law."t85 
See Molomo v. Molomo [1979-80] B.L.R. 250 at p. 256. 
[1988] B.L.R. 260 at p. 263. 
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The wife argued that they intended the house to be their joint property 
and that they put it in the name of the husband because he was the head 
of the family. In the alternative, she argued that she made a substantial 
direct contribution towards the purchase and maintenance of the 
house. 186 The evidence led revealed that she contributed P675 towards 
the mortgage repayment and P 1,601. 01 towards the payment ofrates on 
the house, the purchase price of which was P2,813.78. She also made 
indirect financial contribution for food and general housekeeping. The 
value of the house had risen to P68,000 at the time of the litigation. The 
judge posed the following questions187 to help him determine the 
property rights in the house: 
186 
187 
"(l) Was there, at or before the date when the house was 
purchased, an express intention by the spouses to pool all their 
resources so that it could be said by a court that a unique 
partnership had been formed entitling both spouses to share the 
assets, including the former matrimonial home in equal shares? 
Atp. 267. 
Atp. 266. 
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(2) Was there, at the time when the house was purchased, an 
expressed intention by the spouses to share equally in the de 
facto ownership of the former matrimonial home so that it could 
be said by a court that a unique partnership has been formed 
entitling both spouses to share in the equity of the house in 
equal shares? 
(3) In the absence of an expressed intention on the part of the 
spouses, can an intention be implied by the court that the wife 
has acquired an interest which amounts to unique partnership 
between the spouses in the equity of the said house? 
(4) Where the answers are in the affirmative in (1) and (2) 
above the spouses share equally but different considerations 
apply in (3) above and the question is what share is a spouse 
entitled to where she has established to the court's satisfaction 
on the balance of probabilities that she has a substantial 
interest in the former matrimonial home?" 
He concluded, 188 after reviewing the evidence, that the spouses never 
pooled their resources to form a unique partnership, a term that he may 
188 Ibid. 
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have used as synonymous to universal partnership. This is so because 
earlier on in the judgment189 he had relied on Hahlo's description of the 
universal partnership as a possible basis for the wife's claim. He 
therefore answered question (I) above negatively. He also answered the 
second question negatively after preferring the husband's evidence on 
that point to that of the wife. He found some difficulty in answering the 
third question. It was common cause that the wife had made a direct 
contribution to the purchase and maintenance of the house. Considering 
all the evidence, especially the total purchase price, he came to the 
conclusion that the wife's contribution was substantial and so answered 
question (3) affirmatively. In answering question ( 4) the judge said: 190 
189 
190 
At p. 265 relying on the description of the concept at p. 290 of the 5th ed. of 
the author's book op. cit., supra. However, it may also seem from the 
judge's acceptance of the dictum of Berman J. in Kritzinger v. Kritzinger 
1987 (4) S.A. 85 (C) at p. 94, in which the term "a unique form of 
partnership" was used, that he was using the term in the sense used in that 
case. The requirements of universal partnership were set out in the South 
African case of Muhlmann v. Muhlmann 1981 (4) S.A. 632 (W) at pp. 634-
635 per McCreath J. confirmed on appeal in 1984 (3) S.A. 102 (A) and 
Pezzutto v. Dreyer 1992 (3) S.A. 379 (A)at p. 390 per Smalberger J.A. See 
further, Sinclair assisted by Heaton op. cit., at pp. 278-280. 
Atp. 267. 
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"In answering the final question ( 4) I exercise my discretion 
taking a number of factors into consideration. As this was not 
a marriage de jure in community of property and there was no 
de facto agreement to share their assets jointly on the former 
matrimonial home, I do not consider that an equal division 
should be made in this case; I consider that the wife is entitled 
to a one third share in the equity of the former matrimonial 
home and I so hold." 
The court did not explain the basis for the arrival at a one third share for 
the wife. One would however, suspect that it is the application of the 
English practice of awarding one third of the joint assets of the spouses 
to a wife in such situations.191 This one third share in the equity of the 
house translated into P22,667 which the court ordered that the husband 
pay to the wife within three months. Although the judge said he was 
considering many factors in determining the share of the wife, it is not 
clear from the judgment what these factors were. What is clear is that 
the wife's financial contribution was the sole determinant. One factor 
that was clearly not taken into account though was the indirect 
191 See pp. 392-398 infra. 
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contribution made by the wife during the subsistence of the marriage. 
This could be inferred from the court's reliance192 on the following 
principle of South African law articulated by Hahlo: 193 
" ... the mere fact that the wife has worked in her husband's 
business or on his farm is not sufficient. It must be shown that 
she made a substantial financial contribution or regularly 
rendered services going beyond those ordinarily expected of a 
wife in her situation; the courts will not readily imply a 
partnership agreement." 
This non-recognition of the wife's indirect contribution may work 
injustice to many a housewife who does not go out to work after the 
marriage but devotes her time to caring for her husband and children, 
thus sacrificing the opportunity of acquiring any capital asset. 194 Had 
there not been evidence of a substantial financial contribution from the 
192 Atp. 265. 
193 Op. cit., at p. 290. 
194 See E.K. Quansah "Determining property rights between spouses on divorce: 
A tale of two jurisdictions (Ghana and Botswana)" op. cit., p. 398. 
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wife towards the purchase of the house, the court would not have 
awarded her a share in the enhanced value of the matrimonial home. 
Martin Horwitz J was faced with a similar problem in Sebina v. 
Sebina. 195 There the applicant had obtained a rule nisi against the 
respondent to stop the respondent from interfering in the running of a 
bakery, which he claimed formed part of the joint estate owned by him 
and his deceased wife. The applicant claimed that he and his deceased 
wife were married in community of property. Nevertheless, on the 
return day of the rule nisi the evidence revealed that the marriage took 
place on the 28th of March 1971 and that they had not signed the 
necessary form under the Married Persons Property Act opting out of its 
provisions. 196 Consequently, their marriage was out of community of 
property. Horwitz J. held: 
195 
196 
"[T}herefore, without more the applicant cannot maintain that 
he is a part owner, a joint owner or any other kind of owner of 
this business. Even if he were to be believed that he had been 
Misca. 111991 unreported (11th. February 1991) High Court, Lobatse. 
Sees. 3(1) of the Act. 
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a person who had advanced the money by the use of his motor 
car that would not conclude the matter. He made no allegation 
of an agreement which he reached with his late wife or giving 
him an interest in the business."191 
He accordingly discharged the rule nisi. This case reiterates the 
principle that in a marriage out of community of property, for a spouse 
to get a share of the property that belongs to the other spouse, he must 
adduce evidence pointing to having contributed substantially to the 
acquisition of the property concerned. 
In Mbenge v. Mbenge 198 the Court of Appeal applied the concept of the 
universal partnership to divide the assets of cohabitees. The possible 
criteria that a court may use in dividing assets of couples married out of 
community of property may be inf erred from this case. The appellant 
in the court a quo had sought an order for equal division of all the 
property acquired by the parties while living together as husband and 
wife from 1958 to 1986. She also sought a division of progeny of 
197 At pp. 5-6 of the transcript. 
198 Civil Appeal No. 17/1995 unreported (51h February 1996). 
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livestock from 1986 to the date of the division and the proceeds of all 
property disposed of by either party up to the division of the property. 
Her claim was based on an assertion that she was married to the 
respondent and was accordingly entitled to claim 50% of the property 
he had a~quired during the period they were married. The evidence 
however showed that no marriage had ever taken place and her counsel 
conceded this at the trial. Aboagye J. held that: 
"The evidence clearly shows that the plaintiff has ignorantly 
elevated her adulterous cohabitation with the defendant to the 
status of a lawful marriage in community of property. In that 
situation, I have no doubt in my mind that whatever she did 
whilst she was with the defendant was regarded by her as 
normal contribution of a wife to the establishment of a happy 
family life without any profit motive. 
As the basis of the plaintiff's claim, according to her evidence, 
is at variance with what is stated in her declaration the claim 
must fail and it is hereby dismissed." 
On appeal, a review of the evidence revealed that the appellant played 
a part in the running of various commercial enterprises during their 28 
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years of cohabitation. The respondent's counsel, while not abandoning 
his client's case, conceded that the evidence did indeed establish a 
universal partnership and that some apportionment should be decreed. 
The parties were given an opportunity to divide the assets but this 
proved impossible and they asked that the court decide the matter. 
Consequently, the Court of Appeal unanimously held: 199 
"I am satisfied, on a reading of the evidence and having 
considered the Heads of Argument on both sides that the 
learned Judge a quo erred in placing undue emphasis on the 
plaintifjlappellant's evidence that her claim was based 
essentially on the assertion that she was the wife of the 
respondent. In my view the equities of the situation required 
that she be found entitled to a 50% share of the respondent's 
assets acquired by the joint efforts of the parties ... ". 200 
This conclusion may be the result of the acceptance of the appellant's 
contention that since it was impossible to quantify the contribution of 
199 At p. 4 of the transcript per Wyle J.A. 
200 At pp. 4-5 of the transcript per Wyle J.A. 
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each party the court should make a finding that they contributed in equal 
proportions. Thus the court, taking into account all the circumstances 
of the case, was able to exercise its discretion in favour of equal 
division of the assets. 
This willingness by the highest court to do substantial justice between 
cohabitants augurs well for couples married out of community of 
property. From the evidence in the case, when the couple first met in 
1958 in Cape Town, the appellant gave up her employment, at the 
instance of the respondent, to live together as his wife. When the 
parties came to live in Botswana, the appellant was involved in the 
purchase and sale of livestock, made possible by the proceeds of a 
thatching grass business in which both parties were engaged. The 
appellant moved to a cattle post when they moved the cattle there in 
1977, dug a well and looked after the cattle. There was no evidence that 
the appellant contributed any money towards the acquisition of the 
various properties. Nor was there any express agreement to create a 
partnership. What was clear though was the fact that she expended 
considerable labour towards the acquisition of the properties, which she 
maintained. All these activities were directed towards the maintenance 
of the parties and their two children. If the court could accept these 
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indirect contributions of a cohabitee as creating a tacit universal 
partnership entitling her to a share in the property acquired because of 
such contributions, it is thinkable that a similar result could be reached 
in a case involving spouses married out of community of property. 
The discussions above show that there is some interaction among the 
three matrimonial property regimes. This is especially so where the 
spouses are subject to customary law. The striking feature revealed by 
the cases is that even where the common law rules of community of 
property were used to divide the matrimonial property as in Molomo 's 
case or where the customary law rules were used as in Moisakamo 's 
case, they produce remarkably similar results.201 The "mode of life" 
exemption was applied in Molomo 's case. In Moisakamo 's the 
exemption was deemed inapplicable, yet the distribution of the 
matrimonial property was similar. The results thus render any 
difference between customary and common law principles in this 
respect illusory. Significantly, the customary courts apply principles of 
the common law in dividing matrimonial property. This is evident from 
201 See Griffiths "Legal duality ... " op. cit., at p. 158. 
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the case of Seitshiro202 where ChiefLinchwe applied the principles used 
in Mo lo mo' s case to divide the matrimonial property of the spouses. 
Griffiths has expressed the view that this interrelationship between 
customary law and common law reflect an acquiescence by the former 
to the latter and that the customary system is applying the common law 
in the guise of a "customary" label. This relationship she describes as 
"a symbiotic one and one which involves a process of mutual 
adaptation. "203 Thus, the interdependence between customary law and 
the common law in the division of matrimonial assets is obvious. This 
is a clear demonstration of the potential of customary law to imbibe new 
ideas to enhance its efficacy in contemporary society. 
6. MAINTENANCE AND PROPERTY RIGHTS ON DIVORCE204 
As stated above, s. 25(2) empowers the court, if it thinks fit, to order the 
husband to secure, to the satisfaction of the court, a gross sum of money 
202 
203 
204 
See note 131 supra. 
Griffiths "Legal duality ... " op. cit., at p. 158. 
See G. Miller "Maintenance and property" ( 1971) 87 Law Quarterly Review 
66 on the situation in England prior to the enactment of the Matrimonial 
Proceedings and Property Act 1970, a situation similar to the one existing 
currently under the Botswana Matrimonial Causes Act 1973. 
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or an annual sum of money to the wife. It also empowers the court to 
order the husband to pay to the wife, during their joint lives, such 
periodic sums for the maintenance and support of the wife as the court 
thinks fit. The principal object of s. 25(2) is the provision of income for 
the maintenance of the wife. The rationale behind the subsection may 
be discovered from the following contribution by the then Attomey-
General to the third reading of the Bill: 
205 
"In the case of a woman, this Bill says that a woman shall not 
support a man, only a man shall support a woman and that is in 
fact, the whole principle throughout this Bill .. ./ think it is fair to 
say that in our law in this country we have tended to feel that it 
is the women who are to be supported not for them to support 
the men ... we do not as a nation, expect a husband ever to ask 
support, financial support from his wife. He is the main partner 
who is the bread winner. If you are not capable of winning 
bread, you should not marry in order to be subsidised by your 
wife's family."205 
See the Report of the Select Committee on the Matrimonial Causes Bill 1972 
Hansard at pp. 22-23 and p. 92. 
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The question that may be asked and answered here is: Does this power 
have any relationship with the determination of the mutual property 
rights under s. 13 especially regarding the rights of the husband who is 
the target of the orders under s. 25(2)? If the court decides to exercise 
its discretion to order a secured gross sum of money or an annual sum, 
it is required to have regard, inter alia, to the fortune of the wife, if any, 
and, presumably, to the husband's ability to pay.206 Under a similar 
provision in England the courts have interpreted such ability to pay to 
mean the husband's potential capacity to provide maintenance. 207 Thus 
although the court cannot adjust property rights under s. 13 of the 
Matrimonial Causes Act, in considering the husband's ability to provide 
a gross or annual sum a rigid distinction should not be drawn between 
income and capital. The husband's property, like immovable assets, 
and other valuable movable property, for example, a large herd of cattle, 
should be taken into account in deciding the secured gross or annual 
sum to be ordered under s. 25(2)(a). Such a consideration will enable 
the court to use the husband's property to secure the gross or an annual 
sum ordered. Furthermore, the ordering of maintenance for the wife 
206 
207 
The wording of the sub-section is unclear. It only states "to the ability of her 
husband ... " 
See N. v. N. (1928) 44 T.L.R. 324. 
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may, in terms of s. 25(2)(b ), be either in addition to or instead of a gross 
or annual sum ordered under subsection (1). The wording of the 
subsection suggests that the orders therein are cumulative rather than 
alternatives, thus establishing a possible link between property rights 
under s. 13 and maintenance as a gross or annual sum or periodical 
payments under s. 25(2). A wife who is fortunate to be awarded a 
substantial gross or an annual sum may not be given periodical 
payments as well or if she gets a periodical payment, this will be 
nominal in nature.208 
In practice though, it is conceded that the court can only properly make 
an order for a lump sum payment against a husband possessed of 
sufficient capital assets to justify it.209 The case law reveals that the 
normal capital asset available on divorce is the matrimonial home or 
cattle but the courts have not seen fit to award a wife a lump sum. In 
fact there has been no reported case since the inception of the 
Matrimonial Causes Act in which a lump sum has been awarded. Thus 
208 
209 
See, for example, the views of Lord Denning in the English case of Button 
v. Button [1968] 1W.L.R.457 at p. 462. 
See the English case of Davis v. Davis [1967] P. 185 at p. 192 in which 
Willmer L.J. expressed a similar view on the English provision. 
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the award of a lump sum may be an exception rather than the rule. In 
a similar vein it is rare for a court to make a maintenance order in 
favour of a wife. This may perhaps be due to the influence of customary 
law in terms of which wives, upon divorce, are assumed to rely on their 
family group for maintenance. Maintenance for children of the 
marriage is the usual order made.210 
The courts have so far exercised their power to determine the mutual 
property rights of spouses in isolation from their power to order 
maintenance for a wife. This situation aside, it is submitted that the two 
powers must, in appropriate circumstance, be used to complement each 
other. This is because a secured gross sum attached to the property of 
the husband, for instance, will be the best way of ensuring the payment 
of any sum awarded. Although the wife in such a case will have a 
limited interest in the property, the husband is not deprived of it but is 
merely made to secure his payment. The persistent failure by husbands 
210 See, for example, Segosebe v. Segosebe Misca 243/1992 unreported (261h 
July 1995) High Court, Lobatse; Ludick v. Ludick MC No. F35/1993 
unreported (15th July 1995) High Court, Francistown; Children, Women and 
Development in Botswana: A situation report op. cit., at p. 211 and A. 
Molokomme "The mosaic of Botswana maintenance law" (1987) 19 
Botswana Notes & Records 129. 
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to pay maintenance when ordered to do so has become chronic211 
despite the existence oflegislation for its enforcement.212 If the courts 
show a willingness to award lump sum payment, secured in appropriate 
cases, this will go some way to alleviate this persistent failure on the 
part of husbands to pay maintenance. 
7. CONCLUSION 
The following inferences can be drawn from the above discussion: 
(a) The court has very little discretion in determining who owns the 
matrimonial property or in adjusting the proprietary rights of the 
spouses. What little discretion there is, is exercised merely in 
determining the quantum of property to be allocated to each spouse. 
(b) The factors that influence the court in determining the quantum of 
property for each spouse are not clearly discernible. 
211 
212 
See Children, Women and Development in Botswana: A situation report op. 
cit., at p. 214. 
See Maintenance Orders Enforcement Act 1970. 
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( c) A contradiction exists in the distribution of matrimonial property 
owned by persons who are subject to customary law who marry under 
the Marriage Act. Fault by a spouse play a part in such distribution 
while it is ignored in the granting of the divorce decree. Where the 
spouses are not subject to customary law, fault is not a factor in the 
distribution of the matrimonial property. 
( d) There is an interaction between the common law regimes of 
community of property/out of community of property on the one hand 
and customary law principles of distribution on the other. 
( e) The courts have rarely used the financial orders provided by the 
Matrimonial Causes Act for the enhancement of a wife's financial 
position. 
These inferences will be elaborated upon in the next chapter. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
EFFICACY OF THE MATRIMONIAL PROPERTY REGIMES 
1. INTRODUCTION 
"Irrespective of the precise allocation of economic roles within 
a marriage, husband and wife are seen as equal partners in co-
operative labour, both making, in the normal case, an essential 
contribution towards the economic viability of the family unit, 
and hence, towards the accumulation of matrimonial property. 
Whatever property is acquired by them during marriage is 
therefore acquired by reason of partnership effort. "213 
This extract from a leading authority on matrimonial property forms the 
theoretical premise upon which the efficacy of the various matrimonial 
property regimes will be evaluated. From the discussions in Chapter 
213 K.J. Gray Reallocation of property on divorce, Abingdon, Professional 
Books, 1977 at p. 24. For similar views, see also the Report of the Royal 
Commission on Marriage and Divorce (1951-1955), Cmd. 9678, para. 644 
and the English case of Midland Bank Trust Co. & Anor. v. Green & Anor. 
(No. 3) (1982] Ch. 529 at pp. 538-9 per Lord Denning M.R. 
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Two, it is clear that one of the glaring shortcomings of the matrimonial 
property regimes is the court's inability to exercise any discretion in 
determining and readjusting the mutual property rights of the spouses 
on divorce. Apart from marriages in community of property where 
equality of distribution is the norm, and where the courts can decide 
which property goes to which spouse, there is no power to exercise 
discretion in the other matrimonial regimes. In marriages out of 
community and under customary law, the philosophy of matrimonial 
partnership is completely ignored when property is distributed on 
divorce. To adapt the words of Scarman L.J. in the English case of 
Calderbank v. Calderbank, 214 under these two regimes the spouses do 
not come to the judgment seat in matters of money and property upon 
the basis of complete equality. The odds are heavily weighted against 
the wife. Yet the traditional role of a wife, even in a culturally 
conservative society like Botswana, is gradually changing and the law 
should reflect this new reality.215 The attendant problems and injustice 
214 
215 
[1976] Fam. 93 at p. 101. 
A typical example of such conservatism was the speech of the then Attorney-
General during the third reading of the Matrimonial Causes Bill in 1972 -
seep. 112 supra. 
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this lack of discretion causes will become clear in the discussions that 
follow. 
2. MARRIAGE OUT OF COMMUNITY OF PROPERTY 
The inability of the court to reorganise the economic relationship of the 
spouses on divorce is brought into a sharp focus where the matrimonial 
regime is out of community of property. This is due to the separate-
property characteristic of the regime. The concept of separate property 
was intended to be beneficial to married women216 but the reality of 
married life in Botswana is that the husband invariably has the superior 
economic power and therefore is in a far more advantageous position to 
acquire capital assets. Even where the wife is working, her income in 
most cases will be less than that of her husband and she will not be in 
216 See Hahlo "Husband and Wife" op. cit., pp. 287-292 where some of the 
advantages conferred on women by this matrimonial regime are said to be -
that they may freely contract and dispose of their property by acts inter vivos 
or mortis causa, if their husbands alienate or encumber their property 
without their consent they may recover it from the third party with the rei 
vindicatio, i.e. an action brought to assert the rights of ownership. See also 
S.M. Cretney & J.M. Masson Principles of Family Law (61h. ed.), London, 
Sweet & Maxwell, 1997 at p. 124 and M.D.A. Freeman "Towards a 
rationale reconstruction of family property law" (1972) Current Legal 
Problems 84. 
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the same position as the husband to acquire capital assets.217 Hence 
when it comes to claiming a share in the matrimonial property her 
position is not satisfactory. In order for her to do this, she would have 
to base her claim on some recognised principle of property law.218 In 
this regard where the property had been purchased in the sole name of 
a husband without the wife making any direct contribution to the 
purchase price or without the spouses making an agreement or 
declaration regarding the beneficial interest in the property, there is a 
prima facie inference that the husband is the sole legal and beneficial 
owner.219 This inference could only be displaced if the court could 
217 
218 
219 
The latest census figures ( 1991) indicate that women accounted for just 3 9% 
of the workers aged 12 years and above. According to this data base less 
than 50% of Botswana's female population (that is, excluding school 
children and the retired) was actually classified as labour force participants 
whereas 90% of their male counterparts were recognised as workers. See 
the 1991 Housing and Population Census, Government Printer, Gaborone 
and National Report for the Fourth World Conference on Women: Beijing, 
China, 1995, Women's Affairs Division, Ministry of Labour and Home 
Affairs, Gaborone, 1994 at p. 13. For a global perspective see Jane Roberts 
"Violation against women as a violation of Human Rights" (1991) 17 Social 
Justice 54 at p. 57. 
See for example, the South African case of Hanel v. Hanel 1962 (3) S.A. 
625 (C) and Hahlo "Husband and Wife" op. cit. at p. 290. 
See Sebina v. Sebina supra and the English case of Gissing v. Gissing 
[1971] A.C. 886. 
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impute, from the conduct of the spouses down to the date of their 
separation, a common intention that the wife was to have a beneficial 
interest in the property. This would in turn depend on whether the wife 
had made a substantial financial contribution towards the purchase of 
the property in dispute. 220 The court cannot impute a common intention 
that a wife was to have a beneficial interest in the property merely on 
account of her domestic contribution towards the well-being of the 
family. Thus, in the English case of Button v. Button221 Lord Denning 
said: 
220 
221 
"The wife does not get a share in the house simply because she 
cleans the walls or works in the garden or helps her husband 
with the painting and decorating. Those are the sort of thing 
which a wife does for the benefit of the family without altering 
the title to, or interests in, the property ... The wife was 
economical in spending on the housekeeping, as most wives are. 
See Molomo v. Molomo op. cit., at p. 252. 
[1968] 1 All E.R. 1064 at p. 1067. This case represents the English courts' 
attitude to a wife's indirect contribution to the matrimonial home before the 
passing of the Matrimonial Proceedings and Property Act 1970. That Act 
gave the courts extensive powers to redistribute virtually all the spouses' 
economically valuable assets. See also Burns v. Burns op. cit., at p. 264. 
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She helped with the decorating and improvements to the house, 
as many wives do. It no doubt improved the value of the 
property ... I have come to the conclusion that the proper 
inference from the evidence is that it was the ordinary kind of 
work which a husband or wife may do on the matrimonial home 
without giving the other a share or interest in it. " 222 
A similar attitude to the above was adopted by Hallchurch J in 
Rabantheng 's case where, in deciding whether there was a universal 
partnership between the spouses with regard to the acquisition of the 
matrimonial home, he said: 
222 
"Thus if the spouses conducted a business together to which 
each contributed money and/or labour, a partnership may have 
to be implied, but the mere fact that the wife has worked in her 
husband's business or on his farm is not sufficient. It must be 
shown that she made a substantial financial contribution or 
regularly rendered services going beyond those ordinarily 
For a similar view expressed on South African law, see Hahlo "Husband 
and Wife" op. cit., at p. 290. 
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expected ofa wife in her situation: the court will not readily 
imply a partnership agreement. "223 (Emphasis added.) 
The wife in that case, as would be recalled, was awarded a share in the 
matrimonial home only because it was adjudged that her contribution 
of P675 towards the purchase price of P2,813.78 in 1975, was "a 
substantial contribution to the purchase of the house ... "224 Were this 
not the case, one could reasonably assume that the wife would not have 
got a share of the matrimonial home even though it was common cause 
that she had made indirect contributions to the purchase and 
maintenance of the house by providing food and other household items 
for her husband and the children. 
Would a ruling that the wife's indirect contribution amounted to a share 
in the matrimonial home have created injustice in the case? The answer 
would be no. A golden opportunity was lost when the court shied away 
from articulating the relevant principles to be applied in resolving 
disputes between spouses married out of community of property. In the 
223 
224 
At p. 265 relying on Hahlo "Husband and Wife" op. cit., at p. 290. 
Atp. 267. 
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court's view, "as this was a marriage out of community of property 
English law is not of assistance and the resulting and constructive trust 
principles do not apply and one looks to South African precedents for 
assistance. "225 This stand taken by the court was unfortunate for 
marriage out of community is the only matrimonial regime known to 
English law and legal principles formulated by the courts in that country 
to resolve matrimonial disputes should be germane to disputes 
concerning this type of regime in Botswana. However, despite the 
rejection of English legal principles by the court, it seems clear that the 
criterion used to determine the wife's share in the matrimonial home 
was based on English law. The relevant authority relied upon by the 
court was Horne v. Hine226 in which the High Court in the then 
Southern Rhodesia (now Zimbabwe) held that where both spouses have 
contributed towards the purchase of a matrimonial home on the 
understanding that it should belong to them jointly, but it was conveyed 
into the name of one spouse only, that spouse will be the legal owner 
but as between the spouses joint ownership principles will apply. The 
plaintiff in that case was a former wife of the defendant. They were 
225 Seep. 264. 
226 1947 (4) S.A. 760 (SR). 
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married in England and subsequently migrated to Rhodesia via South 
Africa. It was accepted that their proprietary rights were governed by 
English law and consequently that law was applied in the resolution of 
the dispute. The legal proposition stated by the court in that case is not 
different from that stated in the English case of Pettit v. Pettit227 by Lord 
Upjohn. He said: 
" ... the document may be silent as to the beneficial title. The 
property may be conveyed into the name of one or other or into 
the names of both spouses jointly in which case parol evidence 
is admissible as to the acquisition and if, as very frequently 
happens as between husband and wife, such evidence is not 
forthcoming, the court may be able to draw an inference as to 
their intention from their conduct."228 
The court in Rabantheng did what was said in the above dictum by 
accepting parol evidence from the wife in the face of the silence of the 
deed of conveyance as to the beneficial ownership of the matrimonial 
227 
228 
[1970] A.C. 777. 
Atp. 813. 
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home. The court held that the wife was entitled to a beneficial 
ownership despite the deed of conveyance being in the sole name of the 
husband. It is therefore submitted that English legal principles are 
relevant in resolving disputes about the proprietary rights of spouses 
married out of community of property. In the absence of a definitive 
statutory provision in this regard, the courts are urged to follow English 
precedents to solve disputes relating to matrimonial property under this 
regime. 
Furthermore, if one takes into account the rudimentary nature of the 
social security framework within which persons without visible means 
of financial support may be given financial assistance by the State when 
they are most vulnerable, 229 the need to provide a wife, who has made 
an indirect contribution, with a share in the husband's acquired property 
becomes even more important. The reality of the marriage situation is 
229 An old age pension scheme was only established in Botswana in October 
1996. The objective is to offer some financial security to elderly citizens of 
65 years and above who in a majority of cases are no longer working. The 
current rate (August 2000) is Pl17 per month. In March 1999 it was 
estimated that some 80,022 people were in receipt of pension under the 
scheme. Of these 46,267 were women and 33,755 were men. These figures 
were revealed at an induction course for officers in the Social Benefit 
Division of the Ministry of Local Government, Lands and Housing in March 
1999. 
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that it is a partnership of the couple and consequently the law should 
give effect to their legitimate and reasonable expectations. 230 The 
present situation in which the court refuses to acknowledge a wife's 
indirect contribution towards the welfare of the family, it is submitted, 
is not only unfair but also does not fulfil the expectations of couples. 
This undoubtedly undermines the presumed partnership of the marriage. 
The situation is further compounded by the fact that job-related benefits, 
such as pensions and gratuities, which are accumulated during the 
marriage do not feature as part of the assets of the spouses. In fact such 
interests have not been discussed at all in the case law. Even if such 
discussion were to arise, there will be some difficulty, in the absence of 
230 See Judith Freedman et al Property and Marriage: An integrated approach 
Institute for Fiscal Studies Report Series No. 29, London, 1988 at p. 9. The 
word "partnership" is not being used in this context in a commercial sense, 
for as explained in an American case Rey v. Rey (I 973) 279 So. 2d 360 at p. 
361 f cited by Gray op. cit. at p. 23 note 5, "The marital relationship, 
although classified as a 'partnership' in terms of demonstrating the equality 
of the individuals involved, was never intended to be a 'partnership' in the 
ordinary business sense where each party is required 'to give an 
accounting' at the termination of the relationship .. .{l]t is somehow 
degrading to the marital relationship and to the institution of marriage itself 
to see a dissolution degenerate into a battle between accountants where the 
spoils go to the better bookkeeper." Similar views about the matrimonial 
'partnership' can be found in the following South African cases: Van Gysen 
v. Van Gysen 1986 (I) S.A.56(C), Kritzenger v. Kritzinger 1989 (1) S.A. 
67(A) and Katz v. Katz 1989 (3) S.A. l(A). 
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a legislative injunction, in treating these benefits as part of a spouse's 
estate.231 It has been asserted that South African common law has no 
principle by which a spouse's pension interest can be compulsorily 
divided on divorce232 and because of the similarity between the common 
law of Botswana and that of South Africa, the Botswana courts are 
likely to adopt this position if the issue were to come before them. 
Moreover, pensions and gratuities are mere expectancies which are to 
be realised in the future, consequently, they are not regarded as 
"property" in the proper sense of the word. One reason for this is that 
only the employee-spouse stands in a particular contractual relation to 
the pension fund to which his employer usually also contributes during 
the currency of the employment. There is a need to recognise these 
interests as property because it is a reasonable expectation of a spouse 
231 
232 
Under s. 8 of the Pensions Act 1966, pensions are generally not assignable 
or transferable except for the purpose of satisfying a debt due to Government 
or an order of any competent court for the payment of periodical sums of 
money towards the maintenance of a wife or ex-wife or minor child of the 
person to whom the pension or gratuity has been granted. 
Seep. 191 infra. 
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who is not economically strong to expect to benefit from the pension of 
the other spouse in the twilight of her years. 233 
The preparedness of the Court of Appeal in Mbenge' s case234 to use the 
concept of the universal partnership to divide the acquired assets of 
cohabitees augurs well for the future. It is hoped that in a suitable case 
a High Court will be persuaded to adopt the progressive attitude 
exhibited by the highest court in that case when it divides the 
matrimonial property of spouses married out of community of property. 
The narrow interpretation given to the provision in s. 13 of the 
Matrimonial Causes Act235 will however hamper any willingness on the 
part of the High Court to equitably readjust the property rights of the 
spouses. The operation of the doctrine of judicial precedent is well 
233 
234 
235 
The old-age pension introduced in 1996 is unlikely to compensate for the 
loss of participating in the other spouse's pension interest. See note 229 
supra. 
See p. 106 supra. 
See pp. 80-81 supra. 
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entrenched in Botswana236 and unless the Court of Appeal, the ultimate 
court in the hierarchical system of courts, has an opportunity to revisit 
the interpretation of the said section, the High Court will continue to 
employ the narrow interpretation of the section. 237 Otherwise, the 
tyranny of this narrow interpretation of s. 13 of the Matrimonial Causes 
Act can only be reversed by legislation. 
3. MARRIAGE IN COMMUNITY OF PROPERTY 
This type of matrimonial regime allows for equal division of the 
matrimonial property on divorce.238 However, such a division may be 
affected by customary law where the spouses are subject to that law. 
The application of customary law to such a division generally does not 
satisfy wives although empirical evidence suggests that a division by 
236 
237 
238 
See E.K. Quansah Introduction to the Botswana Legal System op. cit., at pp. 
34-45 and l.G. Brewer"Sources of the criminal law ofBotswana" op. cit. ,at 
p. 31. 
Although the High Court is generally not bound by its own previous 
decisions, it will follow its previous decisions to aid consistency and 
predictability of the law. See Morgan Moathode v. Kgabywana Mekgwe 
(1968-70] B.L.R. 52 at p. 53 and State v. Macheng (1968-70] B.L.R. 189 at 
p. 197 where the High Court refused to follow its previous decisions. 
See the remarks of Hannah J. in Molomo 's case at p. 88 supra. 
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means of either the common law or customary law produces the same 
results.239 The fairness of community of property in the division of 
matrimonial assets is acknowledged but it is predicated on the 
scrupulous management of the joint estate by the husband during the 
currency of the marriage. This fairness of the regime will be illusory if 
the husband dissipates the joint estate and leaves no assets at the time 
the community comes to an end or leaves only debts. There is a real 
danger of this happening under the current law which gives unrestricted 
administrative powers to the husband over the joint estate by virtue of 
his marital power.240 The reluctance of the courts to call the husband to 
account for his administration except in the most extreme cases is a 
major criticism of this type of matrimonial regime. 241 This shortcoming 
of this regime has led the Women's Affairs Unit of the Ministry of 
Home Affairs to conduct workshops to educate women on the 
advantages and disadvantages of marrying in or out of property.242 
239 
240 
241 
242 
See Griffiths "Legal duality ... " op. cit., at p. 158. 
See pp. 38-41 supra. 
See p. 40 supra. 
As part of the campaign, a booklet titled His, mine or ours - the property 
rights of women married under Botswana common law was published in 
1986 setting out the relative advantages and disadvantages of marrying in or 
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Despite these laudable efforts, the common law's insistence that the 
husband is the sole administrator of the joint estate militates against any 
exercise of rights which women may be made aware of from these 
campaigns. The law as it stands will rarely back their efforts to assert 
their rights to know how the joint estate is being administered by their 
husbands. In Moisakamo v. Moisakamo243 it was held that for a wife to 
obtain an interdict restraining her husband from disposing or otherwise 
dealing with the joint property, she had to show an actual or well-
grounded apprehension that if no interdict was granted she would suffer 
irreparable loss. Such a loss cannot be presumed but must be 
established by the applicant as an objective fact.244 It is not enough for 
the applicant to allege that she herself bona fide feared such loss. In 
most cases of maladministration by the husband such irreparable loss 
243 
244 
out of property. See also Women and the Law in Botswana op. cit. 
[1979-80] B.L.R. 131. See also pp. 8-9 and 41 supra. 
In vindictory or quasi-vindictory actions, that is actions in which the plaintiff 
claims delivery of a specific property as owner or lawful possessor, such 
irreparable loss is presumed until the contrary is proved. See the South 
African case of Stern and Ruskin NO v. Appleson 1952 (3) S.A. 800 (W) at 
pp. 810-813 per Millin J. which was relied upon by the court. In the court's 
view, there was no clear indication whether the applicant's action for the 
division of property was vindicatory or quasi-vindicatory, consequently, she 
must show irreparable loss as an objective fact before an interdict could be 
given to her. She could not do so hence the interdict was refused. 
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may be difficult to prove and so make it impossible to challenge the 
husband's administration of the joint estate. In order for the 
acknowledged fairness of this particular matrimonial property regime 
to be fully appreciated, there must be the abandonment of the concept 
of sole administration of the joint estate by the husband. A wife must 
be made to partake in the administration of the joint estate in 
consonance with the beneficial interest she has in it. 
An aspect of this regime which may affect the determination of 
matrimonial property is the forfeiture of benefit order.245 As argued 
earlier on, 246 this order is in a complete antithesis to the professed 
rationale of the Matrimonial Causes Act and must be taken to be no 
longer applicable under the Act. However, in order to leave no doubts 
as to its non-applicability under the present law, there is a need to 
expressly abolish it by legislation. 
Finally, there is also the need to extend the ambit of the joint estate by 
recognising job-related benefits, such as pensions and gratuities, as 
245 
246 
See pp. 87-89 supra. 
Ibid. 
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property and as such forming part of the joint estate.247 At present no 
such recognition exists and consequently, these benefits which are built 
up during the marriage but may only fall due after its dissolution do not 
form part of the joint estate and therefore are not susceptible to division 
when the community comes to an end. 
4. MARRIAGE UNDER CUSTOMARY LAW 
The customary law matrimonial property regime discriminates against 
women by placing them in a position of relative inequality with men in 
respect of the ownership and allocation of matrimonial property upon 
divorce.248 The Customary Courts generally consider the husband to be 
the owner of almost all property acquired during the marriage even 
where a contribution towards their acquisition has been made by the 
wife. This bias towards the husband, as was stated in Chapter Two,249 
has led to wives bringing action in the High Court to rectify what they 
247 
248 
249 
See pp. 128-130 supra. 
See p. 72 supra and A. Armstrong et al Uncovering reality - excavating 
women's rights in African family law, Women and Law in Southern Africa 
Working Paper No. 7, 1992, at p. 35. 
See p. 72 supra. 
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perceive to be unfair distribution of matrimonial property. The High 
Court has distributed such property in accordance with the relevant 
customary law. However, it has acknowledged the contemporary 
societal changes that have taken, and are taking place and has taken 
these into account in such distribution.250 There is also evidence that 
when the Customary Courts are distributing matrimonial property on 
dissolving a customary marriage, they take into account principles 
which the High Court would have used in distributing the property of 
spouses married under the common law.251 
All these point to the dissatisfaction of the application of the customary 
law by the Customary Courts and the need to rectify the situation. The 
desire to do this would seem to underlie one of the reasons given by the 
High Court in Moisakamo(2)'s case in rejecting counsel's submission 
that the court had no jurisdiction to hear a case involving the 
distribution of the property of spouses subject to customary law.252 S. 
31 of the Customary Courts Act prohibits advocates and attorneys from 
250 
251 
252 
See pp. 75-76 supra. 
See p. 71 supra. 
See [1981) B.L.R. 126 at p. 138. 
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appearing in these courts. The court in Moisakamo(2) alluded to the 
contemporary reality of Batswana men marrying women from tribes 
other than their own and from other African countries, especially 
neighbouring countries. Many of these wives are ignorant of local 
customs as non-Batswana married to Batswana men and in the court's 
opinion, "any practice which would deny these persons of the right to 
be represented by lawyers versed in local customary law when a dispute 
arises as to the disposition of their property must be discouraged. "253 
This judicial recognition of the unfairness of the proceedings in these 
courts is a significant step towards addressing a customary wife's right 
to be protected by the law. 
The customary law property regime also governs the distribution of the 
matrimonial property of spouses married under the Marriage Act but 
253 Ibid The situation is made more difficult because, although s. 2 of the 
Customary Courts Act permits members of a tribe of any other African 
country prescribed by the designated Minister to be included in the definition 
of persons subject to customary law, there is yet no such prescription - see 
p. 64 supra. It is interesting to note that the Presidential Commission on the 
Judiciary, set up on the 191h of January 1996, did not find any justifiable 
reason for any complaint against the prevailing prohibition of legal 
representation in the Customary Courts. See para. 6.8.6 of its Report (91h 
July 1997), Gaborone, Government Printer. 
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who are subject to customary law.254 The general tendency of the High 
Court in such cases is to refer the distribution to a local chief or 
Customary Court255 but invariably the case comes back to the High 
Court because of dissatisfaction with the distribution. This situation 
reinforces the need to reform the customary law especially in its 
application to the distribution of matrimonial property on divorce. A 
statutory yardstick for recognising customary law is that such a law 
should not be "incompatible with the provisions of any written law or 
contrary to morality, humanity or natural justice. "256 Although the 
phrase "contrary to morality, humanity or natural justice" has not been 
defined, it is submitted that a customary law which blatantly 
254 
255 
256 
Sees. 7(1) of the Married Persons Property Act 1971. 
The existence of this practice was acknowledged in Moisakamo v. 
Moisakamo (2) [1981] B.L.R. 126 at p. 135. See also Mfa v. Mfa MC 
Fl 12/93, unreported (1 Ph November 1996) High Court Francistown, 
Gabanakgosi v. Gabanakgosi MC F116/94, unreported {22°d November 
1996) High Court Francistown and Ruwona v. Ruwona MC F35/95, 
unreported (30th June 1997) High Court Francistown. Dicta in Lesotlho v. 
Lesotlho op. cit. suggest that if the properties consist of the kind unknown 
to customary law, such a reference will not be countenanced. In that case 
the properties included mortgage bonds which according to the court was 
unknown to customary law. Accordingly, the court abandoned the idea of 
referring the division of the property to the Customary Court. 
Sees. 2 of the Customary Courts Act Cap. 04:05. 
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discriminates against women in the division of matrimonial property, 
is at least contrary to natural justice in the sense of fairness. 
Consequently, such customary law, in the light of contemporary socio-
economic conditions, should not be upheld. This was implicitly 
recognised in Moisakamo (2}257 where the court expressed the view that 
"a rule that may have been just and suitable in a subsistence farming 
community may work grave hardship and injustice in a commercial 
farming economy." This statement hints at the flexibility and 
adaptability of customary law, characteristics which are already 
acknowledged in other African jurisdictions. A typical example of such 
recognition is the dictum of Osborne C.J. in the Nigerian case of Lewis 
. v. Bankole. 258 In that case the learned Chief Justice said: 
257 
258 
"One of the most strikingfeatures of West African native custom 
is its flexibility; it appears to have been subject to motives of 
expediency; and it shows an unquestionable adaptability to 
altered circumstances without entirely losing its character." 
Seep. 76 supra. 
[1908] 1 N.L.R. 81 at pp. 100-101. See also the dictum of Amissah J.A. (as 
he then was) inAttah v. Esson [1976] 1G.L.R.128 at p. 132. 
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It is submitted that Botswana customary law has these characteristics. 
It is only unfortunate that the superior courts have not taken advantage 
of the existing facility to shape and mould the customary law to suit the 
contemporary socio-economic circumstances of Botswana. 
5. CONCLUSION 
The efficacy of the three matrimonial regimes is far from satisfactory. 
With regard to marriages out of community of property, there is a need 
to give statutory discretion to the courts to adjust the matrimonial 
property rights of the spouses in the light of the post-divorce 
circumstances of the spouses. The exercise of sole control of the joint 
estate by husbands of marriages in community of property needs to be 
abolished and the wife given joint control of such estate. The practice 
. of referring the determination and distribution of matrimonial property 
of persons subject to customary law, who marry under the Marriage Act, 
to a Customary Court must be stopped. Such practice, though based on 
convenience, has no legal foundation. Besides, there are statutory 
provisions for the ascertainment of customary law in the High Court and 
these can and are used occasionally to resolve matters governed by 
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customary law.259 Customary law rules for distribution of matrimonial 
property on divorce must be reformed to place spouses on an equal 
footing before the Customary Courts. This reform may not be 
forthcoming in the immediate future because of the inherent 
conservatism of the House of Chiefs, a body which Parliament is 
obliged to consult on such matters. An alternative reform will be to 
make the provisions of the Matrimonial Causes Act, as it is being 
suggested to be amended, to apply specifically to customary marriages. 
This will enable the relatively fairer provisions of that Act to be applied 
to customary marriages and to overturn the view expressed in 
Mafokate 's case that the provisions of the Act do not apply to customary 
marriages. 
The detailed proposals for reforming these shortcomings will be 
discussed in chapter eight but before that is done an overview will be 
given of how matrimonial property disputes are resolved in South 
Africa, England and Ghana in order to draw lessons from these 
countries to help propose a solution to the shortcomings revealed above. 
The choice of South Africa and England for study is because of their 
259 See s. 7 of Common Law and Customary Law Act Cap. 16:01 and 
Moisakamo v. Moisakamo (2) supra. 
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long historical and political association with Botswana. The bulk of the 
present matrimonial regimes was introduced by the British with a 
significant contribution from South Africa. 260 Therefore, changes in the 
legal systems in these countries have a habit of influencing legal 
thought in Botswana. The choice of Ghana is because, being an ex-
British colonial country, it shares similar problems in this area with 
Botswana. The spirited attempts by the courts in Ghana to adapt the 
existing laws to social change should serve as an impetus to the 
Botswana courts in the face of legislative lethargy to reform. 
260 See Chapter One supra. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
AN OVERVIEW OF THE MATRIMONIAL PROPERTY 
REGIMES IN SOUTH AFRICA261 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Before 1994, the official policy of separate development created for 
Blacks in the "so-called self-governing territories" and "independent" 
TBVC262 states gave rise to pluralism of matrimonial regimes in these 
territories/states and the Republic of South Africa as it existed before 
1994. 263 On the 27th of April 1994 the Constitution of the Republic of 
South Africa Act 200 of 1993 came into effect. This Constitution by s. 
261 
262 
263 
For a detailed exposition of the matrimonial regimes, the reader is referred 
to June Sinclair An Introduction to the Matrimonial Property Act 1984, Cape 
Town, Juta & Co., 1984, Hahlo "Husband and Wife" op. cit., pp. 153-314, 
Cronje & Heaton op. cit., pp. 83-113, Van Heerden et al op. cit., 182-206 
and P.J. Visser & J.M. Potgieter Introduction to Family Law (2"d ed.), 
Kenwyn, Juta & Co., 1998 at pp. 84-154. 
This acronym refers to the former "independent" Republics of Transkei, 
Bophuthatswana, Venda and Ciskei. The self-governing territories were 
Gazankulu, KaNgwane, KwaNdebele, KwaZulu, Lebowa and Qwaqwa. 
On the pluralism of South African marriage laws, see Sinclair assisted by 
Heaton, op. cit., at Chap. 3. 
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1 Part I of the first schedule redefined the national territory of South 
Africa by creating nine provinces which absorbed the then existing self-
governing and "independent" states thus creating one sovereign 
democratic state within which national laws apply. The 1993 
Constitution was repealed by schedule 7 of the Constitution of South 
Africa Act 108 of 1996 which came into effect on the 4th of February 
1997. S. 1 of the 1996 Constitution reaffirmed and retained the 
reunified South African Republic and provided for the continuance of 
existing laws until modified or repealed.264 The Justice Laws 
Rationalisation Act 18 of 1996 has however, repealed and amended 
most of the laws in the former self-governing and "independent" states 
to bring them into line with the law in the rest of the country. This 
chapter will therefore discuss mainly the matrimonial property regimes 
existing in what has been called the old Republic,265 that is, the 
Republic of South Africa as it existed before 1994 with passing 
references, where appropriate, to the regimes in the self-governing and 
"independent" states. The discussion will begin with an exposition of 
264 
265 
See Sched. Six Item 2(1) of the Constitution. Unless otherwise stated 
further references to the Constitution are to the 1996 version. 
See Sinclair assisted by Heaton op. cit., at p. 207. 
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the matrimonial property systems in civil marriages followed by those 
in marriages under customary law. 
2. MATRIMONIAL PROPERTY REGIMES IN CIVIL MARRIAGES 
(a) Historical background. 
Prior to the commencement of the Matrimonial Property Act 88 of 
1984,266 there were, for white, coloured and Asian people, two main 
matrimonial property regimes from which parties proposing to enter 
into marriage could choose. Once the choice has been made the 
immutability doctrine applied, that is, the matrimonial property regime 
chosen at the time of the marriage could not be changed during the 
subsistence of the marriage by an act inter vivos, either by excluding or 
varying community of property, or by cancelling or modifying an 
antenuptial contract. 267 
266 
267 
The Act came into force on the 1'1• of November 1984 - see Proclamation 
RI58 GG 9413 ofJlh. September 1984 Reg. Gaz. 3322. This Act has now 
been extended to the whole of the national territory of South Africa by s. 
2(1) of Act 18of1996. 
See Union Government (Minister of Finance) v. Larkan op. cit., at p. 224 
per Innes C.J., Edelstein v. Edelstein op. cit., at p. 15 per Van den Reever 
J.A. and Honey v. Honey op. cit., at p. 611 per Du Plessis J. Until 1956 it 
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The two matrimonial property regimes were: 
(1) Marriage in community of property which conferred on the husband 
the marital power over his wife and 
(2) Marriage with an antenuptial contract (marriage out of community 
of property) which excluded all forms of sharing and the marital power. 
This regime created complete separation of property. 
There were other possible matrimonial regimes but these were seldom 
used. 268 Of the above two regimes, the community of property regime 
268 
was possible in Natal to enter into a postnuptial contract excluding 
community of property and profit and loss but not the marital power. This 
was by virtue ofs. 7 of Law 22of1863 (N) ands. 2 of Law 14of1882 (N). 
These two laws were repealed bys. 32 of the General Law Amendment Act 
50of1956. See Lee & Honore op. cit., at para. 78. Ss. 1, 3, 4, 5 and 6 of 
Act 50of1956 were repealed bys. 3 of Act 18of1996. 
For example, spouses could agree in their antenuptial contract that there 
would be only a community of profit and loss between them. In such a case 
each spouse retained as his private estate all property owned by him at the 
marriage and all property acquired during the marriage which was not 
regarded as profit. The spouses became co-owners of a joint estate 
consisting of all acquisitions considered as profit, as diminished from time 
to time by outgoings regarded as loss. All three estates were administered by 
the husband by virtue of his marital power. Hahlo "Husband and Wife" op. 
cit, commented in his 4th edition that this type of matrimonial regime is not 
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was considered as the primary regime. In other words, if the parties did 
not expressly enter into an antenuptial contract excluding the 
community of property regime, the community of property regime 
automatically applied to their marriage.269 Marriage out of community 
therefore was a secondary regime. 
The Matrimonial Property Act 88 of 1984 introduced a third regime for 
marriages celebrated after the commencement of the Act by persons 
from the racial groups mentioned above. This regime, called the accrual 
system, applies automatically if community was excluded in an 
antenuptial contract, unless the contract also excluded the accrual 
system. 270 The fundamental principle underlying the accrual system is 
that: 
269 
270 
a living institution in South Africa. 
See Mograbi v. Mograbi 1921 A.D. 274 at p. 275 per Innes C.J., Njobe v. 
Njobe & Dube 1950 (4) S.A. 545 (C) at p. 500 per Van Winsen A.J., 
Edelstein v. Edelstein op. cit,. at p. 10 per Van den Reever J.A., Brummund 
v. Brummund's Estate 1993 (2) S.A. 494 (Nm) at pp. 498-499 per Levy, J. 
and Hahlo op. cit., at p. 157 especially note 1. 
See s. 2 of the 1984 Act. 
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"one spouse contributes financially and otherwise to the growth 
of the other spouse 's estate and should therefore be entitled to 
share in that spouse's estate on the dissolution of the 
marriage". 271 
However, the 1984 Act did not change the primacy of the community 
of property regime and therefore it will be discussed first followed by 
the out of community regime. 
(i) The nature of the community of property regime 
Community of property brings together, subject to certain exceptions, 272 
the property of the spouses into a joint estate without the necessity for 
271 
272 
See the South African Law Commission's Report RP26/1982 titled Report 
pertaining to the matrimonial property law with special reference to the 
Matrimonial Affairs Act, 19 53, the status of the married woman, and the law 
of succession in so far as it affects the spouses at para. 17 .1. 
For example, an asset which a third party gives or bequeaths to one of the 
spouses with a proviso that it shall be excluded from the community does not 
fall into the joint estate. See Erasmus v. Erasmus 1942 A.D. 265 and 
Cuming v. Cuming 1945 A.D. 20 I. For a full list of assets excluded from 
the joint estate, see Hahlo "Husband and Wife" op. cit. at pp. 164-169, 
Cronje & Heaton op. cit. at pp. 86-89, Lee & Honore op. cit., at para. 81, 
Visser & Potgieter op. cit., at pp. 97-100 and The Law of South Africa vol. 
16 (1992), T.J. Scott (ed.) at para. 78. 
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delivery of movables or transfer of immovables. This occurs by 
operation oflaw.273 
The exact legal nature of the regime has been a matter for debate. A 
leading authority has described the position thus: 
273 
274 
"As many as ten theories concerning the legal nature of the 
matrimonial community of property have been distinguished 
... but there are four main ones: see generally Van Wyk Power 
to Dispose274 at 27, 54. Firstly there is the view, popular 
particularly with nineteenth century French authors, that there 
is indeed no 'community' and that the husband is the sole owner 
of the 'joint' estate while the wife has only a spes to receive half 
the estate at dissolution. The theory, which has a very weak 
historical foundation and which is also based on a confusion 
See pp. 37-38 supra. See also Rosenburg v. Dry's Executors & Ors. 1911 
A.D. 679 at pp. 688-689, Ex parte Menzies et Uxor 1993 (3) S.A. 799 (C) 
at p. 807, Hahlo "Husband and Wife" op. cit., at pp. 162-163, Joubert (ed.) 
The Law of South Africa vol. 16 para.76 and Lee & Honore op. cit. at para. 
80. 
This refers to the LL.D. thesis of Prof. Van Wyk, titled The Power to 
Dispose of the Assets of the Universal Matrimonial Community of Property, 
Leiden, 1976. 
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between the joint estate itself and the administration thereof 
has been consciously propounded in four South African 
decisions, viz. ex parte Hoekstra 1923 O.P.D. 92 at 100; 
Oberholzer v. Oberho(zer 1947 (3) S.A. 294 (O); Wolfaardt v. 
Symington & De Kok 1968 (3) S.A. 332 (O); Van Schalkwykv. 
Folscher 1974 (4) S.A. 967 (NC). There are also signs that 
many of the decisions dealing with the basis of the wife 's 
capacity as a public mercatrix and in rebus domesticis were 
unconsciously influenced by this discredited approach. .. The 
Appellate Division expressly rejected this "sole ownership" 
theory in De Wet NO v. Jurgens 1970 (3) S.A. 38 (A), but it 
proved its surprising resilience by reappearing in Van 
Schalkwyk v. Folscher 1974 (4) S.A. 967 (NC) ... (Secondly.) 
Popular with many Romanising Dutch authors was the view 
that the matrimonial community is but an example of a societas 
(partnership) ... Apart from the fact that the matrimonial 
community is far more encompassing than any partnership, the 
modern partnership (unlike the Roman societas) is a 
commercial undertaking with which the matrimonial community 
has little in common. .. The third theory sees the community 
between spouses as a legal persona, even if only in a 
275 
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rudimentary form. It has found no support in South Africa ... but 
was propagated in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries by 
various French and German writers. This approach cannot be 
reconciled with our positive law: our universal community does 
not display the degree of independence to be expected from a 
separate entity, particularly not in respect of the spouses 'joint 
debts. The final (and, it is submitted, correct) view, which is 
also supported by the vast majority of our decisions, is that the 
matrimonial community is but an example of co-ownership: see, 
e.g. Rosenberg v. Dry's Executors 1911 A.D. 679, Union 
Government v. Leask's Executors 1918 A.D. 447, 457-458; 
Estate Sayle v. CIR 1945 A.D. 388, 395 ... However, this co-
ownership is not the normal Roman ''free" co-ownership 
(communio pro partibus indivisis) with.freely disposable shares 
and the possibility to demand a division at any time, but can be 
described as "tied up" co-ownership ... "275 
See Lee & Honore op. cit., at para. 80. See also Hahlo "Husband and Wife" 
op. cit., at pp. 158-159, Annual Survey of South African Law (1974) at pp. 
72-73 and Van Heerden et al op. cit., at pp. 185-194. 
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(ii) The joint estate 
Despite the debate about its exact nature, it is generally accepted that 
this type of matrimonial regime entails that husband and wife become 
co-owners in undivided half-shares of all the assets they both possess 
at the moment of their marriage, as well as of all the assets acquired by 
them stante matrimonio.216 Upon the conclusion of the marriage, the 
separate estates of the husband and wife are combined into one joint 
estate.277 All antenuptial debts and assets of the parties fall into the joint 
estate, as do all debts and assets acquired or negotiated by any one of 
the spouses after the conclusion of the marriage.278 However, it has 
276 
277 
278 
See Estate Sayle v. Commissioner for Inland Revenue 1945 A.D. 388 at pp. 
395-396 per Watermeyer C.J., Lee & Honore op. cit, at para. 80 and the 
authorities cited therein, Cronje & Heaton op. cit., at pp. 85-86 and Hahlo 
"Husband and Wife" op. cit., at pp. 157-161. 
Certain assets are excluded from the joint estate. See note 272 supra. 
See Estate Sayle v. Commissioner for Inland Revenue 1945 A.D. 388 at pp. 
395-396, Cronje & Heaton op. cit., at p. 85, Hahlo "Husband and Wife" op. 
cit., at pp. 157-158. However, certain assets may be excluded from the joint 
estate. These include those excluded by will or deed of donation or those 
subject to afideicommissum or usufruct. See note 272 supra. 
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been argued279 and judicially accepted,280 that it is incorrect to say that 
the spouses are co-owners in undivided half-shares.281 The ownership 
should rather be considered as one in which the spouses have tied-up 
shares, which shares are not only undivided but also indivisible, unless 
a division is ordered by the court. At the termination of the marriage, 
all liabilities are settled from the joint estate and the balance of the joint 
estate is then distributed equally between the spouses. 
(iii) The administration of the joint estate 
Before 1984 the administration of the joint estate was the exclusive 
preserve of the husband by virtue of his having the marital power.282 He 
279 
280 
281 
282 
A.H. van Wyk Power to Dispose ... op. cit., at p. 44. 
See Ex parte Menzies et Uxor op. cit., at p. 811 per King J. 
Roman-Dutch law distinguishes between "free" co-ownership and "tied" co-
ownership. In the former, the parties have undivided shares which are freely 
divisible at their insistence during the subsistence of the co-ownership, 
whilst in the latter case the undivided shares are indivisible during the course 
of the co-ownership. Co-ownership arising out of community of property 
falls under the "tied" ownership category. Seep. 151 supra. 
See pp. 39-41 supra and Hahlo "Husband and Wife" op. cit., Chap.12. The 
marital power has now been abolished. This was done in phases. The initial 
abolition on the 1st of November 1984 bys. 11 of the Matrimonial Property 
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could buy and sell assets, pledge assets or burden them with a mortgage, 
collect moneys on the behalf of the estate, pay debts out of the estate 
and, in general, conclude any contract which would bind the joint estate 
without his wife's consent or knowledge.283 The wife's position, on the 
other hand, was equated to that of a minor. She had only limited 
capacity to act in respect of the joint estate. For example, with the 
consent of her husband, she could conclude a contract which would 
283 
Act 88 of 1984 applied to the old Republic of South Africa, that is, the 
country as it was before the re-integration of the TBVC states and the self-
goveming territories into South Africa by the 1993 Constitution. It was 
followed by its abolition in marriages by Blacks, celebrated after the 2"d 
December 1988: s. l(e) of Marriage and Matrimonial Property Law 
Amendment Act 3 of 1988 repealed s. 22( 6) of the Black Administration Act 
38 of 1927, which rendered marriages of Africans automatically out of 
community of property with the marital power. The General Law Fourth 
Amendment Act 132 of 1993 abolished, as from 1st December 1993, the 
marital power in all existing marriages within the old Republic regardless of 
the date on which they were celebrated. Finally, when the Justice Laws 
Rationalisation Act 18 of 1996 extended, on 1st of April 1997, the operation 
of the Matrimonial Property Act 88 of 1984 to the whole of the re-unified 
Republic of South Africa, the marital power ceased to exist in South African 
matrimonial law. See J. Heaton "Family Law and the Bill of Rights" in Bill 
of Rights Compendium, Durban, Butterworths, 1988 at para. 3C21 esp. note 
1. 
See Cronje & Heaton op. cit., at p. 95. See also Estate Sayle v. 
Commissioner for Inland Revenue 1945 A.D. 388 at p. 396 per Watermeyer 
C.J. 
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bind the joint estate.284 Without her husband's consent, she could 
conclude a contract which brought only rights and no liabilities to the 
joint estate285 or one for the purchase of household necessaries. 286 Also, 
where the wife was engaged as a public trader (publica mercatrix)281 
with the consent, expressed or implied, of her husband, she could 
validly enter into contracts connected with such trade which would be 
binding on the joint estate.288 However, if she entered into a contract 
unconnected with her business, the joint estate would not be bound.289 
284 
285 
286 
287 
288 
289 
See Pretorius v. Hack 1925 T.P.D. 643 at p. 647 per Curlewis J.P. and 
Hahlo "Husband and Wife" op. cit., at pp. 199-201. 
SeeRautenbachv. Groenewaldl9ll T.P.D.1148atp.1150perWesselsJ. 
This capacity to contract for household necessaries applied to married 
women in general irrespective of the matrimonial regime applicable to their 
marriage. 
This referred to a woman married in or out of community of property who 
was subject to her husband's marital power and who publicly conducted a 
business undertaking or a profession in her own name and with her 
husband's consent. See Grob/er v. Schmilg and Freeman 1923 A.D. 496 at 
p. 501. 
See Holton v. Cato (1901) 22 N.L.R. 152. 
Ibid See also Grob/er v. Schmilg and Freeman supra. 
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She generally had no locus standi injudicio that is to say, she could not 
conduct a civil action unassisted by her husband. 290 She could also not 
be appointed to certain offices without her husband's consent. For 
example, it used to be law that she could not be appointed as a director 
of a company without her husband's consent but this has since been 
changed by statute.291 
The position of a wife married in community of property was clearly an 
untenable one. It was ameliorated somewhat by the protection afforded 
her by the common law against her husband's abuse of the marital power. 
The common law, for example, gave her (or her estate) a right of 
recourse against him (or his estate) on the dissolution of the marriage 
where he had made donations out of the joint estate in deliberate fraud 
290 
291 
See Pretorius v. Hack op. cit., at p. 647 and South African Mutual & 
General Co. Ltd v. Bali N.O. 1970 (2) S.A. 696 (A) at p. 705. In certain 
exceptional cases however, such as those relating to her separate property, 
she could litigate without her husband's assistance. See Erasmus v. 
Erasmus 1942 A.D. 157 at pp. 161-162. The rule did not apply to criminal 
proceedings. See Voet Commentarius ad Pandectas (The Hague 1698-
1704) 5.1.17. 
S. 218 (1) (b) of the Companies Act 61of1973, under which such consent 
was required, has now been amended to delete this requirement. See s. 24 
General Law Fourth Amendment Act 132 of 1993. 
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of his wife or her heirs.292 It was also possible to bring an actio Pauliana 
utilis (an action to revoke a donation made to defraud the wife) against 
the third party to whom the donation had been made. In appropriate 
circumstances the wife could obtain an interdict restraining the husband 
from dealing with or alienating joint assets.293 
The common-law protection, however, proved ineffective.294 For 
example, it was held in Ne! v. Cockcroft and A nor., 295 on the authority of 
Voet and Van der Keessel,296 that the actio Pauliana utilis was not 
292 
293 
294 
295 
296 
See Govender v. Chetty op. cit., at p. 1080 per Berman J. On what will 
constitute fraud in this context, see Pretorius v. Pretorius' Estate & Anor. 
1948 (1) S.A. 250 (A.D.) at pp. 255-256 per Schreiner J.A. For the 
prerequisites which a wife must prove to succeed, see Laws v. Laws & Ors. 
1972 (1) S.A. 321 (W) at pp. 324-325 per Margo J. 
See Cullamah v. Munean 1941 N.P.D. 163. 
See Reyneke v. Reyneke 1990 (3) S.A. 927 (E) at p. 930. 
1972 (3) S.A. 592 (T) at p. 595 per De Wet A.J. In Ex parte Van 
Kraayenberg; Ex parte Ahlers NO 1946 T.P.D. 686 at p. 689, Malan J. 
expressed the view that there exists a "considerable body of authority 
pointing in the opposite direction" to the view expressed by Voet, although 
he did not specify what it is because he considered that this was unnecessary 
for the purposes of the proceedings before him. 
Johannes Voet (1647-1713) and Dionysius Godefridus van der Keessel 
( 1738-1816) were Dutch jurists whose works on Roman-Dutch Law are 
frequently cited in South African courts. 
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available to a wife while the marriage subsisted, or at any rate, while the 
joint estate remained undivided.297 Consequently, the legislature 
intervened by restricting the husband's power to alienate or deal with 
certain categories of immovable and movable property.298 In 1984 a 
process was initiated which culminated in the marital power being 
abolished for all marriages in 1997. 299 
297 
298 
299 
In Reyneke v. Reyneke supra at pp. 930-931, Jones J. criticized this rule as 
unlikely to afford any relief of substance to the wife. He expressed the view 
that it seems illogical to give a wife the right to recover community assets 
from a transferee who takes in bad faith, with full knowledge of the fraud, 
but to delay her ability to enforce that right until dissolution of the joint 
estate. This may take place many years later by which time the right may be 
useless. See C.P. Joubert (1972) Annual Survey of South African Law 122 
where a call is made for legislative intervention to allow such actions during 
the marriage. 
See ss. I and 2 of the Matrimonial Affairs Act 37of1953. This Act has 
now been extended to the former areas of the Republic covered by the 
"independent" and self-governing states bys. 2 (I) of Act 18of1996. See 
also p. 170 infra. 
See note 282 supra and pp. 173-177 infra. 
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(iv) The nature of the out of community of property regime 
As indicated above,300 community of property automatically followed the 
conclusion of a civil marriage. To exclude the automatic application of 
the community of property regime, parties to a civil marriage needed to 
enter into an antenuptial contract specifically excluding community of 
property and profit and loss and the marital power of the husband.301 
(v) The nature of an antenuptial contract 
There are no formalities for the validity of the . contract between the 
parties inter partes.302 However, because third parties may also have an 
interest to know what the patrimonial position of the married couple is, 
the law requires that the contract should comply with certain prescribed 
300 
301 
302 
Seep. 147. 
In Roman-Dutch common law there were a variety of forms of antenuptial 
contracts but these subsequently became crystallized into a standard form 
document excluding the three elements stated in the text. See H.R. Hahlo 
"A hundred years of marriage law in South Africa" (1959) Acta Juridic a 47 
at p. 54. The standard form antenuptial contract is the one invariably used 
in practice. 
See Ex parte Spinazze 1985 (3) S.A. 650 (A) at p. 658 and Hahlo "Husband 
and Wife" op. cit., pp. 261-262. 
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formalities for it to be valid against third parties.303 Failure to comply 
with the formal requirements renders the contract not binding on third 
parties, that this, parties other than the spouses and their estate. 304 Other 
persons may also be parties to the contract, for example, if a succession 
clause is included in the antenuptial contract, the beneficiaries may be 
parties to the contract.305 
The antenuptial contract is not a contract in the commercial sense. Its 
primary purpose is not to create obligations but rather to determine the 
matrimonial property system between the spouses by excluding either 
partially or wholly, the normal consequences of marriage.306 
303 
304 
305 
306 
These formalities are set out in s. 87 of the Deeds Registries Act 4 7 of 193 7. 
See generally, Ex parte Kloosman 1947 (1) S.A. 342 (T) and Ex parte 
Spinazze 1983 (4) S.A. 751 (T). 
SeeExparte Executors Estate Everard 1938 T.P.D 190 at pp. 195-197. For 
the different forms succession clauses may take, see The Law of South Africa 
vol. 16, (1992) T.J. Scott (ed.) at para. 151. 
See Cronje & Heaton op. cit., pp. 107-108 and note 91 supra. Cf the dicta 
of Stegmann J. in Mathabathe v. Mathabathe 1987 (3) S.A. 45 at pp. 511 
and 521 where the learned judge held that the term antenuptial contract has 
both narrow and broad meanings. In its broad meaning it could be applied 
to a pre-marital agreement relating to the intended marriage which does not 
deal with proprietary rights expressly or tacitly and which leaves them to be 
dealt with by implication of law. This view of an antenuptial contract was 
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Anything that is legal, not contrary to public policy or good morals may 
be included in an antenuptial contract.307 Thus, a spouse may make a 
donation to the other spouse in an antenuptial contract.308 Such a 
donation may be made conditional; for example, it may revert to the 
donor on the occurrence of a certain event. This type of condition may 
be embodied in a reversion clause and may affect the distribution of 
property between the spouses on divorce.309 In Cumming v. Cumming3 10 
the spouses' antenuptial contract included a clause which provided that 
the marriage settlement made in favour of the wife would revert to the 
husband in the event of the spouses' separation, judicial or otherwise, 
307 
308 
309 
310 
rejected by Coetzee Dep. J.P. in Milbourn v. Milbourn 1987 (3) S.A. 62 (W) 
atp. 65B. 
See Hahlo "Husband and Wife" op. cit., at p. 259 and Cronje & Heaton op. 
cit., at p. 113. 
Prior to the enactment of the Matrimonial Property Act 88 of 1984, the law 
prohibited any donation between husband and wife married out of 
community of property but this prohibition did not apply to donations 
contained in a properly registered antenuptial contract. S. 22 of the 1984 
Act abrogated the prohibition of donations. See note 342 infra. 
However, s. 7(3) of the Divorce Act 70 of 1979 now gives the court a 
discretion to redistribute the assets of certain spouses on divorce. See pp. 
207-226 infra. 
1984 (4) S.A. 585 (T) 
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irrespective of who was responsible for the separation. The spouses were 
later divorced and the court held that the reversion clause was valid and 
not contrary to public policy. 
(vi) The estates of the spouses 
If the spouses validly execute an antenuptial contract, the effect is that 
two separate estates are created, namely: 
(i) the separate estate of the husband comprising all assets and liabilities 
which he had before conclusion of the marriage, as well as all assets and 
liabilities which he acquires or incurs thereafter and 
(ii) the separate estate of the wife comprising all assets and liabilities 
which she had before conclusion of the marriage, as well as all assets and 
liabilities which she acquires or incurs thereafter. 311 
311 Under s. 21(2)(a) of the Matrimonial Property Act 88 of 1984, spouses 
married "in terms of an antenuptial contracf' before the commencement of 
the Act could, by a notarial contract, for an initial period of two years which 
was subsequently extended for another two years for whites, coloureds and 
Asians, introduce the accrual system by an application to the court. 
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The result of this is that the spouses are in the same position as they were 
before they got married,312 except that if they are minors in age they 
became majors in law.313 
(vii) The administration of the separate estates 
The separate estates are managed separately by each spouse without 
reference to one another except in cases where the husband's marital 
power was not excluded. Under this exception, the husband 
administered his own estate as well as that of the wife.314 
(viii) The termination of the antenuptial contract 
The antenuptial contract comes to an end when all the obligations arising 
under it have been carried out or have been terminated by a court 
312 
313 
314 
See Cronje & Heaton op. cit., at p. 117. 
See Hahlo "Husband and Wife" op. cit., at p. 128. 
See Erasmus v. Erasmus op. cit., at p. 271 per Tindall J.A., Estate Watkins-
Pitchford v. Commissioner of Inland Revenue 1955 (2) S.A. 437 (A) at p. 
460 per Van den Reever J .A. and Hahlo "Husband and Wife" op. cit., at p. 
293. The marital power has since been abolished. See note 282 supra. 
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ordering a party to forfeit benefits under it. 315 Thus, the dissolution of the 
marriage will not terminate the contract if there is some outstanding 
obligation, such as a marriage settlement which is yet to be implemented. 
On divorce however, each spouse takes his or her separate estate, 
including whatever was settled on him or her under the antenuptial 
contract.316 But under s. 7(1) of Act 70of1979, the spouses may agree 
on their proprietary rights and such an agreement may be incorporated in 
the order granting the divorce. Except for debts incurred for household 
necessaries, the spouses are not liable for each other's debts.317 
315 
316 
317 
For example, under s. 9 ofDivorce Act 70of1979. See further pp. 194-200 
infra. 
Marriage settlements can be included in antenuptial contracts. They are gifts 
given by a spouse to the other in consideration of the marriage. They take 
a variety of forms, such as one of the spouses undertaking to settle a specific 
asset like a house or an insurance policy on the other or creating a trust in 
favour of the other. See Estate McDonald's Trustee 1915 A.D. 491 at pp. 
499 and 507 respectively, Ex parte Orchison 1952 (3) S.A. 66 Cn, Sinclair 
v. Sinclair 1935 E.D.L. 359 and Dann v. Dann 1961 (4) S.A. 437 (D). 
SeeRosengartenv. O'Brien 1912 T.P.D. 834, Williamsonv. Wagenaar 1940 
E.D.L. 244 ands. 23(5) of the Matrimonial Property Act 88of1984. 
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(ix) Readjusting the property rights of the spouses on divorce 
The courts had very limited discretion in readjusting the proprietary 
rights of the spouses on divorce. Such limited discretion was exercised 
in the area of forfeiture ofbenefits.318 In Watt v. Watt3 19 such benefits 
were held to be fixed at marriage by the terms of the spouses' antenuptial 
contract. In that case the parties were married out of community of 
property. The plaintiff (husband) had donated a house to his wife during 
the course of the marriage. The parties were in agreement that the 
plaintiff alone had contributed to the purchase price of the property as 
well as to the moneys expended on improvements. They wanted the court 
to resolve the question whether the house was a patrimonial benefit of the 
marriage as envisaged bys. 9(1) of the Divorce Act 70of1979. The 
court held that the house, its improvements as well as the escalation in 
its value, were not patrimonial benefits of the marriage. In Koza v. 
Koza320 the court accepted, without deciding the issue, that the 
318 
319 
320 
See Opperman v. Opperman 1962 (1) S.A. 456 (SWA) and Sinclair (1981) 
98 South African Law Journal 469 at pp. 472-473. 
1984 (2) S.A. 455 (W) at p. 460 approving the dictum of Van den Heever J. 
in Rousalis v. Rousalis 1980 (3) S.A. 446 (C) at p. 450E. 
1982 (3) S.A. 462 (T) at p. 465 per McCreath J. 
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patrimonial benefits of a marriage out of community of property are not 
restricted to those conferred in the antenuptial contract. There is 
therefore uncertainty as to the point in time when the patrimonial benefits 
of a marriage out of community of property should be determined. 321 The 
view has however, been expressed that the weight of Roman-Dutch 
authority support the view that the patrimonial benefits of a marriage out 
of community of property are fixed at marriage by the terms of the 
parties' antenuptial contract. 322 
321 
322 
Cf Persad v. Persad 1989 (4) S.A. 685 (D) where in a marriage in 
community of property it was held, per Didcott J. at p. 687, that a 
postnuptial property (a lease) qualified as a patrimonial benefit. One of the 
reasons which influenced this conclusion was that under the policy of the 
Local Authority which granted the lease in question, leases were granted 
only to family units and consequently, it would not have granted the lease 
but for the parties being married. The lease was therefore a benefit derived 
from the marriage and accordingly a benefit of the marriage capable of being 
the subject of a forfeiture order. 
See Cronje & Heaton op. cit., at p. 151 note 70. See also Dawson v. 
Dawson (1892) 9 S.C. 446, Celliers v. Celliers 1904 T.S. 926, Ferguson v. 
Ferguson 1906 E.D.C. 218, Ki/roe v. Ki/roe 1928 W.L.D. 112 and Swi/ v. 
Swil 1978 (1) S.A. 790 (W). Support for a wide interpretation of"benefits 
of the marriage" in the context of forfeiture of benefits has been expressed 
by Hahlo. See "When is a benefit not a benefit?" ( 1984) South African Law 
Journal 456. See also Sinclair & Kaganas (1984) Annual Survey of South 
African Law at p. 110 et seq. 
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The absence of a discretion to readjust the proprietary rights of the 
spouses created problems for the spouse, usually the wife, who was in a 
weaker financial position on a dissolution of the marriage by death or 
divorce. In the event of a divorce, a wife who had not accumulated an 
estate of her own could not partake in the estate of her husband as she 
had no right to share in the growth of such estate.323 The court did not 
have a discretion to give her any share of the husband's estate. 
Consequently, she was left with only a possible claim for maintenance 
from her ex-husband or to prove that a universal partnership324 existed 
323 
,324 
See Beira v. Beira 1990 (3) S.A. 802 (W) at pp. 804-805 per Leveson J. 
explaining the mischief against which the redistribution of assets provisions 
introduced bys. 36 of the Matrimonial Property Act 1984 into the Divorce 
Act 1979 were aimed. 
This is a partnership in which the partners jointly agree to contribute to the 
common fund of the partnership the whole of their property both present and 
future. The requirements for the establishment of this partnership are: ( 1) 
each partner should bring something into the partnership, be it money or 
skill~ (2) the business of the partnership should be carried on for the benefit 
of both parties, (3) the object should be to make profit and (4) the 
partnership contract should be legal. See Isaacs v. Isaacs 1949 (1) S.A. 952 
(C) at pp. 955-956, Rhodesia Railways & Ors. v. Commissioner of Taxes 
1925 A.D. 438 atp. 465,Joubertv. Tarry& Co. 1915 T.P.D. 277 atp. 279, 
Muhlmann v. Muhlmann 1981 (4) S.A. 632 (W) confirmed on appeal in 
1984 (3) S.A. 102 (A) and Pezzutto v. Dreyer op. cit. 
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between herself and the husband. Such claims of universal partnership 
hardly succeeded.325 
(x) Civil marriages of Blacks 
The Black Administration Act 38of1927 regulated the civil marriages 
of Blacks. S. 22(6) of this Act, as interpreted by, the then Appellate 
Division in 1946,326 made such marriages automatically out of 
community of property and of profit and loss but with the retention of the 
marital power. To exclude the automatic application of the regime of out 
of community, parties could make a declaration to that effect within one 
month prior to the marriage, provided that the intended husband was not 
a partner in a customary marriage with another woman at the time of the 
marriage. The reason for this arrangement was that the Black community 
was allegedly accustomed to a matrimonial property dispensation other 
325 
326 
See dicta in Beira v. Beira supra. 
See Ex parte Minister of Native Affairs: In re Molefe v. Molefe 1946 AD. 
315. See also Ngwenya v. Smits NO 1942 W.L.D. 234, Mpushu v. Mjolo 
1976 (3) S.A. 606 (E) and R. v. Silas "1958 (3) S.A. 253 (E). The said s. 
22(6) has since been abolished, see note 282 supra. See also pp. 250-253 
infra. 
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than community of property and that this type of matrimonial regime was 
alien to it. 327 
S. 22(6) of the 1927 Act was also aimed at protecting customary wives 
and their children against the claims of a second woman with whom the 
man contracted a civil marriage. 328 This had to be done because a civil 
marriage by a husband of a customary "union" to another woman 
automatically dissolved the customary "union" existing between him and 
his customary wife. Consequently, she and her children became 
"discarded"329 as a result of the civil marriage and in order to protect 
them, s. 22(7) of the Black Administration Act provided that the civil 
marriage in no way affected the material rights of the partner of the 
customary union or any issue thereof. 
327 
328 
329 
See Sinclair assisted by Heaton op. cit., at pp. 227 n. 55 and 228. The 
learned authors also argue thats. 22(6) of the 1927 Act applies to couples 
of which only the husband is Black. See also N.S. Peart "Civil or Christian 
marriage and customary unions: the legal position of the 'discarded' spouse 
and children" (1983) XVI Comparative and International Law Journal of 
Southern Africa 39 at p. 55. 
See Cronje & Heaton op. cit., at p. 85 n. 10 and Seymour's Customary law 
in Southern Africa (S1h. ed.) by J.C. Bekker, Cape Town, Juta & Co., 1989 
atp. 250. 
See Sinclair assisted by Heaton op. cit., at p. 227 n. 55 and Peart op. cit. 
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(xi) Shortcomings of the matrimonial property regimes 
The Matrimonial Affairs Act 37of1953 attempted to address perceived 
shortcomings in the community of property regime but although the 
attempt proved significant, it did not go far enough to ameliorate the 
position of women who were subject to the marital power. The Act 
retained community of property and profit and loss and the marital power 
but conferred upon the wife a modicum of independent legal capacity, 
with a corresponding diminution in the marital power of the husband. 
Subsequent amendments made to the Act by the General Law Further 
Amendment Act 93 of 1962 and the Matrimonial Affairs Amendment 
Act 13 of 1966, enabled the wife, inter alia, to protect immovable 
property which she had brought into the marriage or acquired out of her 
own earnings or by gift or inheritance against alienation and 
hypothecation by the husband and gave her control of her own earnings 
and savings. 
Despite these reforms, the matrimonial property regimes remained in an 
unsatisfactory state and this prompted a commentator to suggest that the 
legislature should critically consider reforms from abroad, necessitated 
by altered social values, especially as to the place and function of the 
171 
wife, in order to help produce a system suitable for modern South 
African conditions. 330 
In 1982, the South African Law Commission identified the following 
shortcomings in the matrimonial property regimes:331 
(a) The regime of complete separation of property did not allow the 
spouses to share the assets which they acquired during the subsistence of 
the marriage by their joint efforts.332 It was particularly objectionable 
that a wife could not claim, as of right, a share of property acquired by 
her husband with her assistance. 
(b) The position of a wife married out of community of property was 
further complicated by the fact that, unlike her children, she had no claim 
330 
331 
332 
D.L.C. Miller, "Pointers for possible reform of South African matrimonial 
property law" (1974) 91 South African Law Journal 390 at p. 395. 
See its Report RP26/1982 op. cit. 
Ibid. at para. 12.1.4. It cited the following sources, inter alia, to back up this 
shortcoming: The dictum of De Wet J. in £,x parte Podlas 1935 W.L.D. 14 
at p. 16, Report of The Women's Legal Disabilities Commission (UG 
18/1949), paras. 119 and 121, Hahlo, "Husband and Wife" op. cit., (4th ed.) 
at p. 17 and Miller op. cit. 
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to support from her husband's estate where the marriage was dissolved 
by death. 333 
( c) The prohibition of donations between spouses married out of 
community stante matrimonio was an anachronism in the contemporary 
setting.334 In the Commission's view: 
333 
334 
335 
"It is clear not only that the ratio for the prohibition of donations 
between spouses has fallen away in modern times, but even more 
that the retention of the prohibition can in certain circumstances 
give rise to extremely unfust consequences, particularly as 
regards the economically weaker spouse. For instance, a 
husband could reclaim any 'pocket money' he had given his wife, 
or any amount saved by her out of her household allowance on 
the ground that it constituted an unlawful donation. "335 
Para. 12.1.5. See now the Maintenance of Surviving Spouses Act 27 of 
1990 which conferred such a right on the surviving spouse. 
Para. 12.4.1. 
Para. 12.4.4. 
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( d) The exercise of the marital power by a husband subjected the wife to 
several disabilities. For instance, there was no general rule that the 
husband should exercise his marital power in the interest of his wife. 
Thus he was, in principle, entitled to exercise the marital power to his 
own advantage. Furthermore, if the husband were to deliberately damage 
or destroy assets of the joint estate, his wife would have no claim against 
him for damages, and he would not be committing the crime of malicious 
injury to her property.336 
The Law Commission made a number of recommendations for the 
reform of the matrimonial property law.337 These recommendations were 
embodied in the Matrimonial Property Act 88 of 1984. 
(xii) The 1984 reforms of the matrimonial property regimes 
The reforms initiated by the Matrimonial Property Act 1984 retained the 
universal community of property as the primary matrimonial property 
regime in South Africa whilst introducing a statutory variation of 
336 
337 
Paras. 13.1 and 13.1.3. See R v. Van Vliet (1892) 9 S.C. 273, R v. Silas 
1958 (3) S.A. 253 (E) and S. v. Seobi 1974(1) S.A. 494 (0). 
See Chap. 13 of the Report. 
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marriage out of community of property. For such marriages out of 
community of property, the accrual system was introduced unless the 
parties expressly excluded it in their antenuptial contract. 338 The marital 
power was abolished in respect of all marriages concluded by whites, 
coloureds or Asians on or after the commencement of the Act. 339 Equal, 
concurrent administration of the joint estate was introduced into 
marriages in community of property. 340 The principle of immutability of 
the matrimonial property regime was relaxed so that it is now possible to 
change the matrimonial property system that applies to a marriage.341 
The Roman relic that rendered donations between spouses married out 
338 
339 
340 
341 
See s. 2 of the 1984 Act. 
See s. 11 of the 1984 Act and note 282 supra. 
Sees. 4 of the 1984 Act. 
See s. 21(1) of the Act. Prior to the enactment of this subsection, the 
principle of immutability prevented a change in the matrimonial property 
system chosen by the spouses on their marriage. The chosen system 
remained fixed and could not be changed during the subsistence of the 
marriage. See Union Government (Minister of Finance) v. Larkan op. cit., 
at p. 224 per Innes C.J. applied in Honey v. Honey op. cit., at p. 611 per Du 
Plessis J. See also note 267 supra. On the reasons for the relaxation of the 
principle of immutability see the South African Law Commission's Report 
op. cit., at paras. 14 and 20. 
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spouses married out of community revocable was abolished.342 Some of 
the reforms are prospective whilst others are retrospective in nature.343 
S. 36 of the 1984 Act amended s. 7 of the Divorce Act 70of1979 by 
adding subsections 7(3) to 7(6). Under these subsections, a court is 
empowered, in specified circumstances, to make an order that the assets 
or part of the assets belonging to one of the spouses, be transferred to the 
other spouse if the court considers it to be just. The overall effect of 
these amendments to the 1979 Act is to give the court a very wide 
discretion to enable it to redistribute the assets of the spouses on 
divorce.344 This judicial discretion applies only to marriages out of 
342 
343 
344 
Sees. 22 of Act 88of1984. 
See Sinclair An Introduction to the Matrimonial Property Act 1984 op. cit. 
note 263 at p. v. For example, the abolition of the marital power in a 
marriage in community was initially applicable to marriages entered into 
after the commencement of the Act (s.11) whilst the abolition of the rule 
prohibiting donations between spouses applied to both marriages entered 
into before and after the commencement of the Act (s. 22). 
See J. Sinclair "Divorce and the judicial discretion - In search of the middle 
ground" (1989) 106 South African Law Journal 249, B. Clark & B.J. Van 
Heerden "Asset redistribution on divorce - the exercise of judicial 
discretion" (1989) 106 South African Law Journal 243 and N.D.C. Dillion 
"The financial consequences of divorce: S. 7 (3) of the Divorce Act 1979 -
a comparative study" (1986) XIX Comparative and International Law 
Journal of Southern Africa 271. 
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community of property, entered into either before the commencement of 
the 1984 Act, in terms of an antenuptial contract, or before the 
commencement of the Marriage and Matrimonial Property Law 
Amendment Act 3 of 1988, in terms of s. 22(6) of the Black 
Administration Act 3 8 of 1927. 345 
The 1988 Act also repealed s. 22(6) of the 1927 Act which subsection 
rendered the consequences of civil marriages of Blacks different from 
those arising out of marriages of persons of other races346 and extended 
the abolition of the marital power to such marriages entered into on or 
after the commencement of the Act. 347 Consequently, all civil marriages 
entered into after the commencement of the 1988 Act have the same 
consequences irrespective of the race of the parties. They are in 
345 
346 
347 
The 1988 Act came into effect on 2"d December 1988. S. l(e) of the Act 
repealed s. 22(6) of the 1927 Act ands. 2 amended s. 7 of the Divorce Act 
70 of 1979 by extending the judicial discretion to marriages entered into 
before the commencement of the 1988 Act in terms of s. 22( 6) of the 1927 
Act as it existed before its repeal. Sees. 7(3)(b) of the 1979 Act. 
Seep. 167 and note 326 supra. 
Sees. 4(a) of the 1988 Act, which deleted s. 25(1) of the 1984 Act. The 
latter subsection excluded marriages between Black people from the 
provisions of Chapters II and III of that Act, which provisions abolished the 
marital power and replaced it with a system of equal and concurrent 
administration of the joint estate in marriages in community of property. 
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community of property in the absence of an antenuptial contract. The 
General Law Fourth Amendment Act 132 of 1993348 repealed the 
common-law rule that gave the husband the marital power "over the 
person of his wife"349 and abolished any marital power that any husband 
may have been exercising immediately before the commencement of the 
Act.350 
Finally, the Justice Laws Rationalisation Act 18 of 1996 applied the 
above reforms, and other relevant legislation, to the whole of South 
Africa from 1st April 1997. 351 Thus, most of the differences that existed 
between the matrimonial property laws of the old South Africa, the 
TBVC states and the self-governing states have been eliminated. 
3. THE CURRENT LAW 
There are now three matrimonial property regimes coexisting, namely: 
348 The Act came into effect on 151 December 1993. 
349 See pp. 39-41 supra. 
350 See note 282 supra. 
351 See s. 2(1) and sched. 1 of the Act. 
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(1) Marriage in community of property and profit and loss, 
(2) Marriage out of community of property without the accrual system 
(complete separation of property) and 
(3) Marriage out of community of property with the accrual system.352 
These regimes will now be discussed seriatim. 
(a) Marriage in community of property and profit and loss 
As indicated above, 353 marriage in community of property is the primary 
matrimonial property system in South Africa. Every civil marriage is 
presumed to be governed by this matrimonial property system unless the 
352 
353 
See Cronje & Heaton op. cit., at pp. 126-128 and Visser & Potgieter 
Introduction to Family Law op. cit., at pp. 86-88. 
See pp. 146-147. On the legal nature of the community of property, see pp. 
148-151 supra. 
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contrary is proved. 354 This presumption may be rebutted by proof of one 
of the following circumstances:355 
(i) that the parties have entered into a valid antenuptial contract in terms 
of which community is wholly or partially excluded;356 
(ii) that the parties have, with the authority of a court, entered into a 
notarial contract stante matrimonio, in terms of which contract 
community is partly or wholly excluded;357 
(iii) that the husband was, at the time of the marriage, domiciled in a 
country where the legal matrimonial property system is not community 
of property;358 
354 
355 
356 
357 
358 
See pp. 146-147 supra. 
See Cronje & Heaton op. cit, at pp. 84-85 and Visser & Potgieter op. cit., at 
pp. 94-95. 
On the formal requirements for a valid antenuptial contract, see s. 87 of the 
Deeds Registries Act 47of1937. 
Sees. 21(1) of the Matrimonial Property Act 88of1984. 
See Brown v. Brown op. cit., Frankel's Estate v. The Master op. cit. and 
Sperling v. Sperling op. cit. 
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(iv) that the spouses are Black who married each other after 1st January 
1929359 and before the commencement of the Marriage and Matrimonial 
Property Law Amendment Act 3 of 1988 on 2nd of December 1988, 
without making a joint declaration in the prescribed form that they elect 
to be married in community of property.360 
(i) The joint estate 
On the conclusion of a marriage in community of property, all the assets 
and liabilities, whether subsisting at the time of the marriage or acquired 
or incurred during the marriage, are pooled to form a single joint 
estate.361 This joint estate is held by the spouses in co-ownership, in 
equal undivided shares.362 
359 
360 
361 
362 
Date of commencement of s. 22 of the Black Administration Act 1927. See 
pp. 168-169 supra. 
Sees. 22(6) of the Black Administration Act 1927. See also pp. 168-169 
supra. 
See pp. 152-153 supra. On the assets excluded from the joint estate, see 
note 272 supra. 
See pp. 152-153 supra. 
181 
(ii) The administration of the joint estate 
The joint estate is administered by both spouses concurrently, that is, 
both husband and wife have equal capacity to perform juristic acts and 
equal powers to manage the joint estate, which powers can in most cases 
be exercised without the consent of the other spouse. 363 This is the result 
of the abolition of the husband's marital power.364 There is however, a 
list of transactions into which one spouse shall not enter without the 
consent of the other.365 The lack of the requisite consent in the specified 
transactions may have the following consequences. In relation to the 
spouses, it is provided that when a spouse enters into a transaction with 
a person without the required consent of the other spouse or after his 
power to act has been suspended by order of court under s. 16(2),366 and 
that spouse knows or ought reasonably to know that he will probably not 
363 
364 
365 
366 
See ss. 14 and 15 of the Matrimonial Property Act 1984. 
See pp. 152-158 and note 282 supra. See also Godfrey v. Campbell 1997 (1) 
S.A. 570 (C) at p. 574 per Pincus A.J. 
See ss. 15 and 17 of the 1984 Act. 
This subsection provides that if a court is satisfied that it is essential for the 
protection of the interest of a spouse in the joint estate, it may on an 
application of that spouse suspend for a definite or an indefinite period any 
power which the other spouse may exercise in relation to the joint estate. 
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obtain the consent of the other spouse or that the power concerned has 
been suspended, and as a result of that transaction the joint estate suffers 
a loss an adjustment is to be effected in favour of the other spouse upon 
the division of the joint estate.367 In relation to a third party, it is 
provided that if that party did not know and could not reasonably have 
known that the transaction was entered into contrary to the provisions of 
the Act, the transaction is to be deemed to have been entered into in 
compliance with those provisions, in other words, as if the requisite 
consent had been given by the spouse concemed.368 However, no 
provision is made for the situation where the third party knew or should 
reasonably have known that the transaction contravenes the provisions 
of the Act. Views have been expressed, and it is submitted they are 
correct, that in such a situation the transaction should be void. 369 
367 
368 
369 
S. 15(9)(b) of the 1984 Act. 
S. 15(9)(a) of the 1984 Act. 
See Cronje & Heaton op. cit., at p. 101 and Van Aswegen op. cit., at p. 146. 
In Amalgamated Banks of South Africa Bpk v. Lydenburg Passasiersdienste 
Bk en Andere 1995 (3) S.A. 314 (T) it was held that a deed of suretyship 
signed without the other spouse's consent was null and void. On appeal, the 
Supreme Court of Appeal reversed the decision of the court a quo on the 
ground that the suretyship fell within s. 15( 6) of the 1984 Act by which, if 
such suretyship was given by the spouse in the ordinary course of his 
profession, trade or business the consent of the other spouse was not 
required. The appellate court did not rule on the consequence of signing 
183 
These sanctions for the non-compliance of the consent provisions of the 
Act have been criticised as weak and overprotective of third parties to the 
detriment of the innocent spouse. 370 
(iii) Protection of the spouses inter se 
The 1984 Act provides certain measures for the protection of the assets 
of the joint estate.371 For example, the High Court can suspend any 
power which a spouse may have over the joint estate in terms of the Act, 
for a definite or indefinite period. 372 The court will only do this if the 
other spouse applies for the suspension and it is satisfied that it is 
370 
371 
372 
such suretyship outside the scope of a spouse's profession, trade or business. 
Consequently, it is submitted that the court a quo's ruling on that point 
reflects the law. See Amalgamated Banks of South Africa Bpk v. De Goede 
1997 (4) S.A. 66 (SCA) 
See Sinclair An Introduction to the Matrimonial Property Act 1984 op. cit., 
at pp. 21-23. See also N. Zaal "Marital milestone or gravestone? The 
Matrimonial Property Act 88 of 1984 as a reformative half-way mark for the 
eighties" ( 1986) 1 Journal of South African Law/Tydskrif vir die Suid-
Afrikaanse Reg 57 at p. 65. 
These statutory measures supplement the common-law remedies discussed 
above at pp. 156-158. The common-law remedies can still be utilized in 
appropriate circumstances. 
See s. 16(2) of the 1984 Act. 
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essential for the protection of that other spouse's interest in the joint 
estate. If the spouse whose powers in relation to the joint estate have 
been suspended acts contrary to such a suspension, the consequences are 
the same as in the case of a juristic act performed without the requisite 
consent.373 Furthermore, where a spouse's conduct seriously prejudices 
the interests of the other spouse in the joint estate, the prejudiced spouse 
can apply to the court for a division of the joint estate.374 The court 
granting the order may order that the joint estate be divided in equal 
shares or such other basis as it deems just.375 This remedy has great 
potential but the view has been expressed that spouses will seldom make 
use of it because if they have so much conflict over the administration of 
their estate, they would probably rather divorce. 376 Besides, it may prove 
too little too late, for by the time the application for division is made the 
prejudice may already have been suffered. There may well not be enough 
373 
374 
375 
376 
See Cronje & Heaton op. cit., at p. 101. 
Sees. 20(1) of the Act. 
Ibid. For factors which the court will take into account in dividing the joint 
estate, see Leeb v. Leeb 1999 (2) All S.A. 588 (N) at p. 597. 
Cronje & Heaton op. cit., at p. 102 note 43. 
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assets left in the joint estate for the court to rectify the prejudice by an 
order for the division of the joint assets other than by equal sharing.377 
(iv) Dissolution of the joint estate 
The joint estate may be dissolved: 
(a) by the death of one or both of the spouses, 
(b) by divorce, 
( c) by an order of division378 and 
( d) by a change in the matrimonial property regime in terms of s. 21 of 
the Matrimonial Property Act 88 of 1984. 
The effect of the dissolution of the joint estate by divorce is the aspect 
that is germane to this study and consequently only that will be 
377 
378 
See Zaal op. cit., at p. 66. 
Boedelscheiding (separatio bonorum, separation of goods) or its statutory 
successor, s. 20 of the Matrimonial Property Act 88of1984. 
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discussed. The effect of such a dissolution can be summarised as 
follows: 
"When a court grants an order of divorce, the community of 
property between the spouses comes to an end No provision is 
made for an executor to divide the estate and the matter is left in 
the hands of the spouses. They can divide the estate by 
agreement or they can appoint a liquidator to do so. If they 
cannot agree on a liquidator, the court can appoint one to this 
task."379 
According to Hahlo380 "each spouse retains, subject to an order of 
forfeiture of benefits, his or her half share until division is effected." 
This statement, though in accordance with the logical principles of the 
common law, was said to be open to doubt by King J. in Ex parte 
Menzies. 381 The implication of Hahlo's statement, according to the 
learned judge, is that upon divorce the ex-spouses become in effect free 
379 
380 
381 
See Joubert (ed.) op. cit., vol. 16 para. 119 at p. 138. See also Gillingham 
v. Gillingham 1904 T.S. 609 at p. 613 per Innes C.J. 
Op. cit.,atp.175n.108. 
Supra at p. 815. 
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co-owners entitled to a division of the estate. In other words, their 
respective shares become determinate and divisible. However, the 
learned judge pointed out that what comes to an end is the "tied"382 
nature of the co-ownership and not the co-ownership itself. The 
undivided and indivisible shares which the spouses hitherto had become 
"free" and divisible at the instance of either spouse. The spouses may 
continue with the co-ownership in this "free" form. But given the 
circumstances of divorce, this is highly unlikely. Hence, the growth of 
the rule that a decree of divorce carried with it an automatic order for 
division of the joint estate. But this should not necessarily be the case, 
for the spouses may decide to continue, by agreement, with co-ownership 
of particular property. 383 
It seems from the views expressed in the case that the termination of the 
"tied" co-ownership does not necessarily mean the termination of the 
"free" co-ownership that has come into existence. Neither does the court 
have to decree the continuance of the "free" co-ownership nor decree its 
382 
383 
On the distinction between "tied" and "free" co-ownership, see note 281 
supra. 
Under s. 7(1) of the Divorce Act 70 of 1979, a court granting a divorce 
decree may incorporate a written agreement of the parties with regard to the 
division of their assets as part of the court order. See pp. 188-190 infra. 
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termination. This must be left to the spouses to decide, failing which the 
court may then step in. Since it is estimated that a majority of financial 
issues arising out of divorce are settled by agreement, 384 and one will 
assume these will include division of property, the issue whether the 
community automatically terminates on divorce or endures in a "free" 
form until terminated by the spouses, may be devoid of much practical 
importance. 
(v) Private agreement relating to financial matters 
As evident from the passage quoted above, 385 divorcing spouses may, and 
usually do settle the division of their property by entering into an 
agreement with each other to that effect.386 In this regards. 7(1) of the 
Divorce Act 70 of 1979 enables the court to incorporate, as part of its 
order, any written agreement between the parties as to the manner in 
384 
385 
386 
See J. Sinclair "Financial consequences of divorce in South Africa: Judicial 
determination or private ordering?" (1983) 32 International and 
Comparative Law Quarterly 781 at p. 791. 
See p. 186 and Sinclair "Financial consequences of divorce in South 
Africa ... " op. cit., at p. 791. 
See for example, Van Schalkwyk.v. Schalkwyk 1947 (4) S.A. 86 (0) and 
Keyser v. Keyser 1979 (4) S.A. 12 (T). 
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which their matrimonial assets are to be divided.387 Both parties to the 
agreement may subsequently, by mutual consent, modify their 
agreement.388 However, where there is no such mutual agreement, the 
court is powerless to superimpose or add a term to the other terms of the 
settlement. 389 In this connection, there is no power under the Divorce Act 
70 of 1979 for the court to rescind or vary an order made under 
subsection 7(1) relating to division of assets. This is because s. 8(1) of 
the Act, which empowers the court to rescind, vary, or suspend an order 
made under ss. 7(1) or (2) in regard to maintenance, does not provide for 
the rescission or variation of an order made under s. 7 ( 1) in terms of an 
agreement with regard to the division of assets.390 Nevertheless, the 
common-law grounds for setting aside an agreement, namely, error, fraud 
387 
388 
389 
390 
This agreement may be entered into by all divorcing couples irrespective of 
the matrimonial property system governing their marriage. The court's 
attitude to such agreements is that it will usually give effect to them if the 
parties so desire. It was held in Van Schalkwyk v. Van Schalkwyk op. cit., 
at p. 96 per Van den Reever J. that "Where litigants come to some 
arrangement in regard to their proprietary rights which is not illegal, 
contrary to good morals or against public policy, the court should make that 
settlement an order of court." For the English position on this, see infra pp. 
412-418. 
See for example, Ex parte Bashi 1979 (1) S.A. 249 (R). 
See Horne v. Horne 1928 W.L.D. 350. 
See Hahlo "Husband and Wife" op. cit., at p. 386. 
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or duress are not affected by the provision ins. 8(1) of Act 70of1979. 
Consequently, a settlement agreement may be rescinded if any of the 
common-law grounds are established by an aggrieved spouse.391 
In the absence of an agreement as to how the joint estate is to be divided, 
the parties or the court may appoint a liquidator to wind up the joint 
estate. 392 Such a liquidator will sell the assets of the estate, pay the debts 
of the estate and divide what remains equally between the former 
spouses.393 In making such a division, it has been held that the basic 
principles used in the case of the dissolution of a partnership may be 
applied but this does not mean that they should be applied without 
flexibility. 394 
391 
392 
393 
394 
Ibid. note 173. In Cloete v. Cloete 1953 (2) S.A. 176 (0) at p. 178 it was 
held that without prima facie proof that there was fraud or error, a settlement 
agreement which had been embodied in the court's order could not be 
varied. 
See Gates v. Gates 1940 N.P.D. 361, Singh v. Singh 1981 (1) S.A. 787 (C) 
and Soupionas v. Soupionas 1983 (3) S.A. 757 (T). 
See Ex parte De Wet 1952 (4) S.A. 122 (0). 
See Van Onselen NO v. Kgengwenyane 1997 (2) S.A. 423 (B). On the 
general principles for division of partnership assets on dissolution, see Ex 
parte De Wet NO op. cit., Robson v. Theron 1978 (1) S.A. 841 (A) and The 
Law of South Africa Vol. 19 Joubert (ed.) (sv "Partnership") at para. 428. 
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(vi) Pension and other benefits 
In dividing the assets of the spouses the court takes into account a 
spouse's pension interest or retirement annuities395 as part of his estate. 396 
This specie of property was recognised by the Divorce Amendment Act 
7of1989.397 Prior to this Act the South African common law did not 
make any provision for the compulsory division of an ex-spouse's 
pension interest on divorce.398 Pension interests were not regarded as an 
asset of the parties or the common estate in the case of a marriage in 
community of property because only tangible assets capable of 
395 
396 
397 
398 
Pension interest in respect of a person who is a member of a pension fund, 
is the benefits to which he would have been entitled ifhe had terminated his 
membership on the date of divorce. In the case of a retirement annuity fund 
it is the total of all contributions the party paid up to the date of divorce, plus 
interest calculated thereon in the prescribed manner. Sees. 1 ofDivorce Act 
70of1979 as amended by Divorce Amendment Act 7of1989. 
Sees. 7(7)(a) of Act 70of1979. 
The Act came into effect on the 1"1 of August 1989. 
See P.J. Visser & J.M. Potgieter Family Law - Cases and Materials, 
Kenwyn, Juta & Co. 1994 at p. 383 citing J.C. Sonnekus (1989) Journal of 
South African Law!Tydskrifvir die Suid-Afrikaanse Reg 352. 
192 
immediate evaluation were counted as property.399 Pension interests by 
their nature were not "property" properly so called because before 
fulfilment of the relevant conditions of a particular pension fund, pension 
interests constitute a mere expectancy.400 The contemporary changes in 
the nature of wealth and property have given rise to what has been 
termed "new property",401 one of which is pension interest. The 
recognition of pension interests as a specie of property by Act 7 of 1989 
is in line with current developments in comparable legal systems402 
although it is excluded from marriages out of community of property 
entered into on or after 1st of November 1984 in terms of an antenuptial 
399 
400 
401 
402 
J. Sinclair An Introduction to the Matrimonial Property Act 1984 op. cit., at 
p. 69. 
See Sonnekus (1989) op. cit., supra. 
See C. Reich "The New Property" (1964) 73 Yale Law Journal 733 quoted 
by Sinclair in Introduction to the Matrimonial Property Act op. cit., at p. 69 
and A. Glendon The New Family and the New Property, Toronto, 
Butterworths, 1981. See further Sinclair assisted by Heaton op. cit., at p. 
140 note 374. 
See Sonnekus (1989) op. cit. supra. A recent development in England is the 
enactment of the Pensions Act 1995, as amended by the Welfare Reform and 
Pensions Act 1999, which amended the Matrimonial Causes Act 1973 to 
enable a court to deal with pension rights on divorce so as to enable income 
to be paid to a divorce spouse at the time of retirement. See infra pp. 366-
371. 
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contract by which community of property, profit and loss and the accrual 
system are excluded.403 
In the valuation of the pension interest certain contributions may be 
excluded. For example, if the interest consists of a retirement annuity 
fund, only the value of the contribution paid by the member personally 
is considered and the value, for instance, of any contribution by his 
employer is ignored.404 The pension interest is also reduced by any 
amount which was awarded to another party in a previous divorce or was 
accounted in favour of another party in a settlement under s. 7(1) of Act 
70of1979.405 
Notwithstanding the provisions of any law or rules of any pension fund, 
the court may make an order that part of a spouse's interest in a pension 
fund shall be paid by that fund to the other spouse when the benefits 
403 
404 
405 
Sees. 7(7)(c) of Act 70of1979 and p. 213 infra. 
See J.C. Sonnekus (1994) Journal of South African Law/Tydskrifvir die 
Suid-Afrikaanse Reg at pp. 227-8 cited by Visser & Potgieter Family Law -
Cases and Materials op. cit., at p. 384. 
Sees. 7(7)(b) of Act 70of1979. 
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accrue.406 In this regard, it was held in Schenk v. Schenk407 that no 
interest is payable from the date of the divorce until the benefit is actually 
paid out. Inflationary trends in the economy will therefore erode the 
value of the benefit by the time it is paid, thus resulting in what has been 
called "a meagre solatium" (that is, compensation) for the spouse to 
whom the benefit was awarded.408 
(vii) Forfeiture of benefits 
Although by operation of law spouses are each entitled to a one half 
share of the joint estate, a spouse is likely to forfeit the patrimonial 
benefits of the marriage if he or she is adjudged to have been 
406 
407 
408 
Sees. 7(8) of Act 70of1979. 
1993 (2) S.A. 346 (E). 
See Sonnekus (1994) op. cit. The South African Law Commission in its 
report - Report on the sharing of Pension Benefits Project 112of1999 - has 
recommended, inter alia, that the Divorce Act should no longer deal with the 
division of pension interests. It recommends that a specific statute should 
be enacted to deal exclusively with these interests. It further recommends 
that the proposed statute should only apply to marriages which are dissolved 
by divorce after the coming into operation of the statute and that it should 
not apply to spouses who choose complete separation of property as their 
matrimonial property system unless they make the provisions of the statute 
applicable to their marriage by a written agreement. 
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instrumental in the breakup of the marriage. The premise upon which 
such an order is made is that no person should be allowed to benefit 
financially from a marriage which he or she has caused to fail. 409 Prior 
to 1979, when the order for forfeiture was asked for by an innocent 
spouse the court had no discretion but to grant it. 410 However, bys. 9(1) 
of Act 70of1979, the court is given a discretion in granting the order if 
asked for411 and in exercising its discretion the court must have regard to 
the duration of the marriage, the circumstances which led to the 
409 
410 
411 
See Murison v. Murison op. cit., Harris v. Harris op. cit., and Allen v. Allen 
1951 (3) S.A. 320. These cases were decided at a time when divorce was 
based on the fault principle in which the court had to decide the "guilt" or 
"innocence" of a spouse. In the light of the new divorce concept of 
"irretrievable breakdown" of a marriage in s. 4( 1) of the Divorce Act 70 of 
1979, the concept of forfeiture of benefits sits uncomfortably with the 
current basis for divorce. Fault ("substantial misconduct"), is now one of 
three factors, to be taken into account in deciding whether or not to grant a 
forfeiture order. See Engelbrecht v. Engelbrecht 1989 (1) S.A. 597 {C), 
Klerckv. Klerck 1991 (1) S.A. 265 (W), Binda v. Binda 1993 (2) S.A. 123 
(W) and Wijker v. Wijker 1993 (4) S.A. 720 (A). 
Murison v. Murison supra, at p. 161. 
See pp. 87-89 supra. For a criticism ofs. 9(1) of Act 70of1979, see H.R. 
Hahlo & J.D. Sinclair The Reform of South African Law of Divorce Cape 
Town, Juta & Co., 1980 at pp. 51-52. 
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breakdown of the marriage and any substantial misconduct on the part of 
either of the parties.412 
The following principles emerged from the Supreme Court of Appeal's 
interpretation of s. 9(1) in Wijker v. Wijker: 413 
( 1) Before making a forfeiture order, a court must establish whether the 
party against whom an order is sought, will in fact be benefited if the 
order is not made. Then the court must make a value judgement whether 
such benefit will be an undue one.414 
(2) The three factors specified ins. 9(1) of the 1979 Act need not be 
considered cumulatively. The real test is whether the person against 
whom the order is sought will unduly benefit if an order is not made. In 
412 
413 
414 
Sees. 9(1) of Act 70of1979 and its interpretation by the Supreme Court of 
Appeal in Wijker v. Wijker op. cit., at p. 730. However, bys. 9(2) no such 
order may be made when a divorce is granted on the ground of the mental 
illness or continuous unconsciousness of the defendant as provided by ss. 
3(b) and 5 of the Act. 
Supra. 
At p. 727. 
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order to esta?lish this the court must have regard to the factors specified 
ins. 9 of the 1979 Act.415 
(3) The fact that substantial misconduct has not been proved does not 
mean that the court cannot make a forfeiture order.416 
( 4) Substantial misconduct which has led to the breakdown of the 
marriage as well as conduct which has nothing to do with the breakdown, 
must be considered. However, too much importance should not be 
attached to misconduct which is not of a serious nature.417 
( 5) The court must not lose sight of what the matrimonial property 
system governing the marriage entails. In deciding whether a spouse will 
unduly benefit if an order is not made, the principle of fairness is not to 
be resorted to in order to deviate from the consequences of the 
matrimonial property system governing the marriage. Thus, if a spouse 
married in community of property has made no contribution to the 
415 Atp. 729. 
416 Ibid. 
417 Atp. 730. 
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success of a business of the other spouse and still receives a substantial 
benefit from the business, this will be a consequence of the marriage in 
community of property and not necessarily an undue benefit.418 
The effect of an order for forfeiture was succinctly put by Schreiner J. (as 
he then was) in Smith v. Smith419 as follows: 
"What the defendant forfeits is not his share of the common 
property but only the pecuniary benefits that he would otherwise 
have derived.from the marriage .... It [the order for forfeiture] is 
really an order for division plus an order that the defendant is 
not to share in any excess that the plaintiff may have contributed 
over the contributions of the defendant." 
The order means that there is an equal division of the joint estate if the 
guilty defendant had contributed more than half of the estate, but that the 
418 
419 
At p. 731. 
1937 W.L.D. 126 at pp. 127-128. See pp. 87-88 supra, Ex parte De Beer 
1952 (3) S.A. 288 (T) at pp. 289H-290C, Hahlo and Sinclair The Reform of 
the South African Law of Divorce op. cit., at p. 51, Sinclair "Financial 
provision on divorce - need, compensation or entitlement?" ( 1981) 98 South 
African Law Journal 469 at p. 4 71 and Lee & Honore, op. cit., at para. 131. 
199 
estate has to be divided in proportion to the parties' respective 
contributions if the innocent plaintiff had contributed more than the 
defendant. 420 This will be the case where full forfeiture is ordered. The 
court may, on the other hand, decide to order partial forfeiture in a 
particular case. For example, where a husband has caused the marriage 
to break down but has also contributed much over a long period to the 
growth of the joint estate, the court may order that only half of the usual 
forfeiture should take place. In the absence of a forfeiture order, the joint 
estate is divided equally.421 
The efficacy of forfeiture of benefits in divorce proceedings is difficult 
to measure.422 Being premised, inter alia, on a spouse's misconduct, it 
is likely to provoke animosity and bitterness between the parties. In an 
era of no-fault divorce, it is appropriate that such emotions should be 
minimised if not entirely removed. Furthermore, it will prove 
superfluous where the parties agree to settle the division of the 
420 
421 
422 
See Cel/iers v. Celliers op. cit., Gates v. Gates op. cit. and Lee & Honore 
op. cit., at para. 131. 
See Gillingham v. Gillingham op. cit., at p. 613 and Gates v. Gates op. cit., 
atp. 363. 
See Sinclair "Financial consequences of divorce in South Africa ... " op. cit., 
at p. 791. 
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matrimonial property by negotiated settlement. 423 It seems however, that 
the retention of the forfeiture of benefits in the Divorce Act 70 of 1979 
was due to public opinion in support of the principle that no one should 
benefit from his own misconduct.424 This support notwithstanding, it is 
submitted that its inclusion in Act 70of1979 runs counter to the no-fault 
objective of the statute.425 
(viii) Possible post-divorce problems 
The dissolution of the joint estate upon divorce may give rise to some 
problems. For example, the satisfaction of antenuptial delictual debts 
which remained unpaid after the divorce. The payment of such debts is 
the sole responsibility of the spouse who incurred them.426 However, if 
a forfeiture order has been made against such a spouse and as a result he 
423 
424 
425 
426 
Ibid. 
See A.H. Barnard The New Divorce Law, Durban, Butterworths, 1979 at p. 
73. See also para. 15.4 of the South African Law Commission's Report 
RP57/78 - Report on the Law of Divorce and matters incidental thereto 
1978. 
See Hahlo & Sinclair op. cit. 
SeeBlatchfordv. Blatchford Estate (1861) 1E.D.L.365 atp. 368 and Thom 
v. Worthmann NO 1962 (4) S.A. 83 (N) at p. 88. 
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has lost the means of paying such antenuptial debts, creditors may be left 
without satisfaction of their debts. There is a dearth of judicial authority 
as to how such a credit is to be paid. Hahlo suggests that if creditors are 
not to be penalised, then the only equitable solution will be to deal with 
the claims of existing creditors as if no forfeiture order had been made. 427 
Another problem that may arise is whether a forfeiture order affects 
rights of recourse between the spouses in respect of debts paid out of the 
joint estate before, or by one of them personally after the division of the 
estate, either by creating rights of recourse where none would otherwise 
exist or by abrogating them where they would otherwise exist. Here 
again there is no judicial authority on the point but Hahlo has suggested 
that the fact that debts personal to the spouse against whom the order was 
made were paid out of the joint estate before division or by the other 
spouse after division, must be taken into account in determining what 
financial benefits the penalised spouse has derived from the marriage.428 
427 
428 
See Hahlo "Husband and Wife" op. cit., p. 381 and Lee & Honore op. cit., 
at para. 97. 
Hahlo "Husband and Wife" op. cit., at p. 381. 
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(ix) Advantages/disadvantages of community of property regime 
The obvious advantage of marriage in community of property is that the 
husband and wife share equally in each other's financial prosperity. This 
is particularly advantageous to a wife who, after marriage, does not go 
out to work and thus is unable to contribute financially to the increase of 
the joint estate. She is still entitled to share equally with her husband on 
the community coming to an end. 429 Thus, the system gives due 
recognition to the concept of marriage as a partnership of a collaborative 
and constructive enterprise on the part of husband and wife.430 The 
resources of the spouses are pooled together and used for the joint benefit 
of the members of the household, without any thought being given to the 
ownership of short-term assets thus acquired.431 
429 
430 
431 
See Thom v. Worthmann NO. op. cit., at p. 88. 
See Gray op. cit., at p. 35 and note 210 supra. See also the English Royal 
Commission on Marriage and Divorce, Cmd. 9678 ( 1956) para. 644 and the 
Canadian Law Commission's Working Paper No. 8 Family Property (1975) 
at pp. 9-10. 
See A.H. Van Wyk "Matrimonial property systems in comparative 
perspective" (1983) Acta Juridica 53 at pp. 64-65. 
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The community of property regime has theoretical and practical 
simplicity.432 Since there is one single estate, there is virtually no 
possibility that the spouses will collude to the detriment of creditors. 
There is a purposive interaction between the spouses without the 
necessity for the spouses to keep detailed books of accounts and 
inventories for the possible accounting purpose when the community 
comes to an end by death or divorce. 
Conversely, husband and wife also share in each other's financial 
setbacks and as such may ruin each other by their profligate behaviour.433 
The community of property regime also exposes any contribution by the 
one spouse to the claims of the other spouse's creditors. But this 
disadvantage can be countered by the view that it is fair for the assets of 
a household to be used to defray debts incurred on behalf of that 
household. 434 
432 
433 
434 
Ibid 
For a summary of the disadvantages ofcommunity of property, see paras. 5 .3 
and 4 of the Scottish Law Commission's consultative paper No. 57 ofMarch 
1983. 
See Van Wyk "Matrimonial property systems ... " op. cit., at p. 65. 
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Another disadvantage of the community of property system is that it 
leaves little scope for individuality of the spouses and that it gives the 
less well-to-do spouse an undeserved share in the pre-acquired and 
inherited property of the other.435 One may rebut this latter view by 
posing a rhetorical question: Isn't the sharing of property in consonance 
with the marriage vows of "with this ring ... with my body ... and with all 
my worldly goods I thee endow?"436 
The principle of equal management of the joint estate by the spouses can 
also be viewed as a disadvantage. This principle means that both 
husband and wife have equal capacity to perform juristic acts but in 
practice, they may perform certain important legal acts only with each 
other's consent. Thus, restrictions have been placed equally on both 
spouses capacity to act in relation to the joint estate. 
435 
436 
Ibid 
This is an undertaking which the bridegroom makes in most Christian 
marriages, for example, that in accordance with the rites of the Anglican 
church. On this, see Lord Simon, "With all my worldly goods" Holdsworth 
Club, Presidential Address, University of Birmingham (1964) pp. 1-4 cited 
by B. Hoggett & D. Pearl The Family, Law and Society - Cases and 
Materials, London, Butterworths, 1983 at pp. 100-101. 
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(b) Marriage out of community of property without the accrual 
system (complete separation of property) 
This matrimonial property regime applies to marriages entered into after 
1984 in terms of an antenuptial contract excluding community of 
property and of profit and loss and expressly excluding the accrual 
system.437 The proprietary consequences of these marriages are 
substantially the same as those of the marriages entered into subject to 
complete separation of property prior to the commencement of the Act, 
that is, the spouses are financially virtually as strangers to each other.438 
On divorce however, the redistribution power of the court under s. 7(3) 
of Act 70 of 1979 does not apply to those marriages entered into after 
1984.439 
437 
438 
439 
See s. 2 of the 1984 Act. 
See Sinclair "Financial consequences of divorce in South Africa ... " op. cit., 
at p. 788. 
The constitutionality of the limitation of the exercise of judicial discretion 
to redistribute matrimonial assets to pre-1984 marriages out of community 
of property and pre-1988 marriages in terms of the Black Administration Act 
has been raised by commentators. Sinclair assisted by Heaton op. cit., at pp. 
143-148, for instance, argue that ifthe purpose of the adjustive discretion 
is to avoid injustice (and that was the justification adduced for its 
introduction into the legal system) then the date of one's marriage and the 
range of the available choices should not constrain the power of the court. 
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(i) The administration of the separate estates 
The administration of the separate estates is vested in the respective 
spouses. 440 Each spouse has full capacity to act and to litigate in regard 
to their separate estates and can administer such estate independently of 
the other. Each spouse can freely enter into transactions with a third 
party (or the other spouse) in connection with his own estate441 and a 
spouse is not liable for the debts of the other spouse except those 
440 
441 
Many couples are still marrying after the commencement of the two statutes 
mentioned above with antenuptial contracts excluding the accrual system, 
thus creating marriages in which no sharing of assets takes place. Therefore 
there is developing another group of people, more often than not women, 
equally at risk, but who are denied the relief granted to their counterparts 
who married, fortuitously, before the cut-off dates. The date of the marriage, 
it is argued, cannot serve to differentiate between people in identical 
circumstances and the Constitutional Court is urged to strike down this 
criterion as it is arbitrary and unfairly discriminates against persons married 
according to the system of complete separation of property on the ground of 
the date of their marriage. See also J. Heaton "Family Law and the Bill of 
Rights" op. cit., at para. 3C25 where it is submitted that the differentiation 
between the two groups purely on the ground of the date of their marriage 
infringes the guarantee of equality before and equal protection and benefit 
of the law as specified in s. 9(1) of the Constitution. See also the Law 
Commission's Report Review of the Law of Divorce Project 12of1990. 
See p. 163 supra. 
See Rohloff v. Ocean Accident & Guarantee Corp. Ltd. 1960 (2) S.A. 291 
(A). 
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incurred for household necessaries. They can also make donations of 
their assets to each other. 442 
(ii) Property rights of spouses on divorce 
On divorce, each spouse retains his or her own assets which he had 
during the marriage subject to an order for forfeiture ofbenefits.443 
(iii) Redistribution of assets 
Despite the retention of their respective separate estates, a court granting 
a divorce decree in respect of a marriage with ·complete separation 
entered into before 1st November 1984, or 2nd December 1988 in the case 
of Black spouses has a discretion, in terms of s. 7(3) of Act 70of1979, 
to redistribute property between the parties to the divorce action.444 In 
442 
443 
444 
See s. 22 of Act 88 of 1984 which provides that subject to the Insolvency 
Act 24of1936, donations between spouses are not "void or voidable". 
See pp. 164 and 194-200 supra. 
See pp. 165-168 and note 439 supra. 
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Beaumont v. Beaumont445 Botha J .A. expressed the view that the power 
to make a redistribution order under s. 7 (3) was a reforming and remedial 
measure designed to remedy: 
"the inequity which could flow from the failure of the law to 
recognise the right of a spouse upon divorce to claim an 
adjustment of a disparity between the respective assets of the 
spouses which is incommensurate with their respective 
contributions during the subsistence of the marriage to the 
maintenance or increase of the estate of one or the other. "446 
The court may only exercise this power if the following prerequisites 
exist: 
445 
446 
1987 (1) S.A. 967 (A). 
Ibid. at p. 987. 
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(a) The marriage must have been entered into in terms of an antenuptial 
contract prior to 1984 excluding community of property and of profit and 
loss and any form of accrual sharing;447 or 
(b) The marriage must have been contracted in terms of s. 22( 6) of the 
Black Administration Act 3 8 of 1927, as it existed immediately prior to 
its repeal by Act 3of1988.448 
No agreement must have been made by the parties for the division of 
their assets. The presence of the above circumstances enables one of the 
spouses to apply to the court for an order to be incorporated in the 
divorce decree, to the effect that the assets or such part of the assets as 
the court may deem just, be transferred from one spouse to the other.449 
447 
448 
449 
This position contrasts sharply with that of England where the court is given 
a wide adjustive discretion, without any time limitation, under the 
Matrimonial Causes Act 1973 as amended by the Matrimonial and Family 
Proceedings Act 1984 and the Family Law Act 1996. See infra Chapter five 
for a discussion on the use of the English court's discretion to adjust 
matrimonial property on divorce. 
Under s. 22(6) of Act 38of1927 a civil marriage between two Blacks was 
deemed to be out of community of property. Since Act 3 of 1988 such 
marriages are now automatically in community of property and of profit and 
loss. See pp. 167-168 and note 282 supra. 
Sees. 7(3) of the 1979 Act. 
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Furthermore, subsection 7(4) "contains two conjoined jurisdictional 
preconditions to the exercise of the discretion", 450 namely, the spouse 
wanting the redistribution order must have made a contribution to the 
estate of the other and the court must be satisfied that, by reason of such 
a contribution, it will be equitable and just to make a redistribution order. 
The first precondition involves a purely factual finding whilst the second 
involves the exercise of a purely discretionary judgment in equity.451 
The requisite contribution may be made either directly or indirectly, by 
the rendering of services, or the saving of expenses which would 
otherwise have been incurred, or in any other manner. 452 
The nature of the contribution envisaged under the Act was the subject 
of judicial comment in Beaumont v. Beaumont. 453 It was there argued by 
450 
451 
452 
453 
PerKrieglerJ. inBeaumontv. Beaumont 1985 (4) S.A. 171atp.175. 
Per Botha J.A. in Beaumont v. Beaumont 1987 (1) S.A. 967 (A) at p. 987. 
S. 7( 4) of the 1979 Act. A similar provision exists in English law under s. 
25(2)(t) of the Matrimonial Causes Act 1973. See pp. 351-356 infra. 
1987 (1) S.A. 967. 
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the appellant that the legislature could not have intended a contribution 
by either spouse, made purely in the discharge of the common-law 
reciprocal duty of support, to qualify as a contribution which entitled the 
spouse making it to claim "compensation" for it in the form of a 
redistribution order. Something more was required, namely, a 
contribution which exceeded the bounds of the duty of support which 
existed ex lege.454 This argument was firmly rejected by the court which 
expressed the view that: 
454 
"Our legislation does refer specifically to contributions made 
'directly or indirectly ... by the rendering of services, or the saving 
of expenses ... or in any other manner. ' In my view there can be 
no doubt that the plain meaning of these words is so wide that 
they embrace the performance by the wife of her ordinary duties 
of 'looking after the home' and 'caring for the family'; by doing 
that, she is assuredly rendering services and saving expenses 
This argument was premised upon an article written in Afrikaans by Prof. 
J.C. Sonnekus in (1986) 103 South African Law Journal 367 titled 
"Egskeiding en kwantifisering van die bydrae tot die ander gade se boedel -
artikel 7(3)-(5) van die Wet op Egskeiding 70 van 1979". An English 
summary of the gist of the article can be found in Cronje & Heaton op. cit., 
at pp. 158-159. 
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which must necessarily contribute indirectly to the maintenance 
or increase of the husband's estate. "455 
On this view, a wife's domestic services count as a contribution for the 
purposes of redistribution of the matrimonial assets on divorce. Thus, in 
Van Zummeren v. Van Zummeren456 the plaintiff (the wife), who was 
married out of community of property to the defendant (the husband), 
sought a decree of divorce against the defendant and, amongst others, a 
redistribution order compelling the defendant to transfer one half of his 
estate to her. The parties disputed whether the plaintiff was entitled to 
claim for a proportion of the assets belonging to the defendant. The said 
assets consisted of a fixed property registered in the defendant's name 
("the property") and a Mercedes Benz motor car ("the motor vehicle"). 
The defendant contended that these were gifts given to him by his father 
455 
456 
Atp. 997 of1987 (1) S.A. 967 (A)perBothaJ.A. InKatzv. Katz 1989 (3) 
S.A. 1 (A) the wife's domestic services were held to have contributed to the 
husband's estate even though she had help from servants, caterers and "all 
of the accoutrements of a comfortable home" (at p. 14 per Milne J.A.). In 
England, a wife's domestic contribution to the welfare of the family is 
statutorily recognized ins. 25(2)(f) of the Matrimonial Causes Act 1973 as 
amended. See Wachtel v. Wachtel supra at pp. 838-839 and pp. 351-356 
infra. 
[1997] 1 All S.A. 91 (E). 
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and could not as such, in law, be included in a redistribution order. It 
was held that the motor vehicle should be excluded from a redistribution 
order because it was a gift from the husband's father who has established 
a "tradition" of giving motor vehicles to each of his children. The 
property however, could not be so treated and should be included in the 
redistribution order. The court further held that the plaintiff, who 
successfully managed the household in difficult circumstances, cared for 
the children, provided the defendant with home comforts and a home to 
come to for some 16 years, should be awarded one-third share of the 
property. Ludorf J. said: 
" ... on the evidence there can be no doubt that in so managing the 
household and the Property over the extended period mentioned, 
the Plaintiff made a valuable contribution by way of service to 
the estate of the defendant generally and in addition made a 
valuable contribution towards the preservation, and probably 
enhancement, of the major asset in the Defendant's estate, 
namely the Property. She took care of the Property and 
expended energy and time in that regard over many years. In 
those circumstances it matters not in my view, that the Property 
was a gift to the Defendant. In my judgment the Plaintiff 
214 
rendered services by which the Defendant's estate benefited and 
which contributed to the maintenance of the estate of the Plaintiff 
[sic} as contemplated in section 7 (4) of the Divorce Act 70 of 
1979. That estate included the Property at the time of the 
rendering of the services and a substantial measure of the 
services rendered were in fact directed specifically at the 
Property to the direct benefit of the Property itself and the entire 
estate. "457 
On the question whether an asset which had accrued to an estate under 
consideration fortuitously, by way of donation or gift for example, should 
not be taken into account in the making of an order in terms of s. 7(3) of 
Act 70of1979,458 the court held that the terms of s. 7(4) of the Act (the 
empowering section) are clear and explicit. Once a court is satisfied that 
it is just and equitable by reason of the applicant's contribution to the 
maintenance (or increase) of the estate of the other party to make an 
order, it may make a redistribution order in terms of s. 7(3). In the 
court's view, the qualifying factor is to be found, not in the causa 
457 
458 
Atp. 96d-g. 
Under s. 7(5)(d) the court has a wide discretion to take into account any 
other factor which should in the opinion of the court be taken into account. 
215 
underlying the acquisition of the assets comprising the estate, but rather 
in whether or not it has been shown that the services of the applicant 
spouse vis-a vis the estate (in for example, maintaining the assets, or a 
particular asset) are such as to satisfy the court that an order in terms of 
s. 7(3) would be just and equitable. On this point, the court disagreed 
with dicta in Beira v. Beira459 to the effect that an asset which had 
accrued to an estate fortuitously, by way of donation for example, could 
for that reason, in law, not (save in terms of s. 7(5)(a))460 be taken into 
account in the making of an order in terms of s. 7(3) of the Act. The 
court in Van Zummeren was of the view that if it would be unjust and 
inequitable to take account of certain assets because of the circumstances 
of a particular case, such assets should be excluded, otherwise they must 
459 
460 
1990 (3) S.A. 802 (W) at p. 807E per Leveson J. The court held that assets 
in a trust fund do not form part of the estate of the beneficiary under the trust 
and can thus not be taken into account in the making of an order of 
redistribution. 
That subsection provides as follows: "In the determination of the assets or 
part of the assets to be transferred as contemplated in ss. (3), the court shall, 
apart from any direct or indirect contribution made by the party concerned 
to the maintenance or increase of the estate of the other party as 
contemplated in ss. (4), also take into account -
(a) the existing means and obligations of the parties, including any 
obligation that a husband to a marriage as contemplated in ss. 3(b) of this 
section may have in terms ofs. 22(7) of the Black Administration Act, 1927 
(Act 38of1927) ... " 
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be included. For example, an asset which accrued to an estate by way of 
an inheritance on the day before the commencement of the divorce 
proceedings should be excluded.461 This exclusion, the court concluded, 
should not be on the basis that the asset had accrued by virtue of an 
inheritance, but rather because it could not be said that the applicant 
spouse had made any contribution in relation thereto as contemplated by 
s. 7(4) of the Act. In other words, it would not be just and equitable to 
make an order which takes account of such assets in those circumstances. 
It is submitted that although the court's view accords with the terms of 
s. 7( 4) of Act 70of1979, in that the subsection envisages a "contribution 
to the maintenance of the other party's estate", it may create occasional 
hardship to a spouse applying for a redistribution order. For instance, a 
husband who cleverly succeeds in replacing all the assets to which his 
wife had contributed shortly before the divorce, cannot, on the above 
view, be ordered to transfer any assets to his wife. However, in such a 
case, it is submitted that the court can utilise its power under s. 7(5)(d) 
to take into account the fact of such replacement by the husband and 
order a transfer of other assets to which the wife had not contributed as 
461 See the hypothetical case given by Leveson J. in Beira's case at p. 608H-I. 
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being equitable and just by reason of her contribution to the replaced 
assets.462 
In Kritzinger v. Kritzinger463 it was held that a spouse's contribution must 
be positive in nature. A mere refraining from a particular activity or 
course of conduct will not be enough contribution for the purpose of a 
redistribution order. In that case, the parties were married out of 
community of property. During the existence of the marriage the 
respondent husband was offered a post with Mobil Oil (his employers) 
in New York but he declined the offer as his taking up the position in 
New York would have been detrimental to the appellant's business 
career. When he was sued for divorce, the respondent counterclaimed an 
amount ofR200, 000 on the basis that he had contributed to the growth 
in the appellant's estate by not settling in New York so that the 
appellant's career in South Africa could be furthered. The trial judge 
acceded to the counterclaim but on appeal it was held that: 
462 
463 
The wording of the subsection is wide enough to justify this submission. 
See p. 222 infra. 
1989 (1) S.A. 67 (A). 
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"what was clearly envisaged was some positive act by means of 
which one spouse puts something into the maintenance or 
increase of the estate of the other spouse - whether by way of 
money or property, labour or skill. It does not envisage a mere 
refraining from a particular activity or course of conduct.''464 
An ancillary question pertaining to contribution which needs to be 
answered is: must a monetary value be placed on the contribution before 
a redistribution order is made? In Kretschmer v. Kretschmer465 the court 
appeared to suggest that there must be some evidence which would 
enable the court to put a monetary value on contributions in the nature of 
domestic services. 466 But in Katz v. Katz461 the then Appellate Division, 
now Supreme Court of Appeal, was of the view that this suggestion was 
not in consonance with the terms of s. 7(4) and was clearly rejected in 
Beaumont's case. 468 The court reiterated the view it expressed in 
464 Per Milne J.A. at p. 88. 
465 1989 (1) S.A. 566 (W). 
466 At pp. 580-581 per Flemming J. 
467 1989 (3) S.A. 1 (A). 
468 At pp. 987 and 996-997 respectively per Botha J.A. 
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Beaumont's case that s. 7( 4) was wide enough to include unquantifiable 
domestic services. It follows from this that there is no need to put a 
monetary value on such services before ordering a redistribution of the 
assets. As noted by Hazel Kyrk, housewives comprise an economic 
group 
"[p}roducing for use and not for profit, whose incentive to 
efficiency and effort is not financial reward, and whose returns 
are largely the health and happiness of others. In a world 
engaged in creating exchange values these workers are creating 
use values. From this flows the fact ... that no financial value can 
be placed upon their services."469 
As marriage is a partnership, this species of contribution should be 
evaluated, not in the absolute terms of monetary value, but in the relative 
terms of differential equality with the financial contribution usually made 
by the husband.470 The wide discretion given to the court under s. 7(4) 
of Act 70 of 1979 is most suited for this purpose. 
469 
470 
The Family in the American Economy (Chicago, 1953) at p. 275 cited by 
Gray op. cit., at pp. 68-69. 
See Gray op. cit., at p. 68. 
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Another aspect of the redistribution of assets under the 1979 Act which 
needs to be commented upon is whether the court needs guidelines in 
deciding the quantum of the assets to be given to the spouse who had 
contributed to their acquisition. In Beaumont's case the so-called one-
third rule enunciated in the English case of Wachtel v. Wachtel471 by 
which one-third of the matrimonial assets is given to the spouse with 
fewer assets as a starting point, was rejected by the then Appellate 
Division.472 Botha J.A. (with whom the other judges concurred) held, 
obiter, that the judicial discretion should not be curtailed by ''judicial 
glosses" on s. 7(3) in the form of guidelines. In his view, the over-riding 
feature in the exercise of the court's discretion as to what proportion of 
the assets is to be transferred in terms of s. 7(3) of the 1979 Act, is the 
court's assessment of what would be ''just", having regard to the factors 
mentioned specifically and to "any other factor which should in the 
opinion of the court be taken into account." He concluded by saying: 
471 
472 
[1973] I All E.R. 829 at pp. 839-840 per Lord Denning M.R. For a 
discussion of the one-third rule, see infra pp. 392-398. 
Per Botha J.A at p. 991. This rule had hitherto been applied in Van Gysen 
v. Van Gysen 1986 (I) S.A. 56 (C), MacGregor v. MacGregor 1986 (3) S.A. 
644 (C), Kroon v. Kroon 1986 (4) S.A. 616 (E) and was again applied in 
Van Zummeren v. Van Zummeren op. cit. 
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"I do not see any real difficulty in starting with a clean slate, then 
filling in the void by looking at all the relevant facts and working 
through all the relevant considerations, and finally exercising a 
discretion as to what would be just, completely unfettered by any 
starting point. In any event it is an illusion to think that a one-
third starting point will make the task of the courts easier, as the 
experience of the English courts has shown. In my opinion our 
courts can do without any starting points. "473 
Subsection 7(5) prescribes the considerations which the court must take 
into account in the determination of the assets or part of the assets to be 
transferred in terms of the redistribution order. These considerations are: 
(a) the existing means and obligations of the parties, 
473 1987 (1) S.A. 967 (A) at p. 998. In Redgardv. Redgard 1989 (I) S.A. l 13 
(E) it was held that, although the plaintiff would in principle have been 
entitled to a transfer of assets from the defendant's estate, nothing could be 
awarded to her in this case as the defendant was insolvent. A distribution 
order in the circumstances would not advance the object of s. 7(3) to achieve 
a fair and just distribution of assets on divorce. 
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(b) any donation made by one party to the other during the subsistence 
of the marriage or which is owing and enforceable in terms of their 
antenuptial contract, 
( c) any forfeiture order made under s. 9 of the Act or under any other law 
and 
( d) any other factors which should in the opinion of the court be taken 
into account. 
In the context of s. 7(5)(d), the question was raised in Beaumont's case 
as to whether the conduct of the parties should be taken into account in 
the redistribution of assets. The court's view was that it was entitled, in 
terms of the wide words of the subsection,474 to take a party's misconduct 
into account in exercising its discretion to redistribute the assets of the 
parties. This view was taken despite the fact that unlike s. 7(2) of the 
1979 Act which makes conduct a relevant factor in the award of 
474 See Beira v. Beira 1990 (3) S.A. 802 (W) at pp. 806-807 where it was held 
that although the ambit of s. 7(5)( d) of the 1979 Act is wide, it does not 
cover every conceivable thing, and Webster v. Webster 1992 (3) S.A. 729 
(E) at p. 736 where the court was of the view that the ambit of the subsection 
was wide enough to include matters relating to the parties' first marriage. 
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maintenance, s. 7(3) does not expressly include conduct as a factor to be 
taken into account in redistributing assets. The court added however, 
that in considering the conduct of the parties a conservative approach 
must be adopted, for: 
"in many, probably most, cases, both parties will be to blame, in 
the sense of having contributed to the breakdown of the 
marriage ... Jn such cases, where there is no conspicuous disparity 
between the conduct of the one party and that of the other, our 
courts will not indulge in an exercise to apportion the fault of the 
parties and thus nullify the advantages of the 'no fault' system of 
divorce". 475 
Thus, it could be said that unless the conduct in question is such that is 
both "obvious and gross" to an extent that to ignore it would offend 
475 Per Botha J.A. at pp. 994-995. For the English position as to the relevance 
of conduct in post-divorce adjustment of proprietary rights of the spouses, 
see Wachtel v. Wachtel supra at pp. 835-836 and infra pp. 356-365. 
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anyone's sense of justice, it should not be a determining factor in the 
redistribution of the matrimonial assets.476 
In the exercise of its discretion to redistribute assets, the court should 
strive as much as possible to achieve a "clean brea'/C'477 between the 
parties, that is, a complete severance of the financial dependence of the 
one party on the other. But as stated by Botha J.A. in Beaumont's 
case, 478 whilst this is a desirable objective, the circumstances of particular 
cases may not permit it. There will be many cases in which the 
constraints imposed by the facts (the financial position of the parties, 
their respective means, obligations and needs, and other relevant factors) 
will not allow justice to be done between the parties by effecting a final 
476 
477 
478 
See the English case of Wachtel v. Wachtel [1973] 1 All E.R. 113 at p. 119 
per Ormrod J at first instance. In Kretschmer v. Kretschmer 1989 (1) S.A. 
566 (W), the court was of the view that possibly only conduct which relates 
to the breakdown of a marriage is relevant in the process of redistribution. 
The term "clean break" has various meanings - see R. Deech "Financial 
relief: The retreat from precedent and principle" (1982) 98 Law Quarterly 
Review 621 at pp. 635-639. The term as used in the text expresses the idea 
of a final settlement allowing the financial independence of the parties, 
whether achieved immediately on divorce or after a period of readjustment. 
The central notion is the termination of financial dependence. See infra pp. 
398-412 for the application of the "clean break" in English law. 
Atp. 993. 
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termination of the financial dependence of the one on the other. In the 
end everything will depend on the facts and the court's assessment of 
what would be just in the particular case before it. If the circumstances 
permit, the manner of achieving the "clean break" is to make only a 
redistribution order in terms of s. 7(3) of Act 70 of 1979 and no 
maintenance order in terms of s. 7(2).479 However, the two subsections 
play a complementary role where the court is minded to award both 
maintenance under s. 7(2) and order redistribution of assets under 
s. 7(3).480 In that event, the quantum of the property to be transferred will 
be a factor in determining how much maintenance to award.481 
Finally, in determining any patrimonial benefits to which the parties may 
be entitled, pension interests of a party are excluded where the couple 
479 
480 
481 
Ibid See also Katz v. Katz 1989 (3) S.A 1 (A) at p. 11 per Milne I.A. 
Cf Esterhuizen v. Esterhuizen 1999 (I) S.A. 492 (C) where it was held, per 
Josman A.I., that redistribution serves two distinct purposes, namely, to 
transfer assets to a spouse and to provide for the future maintenance of a 
spouse. For a criticism of this case, see Cronje & Heaton op. cit., at p. 164. 
See Beaumont v. Beaumont 1985 (4) S.A 171 (W) at p. 184 per Kriegler J. 
and in 1987 (1) S.A. 967 (A) at p. 992 per Botha J.A. 
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married with complete separation after l51 November 1984.482 The 
rationale for this seems to be that since parties about to marry are fully 
apprised of the consequences of excluding the accrual system in an 
antenuptial contract by way of expert financial advice they receive from 
attorneys, if they make a clear choice ofthis regime, then the division of 
pension interests should not be forced on them. 483 But, as has been 
argued by some commentators, 484 there is absolutely no evidence to 
suggest that choices made after 1984 by intending spouses are informed 
choices, whereas those made prior to 1984 were ill-informed 
necessitating legislative help. If, as is submitted, the purpose of treating 
pension interests as a specie of property is to enhance the future financial 
position of vulnerable spouses, then the date of one's marriage should not 
be a relevant factor in deciding whether to treat such interests as part of 
one's estate and if so whether to divide them. 
482 
483 
484 
Sees. 7(7)(c) of Divorce Act 70of1979. Cf the situation of marriages in 
community of property at pp. 191-194 supra. 
See the General Council of the Bar's reaction to the Law Commission's 
Report Review of the Law of Divorce Project 12 1990 which proposed the 
extension of the judicial discretion under s. 7(3) of Act 70of1979 to post-
1984 marriages out of community excluding all fonns of sharing. The 
reaction is cited by Sinclair assisted by Heaton op. cit., at p. 144 note 386. 
See Sinclair assisted by Heaton op. cit., at p. 147. 
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(iv) Advantages/disadvantages of marriage out of community of 
property 
The main advantage of complete separation of property is that each 
spouse retains his/her own estate and has the power to do with it as 
he/she thinks fit. The spouses are generally not liable for each other's 
debts incurred before or during the marriage.485 Thus, this matrimonial 
regime may prove advantageous to a well-off widower who contracts the 
so-called marriage of companionship with a wealthy widow. This would 
ensure that their respective estates are kept intact for their respective 
heirs.486 It may, it is submitted, also be advantageous to a woman with 
a formal job, a business or some income-generating activity. Such a 
woman may prefer this type of matrimonial regime or the accrual system 
because they do not impose limitations on her freedom to enter into 
agreements and to deal with her separate property. 
The main disadvantage of marriage out of community of property is that 
the spouses have no legal right (subject to a redistribution order if they 
485 See p. 205 supra. 
486 See Cronje & Heaton op. cit., at p. 128. 
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married before 1st November 1984 or 2nd December 1988 in the case of 
Blacks) to share in the growth of each other's estate.487 This creates 
hardship for the spouse, usually the wife, who has an inferior economic 
power when the marriage is dissolved either by death or divorce. It fails 
to recognise the contribution to the prosperity of the household of the 
spouse who is not economically active thus making nonsense any 
argument that the separation of property is based on the principle of 
equality.488 It also disregards the realities of the vast majority of 
households, where a de facto merger of the two estates takes place to 
such an extent that it is extremely difficult to distinguish and disentangle 
property belonging to each spouse.489 
487 
488 
489 
See Beira v. Beira op. cit., at pp. 804-805. 
In England for instance, the doctrine of separate property was in accord with 
the notions of philosophical individualism under with the legal subordination 
of one sex to the other would be replaced by a "principle of perfect equality, 
admitting no power or privilege on one side, nor disability on the other." 
See J.S Mill The Subjection of Women, London, 1869 at p. 263. 
See Van Wyk "Matrimonial property systems in comparative perspective" 
op. cit., at p. 62. 
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(c) Marriage out of community of property with the accrual system 
The Matrimonial Property Act 1984 introduced a system of accrual 
sharing as a secondary matrimonial property regime. 490 The underlying 
principle of the accrual system is that" one spouse contributes financially 
and otherwise to the growth of the other spouse 's estate and should 
therefore be entitled to share in that spouse's estate on the dissolution of 
the marriage. '"'91 The system is therefore designed to help a spouse, 
especially the one who is not economically active, who is married out of 
community of property and of profit and loss, to share in the economic 
wealth of the other spouse upon "dissolution of the marriage. 
490 
491 
See s. 2 of the Act which provides that the accrual system is applicable to all 
marriages out of community of property and community of profit and loss 
unless expressly excluded in the antenuptial contract. Prior to the 
introduction of the statutory accrual system, spouses were free to agree in 
their antenuptial contract upon a deferred sharing of accruals. This freedom 
however, was hardly exercised. See Bosman (1978) 41 Journal of 
Contemporary Roman-Dutch Law/Tydskrif vir Hedendaagse Romeins-
Hollandse Reg 402 at pp. 416-417 and Lee & Honore op. cit., para. 111 note 
3. 
See para. 17. l of the South African Law Commission's Report RP26/l 982 
op. cit. See also p. 148 and note 271 supra. 
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The accrual system applies to the following: 492 
(1) Marriages out of community of property in terms of an antenuptial 
contract by which community of property and community of profit and 
loss are excluded, which are entered into by whites, coloureds and Asians 
on or after 1st November 1984 and on after 2nd December 1988 in case of 
Blacks, unless the parties have expressly excluded the accrual system;493 
and 
(2) Marriages out of community of property in terms of an antenuptial 
contract by which community of property and profit and loss are 
excluded, which were entered into before the commencement of the Act, 
492 
493 
See Hahlo "Husband and Wife:' op. cit., at pp. 304-505, Cronje & Heaton 
op. cit., at pp. 118-119 and Visser & Potgieter Introduction to Family Law 
op. cit., at p. 147. 
See s. 2 of the 1984 Act. The accrual system was originally not applicable 
to marriages in which the couples were Black because the wording of s. 2 of 
Act 88of1984 required the marriage to be out of community "in terms of an 
antenuptial contracf' for that system to be applicable. Black marriages then 
were out of community of property by virtue of s. 22(6) of the Black 
Administration Act 1927 and not by antenuptial contract. Consequently, 
such marriages did not fall withins. 2 of the 1984 Act. In 1988 the Marriage 
and Matrimonial Property Law Amendment Act 3 of 1988 repealed s. 22( 6) 
of the Black Administration Act and brought marriages of Blacks in line 
with those of other racial groups. Seep. 176-177 and note 282 supra. 
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if the parties adopted the accrual system within two years of the Act 
coming into effect by the execution and registration of a notarial 
contract. 494 
During the marriage the matrimonial property regime is one out of 
community of property and of profit and loss. Each party is the 
administrator of his or her own estate. In fact the administration of the 
separate estates is the same as in a marriage out of community of 
property without the accrual495 system but the Act, in s. 8, provides 
additional protective measures.496 
On the dissolution of the marriage the spouses share equally in the 
accrual, that is, the growth which the estate of each spouse showed 
during the subsistence of the marriage.497 The accrual system thus 
494 
495 
496 
497 
Sees. 21(2)(a) of the 1984 Act. The two year period for whites, coloureds 
and Asians was extended for a further two years in 1986 by the Matrimonial 
Property Amendment Act 91 of 1986. See note 311 supra. 
See p. 163 supra. 
See pp. 237-241 infra. 
See s. 3 of the 1984 Act. The equal sharing may be varied by agreement of 
the spouses and the court may give effect to such an agreement under s. 7 ( 1) 
of the Divorce Act 1979. 
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recognises that marriage is a partnership but that property acquired before 
marriage is not to be shared. 498 
(i) The determination of the accrual 
The accrual of the estate of a spouse is the amount by which the net value 
of his estate at the dissolution of his marriage exceeds the net value of his 
estate at the commencement of that marriage.499 
Each spouse's estate is given a net value (assets minus liabilities) at the 
commencement of the marriage. This value can be put into the 
antenuptial contract or into a statement made within six months of the 
marriage. 500 If the spouse's liabilities exceed his or her assets or no value 
is recorded, then for the purpose of calculating the accrual it will be 
498 
499 
500 
For a detailed discussion of the accrual system see Sinclair An Introduction 
to the Matrimonial Property Act I984 op. cit., at pp. 33-36, Cronje & 
Heaton op. cit., at pp.117-126, Hahlo "Husband and Wife" op. cit., at 
chapter 17 and Visser & Potgieter Introduction to Family Law op. cit., at pp. 
146-154. 
Sees. 4{l)(a) of the 1984 Act. 
Sees. 6(1) of the 1984 Act. 
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presumed to be nil unless the contrary is proved.501 In Olivier v. 
Olivier502 it was held that where the spouses have specified the net value 
of their estate in an antenuptial contract they are bound by that value and 
cannot prove that it was inaccurate. 
In determining how the accruals, if any, are to be shared on the 
dissolution of the marriage, the accrual of each party's estate, during the 
subsistence of the marriage, is determined by a revaluation of their 
respective estates and the spouse with the smaller or no accrual acquires 
a claim against the spouse with the greater accrual. The claim is for an 
amount equal to half of the difference between the accrual of the 
respective estates of the spouses. The net value at the dissolution is 
arrived at after payment of creditors but before effect is given to any 
testamentary disposition, donation mortis causa or succession out of that 
estate in terms of the law of intestate succession. 503 Also, due allowance 
is given for the fluctuation in the value of money and in this regard, the 
weighted average of the consumer price index as published from time to 
501 
502 
503 
See ss. 6(4)(a) and 6(4)(b) of the 1984 Act. 
1998 (1) S.A. 550 (D). 
See s. 4(2) of the 1984 Act. 
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time in the Government Gazette is taken as prima facie proof of any 
change in the value of money. 
Certain assets are excluded from the calculation. These are damages 
received for non-patrimonial loss;504 an inheritance, legacy or donation 
received from a third party;505 any asset excluded from the accrual system 
in the antenuptial contract506 and any donations between the spouses 
made during the subsistence of the marriage. 507 The result is that, at the 
dissolution of the marriage, each spouse will usually acquire a claim 
against the other spouse for an amount equal to half of the total accrual 
of both estates508 unless this proportion has been varied by agreement.509 
504 
505 
506 
507 
508 
509 
Sees. 4(1)(b)(i) of the 1984 Act. 
Sees. 5(1) of the 1984 Act. 
Sees. 4(1)(b)(ii) of the 1984 Act. 
See s. 5(2) of the 1984 Act. 
See note 497 supra. Under s. 8 of the 1984 Act, the court may order a 
different proportion of sharing, for example, 60% to wife, 40% to husband. 
A spouse's share of the accrual may also be subject to forfeiture of benefits 
under s. 9 of the Divorce Act 70of1979. See infra pp. 236-237. 
See pp. 188-190 supra. 
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The example given by Sinclair510 may be used to illustrate the division of 
the accrual. 
510 
511 
"H and W marry in I 985 with a standard-form antenuptial 
contract. 511 
At the date of marriage H has a net estate of R25000; 
W has a net estate of R5000. 
The parties become divorced in I 995. 
At the date of divorce H has a net estate of RI 50 000; 
W's net estate is R2000. 
There is no accrual in W's estate. 
It appears that the accrual in H's estate is RI 50 000 - R25 000 
=RI 25 000. But the commencement value of H's estate must be 
adjusted to reflect the fluctuation in the value of money. For this 
purpose the weighted average of the Consumer Price Index is 
An Introduction to the Matrimonial Property Act 1984 op. cit., at pp. 34-35. 
This type of contract is the usual one entered into by couples marrying out 
of community of property. It usually excludes community of property and 
profit and loss. See pp. 159-162 supra. In post-1984 antenuptial contracts, 
the accrual system must be specifically excluded otherwise, in terms of s. 2 
of Act 88 of 1984, the marriage will be subject to the accrual system. 
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used. 512 Assume that the fluctuation in the value of money from 
1985 to 1995 will be similar to that from 1974-1984: The R25 
000 in H's estate on the date of marriage will be adjusted to 
(approximately) R75 000. 
The accrual in H's estate in real terms, therefore, is only RI 50 
000- R75 000 = R75 000. 
W, being a spouse with no accrual, will have a claim against H 
for half of the difference between R75 000 and RO, i.e. R37 
500. "513 
(ii) Forfeiture of benefits 
The right to share in the accrual of the estate of a spouse is a patrimonial 
benefit which may on divorce be forfeited, either wholly or in part in 
terms of s. 9 of Act 88 of 1984.514 Thus, the court may for example, 
512 
513 
514 
Sees. 4(l)(b)(iii) of the 1984 Act. 
For similar calculations of the accrual, see Cronje & Heaton op. cit., at p. 
124, Hahlo "Husband and Wife" op. cit., at pp. 309-310 and Visser & 
Potgieter Introduction to Family Law op. cit., at pp. 151-152. 
Hahlo "Husband and Wife" op. cit., at p. 385 note 166 expresses the view 
that s. 9 of Act 88 of 1984 was presumably inserted ex abundante cautela 
because s. 9 of Act 70 of 1979 is arguably wide enough to cover accruals. 
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order that no division of accruals takes place or may order that all the 
accruals or a greater proportion of the accruals is to go to the applicant 
spouse.sis 
(iii) Protection of a spouse's right to share in the accrual 
Although the accrual system effects a complete separation of estates 
between the spouses, it is clear that during the marriage the spouses have 
an interest in each other's estates.s16 That being the case, there is a need 
to protect a spouse's right to share in the accrual of the estate of the 
other. This is done bys. 8 of Act 88 of 1984. Subsection (1) of that 
section provides that if a spouse, during the subsistence of the marriage, 
seriously prejudices or will probably by his or her conduct seriously 
prejudice the right of the other spouse to share in the accrual of his or her 
estate at the dissolution of the marriage, the spouse who stands to be so 
prejudiced may apply to the High Court for the immediate division of the 
SIS 
S\6 
See Hahlo "Husband and Wife" op. cit., at p. 385. 
Bys. 3(2) of the 1984 Act, the right to share in the accrual of the estate of 
the other spouse cannot be transferred or be liable to attachment of form part 
of the insolvent estate of a spouse during the marriage. 
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accrual. The court may only order such a division if it is satisfied that no 
other person, for example a creditor, will be prejudiced thereby. 
In granting the application, the court may order equal division or division 
on any other basis it deems just. Thus, where for example, a spouse has 
maliciously alienated some of his assets with the intention of prejudicing 
the other spouse's right to share in the accrual, the court may order that 
the prejudiced spouse obtains 70% of the accrual. Under subsection (2) 
if the court orders a premature division of the accrual, it may order that 
the accrual system applicable to the marriage be replaced by a system 
which excludes all sharing.517 
The efficacy of this protection has been doubted on the ground that by 
the time it is invoked, the damage may already have been done.518 All 
that a financially more successful spouse needs to do is to simply transfer 
517 
518 
Sinclair An Introduction to the Matrimonial Property Act op. cit., at p. 37 
note 137 has expressed the view that a spouse whose estate is likely to 
increase in the future (to a greater extent than the estate of the spouse against 
whom an order was sought in terms of s. 8(1 )) would benefit by an order in 
terms of s. 8(2). 
See Hahlo "Husband and Wife" op. cit., at p. 308. See also Cronje & 
Heaton op. cit., at p. 125, Lee & Honore op. cit., at para. 111 note 10, N. 
Zaal op. cit., at p. 59-60 and Van Aswegen op. cit., at p. 148. 
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his gains to a third party before the other spouse can get to court to stop 
it. Even if the other spouse gets to court before the completion of such 
transaction, it is conceivable that she will still fail if the third party is able 
to prove that an immediate division of accrual would ''prejudice" him. 519 
In terms of the section, a spouse claiming immediate division of accrual 
must satisfy the court, inter alia, "that other persons will not be 
prejudiced thereby ... " Failure to satisfy the court on this point will lead 
to the court not granting the order. Furthermore, the protection operates 
only to prevent future prejudice and not to cancel prejudice already 
suffered. 520 
However, it has been suggested that where one of the spouses during the 
marriage makes donations out of his or her estate to a third party in fraud 
of the other's right to share on the dissolution of the marriage in his or 
her accrual, the principles of the common law actio Pauliana utilis 
apply.521 In other words, the prejudiced spouse can take legal action to 
519 
520 
521 
See N. Zaal op. cit., at p. 60. 
See Van Aswegen op. cit., at p. 148. 
See Cronje & Heaton op. cit., atp. 125, Hahlo "Husband and Wife" op. cit., 
at p. 309 and Van Aswegen op. cit., at p. 148. For the difficulties entailed 
in the use of this remedy see pp. 157-158 supra. 
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reclaim the property on the same principles as where, in a marriage in 
community of property, one of the spouses makes a donation to a third 
party in fraud of the other spouse or his or her estate. Other common-law 
remedies are also available to the prejudiced spouse.522 For example, 
upon the application of such a spouse, the court may interdict the other 
spouse as a prodigal and appoint a curator to administer his or her 
estate.523 The prejudiced spouse may also apply for an interdict to 
prohibit the other spouse from donating his or her assets to third parties 
in fraud of the prejudiced spouse's right to accrual sharing.524 
Furthermore, it has been argued that the section cannot be accurately 
depicted as equalising the financial status of spouses during the 
marriage. 525 This is because the section is clearly worded as a special 
power to advance the usual claim on divorce in cases of what the section 
describes as "conduct or proposed conduct of the other spouse", proved 
522 
523 
524 
525 
These common-law remedies are in addition to the statutory remedy. 
See Yared v. Yared 1952 (4) S.A. 182 {T) and Ex parte Wilding 1953 (1) 
S.A. 633 (0). 
See Fawkes v. Fawkes 1969 (1) S.A. 83 (O),Laws v. Laws (2) 1972 (2) S.A. 
1 {T) and Cullamah v. Munean 1941 N.P.D. 163. 
See N. Zaal op. cit., at p. 59. 
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to be causing or likely to cause serious prejudice to that claim. Litigation 
under this section, it is said, can hardly be promoted (even by the most 
ardent supporters of accrual) as a non-contentious way to enhance the 
financial powers of the wife during a marriage which is to subsist happily 
thereafter.526 Perhaps, an introduction of a provision, by which the 
spouses must jointly consent to certain transactions involving the 
accruals of each other's estate, may go some way to enhance the 
protection of the right to share in each other's accruals.527 
(iv) Advantages/disadvantages of the accrual system 
The main advantage of the accrual system is that it combines the best 
elements of marriages in and out of community of property. It enables 
spouses to exercise the freedom to deal with their property without 
reference to one another associated with marriage out of community, as 
well as the benefit that they are normally not liable for each other's 
debts. 528 These benefits are supplemented by certain advantages of the 
526 
527 
528 
Ibid. 
See Hahlo "Husband and Wife" op. cit., at pp. 308-309 and Cronje & 
Heaton op. cit., at p. 125 note 91. 
See pp. 163-164 supra. 
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marriage in community of property, in that a spouse, usually a wife, may 
share in the profit generated through her hus.band's efforts.529 
However, the absence of an existent share in matrimonial property during 
the subsistence of the marriage may create practical problems, such as a 
severe limitation of a married woman's creditworthiness,530 especially 
where she is not economically active. If for example, a husband keeps 
his wife on a shoestring budget, the accrual system provides her with no 
remedy short of divorce.531 The accrual system therefore leaves such a 
married woman at a financial disadvantage during the marriage in 
exchange for a dissolution right which is a mere spes vulnerable to 
unilateral erosion by an unscrupulous husband or by unforseen 
circumstances. 532 
529 
530 
531 
532 
See Visser & Potgieter Introduction to Family Law op. cit., at p. 88. See 
also Cronje & Heaton op. cit., at p. 127 and Hahlo "Husband and Wife" op. 
cit., at p. 312. 
See Van Wyk "Matrimonial property systems in comparative perspective" 
op. cit., at p. 64. 
Such a spouse cannot argue under s. 8(1) of the 1984 Act that such conduct 
on the part of her husband per se prejudices her ultimate rights at 
dissolution. On the contrary, as argued by Zaal op. cit., at p. 59, it could be 
said that the husband's parsimony is geared towards protecting her ultimate 
rights. 
See N. Zaal op. cit., at p. 60. 
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The accrual system also has an air of artificiality about it. This quality 
which, according to a commentator,533 can be described as the 
"mathematisation" of family law, becomes pronounced when one 
considers that in South Africa many marriages show no or only 
negligible accrual.534 Prospective spouses, especially those who are not 
economically active, are warned not to rely alone on the speculative 
nature of the promise which the accrual system makes to the exclusion 
of other more traditional antenuptial settlements if these are also offered 
to them.535 
4. MATRIMONIAL PROPERTY REGIME UNDER CUSTOMARY LAW 
(a) Customary-law marriage in the traditional setting 
The customary-law matrimonial property regime is applicable only to 
Blacks who enter into a customary marriage (as opposed to a civil 
marriage). There is no common system of customary law applicable to 
533 
534 
535 
Van Wyk" Matrimonial property systems in comparative perspective" op. 
cit., at p. 64. 
See Hahlo "Husband and Wife" op. cit., at p. 312. 
See N. Zaal op. cit., at p. 61. 
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all tribal groups but there are certain basic features regulating marriages 
that are common to all tribes. 536 A customary marriage is regulated by 
the customary law of the relevant tribe from which the spouses emanate 
although there are statutory provisions which regulate such marriages in 
parts of the country.537 The Black Administration Act 38of1927 draws 
a distinction between "marriages" and "customary unions". Section 35 
of the Act538 defines the two terms as follows: 
536 
537 
538 
"'Customary union' means the association of a man and a woman 
in a conjugal relationship according to Black law and custom, 
where neither the man nor the woman is a party to a subsisting 
It has been stated in Seymour's Customary law in South Africa, 5th ed. by 
J.C. Bekker Cape Town, Juta & Co., 1989 at Chap. XXXV that there are 
four main groups of Blacks in South Africa, namely, the Nguni, the Sotho-
Tswana, the Tsongo and the Vhavenda. See also Sinclair assisted by Heaton 
op. cit., at p. 239 especially note 91. 
For example, the Natal Code of Zulu Law 1987 and KwaZulu Act on the 
Code of Zulu Law 1985 are special statutes enacted to regulate customary 
marriages in the then Natal Province and the then self-governing territory 
of KwaZulu. The provisions of these Codes are identical. They are left 
intact by Act 18 of 1996 which repealed or amended most of the laws in the 
former "independent" and self-governing states. 
As amended by s. 9 of the Black Administration (Amendment) Act 9 of 
1929. 
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marriage; 'marriage' means the union of one man with one 
woman in accordance with any law for the time being in force in 
any Province governing marriages, but does not include any 
union contracted under Black law and custom or any union under 
the provisions of the Natal and KwaZulu Codes." 
Because of this distinction the common law does not give any recognition 
to "customary unions"539 for, in the words of Innes C.J., the law only 
recognises "a voluntary union for life of one man and one woman to the 
539 Certain statutes were later to treat such unions as valid for the purposes of 
those statutes. For example, s. 21 ( 13) of the Insolvency Act 24 of 1936 
(extended over the whole national territory by s. 2(1) of Act 18 of 1996), s. 
1 of the Income Tax Act 58of1962, s. 5(6) of the Maintenance Act 23 of 
1963 (extended over the whole of the national territory bys. 2(1) of Act 18 
of 1996), s. 1 of the Child Care Act 74of1983 (extended over the whole of 
the national territory by s. 19 of the Child Care Amendment Act 96 of 1996) 
and s. 1 of the Compensation for Occupational Injuries and Diseases Act 
130 of 1993. Customary marriages are however, recognised in 
KwaZulu/Natal (see note 537 supra), in Transkei by ss. 1 and 2 of the 
Marriage Act 21 of 1978 (ss. 42 to 50 were repealed by s. 3 of Act 18 of 
1996) and in Ciskei bys. 2(1) the Customary Law (Amendment) Decree 23 
of 1991 (this statute was left intact by s. 3 of Act 18 of 1996). The 
Recognition of Customary Marriages Act 120 of 1998 has given national 
recognition to customary marriages. See p. 257 infra. 
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exclusion of all others."540 Thus, the polygynous nature of customary 
marriages prevents the common law from according them validity as it is 
"reprobated by the majority of civilised peoples, on the ground of 
morality and religion. "541 But as will be discussed below, this position has 
changed to that of full recognition with the coming into effect of the 
Recognition of Customary Marriages Act 120of1998. 
540 
541 
Seedat's Executors v. The Master (Natal) 1917 A.D. 302 at p. 309 applying 
the classic definition of an English marriage given by Lord Penzance in 
Hyde v. Hyde and Woodmansee (1866) L.R. 1 P. & D. 130 at p. 133. See 
also Ismail v. Ismail 1983 (1) S.A. 1006 (A) at pp. 1019-1020 per Trengove 
J.A. 
Per Innes C.J. in Seedat's Executors v. The Master supra at p. 307 and 
Trengove J.A. in Ismail v. Ismail supra at p. 1026. The latter case was 
followed by Van Dijkhorst J. in Kalla v. The Master 1995 (1) S.A. 261 (T) 
at p. 266 on the basis that the provisions of the South African Constitution 
1993 cannot operate retrospectively to validate a marriage that was invalid 
at the time of its celebration. These cases dealt with Muslim marriages but 
the same principle applies to customary marriages. But cf Ryland v. Edros 
1997 (2) S.A. 690 (C) where the court rejected Ismail in so far as the 
recognition of a Muslim marriage as between the spouses is concerned. See 
also J. Church "The dichotomy of marriage revisited: A note on Ryland v. 
Edros" ( 1997) 60 Journal of Contemporary Roman-Dutch Law!Tydskrif vir 
Hedendaagse Romeins-Hol/andse Reg 294 and LP. Maithufi "Possible 
recognition of polygamous marriages" (1997) 60 Journal of Contemporary 
Roman-Dutch Law!Tydskrif vir Hedendaagse Romeins-Hollandse Reg 695. 
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A distinctive feature of customary marriages is that it is polygynous, that 
is, the husband is permitted to take more than one wife. 542 This gives rise 
to the ranking of wives. There are two systems ofpolygyny, namely, the 
simple system and the complex system. Under the simple system, the 
man has one great wife, his first wife, and all subsequent wives follow a 
chronological order of seniority. 543 The complex system creates "houses" 
which is defined as: 
542 
543 
544 
"the family and property, rights and status, which commence 
with, attach to, and arise out of the customary union of each 
Black woman."544 
Polyandry, the system by which a woman is allowed to marry more than one 
husband, is not permitted. 
See Bekker op. cit., at p. 127-134, Sinclair assisted by Heaton op. cit., at p. 
247 and T.W. BennettA Sourcebookof African Customary law for Southern 
Africa, Cape Town, Juta & Co. 1990 at pp. 224-227. 
See S. 35 of the Black Administration Act 38 of 1927. The number of 
"houses" may depend on whether the said marriage comes under the 
"simple" of"complex" system ofpolygyny. In the latter case, there will be 
one main "house" with other subordinate "houses" whilst in the latter, there 
may be two or more main "houses" with ancillary "houses" dependent upon 
and subordinate to them directly. See Sijila v. Masumba 1940 N.A.C. (C & 
0) 42 at pp. 44-47, Bekker op. cit., supra at pp. 126-140 and Sinclair 
assisted by Heaton op. cit., at pp. 247-248. 
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The ranking of wives and their houses, which together constitute the 
family group, differs from tribe to tribe but, in general, the first wife is the 
great wife and she creates the great house. The second wife may or may 
not enjoy a special status as the right-hand wife or the left-hand wife. If 
she does, her house, subservient to the great house, enjoys priority over 
the houses of subsequent wives.545 
Customary marriage is also characterised by the giving or the undertaking 
to give property by the prospective husband or the head of his family to 
the head of the family of his future wife. This property is referred to 
generally as lobolo. 546 The exact role lobolo plays in a customary 
545 
546 
See note 544 supra. 
This means the livestock or other property paid in respect of the marriage by 
the husband or his father, as the case may be, to the wife's guardian. It is 
also known by a variety of names such as bogadi, bohali, lumalo, xuma, 
magadi, bridewealth, and marriage gifts. The concept has generated a great 
deal of literature, some examples of which are, Bekker op. cit., Chap. VI, 
Bennett op. cit., at pp. 195-217, D.D.N. Nsereko "The nature and function 
of marriage gifts in customary African marriage" (1975) 23 American 
Journal of Comparative Law 682, C.R.M. Dlamini "The modem 
significance ofllobolo in Zulu society" ( 1984) 17 De Jure 148, J.M. Hlophe 
"The KwaZulu Act on the Code of Zulu law, 6of1981 - a guide to intending 
spouses and some comments on the custom of lobolo" ( 1984) 17 
Comparative and International Law Journal of Southern Africa 163, C.R.M. 
Dlamini "Should Ilobolo be abolished? A reply to Hlophe" (1985) 18 
Comparative and International Law Journal of Southern Africa 361 and S. 
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marriage ts a subject of debate.547 In the uncodified systems548 of 
customary law, it is said to be a major essential requirement of a 
customary marriage. 549 However, in the codified system of customary law 
it is not expressly stated as an essential requirement of a customary 
marriage.550 This notwithstanding, it is customarily given prior to the 
marriage in the coded system of customary law. With increased 
urbanization of Blacks, the payment of the lobolo with livestock is being 
replaced by the payment ofmoney.551 
Despite the uncertainty about its role in a customary marriage, it is 
generally agreed that the payment of lobolo serves to transfer the woman 
547 
548 
549 
550 
551 
Burman "Capitalizing on African Strengths" ( 1991) 7 South African Journal 
of Human Rights 215. 
See Bennett op. cit., at pp. 204-207. 
That is, systems which are not regulated by any formal code. 
See Bekker op. cit., at p. 107. See also I. Schapera A Handbook of Tswana 
Law and Custom, London, Frank Cass, 1955 at p. 138. 
Sees. 38 of the KwaZulu-Natal Codes. The Codes however, regulate certain 
aspects of lo bolo, for example, the nature, delivery and the quantum. See ss. 
43, 47, 51, 52, and Chap. 8 of the Codes. 
See Bennett op. cit., at p. 107. 
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and her reproductive capacity, from the family of her guardian into the 
family of her husband. It operates to bestow parental rights over any 
children born to the marriage upon the husband's patrilineage.552 
(i) Proprietary consequences of customary marriage 
It has been asserted that in the context of customary law, ''proprietary 
consequences" sounds somewhat contrived. 553 The reason for this is that 
customary law has no clearly conceived property law554 and writers of the 
western legal tradition are hard pressed to find language appropriate to 
describe this aspect of the customary marriage relationship. Furthermore, 
the courts when faced with deciding issues relating to property in this 
552 
553 
554 
See Schapera op. cit., at p. 139, Sinclair assisted by Heaton op. cit., p. 243 
and Bekker op. cit., at p. 150. 
See Bennett op. cit., at p. 230. 
The possible reason for this was given by the Law Commission in its Report 
on Customary Marriages (Project 90) 1998 at para. 6.3.1.3 as follows: "It 
is quite understandable why customary law should be so vague on questions 
of property. Before colonization, there would have been little need for an 
elaborate code of rules, because people had a relative abundance of food 
and land, and the economy was geared mainly to subsistence. An 
individual's responsibility to support dependents was given far greater 
emphasis. It was inevitable, then, that customary law would have few rules 
specifYing rights to property." 
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context, adopt a pragmatic approach by transposing their familiar 
common-law institutions, such as ownership, usufruct and trusts, onto the 
structure of the polygynous family. 555 Within such a family property will 
comprise of family/general and "house" property. Family/general 
property is made up of the general estate of a family head, namely, his 
earnings or property bought with those earnings together with his 
inheritances, lobolo received for daughters556 and that part of family 
property which has not been allotted to any house. "House" property is 
made up of, inter alia, property specifically allotted by the family head to 
a particular "house" or accruing to a "house" by the operation of 
customary law, gifts to the wife and her earnings, and acquisitions by 
other inmates of the "house". 557 The control and administration of 
family/general and "house" property fall on the head of the family or the 
555 
556 
557 
Bennett op. cit, at p. 230. 
According to Bennett op. cit. at p. 238 Lobolo received for daughters is 
regarded as family property in Venda In other places it forms part of the 
property of the "house". 
See s. 1(1) of the KwaZulu-Natal Codes, Bekker op. cit., at p. 71 and 
Bennett op. cit. at pp. 232-238. 
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husband and on the son of his major wife on his death as the case may 
be.55& 
This situation notwithstanding, the proprietary consequences of a 
customary marriage are generally accepted as one of out of community of 
property because, inter alia, the polygynous nature of the marriage is 
more compatible with separate estates.559 The reality of the relationship 
between a husband and his wife is however one of subjection of the wife 
to the overall authority of the husband as a result of patriarchal 
tradition. 560 Thus, it has been held that whatever a woman earns after her 
marriage belongs to the husband561 who exercises overall control over the 
558 
559 
560 
561 
Sees. 20 of the KwaZulu-Natal Codes, Bekker op. cit., at pp. XXV and 70 
and Sinclair assisted by Heaton op. cit., at p. 248. 
See the Law Commission's Report Project 90 op. cit., para. 6.3. 
See Law Commission's Report, Project 90 op. cit., at para. 6.2.1 and Bennett 
op. cit., at 302 where it is argued that the patriarchal nature of African 
society does not necessarily mean women lack power. Through various 
devices, such as, gossip, magic and the withholding of services, women have 
always contrived to mitigate male authority. 
See for example, the Transkei case of Sixakwe v. Nonjoli (1896) 1 N.A.C. 
11. The position is different in KwaZulu-Natal where s. 13 of the Kwa 
Zulu-Natal Codes permits any Black person to acquire movable and 
immovable property. 
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matrimonial property. Furthermore, it has been held that women can have 
outright ownership in only a very limited category of things, such as, the 
ngquthu beast,562 and property of an intimate nature, such as traditional 
wearing apparel. 563 This inferior status that customary law gives to wives 
has prompted the comment that they are: 
562 
563 
564 
"economically dependent, without the power to overcome their 
poverty, and without the self-determination to make decisions 
regarding their own lives."564 
A Zulu term meaning a beast paid by a bridegroom or a seducer of a virgin. 
See Mohlakula v. Elizabeth (1902) 1 N.A.C. 56 and Mpongo v. Mandela & 
Anor. (1913) 3 N.A.C. 34. 
See Xakaxa v. Mkize (1947) N.A.C. (N&T) 85 and Bennett op. cit., at p. 
327. 
K.L. Robinson "The minority and subordinate status of African women 
under customary law" (1995) 11 South African Journal on Human Rights 
463 at p. 464. Sees. 6 of the Recognition of Customary Marriages Act 120 
of 1998 which now confers equal status and capacity on customary-law 
spouses. See p. 257 infra. 
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(ii) Proprietary rights of spouses on divorce 
In terms of traditional customary law, a customary-law wife cannot upon 
divorce expect a share of the matrimonial estate. 565 She has no claim to 
a right of ownership in any house property (other than some personal 
belongings and ceremonial items)566 or to redistribution or division of 
property regardless of any contribution she may have made to the 
maintenance or increase in value of the family estate. 567 She is perceived 
as an unpaid servant of her husband. At the end of the marriage she 
virtually leaves the matrimonial home empty-handed. She is not even 
entitled to maintenance as she is expected to be taken care of by her own 
family. 568 This untenable position of customary-law wives gave rise to 
565 
566 
567 
568 
Bennett op. cit., at p. 277. 
Ibid., citing N.J. Van Warmelo & W.M.D. Phophi Venda Laws Pretoria, 
Government Printer, 1948, Part 3 pp. 633-639. 
See T.W. Bennett Human Rights and African Customary law Under the 
South African Constitution, Cape Town, Juta & Co., 1995 at p. 125. 
The giving of Lobolo is seen as the provision of security for this eventuality. 
See Bennett Sourcebook of African Customary law ... op. cit. at p. 275. 
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calls for legislative intervention to reflect the socio-economic changes in 
South Africa. 569 
(iii) "Converted" customary marriages570 
The inferior status of the customary-law wife may be enhanced by her 
husband marrying her again in a civil marriage, provided the husband is 
not also a partner in a subsisting customary "union" with another 
woman. 571 Their potentially polygynous union is "converted" into a 
monogamous one with its attendant incidents. The proprietary 
consequences of such a marriage were, by s. 22(6) of the Black 
Administration Act 38 of 1927 (before it was repealed in 1988 by 
569 
570 
571 
See Law Commission's Report, Project 90 op. cit., para. 6.2.1.7 and T.W. 
Bennett "The compatability of African customary law and human rights" 
(1991)ActaJuridica 18 at pp. 26-27. 
The phrase "to convert" has many meanings. See Stroud's Judicial 
Dictionary 51h ed. by J.S. James, London, Sweet & Maxwell, 1986 vol. 1. 
In the context of the text, it is used to mean "to make new". 
S. 22(1) of the Black Administration Act 38of1927 as amended bys. 1 of 
the Marriage and Matrimonial Property Law Amendment Act 3 of 1988 
allows this type of second marriage. Otherwise, by s. 22(2) no person who 
is married according to customary law "shall be competent" to enter into a 
civil marriage while the customary "union" subsists. See also pp. 168-169 
supra. 
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Marriage and Matrimonial Property Act),572 complete separation of 
property with the marital power.573 Community of property could be 
introduced by declaration within one month prior to the marriage only if 
the man was not a partner in a customary ''union" with another woman. 574 
After the commencement of the 1988 Act (2nd December 1988), all civil 
marriages between Blacks are automatically in community of property 
and of profit and loss. Marriage by antenuptial contract produces 
separation of property with the accrual system unless expressly 
excluded. 575 The patrimonial consequences of this "conversion" of the 
customary marriage are the same as those described under the various 
civil-marriage regimes above. 
572 
573 
574 
515 
Sees. l(e) of the Act. 
Seep. 168-169 supra. 
Ibid. 
See s. 2 of Act 88 of 1984. 
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(b) Customary-law marriage under the Recognition of Customary 
Marriages Act 1998 
The catalyst for the enactment of the Recognition of Customary Marriages 
Act 120 of 1998 was the Law Commission's Report on customary 
marriages.576 The Act was assented to by the State President on the 20th 
ofNovember 1998 and came into effect on the 15th ofNovember 2000.577 
The Commission recommended, inter alia, that customary marriages 
must be fully recognised, that is, be put on an equal footing with civil 
marriages. 578 This has been done by s. 2 of the Act. 579 Also, equal status 
576 
577 
578 
579 
See Project 90 op cit. especially Annexure A where a draft Bill is set out. 
However, the Act differs markedly in many respects from that draft Bill. 
See Proclamation No. 66 of 2000, Government Gazette 21700 of 1'1 
November 2000. 
Ibid. para. 3 .1.13. 
The section provides that a valid marriage at customary law existing at the 
commencement of the Act and one entered into after the commencement of 
the Act are for all purposes recognized as a marriage. See generally Cronje 
& Heaton op. cit., Chap. 12. 
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and capacity is given to the spouses, thus enhancing the hitherto inferior 
status of the customary-law wife.580 
(i) Proprietary consequences of customary-law marriage under the 
Act 
S. 7 of the Act is of particular relevance to this study. That section 
provides that the proprietary consequences of all customary marriages 
entered into prior to the commencement of the Act will continue to be 
governed by customary law581 whilst those pertaining to monogamous 
marriages entered into after the commencement of the Act will be in 
community of property unless community is specifically excluded by 
antenuptial contract. Interestingly, the latter position is the same as that 
in civil marriages but it does not seem that the rationale is to unify the law 
580 
581 
See s. 6 of the Act which provides that a wife in a customary marriage has, 
on the basis of equality with her husband and subject to the matrimonial 
property system governing the marriage, full status and capacity, including 
the capacity to acquire assets and to dispose of them, to enter into contracts 
and to litigate, in addition to any rights and powers that she might have at 
customary law. See also Cronje & Heaton op. cit., at pp. 235-236. 
See pp. 250-253 supra. 
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relating to civil and customary marriages.582 Parties to a monogamous 
customary marriage entered into before the commencement of the Act are 
given the opportunity tO change their matrimonial property system. 583 
Spouses who marry after the coming into operation of the Act may also 
change their matrimonial property system by complying with the 
requirements and procedure laid down in s. 21(1) of the Matrimonial 
Property Act 1984, provided the husband does not have more than one 
wife.584 
Under s. 7(6) of the Act, a husband who is a party to an existing 
customary marriage and who wishes to enter into a further customary 
marriage with another woman after the commencement of the Act, must 
make an application to the High Court to approve a written contract 
which will regulate the future matrimonial property system of his 
marriages. 585 When considering such an application, the court must, if the 
582 
583 
584 
585 
See para. 6.3.4.22 of the Law Commission's Report. 
Sees. 7(4) of the Act. The change is effected by way of a court application 
similar to s. 21(1) of the Matrimonial Property Act 88of1984. 
Sees. 7(5) of the Act. 
On the selection of the available matrimonial property systems for the 
proposed marriage, see Cronje & Heaton op. cit., at pp. 234-235. 
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existing marriage is in community of property or subject to the accrual 
system, terminate the matrimonial property system which is applicable to 
the marriage and effect a division of the matrimonial property.586 The 
court is further obliged to ensure an equitable distribution of the property 
and to take into account all the relevant circumstances of the family 
groups which would be affected if the application is granted. All persons 
having sufficient interest, (in particular the wives), must be joined in the 
proceedings. 587 
The court may allow amendments to the terms of the contract, grant the 
order subject to any condition it may deem just or refuse the application 
if in its opinion the interests of any of the parties involved would not be 
sufficiently safeguarded by means of the proposed contract. 588 
A question that may be relevant in this context will be whether the court 
may allow different matrimonial property systems to operate in the 
various marriages of one man? Submissions to the Law Commission on 
586 
587 
588 
Sees. 7(7)(a) of Act 120of1998. 
See s. 7(8) of Act 120 of 1998. 
Sees. 7(7)(b) of Act 120of1998. 
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this issue were diverse589 but they raised the possibility of different 
matrimonial property systems applying to the various marriages of a 
man.590 However, the provisions of s. 7(6) of the Act do not lend 
themselves to multifarious matrimonial property systems. The subsection 
provides that the contract approved in terms of the subsection "will 
regulate the future matrimonial property system of his marriages". Thus, 
only a single matrimonial property system is envisaged under the 
subsection. 591 
(ii) Proprietary rights of spouses on divorce 
A court granting a decree of divorce in respect of a customary marriage 
has generally the same powers to regulate the consequences of the 
dissolution as a court granting a decree of divorce in respect of a civil 
589 
590 
591 
See paras. 6.3.4.15- 6.3.4.16 of its Report op. cit. 
See for example the views expressed at the Legal Profession Workshop 
reported in para. 6.3.4.15 of the Report to the effect that only the first 
marriage should be in community; subsequent marriages should be out of 
community. The rationale of this approach was said to be that only the first 
wife may have had expectations of monogamy. Subsequent wives would be 
aware of the type of union they were contracting. 
See Cronje & Heaton op. cit., at pp. 233-234. 
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marriage under the Divorce Act 70of1979.592 However, in exercising 
these powers a distinction seems to be drawn between polygynous 
customary marriages and monogamous customary marriages. In the case 
where the decree of divorce is granted in a marriage of a man who is a 
spouse in more than one customary marriage, s. 8(4)(b) of the Act 
requires the court to take all relevant factors (including specifically 
whether the spouses have changed their matrimonial property system 
during the marriage593 and, if the husband entered into another customary 
marriage after the coming into operation of the Act, what order the court 
made in respect of the matrimonial property system applicable to his 
marriages) into consideration and to make any equitable order that it 
deems just. Thus, by this provision, the court can exercise discretion in 
distributing the assets of the parties to a polygynous customary marriage 
but cannot do so where the customary marriage is a monogamous one. 
This creates an anomaly especially if one takes into account the fact that 
the court does not have this discretion in dissolving civil marriages unless 
they were entered into subject to complete separation of property before 
592 Sees. 8(4)(a) of the 1998 Act. 
593 See notes 536 and 537 supra. 
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l51 November 1984,594 or 2nd December 1988595 in the case of Black 
couples. 596 
(iii) "Converted" customary marriages 
It was pointed out above that it was possible for parties to a customary 
marriage to "convert" their marriage into a civil one. 597 This conversion 
is also available under s. 10( 1) of the Act. This section provides that 
spouses who are parties to a customary marriage may not later enter into 
a civil marriage except with each other and before they can enter into a 
civil marriage with each other, the husband's other customary marriages 
(if any) must first be dissolved.598 Parties to a civil marriage are not 
594 
595 
596 
597 
598 
The date of commencement of the Matrimonial Property Act 88 of 1984. 
The date of commencement of the Marriage and Matrimonial Property Law 
Amendment Act 3 of 1988. 
See Cronje & Heaton op. cit., at p. 227. On the exercise of the court's 
discretion to redistribute the assets of spouses in a civil marriages see pp. 
207-226 supra. 
See pp. 255-256 supra. 
As read with s. 3(2). The provisions of ss. 10( 1) and 3(2) are similar to ss. 
22(1) and (2) of the Black Administration Act 38of1927, which governed 
the position until I 5th November 2000 when the Recognition of Customary 
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permitted to convert such a marriage into a customary one.599 The 
conversion therefore, is only from a polygynous or potentially polygynous 
marriage to that of a monogamous one. 
Furthermore, s. 10(2) provides that when a marriage is concluded as 
contemplated in subsection ( 1 ), the marriage is in community of property 
and of profit and loss unless such consequences are specifically excluded 
in an antenuptial contract. This means that the provisions of the 
Matrimonial Property Act 1984600 relating to joint administration of the 
joint estate,601 litigation by or against a spouse who is married in 
community of property,602 damages for non-patrimonial loss incurred or 
599 
600 
601 
602 
Marriages Act came into operation. See Sinclair assisted by Heaton op. cit., 
at pp. 222-223 for a discussion on the effect of ss. 22(1) and (2) of the Black 
Administration Act. 
S. 10(4) of the Act. 
Sees. 10(3) of the Act. 
Sees. 14 of the 1984 Act. 
See s. 17 of the 1984 Act. 
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recovered by such spouse, 603 the spouses' delictual liability604 and the 
statutory protective measures one spouse can employ against the other605 
apply to the marriage. 
The provisions of s. 10 have been criticised as not being adequate to 
regulate the consequences of a conversion of a customary marriage into 
a civil marriage.606 It is asserted that the purported rationale behinds. 
10(2)607, namely, to ensure that there is no implication that the customary 
marriage is superceded by a civil marriage when the parties have 
contracted both, and that the parties in such a situation are merely 
converting from one set of consequences to another, is not adequately 
addressed by the subsection. 608 Questions, such as, does the "conversion" 
mean that the customary marriage continues to exist with the result that 
the spouses are simultaneously married according to two systems oflaw? 
603 Ibid 
604 See s. 19 of the 1984 Act. 
605 Sees. 16 of the 1984 Act. 
606 See Cronje & Heaton op. cit., at pp.236-237. 
607 See Cronje & Heaton op. cit., at p. 237. 
608 Ibid 
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are left unanswered by the provisions of s. 10. The following solution is 
offered for this unsatisfactory situation.609 The wording of s. 10(2) 
reveals that customary law applies in respect of the proprietary 
consequences before the date of the civil marriage and that the provisions 
of s. 10(2) apply only as from the date of the civil marriage. The 
reasoning given for this solution is that the subsection prescribes the 
matrimonial property consequences in "the marriage" "[w }hen a 
marriage is concluded as contemplated in subsection (I)". S. 10(1) 
governs the capacity of the spouses who are married at customary law to 
"contract a marriage with each other under the Marriage Act", that is, 
their capacity to conclude a civil marriage. S. 10(2) therefore only deals 
with the consequences of the civil marriage. Thus, all assets acquired 
before the civil marriage will still be governed by the customary-law 
principles of family and house property while assets acquired from the 
date of the civil marriage fall into the joint estate and will be controlled 
by the spouses, subject to the limitation imposed by the Matrimonial 
Property Act. 
609 See Cronje & Heaton op. cit., at p. 237-238. 
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It is submitted that an alternative solution will be to treat the civil 
marriage as having superceded the customary marriage. This will be the 
outcome of drawing an inference from the fact that since no special 
procedure is specified for the conversion of the marriage, the same 
· procedure for contracting a civil marriage will be used for the purpose of 
conversion. It is therefore legitimate to infer that s. 10(1) contemplates 
that the second marriage is to be regarded as a new one despite the 
professed intention to the contrary. Under s. 30(1) of the Marriage Act 
25 of 1961, the prescribed marriage formula must be adhered to in all 
civil marriages. Before the marriage officer declares the parties to be 
married, he is required to address them as follows: 
"Do you, A.B., declare that as far as you know there is no lawful 
impediment to your proposed marriage with C.D. here present, 
and that you call all here present to witness that you take C.D. as 
your lawfal wife (or husband)?" 
If the answer to the question is in the affirmative, then the marriage 
officer shall declare the marriage solemnised in the following words: 
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"/declare that A.B. and CD. here present have been lawfully 
married'. 
Thus, the general formula for the solemnisation of the civil marriage does 
not acknowledge the existence of a prior customary marriage610 and the 
compliance with the statutory requirements is sufficient in itself to 
constitute a civil marriage independently of the pre-existing customary 
marriage. Consequently, it is submitted that the civil marriage creates a 
marriage de novo and the pre-existing customary marriage is superceded 
by this new marriage and therefore only the community of property 
regime should govern the civil marriage. This conclusion accord with 
judicial attitude to similar problems raised by Marriage Acts in Ghana and 
Nigeria.611 
610 
611 
Cf. s. 9 of the Kenya African Marriage Ordinance (1962 Rev.) which 
provides as follows: "Do I understand that you A.B. and you C.D., have 
been heretobefore married to each other by native law and custom, and that 
you come here for the purpose of binding yourself to each other as man and 
wife so long as both of you shall live?" This formula duly acknowledges the 
pre-existing customary marriage. 
See s. 14(4) of the Ghana Marriage Ordinance 1884 which permits 
conversion of a customary marriage into a civil marriage and the case of 
Graham v. Graham [1965] G.L.R. 407. See also W.C.E. Daniels "Marital 
family law and social policy" in Essays in Ghanaian Law, Legon, Faculty 
of Law, University of Ghana, 1976 at pp. 104-105 and K.O. Adinkrah 
"Ghana's Marriage Ordinance: An inquiry into a legal transplant for social 
269 
One may concede though that treating the second marriage as a marriage 
de novo may give rise to the impression that the pre-existing customary 
marriage does not create a status. The full recognition of customary 
marriages under the 1998 Act gives spouses of such marriages the same 
status of"married persons" as is given to spouses of a civil marriage. The 
question then will be asked: Why should couples already possessing the 
status of married persons seek to acquire the same status by marrying 
again under the Marriage Act? To answer this question one may have to 
adapt the meaning of "convert" from "making new" to one of "change of 
user" or "structural alteration''612 of the pre-existing customary marriage. 
In terms of this meaning, the parties to the pre-existing customary 
marriage should be treated as married persons for the purpose of the 
second, civil marriage. The only change that comes about as a 
612 
change"(1980) 18AfricanLawStudies 1 at pp. 17-18. InNigerias. 33 of 
the Marriage Act 1914 allows conversion of a customary marriage into a 
civil marriage. In Ohochuku v. Ohochuku [1960] 1 All E.R. 253, an English 
court accepted expert evidence on Nigerian law from the eminent Nigerian 
jurist, Dr. T.O. Elias, that when a customary marriage is converted into a 
civil marriage, the latter marriage supercedes the former. The case was 
however, decided on a different ground. See also pp. 426-428 and note 1045 
infra. 
See W. C.E. Daniels "Towards the integration of the laws relating to husband 
and wife in Ghana" in Integration of Customary and Modern Legal Systems 
in Africa, New York & Ile lfe, African Publishing Co & University of Ife 
Press, 1964, 352 at pp. 361-362. 
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consequence of the civil marriage is a change of user or a structural 
alteration of the pre-existing customary marriage.613 Accordingly, the 
status created by the customary marriage becomes merged in the status 
offered by the civil marriage whilst the matrimonial consequences of the 
civil marriage will do the same with those of the customary marriage. 
The customary marriage will thereby cease to exist and so, a decree of 
divorce granted in respect of the subsequent civil marriage, for instance, 
will be sufficient to terminate the spouses' status as "married persons". 
(iv) Customary law and the Constitution 
The constitutional apportionment oflegislative competence between the 
National Assembly and the Provincial Assemblies has been stated to have 
created some uncertainty about the future of customary law.614 
Legislation concerning customary law is under the concurrent competence 
of the National and Provincial Assemblies under Schedule four of the 
Constitution. It is therefore conceivable that both legislatures may enact 
613 
614 
Ibid. 
See Sinclair assisted by Heaton op. cit., at p. 161. Ss. 44(1) and 104(1) of 
the Constitution confer legislative competence on the National and 
Provincial Assemblies respectively. 
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legislation covering the same matter giving rise to possible conflicts. S. 
146 of the 1996 Constitution does provide a solution to this situation. It 
provides that were there is a conflict between national and provincial 
legislation falling within a functional area listed in Schedule four, the 
national legislation which applies uniformly over the whole country shall 
prevail provided, inter alia, that the national legislation deals with a 
matter that cannot be regulated effectively by legislation enacted by 
respective provinces individually.615 Thus, a statute such as the 
Recognition of Customary Marriages Act 1998, will come within the 
provision of s. 146 in that it deals with the recognition of customary 
marriages, marriages which may be entered into by persons who do not 
necessarily live in a single province. Consequently, with the enactment 
of the 1998 Act a Provincial Assembly cannot enact a law which covers 
the same subject matter as that covered by the 1998 Act. 
It is conceivable that the constitutionality of the recognition afforded by 
the 1998 Act to customary marriages may be raised. S. 15(3) of the 
Constitution allows legislation to be made recognising marriages 
concluded under any tradition or system of religious, personal and family 
615 S. 146(2)(a) of the Constitution. 
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law. In addition legislation may also recognise systems of personal and 
family law under tradition or religion. There is no doubt that the Act falls 
within the ambit of s. 15(3) of the Constitution. What is doubtful is 
whether the said section clothes it with immunity from constitutional 
challenge. Since the provisions of s. 15(3) are qualified to the extent that 
they should be consistent with the provisions of s. 15(1) (the section 
guaranteeing, inter alia, freedom of religion, belief and opinion) and other 
provisions of the Constitution,616 the answer seems to be that the Act is 
not immune from constitutional challenge.617 It is possible that such a 
challenge may be mounted against the Act on the ground, for example, 
that it infringes the sex and gender provisions of the Constitution618 in that 
customary law marriages require the payment of"lobolo".619 
616 
617 
618 
619 
Sees. 15(3)(b) of the Constitution. S. 15(3) is said to read more naturally 
as an immunization of certain practices from constitutional attack but in view 
of s. 15(3)(b) this is unlikely to be achieved. See N. Smith "Freedom of 
religion under the final Constitution" ( 1997) 114 South African Law Journal 
217atp.222. 
See Cronje & Heaton op. cit., at p. 240. 
Sees. 9(3) of the Constitution. 
For a definition of this term, see note 546 supra. There is however, no 
unanimous agreement about the answer to the question whether "lobolo" 
unfairly discriminates against women. On this lack of unanimity, see Cronje 
& Heaton op. cit., at p. 239 and the South African Law Commission Report 
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Another aspect of customary mamage which may also raise a 
constitutional issue on the ground of discrimination is the practice of 
polygyny. The question whether this practice discriminates against 
women has attracted the attention of various commentators. 620 It has been 
asserted that the mere fact that the husband is permitted to take more than 
one wife but the wife is not permitted to take more than one husband 
means that there is no formal equality in polygyny.621 However, in the 
620 
621 
op. cit., at paras. 4.3.2.6and 4.3.2.7. 
See Cronje & Heaton op. cit., at pp. 23 8-239, Sinclair assisted by Heaton op. 
cit., at pp. 164-169, A. Sachs Protecting Human Rights in a New South 
Africa Cape Town, Oxford University Press, 1990 at p. 64, J.C. Bekker 
"Interaction between constitutional refonn and family law (1991) Acta 
Juridica 1, T.W. Bennett "The compatibility of African customary law and 
human rights" (1991) Acta Juridica 18, F. Kaganas & C. Murray "Law, 
women and family: The question of polygyny in a New South Africa" ( 1991) 
Acta Juridica 116, J. Sinclair "Family Law" in Constitutional Law of South 
Africa, Chaskalson et al (eds.), Cape Town, Juta& Co. 1996 at para. 34-10-
34-11 and LP. Maithufi "Customary law of marriage and a bill of rights in 
South Africa: Quo vadis?" (1996) Journal of Contemporary Roman-Dutch 
Law/Tydskrif vir Hedendaagse Romeins-Hollandse Reg 298. 
See Cronje & Heaton op. cit., at p. 238. The learned authors distinguish 
between fonnal and real or substantive equality. According to them, fonnal 
equality presupposes that all persons are essentially in the same position and 
that discrimination between the sexes can be eradicated by the removal of 
express discrimination based on sex or gender. Real or substantive equality, 
on the other hand, presupposes an acknowledgment that mere removal of 
fonnal discrimination is insufficient to achieve equality of outcome. They 
conclude that the object of real equality is to achieve effective equality 
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as has been stated by a commentator,624 African customary law is to take 
an honoured position within South African jurisprudence, it must 
continuously undergo revitalisation and development in the same manner 
as does Roman-Dutch law. Hopefully, the legal recognition given to 
customary marriages under the 1998 Act is a significant step on the road 
to such revitalisation and development which will in turn lead to a change 
of the "Cinderella" image of customary law in general and customary-law 
marriages in particular. Such recognition brings not only respect for the 
African legal tradition but also an improvement in the position of women 
and children, two groups previously disadvantaged by the traditional 
customary-law regime.625 
5. CONCLUSION 
A striking characteristic of the matrimonial property regimes governing 
civil marriages in South Africa is that they provide two extreme points in 
a range of options linked by a bridge. On the one hand, the community 
624 
625 
W. Van der Meide "Gender equality v. right to culture: Debunking the 
perceived conflicts preventing the reform of the marital property regime of 
the 'official version' of customary law" (1999) 116 South African Law 
Journal 100. 
See para. 2.1.5 of the Report. 
276 
of property and, on the other, the contractual alternative of complete 
separation of property. The bridge linking these two extreme points is the 
accrual system. The Matrimonial Property Act 1984, as subsequently 
amended, has provided improvements in the matrimonial property 
regimes but each regime still has some disadvantage attached to it. To 
adapt an observation made by a commentator,626 the 1984 Act is only a 
half-way mark towards a legal facilitation of a genuine parity and 
financial security for all married couples, especially wives. There is 
therefore a need for further reform of aspects of the present regimes. One 
has in mind, particularly, the unsatisfactory protection afforded to spouses 
whose marriages are governed by the accrual system in protecting their 
rights to share in the accrual of each other's estate, the non-extension of 
the court's discretion to redistribute assets on divorce to marriages out of 
community of property entered into after 1984, the overprotection of third 
parties in transactions conducted by a spouse married in community of 
property without the requisite consent and the continuance of the right of 
a spouse, on divorce, to demand forfeiture of benefits against his or her 
spouse. As far as the customary-law marriage is concerned, the 
recognition of this type of marriage and the equalisation of its 
626 See Zaal op. cit., at p. 69. 
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consequences with that of a civil marriage is a welcome development. 
This has made South African matrimonial law all inclusive as married 
couples, irrespective of race, will generally be able to have the same 
matrimonial consequences apply to their marriage irrespective of whether 
they choose to contract a customary or a civil marriage. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
AN OVERVIEW OF THE MATRIMONIAL PROPERTY 
REGIME IN ENGLAND 
1. INTRODUCTION 
627 
"There is really no such thing in English law as 'family property'. 
We have a very elaborate law of property, but the family, though 
a social unit of great importance and recognised as such by the 
law, is not an entity that is given rights or even defined: it has 
failed to attract rights and duties comparable with those of an 
individual human being, a company, or a partnership. And so it 
is not surprising that English 'family property law' is hardly more 
than a label given to the hesitant moves made by Parliament 
during the last hundred years to eliminate the grosser irljustices 
inflicted by the common law upon married women in property 
matters". 627 
Law Commission Working Paper No. 42 op. cit., para. 0.1. 
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This extract from the English Law Commission's Working Paper on 
family property precisely sums up English law's attitude to matrimonial 
property. The current law on matrimonial property can only be properly 
understood with its historical background in mind. Consequently, a brief 
historical background will be given. 
2. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND 
The development of English matrimonial property law has been said to 
be a story of"compromise and failure; of successive attempts of salvage 
from a shipwrecked vessel; or (to change the metaphor) groping in the 
dark. "628 The story began with the insistence of the common law that on 
marriage, husband and wife become one. In the words of the eminent 
jurist, Blackstone, "the very being or legal existence of the woman is 
suspended during the marriage, or at least incorporated into that of the 
husband". 629 This position, though fictitious, had wide ramifications. For 
628 
629 
See M.D.A. Freeman "Towards a rational reconstruction of family property 
law" in ( 1972) Current Legal Problems 84 at p. 85. 
Commentaries on the Laws of England (4th. ed. 1770) at p. 442. For a 
historical sketch of the origins and development of the doctrine of unity of 
husband and wife, see Midland Bank Trust Co. Ltd & Anor. v. Green & 
Anor. (No. 3) [1979] Ch. 496 atp. 510 et seq. On the historical development 
of matrimonial rights between spouses, see S.M. Cretney Principles of 
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example, the wife's personal property, except her clothes and personal 
ornaments, as well as her income vested in her husband on marriage. The 
law regarded husband and wife as one and that one was the husband.630 
This system was described as resting "on the doctrine of what is mine is 
yours, but what is yours is not mine ... "631 However, despite its apparent 
unfairness, it has been argued that, based as it was on a land-owning 
society, there were special built-in rules to mitigate the consequences of 
a rigid application of the unity of spouses. 632 In fact equity633 developed 
a system whereby a transfer of property at any time to trustees to hold for 
the wife's "separate use" would prevent any interest in that property from 
630 
631 
632 
633 
Family Law (41h ed.) London, Sweet & Maxwell, 1984 at pp. 629-634 and 
the literature referred to in the notes therein and P.M. Bromley Family Law 
(6th ed.) London, Butterworths, 1981 at Chap. 13. 
See Williams & Glyn's Bank Ltd v. Boland [1979] Ch. 312 at p. 332 per 
Lord Denning M.R. 
See J.S. Mill The Subjection of Women Everyman's Library ed. 1869 at p. 
263. 
See Cretney (4th ed.) op. cit., at p. 630. 
A system developed by the old Court of Chancery prior to the Judicature Act 
1873 to ameliorate the rigidity of the common law. For a fuller account of 
the development of equity see Sir William Holdsworth History of English 
Law Vol. I (3'd Impression 1978) London, Sweet & Maxwell, 1924, at pp. 
395 et seq. 
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vesting in the husband. The wife retained in equity the same right of 
holding and disposing of the property as if she was a feme sole, an 
unmarried woman.634 Accordingly, a prudent parent would ensure that a 
proper settlement was made on marriage, securing first that his daughter's 
existing property was held for her separate use, and secondly that any 
after-acquired property would be so held. 
After a long agitation635 for separate property for the wife, the Married 
Women's Property Act636 was passed in 1870. This Act provided a 
number of specified cases ( for example, her earnings, deposits in savings 
banks, stocks and shares) in which property acquired by the wife were 
deemed to be held for her separate use. This clumsy half-measure637 was 
repealed by the Married Women's Property Act 1882.638 The combined 
634 
635 
636 
637 
638 
See Holdsworth op. cit., vol.Vat pp. 310-315. 
See Cretney (41h ed.) op. cit., at pp. 631-634 and Freeman op. cit., at pp. 85-
87. 
33 & 34 Viet. c. 93. 
See Freeman op. cit., at p. 85. 
45 & 46 Viet. c. 75. There were further Married Women Property Acts in 
1884, 1893, 1907 and 1908. These statutes did not effect any change of 
principle but were passed to clear up a number of difficulties, ambiguities 
and one or two gaps left in the 1882 Act. 
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effect of sections 2 and 5 of the 1882 Act were that any woman marrying 
after 1882 was entitled to retain, as her separate property, all property she 
owned at the time of the marriage as well as all property she acquired 
during the marriage and that, regardless of when she married, any 
property acquired by a married woman after 1882 was held by her in the 
same way. The detailed provisions of the Act are too complex to be 
discussed here, except to state that, subject to the restraint on 
anticipation,639 a married woman's capacity to hold and dispose of 
property was very nearly the same as that of a feme sole. The Law 
Reform (Married Women and Tortfeasors) Act 1935640 completed the 
emancipation of the married woman by abolishing the concept of the 
"separate property" as introduced by the 1882 Act. The 1935 Act gave 
639 
640 
This was a conveyancing device, inserted in marriage settlements, to stop a 
wife getting control of anything beyond the current income of the property 
held by trustees for her separate use. It prevented her from selling, 
mortgaging or giving away the property which was thus preserved intact, 
usually for the wife's family. In equity she was owner of the property and 
any instruction given by her to the trustees to transfer the property to a third 
party was to be obeyed. Thus the device was to prevent the married woman 
from transferring such property to her husband at his instigation. See 
further, W.G. Hart "The origin of the restraint upon anticipation" (1924) 40 
Law Quarterly Review 221. Restraint upon anticipation was finally 
abolished in 1949 by the Married Women (Restraint upon Anticipation) Act 
1949. 
25 & 26 Geo. 5, c. 30. 
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the wife the same rights and powers as were already possessed by other 
adults of full legal capacity.641 But as will be clear from the discussions 
below, the legal position of married women was far from satisfactory. 
3. THE CURRENT LAW 
The underlying principle of English matrimonial property law is that 
marriage under English law has no effect on the property of the spouses, 
that each retains what he or she had at the time of the marriage or acquires 
during the marriage, that each can freely dispose of that property, and that 
each has full and unrestricted right to the income derived from it.642 The 
641 
642 
See ss. l(a) and 2(1) of the Act. Doubts have been expressed about the 
efficacy of the 1882 Act. See for example, Freeman op. cit. at p. 85 who 
opines that, with the exception of s. 17, the teeth of which were extracted by 
the House of Lords in Pettitt's case, the Act is not really remembered. The 
said s. 17 gave power to a judge to "make such order ... as he thinks jif' 
where any question arose between husband and wife as to the title to or 
possession of property. It was claimed that this gave the court a free hand 
to do what was just. But in Pettitt v. Pettitt op. cit. the House of Lords held 
that the section was purely procedural. The task of the court was to ascertain 
the rights of the parties and it had no power to vary established rights. The 
question was" Whose is this?" and not "To whom shall this be given?" per 
Lord Morris at p. 798. 
See Freeman op. cit., at pp. 85-86, Law Commission Working Paper No. 42 
op. cit., at para. 0.9, Miller op. cit., at Chap. 2 and Cretney (4th ed.) op. cit., 
at p. 633. 
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acceptance of the principle of separate property led to a situation where 
there is no longer "one law of property applicable where a dispute as to 
property is between spouses or former spouses and another law of 
property where the dispute is between others".643 A wife who wants to 
claim a share in her husband's property thus has to base her claim on 
some recognised principle of property law. She can only do so if someone 
who has never been married to the husband can equally do so. In the 
words of Lord Upjohn: 
643 
644 
"The rights of the parties [to a marriage] must be judged on the 
general principles applicable in any court of law when 
considering questions of title, and though the parties are husband 
and wife these questions of title must be decided by the principles 
of law applicable to the settlement of claims between those not so 
related, while making full allowances in view of the 
relationship. "644 
Per Viscount Dilhome Gissing v. Gissing op. cit., at p. 899. See also the 
dicta in Pettitt v. Pettitt op. cit., at p. 803 per Lord Morris, at p. 813 per Lord 
Upjohn, and at p. 821 per Lord Diplock. 
Pettitt v. Pettitt op. cit., at p. 813. See also per Lord Morris at p. 803 and per 
Lord Diplock at p. 821. 
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There are formidable obstacles in the way of a wife who seeks to make 
such a claim. For instance, if the deed of conveyance of the matrimonial 
home is taken in the husband's name, the wife can make no claim to be 
entitled to the legal estate in the absence of any subsequent conveyance 
to her.645 Furthermore, no interest in land can be created or disposed of 
except by a signed written document. 646 Thus, if a husband verbally tells 
his wife that she has a share in the matrimonial home which is in his sole 
name, this is insufficient to confer a share on her. In the leading case of 
Gissing v. Gissing, 647 the husband said to the wife "Don 't worry about the 
house - it's yours. I will pay the mortgage payments and all other 
outgoings." This promise was held by the House of Lords to be 
ineffective at law since there was no deed which could displace the legal 
estate, and no written document which could give her any other interest. 
645 
646 
647 
This is as a result of s. 52 of the Law of Property Act 1925 ( 15 & 16 Geo. 
5, c. 20) which stipulates that a deed is required to convey or create any legal 
estate in land. 
Sees. 53 of the Law of Property Act 1925. 
Supra. 
286 
Thus, it became a paradox that a system which was created to further 
married women's rights was perpetrating serious injustice to them. 648 It 
had become out of touch with the contemporary reality, a reality in which 
most families practice community rather than separation of property. For 
instance, the matrimonial home, around which most disputes are centred, 
is purchased in joint names from savings in joint bank accounts. 
Household furniture and other goods are regarded as "ours" rather than 
"yours" or "mine".649 There was therefore the need to adjust the system 
to the realities of contemporary conjugal roles. The courts resorted to the 
trust concept in order to bring about this adjustment. 
In terms of s. 53 (2) of the Law of Property Act 1925 the legal rules for 
the creation of the legal estate or other interest in land do not affect the 
"creation or operation of resulting, implied or constructive trusts". In the 
absence of a signed written document as required bys. 53 (1) of the 1925 
Act, a spouse may therefore be able to establish a claim under these 
equitable doctrines, which are based on the underlying principle that it 
would in the circumstances be unconscionable to allow the legal owner 
648 
649 
See Cretney (41h ed.) op. cit., at p. 633. 
See Freeman op. cit., at p. ~7. 
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to continue to assert the absolute ownership which appears on the title 
documents to be his.650 . However, the courts' attempt at modernising the 
system has been "unsystematic, haphazard, partial and uncertain of 
conclusion".651 This situation prompted Mustill L.J. to remark in Grant 
v. Edwards 652 that the time had not yet "arrived when it is possible to 
state the law in a way which will deal with all the practical problems 
which may arise in this difficult field, consistently with everything said in 
the cases." The equitable principles relied upon by the courts in trying to 
redress the injustice created by the separate property principle can be 
grouped under two main headings: 
(a) cases in which a common intention is imputed to the parties to share 
the equitable ownership; and 
650 
651 
652 
See Winkworth v. Edward Baron Development Co. Ltd [1987] 1 All E.R. 
114 at p. 118 per Lord Templeman. 
Per Lord Simon in an extrajudicial lecture to the Holdsworth Club in 
Birmingham in 1964 titled "With all my worldly goods .... " at p. 16 cited by 
Freeman op. cit., at p. 87. 
[1986] l All E.R. 426 at p. 435. 
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(b) cases where there is evidence of an express but informal promise 
made by one party to the other that the other shall have a share in the 
property. 653 
The principles underlying the cases falling under the two groups used to 
be treated differently. Those falling under (a) used to be referred to as 
cases of implied/resulting trust and those under (b) as cases of 
constructive trust. 654 There have recently been some attempts in 
academic655 and judicial circles656 however, to treat them as having 
become essentially indistinguishable and referring to both as examples of 
653 
654 
655 
656 
See J. Dewar Law and the Family, (2°d ed.) London, Butterworths, 1992 at 
p. 185. 
Ibid 
E.g. D.J. Hayton "Equitable rights ofcohabitees" [1990) Conveyancer 370 
at p. 378. 
See Browne-Wilkinson V.-C. in Grantv. Edwards [1986] 2 AllE.R. 426 at 
pp. 437-440 and Lord Bridge in Lloyds Bank Pie v. Rossel [1991) 1 A.C. 
107 at pp. 132E-133A. It has been noted that in the latter case, Lord Bridge 
may have assumed that there was no question of a resulting trust in the 
traditional sense arising on the facts. See J. Dewar op. cit., atp. 185 note 12. 
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constructive trust.657 For the purpose of clarity, the traditional distinction 
between the principles will be maintained in this discussion. 
(a) Imputed common intention: Implied/Resulting Trust 
Where there is no evidence of an express agreement between the parties 
concerning the ownership of the property, the court will impute an 
intention to the parties to share the equitable (beneficial) ownership where 
it is reasonable to do so.658 The court will scrutinise all the available 
evidence, especially contributions which have been made by each party 
in cash, kind or services in order to obtain some clue as to the parties' 
"unexpressed and probably unconsidered intentions as to the beneficial 
ownership ... "659 This search for what has been described as the ''fugitive 
657 
658 
659 
See Lloyds Bank Pie v. Rosset, supra, Hayton op. cit., p. 378 note 1 and 
Dewar op. cit., at p. 185. Cf the views of P. Ferguson "Constructive trusts -
a note of caution" (1993) Law Quarterly Review 114 who argues that to 
overlook the distinction between constructive trusts and estoppel will lead 
to adverse consequences. See further, D. Hayton "Constructive trusts of 
homes - a bold approach (1993) 109 Law Quarterly Review 485. 
Per Lords Reid and Diplock in Pettitt v. Pettitt supra, at pp. 793 and 811 
respectively. 
See Bernard v. Joseph op. cit., at pp. 402 and 404 per Griffiths L.J., at p. 
398 per Lord Denning M.R. 
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common intention"660 has led to an" air of unreality" about the exercise. 661 
This situation notwithstanding, the court tends to regard financial 
contributions to the acquisition of the disputed property as sufficient 
grounds for imputing this intention. It will not be sufficient to show that, 
for example, "a house is to be renovated as 'joint venture '[or] that the 
house is to be shared by parents and children."662 
The type of contribution recognised by the courts as justifying the 
inference of a common intention may be summarised as follows: 663 
660 
661 
662 
663 
Per Dickson J. in Pettkus v. Becker (1980) 117 D.L.R. (3d) 257 at p. 269 
(Supreme Court of Canada) cited by Waite J. in H v. M (Property: 
Beneficial Interest) [1992] 1 F.L.R. 229 at p. 231. 
See Bernard v. Joseph supra at p. 404 per Griffiths L.J. 
Per Lord Bridge in Lloyd's Bank pie v. Rasset supra at p. 130. See also 
Burns v. Burns [1984] 1 All E.R. 244, Grant v. Edwards supra, Thomas v. 
Fuller-Brown [1988] 1 F.L.R. 237, Bernardv. Joseph supra, Pettittv. Pettitt 
supra and Gissing v. Gissing supra. It must be remarked that in the cases 
involving unmarried couples, the courts have in practice shown themselves 
less ready to draw inferences of a commitment to sharing. 
See Dewar op. cit., at p. 186 and S.M. Cretney and J.M. Masson Principles 
of Family Law (61h ed.) Sweet & Maxwell, London, 1997 at pp. 126-154. 
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(a) The payment of a deposit on a house, or any other direct financial 
contribution to its purchase, such as the payment of mortgage 
instalments. 664 Thus, if one partner provides all or part of the purchase 
price of a matrimonial home conveyed into the name of the other, he or 
she will, in the absence of admissible evidence that some other result was 
intended, be entitled in equity to a share in the property proportionate to 
the amount of his or her contribution. This is by way of resulting trust. 665 
In some situations the presumption of resulting trust may be rebutted by 
the so-called presumption of advancement, 666 that is, that the transferor 
664 
665 
666 
See Pettitt v. Pettitt supra, Gissing v. Gissing supra, Burns v. Burns supra 
and Bernard v. Joseph supra. 
See Cowcher v. Cowcher [1972] 1W.L.R.425, Springette v. Defoe [1992] 
2 F.L.R. 388 (C.A.) and Tinsley v. Milligan [1994] 1 A.C. 340. Resulting 
trusts are classified into two types - "automatic" and "presumed". The 
former arises automatically whenever some or all of the beneficial interest 
in an expressed trust , that is, a trust created expressly by the settlor, has not 
been effectively exhausted. The unexhausted part is presumed to 
automatically revert to the original settlor. For example, where property is 
bought with money provided by two or more persons, it will rebuttably be 
presumed that they intended the property to belong to those who provided 
the purchase money. Accordingly, in the absence of any contrary evidence, 
the property is held on a resulting trust for them in shares proportionate to 
their contribution (see Re Vandervell's Trusts (No. 2) [1974] 1 All E.R. 47). 
It is the latter type that the text is concerned with. 
The presumption of advancement is usually implied in circumstances where 
a special relationship, such as husband/wife or parent/child, exists between 
the parties. 
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intends to make a gift of the property. Thus, in Silver v. Silver661 
successive dwelling-houses were purchased in the name of the wife. In 
each case, the property had been financed by building society mortgages, 
the instalments being paid entirely by the husband. It was held, at first 
instance and affirmed on appeal, that, on the facts, there was nothing to 
rebut the presumption that in having the houses put in the name of the 
wife and paying the mortgage instalments, the husband intended to make 
an advancement to the wife. 
It must be remarked that the strength of the presumption of advancement 
between husband and wife is nowadays very weak and the court will only 
resort to it as a last resort. 668 A concerted effort will usually be made to 
look for the intentions of the parties from the available evidence. The 
presumption of advancement is rebuttable by evidence to the contrary, in 
which case a resulting trust is imposed. In Loades-Carter v. Loades-
667 
668 
[1958] 1 W.L.R. 259. 
In Pettitt v. Pettitt supra, two Law Lords treated the presumption of 
advancement as applicable but two others treated it as inappropriate for 
modem times. InHarwoodv. Harwood[1991] 2 F.L.R. 274 atp. 294, Slade 
J. stated that the presumption must be applied with caution in modem 
circumstances. Thus it is a weak starting point, especially if the wife makes 
some contribution to a house mainly purchased by the husband in his name. 
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Carter, 669 a house was put in the name of the wife for the purpose of 
obtaining a mortgage. This was held to be sufficient evidence to rebut the 
presumption of advancement. The limits within which such rebuttal may 
be made were set by the House of Lords in Shepherd v. Cartwright. 670 
The case reaffirmed the rule that evidence of subsequent acts, though not 
admissible in favour of the party doing the acts, is admissible against him. 
The rebuttal evidence must not be based on illegality, for "he who comes 
to equity must come with clean hands". Thus in Gascoigne v. 
Gascoigne611 a husband took a lease ofland in his wife's name and built 
a house upon it with his own money. He used the wife's name in the 
transaction with her knowledge and connivance because he was in debt 
and was desirous of protecting the property from his creditors. In an 
action by him against the wife for a declaration that she held the property 
as trustee for him, the court held that he could not be allowed to set up his 
own fraudulent design as rebutting the presumption that the conveyance 
669 
670 
671 
(1996) 110 S.J. 51. 
[1995) A.C. 431. 
[1918] 1 K.B. 223. See also Tinsley v. Milligan supra, Re Emery's 
Investment Trusts [1959] Ch. 410 and Tinker v. Tinker [1970] P. 136. In 
Tribe v. Tribe [1995] 4 All E.R. 236, the Court of Appeal held that where 
the illegal purpose had not been carried out, it should not have any effect on 
the rebuttal evidence. 
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was intended as a gift to her. It was further held that she was entitled to 
retain the property for her own use notwithstanding that she was a party 
to the fraud. 
(b) The contribution of money to general household expenses which 
thereby enables the other partner to make the mortgage payments. This 
particular contribution has proved to be problematic. On one view, the 
making of such indirect contribution suffices if, but only if, either: 
(i) husband and wife have consistently applied a system of meeting all 
expenses, including those of the house purchased, out of a common fund 
formed by their pooling their resources, 672 or 
(ii) if those contributions are directly referable to the acquisition costs.673 
Another view is that the court may draw the inference that the parties 
672 See Cowcher v. Cowcher supra, at p. 437. 
673 See Falconer v. Falconer [1970] 1 W.L.R. 1333. 
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intended joint ownership whenever there has been a substantial 
contribution in money or money's worth to family expenses.674 
However, following the decision of Lloyd's Bank Plc v. Rossef'15 it may 
now be doubtful whether contribution to household expenses will qualify 
the contributor for a share in a house purchased by the other spouse. Lord 
Bridge, with whom the other Law Lords agreed, thought it was "extremely 
doubtfuI" whether anything less than direct contribution to the purchase 
price, whether initially or by mortgage instalments, will justify the 
necessary inference of a common intention. 676 In that case, the 
matrimonial home, a derelict farmhouse, was purchased in the sole name 
of the husband. The purchase money had come from the husband's 
family trust in Switzerland and the trustees had insisted it be purchased 
in his name. He paid for the renovation work. The wife, a skilled 
decorator and painter, made no financial contribution to the purchase, but 
spent all her time over a seven-week period trying to make the house 
674 
675 
676 
See Falconer v. Falconer supra, at p. 1336E, Wachtel v. Wachtel supra, at 
p. 838J, Burns v. Burns supra, at p. 252 and Hazell v. Hazell [1972] 1 
W.L.R. 301 at p. 304. 
Supra. 
Ibid. at p. 133. 
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ready for occupation by Christmas. Unknown to the wife, the husband 
had charged the house to a bank as security for an overdraft. When the 
husband defaulted, the bank sought possession of the house. The wife, 
by way of a defence to the possession action, contended, inter alia, that 
she was entitled to a half share of the beneficial interest under a 
constructive trust.677 The House of Lords, (per Lord Bridge), rejected as 
"quite untenable"thetrialjudge's viewthatthewife's contributions were 
sufficient evidence of a common intention that she should have a 
beneficial interest in the house. "Considerable doubf' was expressed as 
to whether such "trifling" contributions were capable of constituting the 
necessary detriment to enable the wife to acquire a share in the house. It 
was "the most natural thing in the world for any wife ... to spend all the 
time she could spare and to employ any skills she might have ... in doing 
all she could to accelerate progress of the work ... "678 
677 
678 
For a general discussion of constructive trusts, see A. W. Scott "Constructive 
Trusts" (1955) 71 Law Quarterly Review 39 and Hayton & Marshall 
Commentary and Cases on the Law of Trusts and Equitable Remedies (10th 
ed. by D.J. Hayton), London, Sweet & Maxwell, 1996 Chap. Six. On the 
evidence required for such a trust to occur, see the dicta of Lord Bridge in 
Lloyds BankPlcv. Rossetsupra, atpp. 132E-133AandNourseL.J. in Grant 
v. Edwards supra at pp. 431-432. 
Per Lord Bridge at p. 131. 
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On the principle that equity will not assist a volunteer,679 the finding of 
contribution on the part of a spouse, will not per se entitle him to a share 
in the property acquired by the other spouse. The court would have to 
examine the subsequent course of dealings between the parties for some 
evidence of conduct detrimental to the spouse without legal title referable 
to a reliance upon an arrangement to share the beneficial interest in the 
property acquired. 680 In other words, the spouse claiming an interest in 
the property acquired will have to show that he has acted on the presumed 
intention to his detriment. The provision of some contribution will in 
practice go to establish that the claimant has suffered detriment, albeit not 
necessarily in a way specifically referable to the acquisition of the 
property in question. In Grant v. Edwards681 the claimant was told that 
her name was not going to go on the title because if it did, there might be 
problems in her then pending divorce proceedings. The Court of Appeal 
accepted that this fact, coupled with evidence that the parties treated the 
house as belonging to them both and that they had a principle of sharing 
679 
680 
681 
A "volunteer" is one who has not given valuable consideration, which may 
be money, marriage or the suffering of some detriment on his part. See Re 
Plumtre's Marriage Settlement [1910] 1Ch.609. 
See H. v. M (Property: Beneficial Interest) op. cit at p. 231 per Waite J. 
Supra. 
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everything, constituted sufficient proof that she was intended to have an 
interest in the house. Browne-Wilkinson V.-C. said: 
" ... once it has been shown that there was a common intention that 
the claimant should have an interest in the house, any act done by 
her to her detriment relating to the joint lives of the parties 
is ... sufficient detriment to qualify. The acts do not have to be 
inherently referable to the house."682 
However, in Midland Bank Pie v. Dobson and Dobson683 the Court of 
Appeal accepted that the husband and the wife had a common intention 
to share the beneficial interest in the matrimonial home, but the wife 
nonetheless failed in her claim to a beneficial interest because there was 
no evidence that she acted to her detriment on the basis of that intention. 
She had made no direct contribution to the acquisition costs or mortgage 
instalments, and her contributions in buying domestic equipment and 
decorating the house was held to be unrelated to the intention that the 
ownership of the house was to be shared. 
682 
683 
At p. 439. See also Jones v. Jones [1977] 1 W.L.R. 438 and Pascoe v. 
Turner [1979] 1W.L.R.431. 
[1986] 1 F.L.R. 171. 
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The undue reliance by the courts on purely financial contributions has 
meant that in the absence of an express promise or agreement relating to 
beneficial ownership, certain types of contributions will not qualify a 
claimant to a share in the property acquired by another. Thus, 
contributions in the form of caring for children, running the household, 
buying clothes, furnishings or consumer durables for the family, 684 'do-it-
yourself improvements to, or re-decoration of the family home, 685 and 
supervision of building works686 have all been held to be insufficient to 
impute the necessary common intention to the parties. This situation is 
obviously disadvantageous to those spouses, usually wives, who give up, 
or who never undertake, regular full-time employment in order to 
discharge home care responsibilities. 
684 Burns v. Burns supra. 
685 Pettitt v. Pettitt and Gissing v. Gissing supra. 
686 Lloyds Bank Pie. v. Rossel supra. 
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(b) Acquisition of interest by way of a constructive trust 
The restrictive tendency of the courts to the question of what constitutes 
financial contribution have led claimants to rely on an alternative body of 
equitable doctrine, which falls under the general rubric of constructive 
trust687 and estoppel.688 As mentioned above,689 there have been attempts 
to treat these two concepts as indistinguishable because one basic 
principle of unconscionability underlies them, 690 and that it is this 
principle, rather than any apparent differences remaining between them 
687 
688 
689 
690 
A constructive trust traditionally arises when the court imposes it in a given 
situation irrespective of the intention, actual or imputed, of the parties. See 
Gissing v. Gissing supra at p. 905 per Lord Diplock. 
The doctrine of estoppel recognises that if a person incurs expenditure or 
does some other detrimental act in the belief, encouraged by the legal owner 
of property, that he already owns or is to be given some proprietary interest 
in a specific property, an equity will arise to have the expectations which 
have been encouraged, made good so far as may fairly be done between the 
parties. See Taylors Fashions Ltd v. Liverpool Victoria Trustee Co. Ltd. 
[1982] Q.B. 133 and p. 299 infra. 
See pp. 288-289 supra. 
See notes 655, 656 and 657 supra. 
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which should guide the courts in deciding cases.691 In Lloyds Bank Pie. 
v. Rosset, for example, Lord Bridge set out a concise statement of the 
principles to be used in constructive trust cases. He said: 
691 
"I..draw attention to one critical distinction which any 
judge ... should always have in the forefront of his mind. The first 
and fundamental question ... is whether, independently of any 
inference to be drawn from the conduct of the parties ... there 
has ... been any agreement, arrangement or understanding reached 
between them that the property is to be shared beneficially. The 
finding of [such] an agreement or arrangement ... can only ... be 
based on evidence of expressed discussions ... Once a finding ... is 
made it will only be necessary for [the claimant] to show that he 
or she has acted to his or her detriment .. .in reliance on the 
agreement in order to give rise to a constructive trust ... where 
there is no evidence to support a finding of an agreement or an 
arrangement...and where the court must rely entirely on the 
It has, however, been judicially accepted in Stokes v. Anderson [1991] 1 
F.L.R. 391 at p. 399 per Nourse L.J. that the doctrines of constructive trust 
and those of estoppel have not been assimilated. Estoppel is a remedial 
concept based on intervention by the court whilst a constructive trust is a 
means of creating a proprietary right which operates entirely independently 
of the court. See Cretney & Masson op. cit., at p. 140. 
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conduct of the parties both as the basis from which to infer a 
common intention to share the property beneficially and as the 
conduct relied on to give rise to a constructive trust ... direct 
contributions to the purchase price by [the claimant] ... will 
readily justifY the inference necessary to the creation of a 
constructive trust. But ... it is ... extremely doubtful whether 
anything less will do. "692 
This dictum seems to treat both constructive and implied trusts as derived 
from the same basis and reiterates the dictum of Lord Diplock in Gissing 
v. Gissing.693 By saying the making of direct contributions to the 
purchase price would "readily justifY the inference necessary to a 
constructive trust", Lord Bridge could easily have said, based upon the 
discussions on implied trust above, that such a trust arises from the 
circumstances. Furthermore, his stated requirements for a constructive 
trust where there is no expressed agreement appear to be indistinguishable 
from those for a resulting trust. 694 These differences of terminology are 
692 
693 
694 
At pp. 132E-133A. See also Grant v. Edwards supra at pp. 431-432 per 
Nourse L.J. 
Supra at p. 905C-D. 
Ibid. See also Ferguson op. cit., at p. 118. 
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not only confusing but also have little or no practical effect according to 
commentators. 695 The important issue of principle is whether a 
constructive trust can be imposed in cases where there is no common 
agreement, express or implied. The House of Lords does not think that 
is possible at present. English law is yet to embrace a general principle 
whereby the courts would have a discretion to do whatever they might 
consider to be just or reasonable in the circumstances of a particular case, 
without reference to a common agreement, arrangement or understanding 
between the parties, and impose a constructive trust on the property in 
such shares as justice and equity require.696 
It can be deduced from the above dictum of Lord Bridge that there are two 
situations in which a constructive trust may arise. The first is where there 
is an express agreement, arrangement or understanding that the property 
is to be shared beneficially. The second is where there is no express 
agreement, arrangement or understanding, but where an agreement can be 
inferred provided there has been a direct contribution to the purchase 
695 
696 
Cretney & Masson op. cit., at pp. 132 (note 43a) and 138. 
Attempts were made by the late Lord Denning M.R. to establish such a 
general principle but it does not seem to have been embraced by his 
colleagues. See his dicta in Williams & Glyn's Bank v. Boland supra at p. 
329 and Hussey v. Palmer [1972] 1 W.L.R. 1286. 
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price. In both situations it is necessary to prove detriment, which may be 
either financial, labouring work on improving the property697 or staying 
at home looking after children by a previous marriage and children of the 
marriage, 698 in order to satisfy the maxim that "equity will not assist a 
volunteer".699 An act of detrimental reliance usually provides the 
necessary consideration to enable the court to find the existence of a 
constructive trust. However, it is clear from the case that constructive 
trust cannot be imposed just to do justice in a particular case and that 
payment of money per se is not sufficient to establish an interest in 
another person's property. 700 
A narrower variant of the constructive trust is the doctrine of estoppel701 
which has been treated sometimes as the same as constructive trust 
properly so-called. 702 There is however, a difference between the two 
697 
698 
699 
700 
701 
702 
Eves v. Eves [1975] 1 W.L.R. 1338. 
Grant v. Edwards supra. 
See note 679 supra. 
See Thomas v. Fuller-Brown supra at p. 240 per Slade L.J. 
See note 688 supra. 
See note 687 supra. 
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doctrines. Firstly, estoppel requires unilateral conduct by one party which 
leads the other party to act to his or her detriment, whereas constructive 
trust is based on evidence of a bilateral agreement, arrangement or 
understanding. Secondly, the imposition of a constructive trust gives the 
claimant equitable rights of ownership, but once estoppel is proved, the 
court has a discretion to decide what remedy to grant. Thirdly, interests 
under a constructive trust are retrospective, in that they are assumed to 
arise when the claimant acts to his or her detriment, but interests under 
estoppel arise from the date of the court decree, for until then the remedy 
is uncertain. 703 
The doctrine of estoppel may be relied upon if one partner has incurred 
expenditure or done other acts to his detriment in the reasonable belief 
that he already owned or would be given a proprietary interest in the 
property. Equity will give effect to that belie£ There are three stages in 
the process,704 namely, the court, having analysed the conduct and 
relationship of the parties, asks, first, whether an equity has been 
703 
704 
See K. Standley Cases & Materials on Family Law, London, Blackstone 
Press, 1997 at p. 96. See also Cretney & Masson op. cit., at p. 140 and 
Ferguson op. cit., at p. 124. 
See Scarman L.J. in Crabb v. Arun R.D.C. [1976] Ch. 179 at p. 193. 
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established, secondly, if so, what is the extent of that equity, and thirdly, 
what is the relief appropriate to satisfy the equity? Thus in Pascoe v. 
Turner105 the plaintiff, on the breakdown of their relationship, told the 
defendant, that the house "is yours and everything in it." The defendant, 
in reliance on this assurance, then used a large proportion of her small 
capital for repairs, improvements, and maintenance. The court held that 
the plaintiffs encouragement and acquiescence gave rise to an estoppel 
which could only be satisfied by ordering him to do what the defendant 
had been led to expect, namely that he would transfer the property to 
her.106 
705 
706 
Supra. 
This case, on the face of it, is indistinguishable from that of Gissing v. 
Gissing supra. But a crucial distinction between the two cases is that while 
in the latter case the wife's contributions in the form of payment for 
household items and clothes for herself and the children were found to be 
insufficient, in the former case the expenditures were regarded as sufficient. 
Estoppel does not however provide a general remedy for injustice. In 
Coombes v. Smith [1986) 1 W.L.R. 808 the defendant assured the plaintiff 
that he would always provide for her and that she would always have a roof 
over her head. After I 0 years the relationship came to an end. The plaintiff 
claimed a proprietary interest in a house bought by the defendant. It was 
held that she was not entitled to an interest by way of estoppel since, on the 
evidence, she had not been under any misapprehension about her legal 
rights. 
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The disadvantage of bringing a claim based on estoppel is that, once 
estoppel has been established, the court must look at the circumstances of 
the case to decide how the "equity can be satisfied''.707 This involves a 
great deal of discretion and in the exercise of such discretion, the court 
may grant a licence to remain in the property,708 or award financial 
compensation for the detriment suffered, 709 rather than give the claimant 
a right of ownership in equity. 
(c) Conclusion 
The doctrinal basis for the ascertainment of the interest of a non-legal 
claimant is unsatisfactory. The "present legal rules are uncertain and 
difficult to apply and can lead to serious injustice."710 Despite this 
707 
708 
709 
710 
See Plimmer v. Wellington Corp. [1881-85] All E.R. Rep. 1320. 
See Matharu v. Matharu [ 1994] 2 F .L.R. 597 and Greasley v. Cooke [ 1980] 
3 All E.R. 710. 
See Baker v. Baker [1993] 2 F.L.R. 247. 
The Law Commission's Sixth 's Programme of Law Reform (Law Com. No. 
234) 1995 p. 34. See also Midland Bank Pie. v. Cooke [1995] 4 All E.R. 
562 at p. 565 per Waite L.J. 
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unsatisfactory state of the law, the attitude of the courts to such claims 
may be summarised as follows: 
"The court first has to ask itself whether there have at any time 
prior to acquisition of the disputed property, or exceptionally at 
some later date, .been discussions between the parties leading to 
any agreement, arrangement or understanding reached between 
them that the property is to be shared beneficially. Any further 
investigation carried out by the court will vary in depth according 
to whether the answer to that initial inquiry is 'Yes' or 'No. ' If 
there have been discussions of that kind and the answer is 
therefore 'Yes', the court then proceeds to examine the 
subsequent course of dealing between the parties for evidence of 
conduct detrimental to the party without legal title referable to a 
reliance upon the arrangement in question. If there have been no 
such discussions and the answer to the initial inquiry is therefore 
'No', the investigation of subsequent events has to take the form 
of an inferential analysis involving a scrutiny of all events 
potentially capable of throwing evidential light on the question 
whether, in the absence of expressed discussion, a presumed 
intention can be spelt out of the parties' past course of 
309 
dealing ... The process is detailed, time-consuming and 
labourious. "711 
( d) Quantification of the non-legal owner's share 
If after going through the above process the court comes to the conclusion 
that there was an intention on the part of the legal owner to share the 
property with the non-legal owner, then the latter's share in the property 
will have to be quantified. The approach to be adopted in evaluating the 
proportionate shares of the parties was spelt out by Lord Diplock in 
Gissing v. Gissing. 712 His Lordship was of the view that, if there is no 
express agreement, the court should "do its best to discover from the 
conduct of the spouses whether an inference can reasonably be drawn as 
to the probable common understanding about the amount of the share of 
the contributing spouse"; failing which, the court is entitled to resort to 
the maxim "equality is equity", and to hold that the beneficial interest 
belongs to the spouses in equal shares. His Lordship went on to illustrate 
how certain facts, such as contribution towards mortgage repayment, 
711 
712 
Per Waite J. in Hammond v. Mitchell [1991] 1 W.L.R. 1127 at p. 1129-
1130. 
Supra at pp. 908-909. 
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might indicate common understandings as to certain quanta and 
concluded that: 
" ... there is nothing inherently improbable in {the spouses'} acting 
on the understanding that the wife should be entitled to a share 
which was not to be quantified immediately on the acquisition of 
the home but should be left to be determined when the mortgage 
was repaid or the property disposed of on the basis of what 
would be fair having regard to the total contributions, direct or 
indirect, which each spouse had made by that date." 
From the above view, it can be said that, in the absence of an express 
agreement, the court should look for an implied agreement, which may 
take the form either that the spouses' shares should be fixed at particular 
percentages, or that they should float and be quantified by the court's 
decision as to what is fair. In looking for the implied agreement direct or 
indirect contributions to the purchase price may be evidence, not only of 
such implied agreement but also as to any agreed quantum and as a 
benchmark of fairness in floating cases. 
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Whether fixed or floating, Lord Diplock regarded the size of the parties' 
interests as depending on their intentions. 713 This approach was cited with 
approval in Midland Bank Pie. v. Cooke and Anor.714 The court took the 
view that once a beneficial interest had been found in favour of the non-
legal claimant, the court would undertake a survey of the whole course of 
dealing between the parties to establish what proportion of the beneficial 
interest should be granted. In that case, a house had been bought as Mr 
and Mrs Cooke's matrimonial home, but the title was conveyed into Mr 
Cooke's name alone. Its price, £8,500, was funded mainly by a mortgage 
taken out in Mr Cooke's name, partly by some savings belonging to Mr 
Cooke, and partly by a wedding present of £1,100 from Mr Cooke's 
parents. Mrs Cooke made significant contributions to the family income 
by using her earnings to meet household bills, and by doing various types 
of work in kind. None of these contributions amounted to the "direct 
contributions to the purchase price" which, under Lloyds Bank Pie. v. 
Rosset,115 are alone to count as evidence from which a court may infer a 
common intention that the contributor should have a beneficial interest. 
713 
714 
715 
Ibid at p. 909. 
[1995] 4 All E.R. 562 at pp. 572-573 and 574 per Waite L.J. 
Supra, at pp. 132E-133A. See pp. 295-296 supra. 
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However, the court took the view that the wedding gift of £1,100 was 
given jointly to Mr and Mrs Cooke and consequently, Mrs Cooke made 
a direct contribution of £550 towards the purchase price and could claim 
a beneficial interest in the house. This interest constituted an overriding 
interest binding on the bank, which had subsequently taken a mortgage of 
the house from Mr Cooke. The said contribution of Mrs Cooke 
represented 6.47% of the value of the property but she was granted 50% 
share of the property. The court based its conclusion on the following 
dictum: 
"One could hardly have a clearer example of a couple who had 
agreed to share everything equally: the profits of his business 
while it prospered, and the risks of indebtedness suffered through 
its failure; the upbringing of their children; the rewards of her 
own career as a teacher; and, most relevantly, a home into which 
he had put his savings and to which she was to give over the years 
the benefit of the maintenance and improvement contribution. 
When to all that there is added the fact (still an important one) 
that this was a couple who had chosen to introduce into their 
relationship the additional commitment which marriage involves, 
the conclusion becomes inescapable that their presumed intention 
313 
was to share the beneficial interest in the property in equal 
terms. "716 
It is interesting to point out that Mr and Mrs Cooke gave evidence to the 
fact that they had come to no view, shared or otherwise, regarding the 
beneficial title to their home. This however, did not deter the court from 
inferring one. The court expressed the view that the existence of ''positive 
evidence that the parties neither discussed nor intended any agreement 
as to the proportions of their beneficial interest does not preclude the 
court, on general equitable principles, from inferring one."717 
This case has been criticised for being too flexible an application of 
Lloyds Bank Pie. v. Rasset. 718 It has also been asserted that the point may 
well have been reached where the classical authorities' approach (that is 
the approach in Gissing v. Gissing and Lloyds Bank Pie. v. Rasset) has 
been so marginalised that it has lost the mass of institutional influence 
716 At p. 576D·F. 
717 Per Waite L.J. at p. 575. 
718 See P. Wylie "Computing shares in the family home" [1995] Fam. Law 633. 
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critical for sensible survival.719 Despite criticism of the case, it is 
submitted that Equity, as a body of rules, has always taken pride in 
matching established principle to the demands of social change. The 
reality of married relationship is that many couples, from the outset of 
their relationship, do not discuss the basis on which they will share their 
interest in property they may happen to own jointly. If anything at all, 
they enter into such relation on the basis of mutual trust and in 
expectation that their relationship will endure. It is therefore unfair to 
expect that there will always be some expressed agreement as to the basis 
of sharing such property and in the absence of such agreement to deny the 
existence of an intention to share even though the conduct of the spouses 
point to the contrary. Consequently, the court's approach in the case is to 
be supported, otherwise there will be many spouses (mainly wives) who 
will be severely disadvantaged. It is further submitted that the correct 
approach is to look at the contribution (even where it is not directed to the 
purchase of the property in question) of the non-legal claimant in the 
overall scheme of things and to accord him/her a proportion of the 
beneficial interest in consonance with such contribution. After all, the 
719 See S. Gardiner "Fin de Siecle chez Gissing v. Gissing" (1996) 112 Law 
Quarterly Review 378 at p. 382. See also M. Oldham "Quantification of 
beneficial interests in land" ( 1996) Cambridge Law Journal 19. 
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fundamental premise of Equity is fairness and such an approach accords 
with it. 
An option open to spouses who want the beneficial interest in property to 
be quantified is to make an application under s.3 7 of the Matrimonial 
Proceedings and Property Act 1970. This section addresses the 
uncertainty that arose as to the circumstances in which a spouse who paid 
for, or carried out improvements on, property acquired by the other 
spouse could acquire a beneficial interest in that property.720 The said 
section provides as follows: 
720 
"It is hereby declared that where a husband or wife contributes 
in money or money's worth to the improvement of real or 
personal property in which or in the proceeds of sale of which 
either or both of them has or have a beneficial interest, the 
See Pettitt v. Pettitt supra. Despite the variety of opinions expressed by the 
Law Lords in the case as to the principles on which one spouse might 
acquire a beneficial interest in property vested in the other, they were 
unanimous in the view that the efforts of the husband in that case, namely, 
laying out the garden with a lawn and patio, putting up a side wall and a gate 
and redecorating the house, were insufficient to give him a beneficial 
interest. See Lord Reid at p. 796, Lord Hodson at p. 807 and Lord Dip lock 
at pp. 825-826. 
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husband or wife so contributing shall, ifthe contribution is of a 
substantial nature and subject to any agreement between them to 
the contrary express or implied, be treated as having then 
acquired by virtue of his or her contribution a share or an 
enlarged share, as the case may be, in that beneficial interest of 
such an extent as may have been then agreed or, in default of such 
an agreement, as may seem in all the circumstances just to any 
court before which the question of the existence or extent of the 
beneficial interest of the husband or wife arises (whether in 
proceedings between them or in any other proceedings)." 
The section is declaratory of the then existing law and has the intention 
of applying the same principle as the courts had adopted in the case of 
contributions to the initial acquisition of property.721 However, it was 
thought better not to prescribe any rule that the share must be 
commensurate with or proportional to the cost or value of the 
improvements, but to allow the court, in the event of a dispute, to make 
such order as it thinks just in the circumstances.722 
721 
722 
Miller op. cit, at p. 41. 
See the Law Commission Report (Law Com. 25) Financial Provision in 
Matrimonial Proceedings. (1969) pp. 29, 103 and 105. 
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The discretion conferred upon the court is, however, limited by three 
factors. First, the contribution must be substantial,723 secondly, it must be 
in money or money's worth (such as work or labour)724 and thirdly, it 
must relate to improvements 725 to the property as distinct from the 
723 
724 
725 
Thus, improvements by way of "do-it-yourself jobs which husbands often 
do" will not be considered "substantiaf' for this purpose. See Button v. 
Button op. cit, at p. 461 per Lord Denning M.R. 
In Griffiths v. Griffiths [ 1974] 1 W.L.R. 13 50 a spouse who paid a contractor 
£4,500 for an extension to the matrimonial home was awarded a share in the 
property and in Re Nicholson [1974] 2 All E.R. 386 a payment of £189 
towards the installation of central heating in the matrimonial home was held 
to entitle the contributor to an enlarged share in the property. See also Davis 
v. Vale [1971] 1 W.L.R. 1022 at pp. 1024 and 1028 respectively. 
Improvements seem to be used by the courts in contradistinction to 
"maintenance" - see Re Nicholson supra, at p. 393 where Pennycuick V.-C. 
was of the view that the replacement of a gas cooker may not amount to an 
improvement. Cretney & Masson op. cit., at p. 182-183 comment that this 
distinction may lead to some curious anomalies. For example, if a husband 
who is a jobbing builder takes time off from work to carry out extensive 
repairs to the roof or structure of the house this will not enable him to claim 
under the section. But he can claim if he instals a prefabricated garage, 
although the value of this work is much less. They add however, that what 
will constitute an "improvement" may be a question of degree. Thus, in 
Jansen v. Jansen [1965] P. 478, a husband who devoted his full time to 
converting a house vested in his wife into three self-contained flats was held 
to have made substantial improvements. The House of Lords in Pettitt v. 
Pettitt supra expressed different opinions as to whether Jansen was correctly 
decided. 
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acquisition of the property to which the equitable principles discussed 
above are concerned with. 
In Re Nicholson126 the court expressed the view that in principle the 
proper approach in quantifying the beneficial interests under the section 
is to ascertain the value of the property at the date immediately before the 
making of the improvement, and then to ascertain what addition to the 
value of the property was due to that improvement. The court should then 
treat the share of the party who made the improvement as enlarged by a 
proportionate amount corresponding to the increase in value represented 
by the improvement. It was acknowledged that difficulty may arise where 
one party carries out a series of relatively small improvements. In the 
court's view the section did not require that on each separate occasion the 
shares of the parties should be readjusted. In such a case, a legitimate 
course in deciding what is just would be to look with hindsight at the 
series of repairs and treat them as a single improvement and take some 
date at which that improvement should be taken as having been made. 
726 Supra at p. 392-393 per Pennycuick V.-C. 
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It must be emphasised here that improvements per se do not confer an 
interest upon the provider of such improvements. The improvement must 
add some value to the property, for, as Lord Green M.R. said in Re 
Diplock, 727 improvements "may add not one penny to the value of the 
house. Indeed, the alteration may well lower its value, for the alteration, 
though convenient to the owner, may be highly inconvenient in the eyes 
of the purchaser." 
The section applies subject to any agreement, expressed or implied, 
between the spouses to the contrary. Such an agreement may be either 
negative, that is, that, notwithstanding the work, no interest shall be 
acquired, or positive, for instance, that the interest shall be a certain 
percentage of the proceeds of sale. 728 
Finally, though one cannot doubt the efficacy of the section, it is now 
important only in a relatively small number of cases where it will be 
necessary or advantageous to bring proceedings under the s. 17 of the 
727 [1948] Ch. 465 at p. 546. 
728 See Cretney & Masson op. cit., at p. 183. 
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Married Women's Property Act 1882.729 This is because the powers 
given to the courts under s. 25 of the Matrimonial Causes Act,730 are more 
suitable to giving effect to contributions than the provisions of the 1970 
Act. Some recent cases about quantifying interests of contributors of 
improvements to property have been decided entirely without reference 
to the section. In Midland Bank Pie. v. Cooke, 731 for example, no 
reference was made to the section even though the wife's claim to a 
beneficial interest in that case appears to have been substantially founded 
on the improvements she had carried out. 
4. PROPERTY ADJUSTMENT ON DIVORCE 
The equitable principles discussed above were applied mainly to cases 
involving unmarried couples. In those cases the court was reluctant to 
729 
730 
731 
See Miller op. cit., at p. 44. 
Particularly, s. 25(2)(f) which enjoins the court to take into account the 
contributions made by each of the parties to the welfare of the family, 
including any contribution made by looking after the home or caring for the 
family. See pp. 351-356 infra. 
Supra. See also Re Pavlou (A Bankrupt) [1993] 2 F.L.R. 751 where a 
decision about giving a co-owner credit for improvements was resolved 
without any specific reference to the section. 
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draw inferences of a commitment to sharing732 especially in the absence 
of direct contribution in money or money's worth.733 Marriage, on the 
other hand, involves a commitment to a permanent relationship, at least 
that is the intention of the parties from the start. Consequently, the court 
is more inclined to infer an intention of sharing but, since the same 
principles apply in both cases, the problems implicit in the equitable 
principles apply with equal force to married couples. A spouse however, 
has the option of applying for an interest in the other spouse's property 
under statutory provisions enacted specifically for that purpose under the 
Matrimonial Proceedings and Property Act 1970. This Act was 
subsequently consolidated under Part II of the Matrimonial Causes Act 
1973 (MCA 1973).734 
732 
733 
734 
See for example, Bernard v. Josephs op. cit., p. 402E-H per Griffiths L.J. 
See Burns v. Burns supra and Layton v. Martin [ 1986] 2 F .L.R. 227. 
See ss. 23-25 of the Act as amended by Matrimonial and Family Proceedings 
Act 1984. It is envisaged bys. 15 and scheds. 2 and 8 of the Family Law 
Act 1996, an Act introducing anew divorce law, that Part II of the 1973 Act 
will still operate with amendments. However, the relevant sections of the 
1996 Act, found in Part II of that Act, which will make the necessary 
amendments to the stated part of the 1973 Act, have not yet come into force. 
Presently, only a few sections, such as, Part I (general principles underlying 
Parts II and III), s. 22 (funding for marriage support services), Part IV 
(dealing with domestic violence excepts. 60) and scheds. 4-7 are in force. 
See the Family Law Act 1996 (Commencement No. 1) Order 1997 (S.I. No. 
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The powers given under Part II of the 1973 Act are to enable a divorce 
court to adjust property rights of spouses on the breakdown of their 
mamage. The relative importance of ascertaining ownership of 
matrimonial property is considerably reduced by this Act.735 Under its 
provisions, a divorce court is given powers to redistribute and reallocate 
matrimonial property according to the needs and resources of the parties, 
largely irrespective of their respective rights of ownership but focussed 
on the question of need. 736 The orders which a court can make are 
735 
736 
1077 C. 38) and the Family Law Act 1996 (Commencement No. 2) Order 
1997 (S.1. No. 1892 C. 76). Meanwhile, sched. 15 of the Access to Justice 
Act 1999 has repealed Part III (dealing with legal aid for mediation) of the 
1996 Act. In June 1999 the Lord Chancellor announced that the government 
did not intend to implement Part II of the 1996 Act in 2000. See J. Black et 
al A Practical Approach to Family Law ( 61h ed.), London, Blackstone Press, 
2000 at p. 166. 
The Law Commission, in a report which preceded the 1970 Act, (Law Com. 
No. 25 1969 op. cit., at para. 61), expressed the view that on a breakdown 
of marriage it will often be appropriate to utilize the summary procedure 
under s. 17 of the Married Women's Property Act 1882 to determine the 
existing proprietary rights of the parties and then to invoke the powers under 
the amended Matrimonial Causes Act to enable those rights to be altered to 
produce an equitable result in the light of the breakdown. This view did not 
however prevail. In Kowalczuk v. Kowalczuk [1973] 1 W.L.R. 930 at p. 
934, Lord Denning M.R. held that it was unnecessary to decide the exact 
property rights of the spouses under s. 17 of the 1882 Act when all 
appropriate orders could be made under the 1970 Act. See also P. v. P. 
[1978] 3 All E.R. 70 at p. 75 per Ormrod L.J. 
See Gray op. cit., at pp. 313-315. 
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extremely wide and by a combination of the available powers the court 
can usually achieve whatever result is regarded as fair, just and equitable. 
The process of adjusting property rights under the Act has been described 
as follows: 
"The Family Court takes the rights and obligations of the parties 
all together and puts the pieces into a mixed bag. Such pieces are 
the right to occupy the matrimonial home or have a share in it, 
the obligation to maintain the wife and children, and so forth. 
The court then takes out the pieces and hands them to the two 
parties - some to one party and some to the other - so that each 
can provide for the future with the pieces allotted to him or to her. 
The court hands them out without paying any too nice a regard to 
their legal or equitable rights but simply according to what is 
fairest provision for the future, for mother and father and the 
children. "131 
The Act does not discriminate between the sexes, as Scarman L.J. put it, 
"husbands and wives come to the judgment seat ... upon a basis of 
737 Hanlon v. The Law Society [1981] A.C. 124 at p. 147 per Lord Denning 
M.R. 
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complete equality."138 However, the economic realities normally dictate 
that financial orders will be made against the husband in favour of the 
wife.139 
The overriding objective of the powers given to the court under Part II of 
the MCA 1973 was originally to place the parties in the position in which 
they would have been had the marriage not broken down. In other words, 
the financial position of the parties should so far as possible be unaffected 
by their divorce.740 This came to be known as the ''principle of minimum 
loss. "741 The effect of this statutory regime was said to alter the legal axes 
of regulation of the family in such a way as to reveal the marriage contract 
738 
739 
740 
741 
Calderbank v. Calderbank [1976] Fam. 93 at p. 103. 
But see B. v. B. (Financial Provision) (1982) 3 F.L.R. 298 where a wife was 
ordered to pay £50,000 to her husband. 
See Law Com. No. 103 The Financial Consequences of Divorce: The Basic 
Policy (1980) para. 22. 
See J. Eekelaar Family Law and Social Policy (2"d ed.) London, Weidenfeld 
& Nicholson, 1984 at p. 109. Gray op. cit., at p. 319 called it "the mandate 
of restitution. .. misconceived [and}. .. almost always incapable of fulfilment". 
In Harnett v. Harnett [1973] Fam. 156 at p. 161, Bagnall J. remarked that 
the notion ofrestitution in terms of s. 25(1) of the MCA 1973 was "indeed 
an elusive concept based on a difficult hypothesis". 
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to be an economic or financial one rather than a contract based on sexual 
fidelity and moral obligation.742 
The assumption underlying the said Part II of the 1973 Act, namely, that 
the parties to the marriage remained bound to provide for each other even 
when the marriage had been dissolved, came under criticism.743 The 
central criticism was that it was inconsistent with modem divorce law. 
Divorce law now seeks to give legal recognition to the fact that the 
marriage has broken down, and on this view, if the marriage is over the 
financial obligations of the marriage should also be over.744 The Law 
Commission analysed the arguments against the retention of the 
objectives underlying Part II of the 1973 Act under four heads: 745 
742 
743 
744 
745 
See C. Smart "Marriage, divorce and women's economic dependency: A 
discussion of the politics of private maintenance" in State, Law and the 
Family (M. Freeman ed.) Tavistock, London, 1984 Chap. I. 
See Eekelaar Family Law and Social Policy op. cit., at p. 262, and B. Baker 
et al Matrimonial Jurisdiction of Registrars: The Exercise of the 
Matrimonial Jurisdiction by Registrars of England and Wales, Social 
Sciences Research Council, Oxford, 1977. 
See Law Com. No. 103 para. 23. 
Law Com. No. 103 para. 30. 
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(a) The argument that marriage can no longer be regarded as a life-time 
union, and that the financial consequences of divorce should no longer be 
based on this assumption. 
(b) The argument that the change to "irretrievable breakdown" as the 
basis for divorce required a new approach to its financial consequences. 
(c) The argument that the objective of life-long support is impossible to 
attain in most cases. 
( d) The argument that the changed economic position of women has 
rendered the concept oflife-long support out of date. 
In its 1981 report, 746 the Commission avoided a wholesale reconsideration 
of the basis of the law. Instead it suggested certain changes of emphasis 
within the statutory framework set up by the Act. 747 
The changes suggested by the Commission were: 
746 
747 
Law Com. No. 112 The Financial Consequences of Divorce (1981 ). 
Law Com. No. 112 para. 23. 
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(a) to give greater priority to the needs of children;748 
(b) to place greater emphasis on the need for the parties to become self-
sufficient following divorce; 749 and 
(c) to promote the use of the so-called "clean break" in financial matters, 
which results in a once-and-for-all financial settlement involving no 
continuing economic links between the parties.750 
The Commission also proposed that the statute should no longer impose 
on the court the duty so to exercise its powers as to place the parties in the 
financial position in which they would have been if the marriage had not 
broken down (the ''principle of minimal loss").151 However, the 
Commission suggested no replacement for the removal of the ''principle 
of the minimal loss". 
748 
749 
750 
151 
Law Com. No. 112 para. 24. Sees. 25(1) of the MCA 1973. 
Law Com. No. 112 paras. 26-27. Sees. 25A(3) of the MCA 1973. 
Law Com. No. 112 paras. 28-29. See ss. 25A, 28(1A) and 31(7) of the 
MCA 1973. 
Law Com. No. 112 para. 17. 
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The above proposals752 were embodied in the Matrimonial and Family 
Proceedings Act 1984 which effected amendments to the Matrimonial 
Causes Act 1973 (MCA 1973).753 The primary aim of the 1984 Act is to 
restrict the use ofincome maintenance after divorce, although the changes 
envisaged are to be applied equally to property awards. 
The 1984 Act was also subjected to criticism, for example, that its 
objectives are contradictory. It has been argued that according priority to 
the needs of children may be inconsistent with the priority to be accorded 
to self-sufficiency and the clean break, since it may not be in the best 
interest of the children for a wife to go out to work or to be dependent on 
welfare benefit. 754 Despite these criticisms, the guidelines given under 
752 
753 
754 
For critical comments on the proposals, see J. Eekelaar "Law Commission 
reports on the financial consequences of divorce" (1982) 45 Modern Law 
Review 420, R. Deech op. cit. and J. Dewar "Reforming financial provision: 
The alternatives" (1984)Journal of Social Welfare Law 1. 
See for example, ss. 24A and 25A making provision for order for sale and 
the "clean break" principle respectively. For a history of and background to 
the 1984 Act, see Whiting v. Whiting [1988] 1 W.L.R. 565 at pp. 571-574 
per Balcombe L.J. 
See P. Symes "Indissolubility and the clean break" (1985) 48 Modern Law 
Review 44, J. Dewar "Financial provision reformed: An abdication of 
responsibility?" (1986) Conveyancer and Property Lawyer 96 and G. 
Douglas "Family law under the Thatcher government" (1990) 17 Journal of 
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Part II of the 1973 Act, as hiodified by the 1984 Act, seem to have 
worked fairly well in practice. 755 
(a) The statutory guidelines 
These guidelines are to be resorted to in the absence of agreement 
between the former spouses. In deciding whether to exercise its powers 
to order financial provision or adjustment of property rights in favour of 
a party to a marriage, and if so, in what manner, the court is empowered 
to take all the circumstances into account, first consideration being given 
to the interest of any child of the family who has not attained the age of 
18 years.756 In particular, the court is to have regard to the following: 
155 
756 
Law and Society 411. See also K. O'Donovan "Should all maintenance of 
spouses be abolished?" (1982) 45 Modern Law Review 424. 
See S. Edwards & A. Halpern "Financial provision, case-law and statistical 
trends since1984" (1987) Family Law 354-357 and J. Eekelaar Regulating 
Divorce, OUP, Oxford, 1991 at pp. 68-70. 
S. 25(1) of the 1973 Act. "First" in this subsection has been held in Suter 
v. Suter & Jones [1987] 2 All E.R. 336 at p. 342 per Cumming-Bruce L.J. 
not to be the same as "paramount" consideration overriding all other 
considerations pointing to a just result. The court has to consider all the 
circumstances always bearing in mind the important consideration of the 
welfare of the child(ren) and then attempt to attain a financial result which 
is just as between husband and wife. Accordingly, it is possible to terminate 
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(a) the income, earning capacity, property and other financial resources 
which each of the parties to the marriage have or is likely to have in the 
foreseeable future, including in the case of earning capacity any increase 
in that capacity which it would, in the opinion of the court, be reasonable 
to expect a party to the marriage to take steps to acquire (s. 25(2)(a) MCA 
1973), 
(b) the financial needs, obligations and responsibilities which each of the 
parties to the marriage have or is likely to have in the foreseeable future 
(s. 25(2)(b) MCA 1973), 
( c) the standard ofliving enjoyed by the family before the breakdown of 
the marriage (s. 25(2)(c) MCA 1973), 
one party's financial obligations to the other even where there are minor 
children involved. S. 25(3) enumerates a variety of factors (such as the 
financial needs of the child, the child's financial resources and any physical 
or mental disability of the child) the court is to take into account in 
exercising its power to order financial provision or adjustment of property 
in relation to a child of the family. Very little guidance has emerged from 
the case law as to how these factors are used in making financial provision 
for a child. In Wachtel v. Wachtel supra, the wife was awarded a sum based 
on the "one-third" rule (see infra); the court then awarded an "additional 
sum" for the child without specifying the basis of the calculation. 
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( d) the age of each party to the marriage and the duration of the marriage 
(s. 25(2)(d) MCA 1973), 
( e) any physical or mental disability of either of the parties to the 
marriage (s. 25(2)(e) MCA 1973), 
(f) the contribution which each of the parties has made or is likely in the 
foreseeable future to make to the welfare of the family, including any 
contribution by looking after the home or caring for the family (s. 25(2)(f) 
MCA 1973), 
(g) the conduct of each of the parties, if that conduct is such that it would 
in the opinion of the court be inequitable to disregard it (s. 25(2)(g) 
MCA1973), 
(h) in the case of proceedings for divorce or nullity of marriage, the value 
to each of the parties to the marriage of any benefit (for example, a 
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pension) which, by reason of the dissolution or annulment of the marriage 
that party will lose the chance of acquiring757 (s. 25(2)(h) MCA 1973). 
The above statutory provisions are not ranked in any kind of hierarchy. 
The weight, or importance, to be attached to them depends upon the facts 
of the particular case758 but the court must ensure that they are carried out 
rigorously. 759 
757 
758 
759 
The Pensions Act 1995 inserted ss. 25B, 25C and 25D into the Matrimonial 
Causes Act 1973 to allow the court to "earmark" pensions on divorce so as 
to enable income to be paid to a divorced spouse at the time of retirement. 
These provisions came into force on the 1 '1 of August 1996. Ss. 25B-25D 
of the 1973 Act have been amended by sched. 3 of the Welfare Reform and 
Pensions Act 1999 while s. 25B(2) (dealing with certain factors to be taken 
into account in making an order under s. 23 ) has been repealed by sched. 13 
of the 1999 Act. Sees. 21 of the 1999 Act and The Welfare Reform and 
Pensions Act 1999 (Commencement No. 5) Order 2000 (S.1. No. 1116 (C. 
35)) of2000 which will come into force on the 1 •1 December 2000. Pension 
splitting on divorce, which was to be introduced bys. 16 of the Family Law 
Act 1996, has also been repealed by sched. 13 of the 1999 Act. See S.I. No. 
1116 (C. 35) of2000. 
See Piglowska v. Pigslowski [1999] 1 W.L.R. 1360 at p. 1379 per Lord 
Hoffmann. 
See Scheeres v. Scheeres [1999] 1 F.L.R. 241. 
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Finally, there are provisions to direct the court's attention to the principle 
of self-sufficiency, and to facilitate the making of a "clean break" between 
the parties to the marriage in appropriate cases.760 
The above guidelines first came up for discussion in Wachtel v. Wachtef61 
where the view was taken that Parliament had intended to bring about a 
shift of emphasis from the old concept of "maintenance" of the wife and 
children by the husband to one of redistribution of assets and "purchasing 
power".762 However, this latter emphasis has, since the enactment of the 
1984 Act, been shifted to one of having regard to all the circumstances 
whilst giving first consideration to the welfare of any child of the family 
who is younger than 18.763 
Of particular relevance to this study are the claims between the spouses 
which may be subject to the needs of children, if any. While the needs of 
760 
761 
762 
763 
Sees. 25A of the 1973 Act. See also ss. 28(1A) ands. 31(7) of the same 
Act. 
Supra. 
Ibid. at p. 834. 
See note 756 supra. 
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children may have some bearing on how the court will exercise its powers 
in favour of a spouse, the extent to which this will be the case is not clear. 
Empirical evidence that exists suggests that court decisions as to the level 
of child support awards remain arbitrary and their basis undisclosed.764 
A dependent child is likely to have two main financial needs, namely, to 
be maintained and to have a home. Consequently, the court's task will be 
to assess carefully whether the parent who has day to day custody of the 
child has sufficient income to bring up the child. This will be relevant in 
cases where the court orders maintenance payments by the absent parent 
but in practice the Child Support Act 1991 has usurped the courts' 
jurisdiction in respect of maintenance orders for the benefit of children in 
the great majority of cases765 and so the effect of the child's needs on the 
exercise of the court's powers in favour of a spouse is of limited 
importance. The 1991 Act creates a new scheme for the assessment and 
enforcement of child maintenance. The scheme, it has been said, will 
soak up most of the resources available to the parties with the practical 
764 
765 
See R. Sax eta/"Childmaintenance: A fresh look" (1987) Family Law 275. 
See ss. 1 and 3 of the Act. 
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effect being to propel child support issues into the forefront of matters to 
be dealt within agreed settlements or if there is any dispute. 766 
The case law dealing with the statutory guidelines are numerous and it is 
not intended to discuss them in detail. It will be sufficient only to discuss 
significant points about each of them. 
(i) S. 25(2)(a) MCA 1973 
This provision, in the broadest possible terms, directs the court's attention 
to the parties' assets and income. All possible assets and income, present 
and future, 767 are considered. Thus, a flat bought by the wife with 
personal injury damages awarded to her has been taken into account,768 as 
766 
767 
768 
See Eekelaar Regulating Divorce op. cit., at p. 120. 
For example, in Happe v. Happe [1990] 2 F.L.R. 212, a gratuity to be paid 
in the future was taken into account. 
See Daubney v. Daubney [1976] 2 All E.R. 453. 
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has the likelihood that a party will benefit under the will of a relative who 
is terminally il1769 and the ability to raise money by borrowing.770 
Earning capacity 
The court must have regard to the earning capacity of the parties and to 
any possible increase in that earning capacity which it would be 
reasonable to expect. Thus, inMcEwan v. McEwan771 the court took into 
account the potential earning capacity of a retired detective constable aged 
59. In the light of the evidence of a demand for labour in his home town 
the court inferred that he was voluntarily unemployed. In Hardy v. 
Hardy, 772 the husband worked in his father's racing stables for much less 
than he could have earned on the open market. The court took the view 
that he should not be allowed this privilege at the expense of his wife and 
769 
770 
771 
772 
See Morgan v. Morgan [1977] 2 All E.R. 515 and MTv. MT (Financial 
Provision: Lump Sum) [1992] 1 F.L.R. 362. The court is sometimes 
reluctant to do this since the fact of the inheritance and the possible death of 
the relative concerned are often fraught with uncertainties. See Michael v. 
Michael [1986] 2 F.L.R. 389 at p. 397 per Nourse L.J. 
See Newton v. Newton [1990] 1 F.L.R. 33. 
[1972] 2 All E.R. 708. 
[1981] 2 F.L.R. 321. 
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children and made an order based on the earnings he could have made on 
the open market. 
There is, however, some confusion over whether the court should take 
into account the earning capacity of the applicant (so as to reduce the 
award). In Leadbeater v. Leadbeater, 773 the wife, who had been a 
secretary but earned only £1,608 per annum as a part-time receptionist, 
was considered to be capable of working longer hours to increase her 
earnings. But in M v. M (Financial Provision) 774 the court took the view 
that a wife who had worked as a secretary prior to her 20-year marriage 
was unlikely, at her age and experience, to secure more than a fairly 
modest secretarial job. Consequently, her earning capacity should be 
reduced. The difference between the two cases may perhaps be explained 
on the basis that in the former case the wife was working during the 
marriage and as such her earning capacity could be fairly assessed 
whereas in the latter case she was not and consequently, her earning 
capacity could merely be speculated upon. But should it be reasonable to 
expect a wife to increase her earning capacity after a long marriage during 
773 
774 
[1985] F.L.R. 789. 
[1987]2 F.L.R. 1. 
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which she did little or no work outside the home? The answer will of 
course depend on whether such a wife is trainable, that is, capable of 
learning new skills to adapt whatever job experience she may have had 
before the marriage to the situation prevailing at the time of the 
dissolution of the marriage. Thus, if a wife had experience as a secretary 
·using typewriters before marriage and there is the possibility that by 
retraining on computers she may be able to get a well paid secretarial job, 
this earning capacity may be taken into account. In terms of the statutory 
provision, is it reasonable to expect her to do so? Reasonableness in this 
context will be relative to the circumstances of the particular case. Thus, 
in Leadbeater v. Leadbeater,775 the court did not think it was reasonable 
to expect a 47-year-old woman to familiarise herself with modem office 
technology. In contrast, in Mitchell v. Mitchell776 the court thought that 
it would be reasonable to expect a woman, who had been a full-time 
secretary for a period during the marriage, once again to take up such 
comparatively highly paid work when her children had left school in 
preference to a part-time job as a canteen assistant. 
775 Supra. 
776 [1984) F.L.R. 387. 
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However, in assessing whether or not it is reasonable for a wife to take up 
employment after the dissolution of the marriage, it is important for the 
court to bear in mind the salutary dictum made in Camm v. Camm111 to the 
effect that: 
" ... experience in this court indicates that it is much easier to talk 
about married women who have not been working for a good 
number of years getting back into full-time employment. It is to 
be remembered that 15 years or more of looking after children 
and not earning is a serious economic handicap ... " 
Support from third parties 
A factor which the court takes into account in determining the parties' 
income is the availability of the resources of the new partner of one of the 
spouses778 but in this case the court is not empowered to make an order 
that a third party with whom a spouse is living should provide for an 
777 
778 
[1982] 4 F.L.R. 577 at p. 586 per Sir Roger Ormrod. 
See Macey v. Macey [1982] 3 F.L.R. 7. 
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applicant.779 Neither can the court make an order which can only be 
satisfied by dipping into the resources of a third party.780 Also, the 
availability of welfare benefits from the State are taken into account 
although a husband should not be allowed to shift his responsibilities onto 
the community more than is necessary. The proper approach in this case 
is for the court to consider what would be the appropriate amount to order 
the husband to pay to the wife ignoring the fact that supplementary 
benefit will be available to her to make up any deficiency. However, if 
an order for such an amount would have the effect of reducing the 
husband's income to below subsistence level, a court should limit the 
amount of the order so that the husband will be left with an income at 
subsistence level. The result would be unsatisfactory but at least it would 
be just as between the spouses and their children on the one hand and the 
community on the other.781 
779 
780 
781 
See B. v. B. (Periodical Payments: Transitional Provisions) [1995] 1 F.L.R. 
459. 
Re L. (Minors) (Financial Provision) [1979] 1 F.L.R. 39. 
See Ashley v. Ashley [1968] P. 582 at p. 590 per Sir Jocelyn Simon P. See 
also Barnes v. Barnes [1972] 1 W.L.R. 1381. 
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(ii) S. 25(2)(b) MCA 1973 
Needs 
The concept of need have been interpreted in "relative" rather than in 
"absolute" terms and hence it must correspond with the reasonable 
requirements of the spouses. 782 It follows from this that the needs of 
wealthy spouses would be regarded as greater than the equivalent needs 
of poorer spouses. Thus, in Preston v. Preston, 783 the Court of Appeal 
refused an appeal of a wealthy husband against a lump sum of £600,000 
awarded to his wife. In Dart v. Dart784 the spouses had a lavish lifestyle 
spending some £400, 000 a year. The Court of Appeal upheld an award 
of £9 million pounds to the wife but expressed the view that too much 
weight was being put on the "reasonable requirements" against other 
criteria when it came to assessing the needs of wealthy spouses. This 
782 
783 
784 
See Preston v. Preston [1982] 1 All E.R. 41. The court however said that 
the meaning of "needs" was coloured by the then "principle of minimum 
loss". This notwithstanding the case was approved in the post-1984 case of 
Duxbury v. Duxbury [1987] 1 F.L.R. 7. 
Supra. See also Bullock v. Bullock [1986] 1 F.L.R. 372, Duxbury v. 
Duxbury supra and Gojkovic v. Gojkovic [1990] F.L.R. 140. 
[1996] 2 F.L.R. 286. 
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view was reiterated by the House of Lords in White v. White 785 where it 
held that the statutory provisions do not lend support to the idea that a 
claimant's financial needs, even interpreted generously and called 
"reasonable requirements", are to be regarded as determinative. The 
correct approach to be taken by a judge where resources exceed needs (the 
so-called "big money" cases) is to have regard to all the facts of the case 
and the overall requirements of fairness. When doing so, the judge is 
entitled to have in mind the wish of a claimant wife that her award should 
not be confined to living accommodation and a vanishing fund of capital 
earmarked for living expenses which would leave nothing for her to pass 
on. The judge should give to that factor whatever weight, be it much or 
little or none at all, he considers appropriate in the circumstances of the 
particular case. 786 
In that case, the overall net worth of the couple was some £4.6 million. 
This comprised: Mrs. White's solepropertyvaluedat£193,300, her share 
of property owned jointly, either directly or through the farming 
partnership run with her husband valuedat£1,334,000; Mr. White's share 
785 [2000] 3 W.L.R. 1571. 
786 At p. 1581 per Lord Nicholls with whom all the other Law Lords agree. 
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of the joint property valued at £1,334,000; and Mr. White's sole property 
valued at £1,783,500. The trial judge decided that the wife reasonably 
required £980,000. This was to be satisfied by payment of £800,00 and 
by her keeping her sole assets. On being paid this amount she was to 
transfer all the jointly owned assets to her husband. Under this 
arrangement, the wife was to receive slightly over one-fifth of their assets. 
The wife appealed and the amount of her payment was increased to £1.5 
million by the Court of Appeal, thus raising her share of the total assets, 
taking some deductions into account, to about two-fifths. The husband 
appealed to the House ofLords, seeking the restoration of the trial judge's 
order. The wife cross-appealed seeking an order giving her an equal share 
in all the assets. The House of Lords unanimously dismissed both 
appeals. Lord Nicholls, who delivered the leadingjudgment with which 
all the other Law Lords agreed, held that the trial judge misdirected 
himself by making the parties' reasonable requirements the determinative 
factor for making the award. Accordingly, the Court of Appeal was 
entitled to exercise afresh the statutory discretionary powers and on the 
·principles expounded in Piglowska v. Pigs low ski, 787 there was no ground 
787 Supra at p. 13 72 per Lord Hoffmann. It was there stated that in order for an 
appellate court to hold that the exercise of a judicial discretion was plainly 
wrong, the appellate court should have regard to the advantage which the 
trial court had in seeing the witnesses both in respect of its findings of 
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entitling the House to interfere with the Court of Appeal's exercise of its 
discretion. 
In the case of spouses with limited resources, the court can do no more 
than allocate the limited resources to cover the basic needs for food, 
clothing and accommodation. In the words of Ormrod L.J. in Browne v. 
Pritchard'88 
788 
"Whenever a court is dealing with families with limited resources 
'needs ' are likely to be much more important than resources, 
when it comes to exercising discretion. In most individuals and 
most families the most urgent need is a home. It is therefore to 
the provision of homes for all concerned that the courts should 
direct their attention in the first place." 
primary fact and its evaluation of them, and should assume unless 
demonstrated to the contrary, that the court knew how to perform its 
functions and which matters it should take into account; that when the 
exercise of discretion involved value judgments on which reasonable people 
might differ, a degree of diversity was inevitable. 
[1975] 3 All E.R. 721 at p. 725. 
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Housing 
The need for housing, particularly where a spouse is to have custody of 
minor children, in most cases is the "need" that has to be satisfied. It may 
be convenient in some cases to transfer the house outright to the other 
spouse. In Hanlon v. Hanlon, 789 for example, an outright transfer of the 
matrimonial home was ordered in favour of the wife where the husband 
had rent-free housing available to him by virtue of his employment as a 
police officer.790 
However, the commonest type of order used by the courts used to be the 
"Mesher order."791 This order directs a transfer of the matrimonial home 
789 
790 
791 
[1978] 2 All E.R. 889. 
See pp. 380-386 infra. 
Derived from Mesher v. Mesher [1980] 1 All E.R. 126. In this case, the 
matrimonial home was held by the spouses jointly. The order provided that 
they continue to hold the house on trust for sale and should hold the 
proceeds of sale and rents and profits until sale on trust for themselves in 
equal shares, provided that as long as the daughter of the marriage was under 
17, or until further order, the house should not be sold. 
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into the joint names of the spouses on trust for sale792 for themselves in 
some specified shares provided that the property is not to be sold until the 
youngest child attains a specified age or stops full-time education.793 The 
advantage of this order is that it not only preserves a home for one former 
spouse who will be able to bring up the children there, but it does so 
without depriving the other former spouse of all interest in that property. 
However, this form of compromise between retention and sale of the 
family home will only be appropriate under certain circumstances, for 
example, where both parties have remarried, so that at the eventual date 
of sale the resident spouse will not be without resources to find alternative 
accommodation. 794 Thus, the courts have realised that where there is 
serious doubt about the ability of a spouse, usually the wife, to rehouse 
herself on the charge taking effect, the "Mesher order" will be 
792 
793 
794 
That is, a trust under which the trustees have an obligation to sell the trust 
property and hold the proceeds of sale in trust for the beneficiary. There is 
an implied power to postpone the sale as long as they think fit under s. 25 of 
the Law of Property Act 1925. 
See Chamberlain v. Chamberlain [1974] 1 All E.R. 33, Alonso v. Alonso 
(1974) 4 Fam. Law 164 and Allen v. Allen [1974] 3 All E.R. 385. 
See Dewar op. cit., at p. 331. 
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inappropriate. 795 Besides, the order seems to be in conflict with the "clean 
break" principle as it preserves a financial link between the spouses rather 
than sever it. Consequently, oflate, the order has been used infrequently. 
The courts now make an outright transfer order796 or, if that is not 
appropriate in the circumstances, it makes a "Martin order"797 which gives 
a spouse the right to occupy the house until her death or remarriage or, 
sometimes, her becoming dependent on another man or living with him 
as his wife.798 This specie of the "Mesher order" has an advantage over 
795 
796 
797 
798 
See Clutton v. Clutton [l 991] 1 W.L.R. 359 at p. 365 per Lloyd L.J. See also 
the criticism of the order by Parker L.J in Mortimer v. Mortimer-Griffin 
(1986] 2 F.L.R. 315 at p. 319 where he said that the order is "likely to 
produce harsh and unsatisfactory results" and should "no longer [be} 
regarded as the 'bible'". See also Carson v. Carson (1983] 1 W.L.R. 285 
and Thompson v. Thompson [1986] Fam. 38. Despite this criticism, 
Eekelaar Regulating Divorce op. cit., at pp. 71-72 has found that some court 
registrars regard them favourably. 
See Mortimer v. Mortimer-Griffin supra. 
Derived from Martin (BH) v. Martin (D) ( 1977] 3 All E.R. 762. In this case 
the spouses were childless. The court held that since the husband had 
secured council housing, and the wife would not get sufficient money from 
a sale of the house to rehouse herself, the appropriate solution would be to 
settle the house on trust for the wife during her life or until remarriage or 
such earlier date as she should cease to live there. Subject thereto the house 
was to be held on trust for the spouses in equal shares. 
See Chadwick v. Chadwick [1985] F.L.R. 606. 
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its parent order in that, by the time the charge takes effect, the needs of 
the resident spouse will either be non-existent or have been taken care of 
in some other way. 799 
(iii) S. 25(2)(c) MCA 1973 
The abolition of the principle of "minimum loss" by the 1984 Act has 
greatly diminished the relevance of this guideline but in Gojkovic v. 
Gojkovic800 it was suggested that the repeal of the principle of"minimum 
loss" did not prevent the court, where finances permit, from keeping the 
parties' post-divorce standard ofliving in proportion to each other. Thus, 
in Leadbeater v. Leadbeater801 the wife had been married for four years 
to a man worth £250,000 and had in consequence enjoyed a "much 
enhancecf' lifestyle. This factor as well as her modest pre-marital 
lifestyle was taken into account in awarding her a comparatively modest 
lump sum of £37, 500. In R. v. R. (Financial Provision: Reasonable 
799 
800 
801 
See Clutton v. C/utton supra at p. 248 per Lloyd L.J. and Dewar op. cit, at 
p. 331. 
Supra. 
Supra. 
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Needs}8°2 the court was of the view that the wife was entitled to continue 
living in a "splendid mansion" and was awarded a lump sum of 
£550,000.803 The above cases concern spouses with substantial resources 
but where the resources are limited this guideline will be a factor oflittle, 
if any, weight. In the latter case, there will inevitably be some reduction 
in the previous standard of living and the task of the court will be to 
ensure that both spouses enjoy a comparable standard of living. 804 But 
even this attempt at ensuring a comparable standard of living will not 
always be successful. 805 
(iv) S. 25(2)(d) MCA 1973 
The age of the spouses will be an important factor to be taken into 
account in assessing their needs. The needs of a young and healthy wife, 
802 
803 
804 
805 
[1994) 2 F.L.R. 1044. 
At p. 1049. See also F v. F (Ancillary Relief Substantial Assets) [1995) 2 
F.L.R. 45 at p. 63 where the court was of the view that the standard ofliving 
of the wife would continue to rise and this was to be maintained. It awarded 
her £1.75 million per annum. 
See Scott v. Scott [1978] 1 W.L.R. 723. 
See Martin v. Martin [1976] Fam. 167 at p. 182 per Purchas J. 
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for instance, will not be as great as an elderly and infirm one since in the 
former case she is likely to go back to work or capable of enhancing her 
earning capacity and prospects. 806 
What constitutes a "short" marriage has not been judicially defined807 and 
will depend on the facts of the individual cases. However, where the 
court has concluded that the duration of the marriage has been short, this 
will affect the level of the award. Thus, in Leadbeater v. Leadbeater808 
the wife's award was reduced by 25% because the marriage has lasted for 
only four years. 
Where the spouses are older, the effect of even a short marriage may be 
adverse to their financial circumstances. Thus, in S. v. S. 809 where the 
parties were more than 50 years and the marriage lasted for two years, the 
Court of Appeal was of the view that in considering a short marriage 
where the parties are not young, the primary consideration should be the 
806 See Khan v. Khan [1980] 1 All E.R. 497. 
807 See G/engler v. Glengler [1976]2 All E.R. 81 at p. 82. 
808 Supra. 
809 [1977] 1 All E.R. 56. 
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need of the parties. Their resources and obligations should be ascertained 
and balanced against each other in relation to all the circumstances of the 
marriage. On the facts of that case, the husband was ordered to settle 
£ 11, 000 on the wife on trust until death or earlier marriage, together with 
a lump sum of £2,000 to cover the cost of moving house and furniture. 
(v) S. 25(2)(e) MCA 1973 
In practice this factor does not add very much to the factors which will 
have been taken into account under paragraphs (a) and (b) above. This is 
because mental or physical disability obviously has an effect on a 
person's earning capacity and/or foreseeable future needs.810 It seems to 
have fallen into desuetude as it has not as yet featured as a separate matter 
in the case law. 
(vi) S. 25(2)(t) MCA 1973 
This provision gives clear recognition to the indirect contributions which 
are usually made by wives who do not normally undertake paid 
810 See C. v. C. (Financial Provision: Personal Damages) [1995] 2 F.L.R. 171. 
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employment during the subsistence of the marriage. In Wachtel v. 
Wachtel811 Lord Denning considered the object of this provision and said: 
" ... we may take it that Parliament recognised that the wife who 
looks after the home and family contributes as much to the family 
assets as the wife who goes out to work The one contributes in 
kind. The other in money or money's worth. If the court comes 
to a conclusion that the home has been acquired and maintained 
by the joint efforts of both, then, when the marriage breaks down, 
it should be regarded as the joint property of both of them, no 
matter in whose name it stands. Just as a wife who makes a 
substantial money contribution usually gets a share, so should a 
wife who looks after the home and cares for the family for 20 
years or more." 
On the facts of the case, the wife was found to have made a substantial 
contribution to the home over a period of some 18 years and to be an 
excellent mother. 
811 Supra at p. 838-839. 
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The kind of "contribution" that may be considered under this provision 
may come in a variety of forms. Apart from the usual cases in which "a 
wife has faithfully carried out the duties and functions of a loving wife 
and mother" there are cases in which, in addition, "she has been 
practically involved and has participated in the family business project, 
whether in farming, industry, or otherwise, or possibly in acquisition of 
an asset. "812 This active participation will be recognised as a contribution 
under this provision. Thus, in 0 'D v. 0 'D813 the wife had worked as a 
receptionist, chambermaid, cook, waitress and clerk while building up a 
hotel business. The court awarded her a lump sum of £70,000 in partial 
recognition of this fact, although her needs could have been satisfied by 
a payment of £30,000. In P. v. P. 814 a gift of property given to the wife by 
her father was taken into account as part of her contribution and in Vicary 
812 
813 
814 
Per Wood J. in Page v. Page [1981] 2 F.L.R. 198 at p. 205. 
[1976] Fam. 83. See also Gojkovic v. Gojkovic supra and White v. White 
supra. In the latter case, one of the reasons given by the Court of Appeal for 
the increase of the wife's share of the matrimonial assets was to recognize 
her contribution to the family as wife and mother for 33years over and above 
her role in the farming business. See White v. White (1999]2 W.L.R. 1213 
(C.A.) at pp. 1225 and 1228 per Thorpe and Butler-Sloss L.JJ. respectively. 
(1978] 1 W.L.R. 483 at p. 489. 
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v. Vicary815 it was accepted that a wife of a millionaire businessman who 
had supplied the infrastructure and support in the context of which the 
husband was able to work hard, prosper and accumulate wealth could be 
credited for such indirect contribution.816 
Whilst consideration of this provision will generally work in favour of a 
spouse, it can also be a disadvantage. Thus in West v. West811 the wife 
had unreasonably refused to join the husband in the home he had 
purchased and set up a family of their own as she preferred to stay with 
her own parents. Although the case was concerned with whether the 
wife's conduct was "gross and obvious" within the context of s. 25 (2) (g) 
of the 1973 Act, Ormrod L.J. said818 that the limited provision made for 
the wife could be justified under paragraphs (d) and (f) of the Act: 
815 
816 
817 
818 
[1992] 2 F.L.R. 271. 
See also Trippas v. Trippas [1973] Fam. 134 atp. 144 per Scarman L.J. See 
also Kokosinki v. Kokosinki [1980] I All E.R. 1106 where the contribution 
was in the form of finance for business purposes. 
[1978] Fam. 1. 
Atp. 9E-F. 
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"The duration of the marriage, to all intents and purposes in this 
case, was nil, and the wife 's contribution to looking after the 
home, as there was no home, was virtually nil, and so far as 
caring for the family is concerned, she has never cared for her 
husband in any sense. On the other hand, she has cared for the 
child in her ownfamily's home." 
The domestic contributions are assessed only in relation to the aggregate 
of the matrimonial assets, for as has been pointed out by Lesser:819 
"in looking to the contributions made to the welfare of the family, 
(the court) would.find it difficult, perhaps impossible, to draw any 
precise link between such contributions and the purchase of the 
particular asset ... " 
Thus in Harnett v. Harnett, 820 the court distinguished between the "mere 
general contributions that are brought into reckoning" under s. 25(1 )(f) 
819 
820 
"The acquisition of inter vivos matrimonial property rights in English law: 
A doctrinal melting pot" (1973) 23 University of Toronto Law Journal 148 
at p. 208 cited by Gray Reallocation of Property on Divorce op. cit., at p. 
119 note 9. 
[1973] Fam. 156 at p. 167 per Bagnall J. 
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and contributions to the improvement of property which are relevant 
under s. 37 of the Matrimonial Proceedings and Property Act 1970. 
Under the 1970 Act, the contribution must be "identifiable with the 
relevant improvement."821 
(vii) S. 25(2)(g) MCA 1973 
Prior to the Divorce Reform Act 1969822 the conduct of the spouses, 
particularly the wife, was of crucial importance to the determination of 
post-divorce financial provision.823 The matrimonial offence doctrine 
ensured that only an "innocent" wife was entitled to be maintained whilst 
821 
822 
823 
See pp. 315-320 supra. 
This Act, which was subsequently consolidated into the Matrimonial Causes 
Act 1973, altered the conceptual basis of divorce from that based on proof 
of the commission of a matrimonial offence to that of irretrievable 
breakdown of the marriage. For the evolution of the law, see Cretney & 
Masson op. cit., pp. 305-383. See also H.A. Finlay "Reluctant, but 
inevitable: The retreat of matrimonial fault" (1975) 38 Modern Law Review 
153 and "Fault causation and breakdown in the Anglo-Australian law of 
divorce" (1978) 94 Law Quarterly Review 120. 
See the Law Commission's discussion paper, The Financial Consequences 
of Divorce: The Basic Policy (1980, Law Com. No. 103) paras. 8-13. 
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a "guilty" wife was deprived ofmaintenance.824 The abandonment of the 
matrimonial offence doctrine by the 1969 Act825 brought into question the 
role of conduct in determining post-divorce financial provision. In 
Wachtel v. Wachtel826 Lord Denning M.R. was of the view that the fact 
that the court was to have regard to the parties' conduct did not mean that 
the court was to hearthe parties' "mutual recrimination and ... go into their 
petty squabbles for days on end' as was the case before the passing of the 
1969 Act. In his Lordship's view there was no need for "a post-mortem 
to find out what killed' the marriage because: 
824 
825 
826 
"In most cases both parties are to blame - or, as we would prefer 
to say - both parties have contributed to the breakdown. It has 
been suggested that there should be a 'discount' or 'reduction ' in 
what the wife is to receive because of her supposed misconduct, 
SeeAshcroftv. Ashcroft [1902] P. 270 atp. 273 per Gorell Barnes J., Dailey 
v. Dailey [1947] 1 All E.R. 847 at p. 851 per Willmer J. and Law Com. No. 
103 para. 13. Subsequently the doctrine developed that a "guilty" wife 
should not forfeit all right to maintenance unless her conduct was of a really 
serious nature, disruptive, intolerable and unforgivable. See Ackerman v. 
Ackerman [1972] Fam. 1 at p. 6. 
The Act came into force on the I 51 of January 1971. 
Supra at pp. 835-836. 
827 
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guilt or blame (whatever word is used). We cannot accept this 
argument. In a vast majority of cases it is repugnant to the 
principles underlying the new legislation, and in particular the 
1969 Act. There will be many cases in which a wife (although 
once considered guilty or blameworthy) will have cared for the 
home and looked after the family for very many years. Is she to 
be deprived of the benefit otherwise to be accorded to her bys. 5 
(1) (/) because she may share responsibility for the breakdown 
with her husband? There will no doubt be a residue of cases 
where the conduct of one of the parties is in the judge's words827 
both 'obvious and gross', so much so that to order one party to 
support another whose conduct falls into this category is 
repugnant to anyone's sense of justice. In such a case the court 
remains free to decline to afford financial support or to reduce 
the support which it would otherwise have ordered But, short of 
cases falling into this category, the court should not reduce its 
order for financial provision merely because of what was 
formerly regarded as guilt or blame. To do so would be to 
[1973] 1 All E.R. 113 at p. 119 per Ormrod J. at first instance. 
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impose a fine for supposed misbehaviour in the course of an 
unhappy married life." 
This dictum was an elaboration of that of Orm.rod J at first instance828 and 
makes it clear that conduct should generally not be given any appreciable 
weight unless it is "both obvious and gross". In other words, it must be 
conduct of exceptional gravity, "of a kind that would cause the ordinary 
mortal to throw up his hands and say, 'surely that woman is not going to 
be given any money' ... "829 Thus, where a wife, for example, has an 
adulterous relationship with her husband's father, 830 or if one party 
without reasonable excuse totally fails to set up any married life at all,831 
or where the husband commits adultery with a daughter-in-law,832 or 
828 
829 
830 
831 
832 
Supra. 
Per Sir George Baker P. in W v. W (Financial Provision: Lump Sum) 
[1976) Fam. 107 atp. 110. See alsoArmstrongv. Armstrong(1974) 118 S.J. 
579 per Stephenson L.J. cited in Kokosinski v. Kokosinski supra at p. 1116 
per Wood J., Harnett v. Harnett [1974] 1 All E.R. 764 at pp. 768 and 770 
per Cairns and Roskill L.JJ. and Robinson v. Robinson [1983) I All E.R. 
391 at p. 395 per Waller L.J. 
Bailey v. Tolliday [1982) 4 F.L.R. 542. 
West v. West supra. 
Dixon v. Dixon [1974) 6 Fam. Law 58. 
360 
where the wife assisted her husband with suicide attempts in order to set 
up home with her lover and get as much from the husband's estate as 
possible, 833 the court will be satisfied that the requirement of exceptional 
conduct which would be inequitable to disregard has been satisfied. 
These types of conduct will for the most part be used to reduce the 
amount of financial provision which the court might otherwise have 
awarded to a party. However, in Kokosinki v. Kokokinski834 the court held 
that in an appropriate case conduct will be regarded as a circumstance 
which should be taken into account as a positive factor in influencing the 
financial provision to be awarded to a spouse. In that case the respondent 
left Poland in 1939, leaving behind a wife and child, and settled in the 
United Kingdom. In 194 7 the respondent began to live with the petitioner 
and their son was born in 1950. During the period of cohabitation the 
petitioner was faithful, loving and hard-working. She played a significant 
role in building up the husband's business and from her earnings she 
contributed substantially to the maintenance of the household. In 1969 
833 
834 
K. v. K. (Financial Provision: Conduct) [1988] 1 F.L.R. 469. The wife's 
lump sum was reduced from £14 000 to £5 000. See also A. v. A. (Financial 
Provision: Conduct) [1995] 1F.L.R:345. 
[1980] Fam. 72. 
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the respondent's Polish wife divorced him and in 1971 the respondent and 
the petitioner were married. Early in 1972 cohabitation ceased and, in 
1977, the petitioner obtained a decree nisi on the grounds of the 
re~pondent's desertion. On the question whether, in view of the short 
duration of the marriage, the petitioner should be granted a lump sum by 
way of financial provision, the court held that s. 25(1) of the MCA 1973 
required the court not only to consider the duration of the marriage but 
"all the circumstances of the case" and the conduct of the parties. The 
court held that: 
835 
"The wife has given the best years of her life to the husband. She 
has been faithful, loving and hard-working. She has helped him 
to build what is in every sense a family business. She has 
managed his home and been a mother to and help him bring up 
a son of whom they are both justly proud. I believe that she has 
earned for herself some part of the value of the family 
business. "835 
Per Wood J. at p. 85. 
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These matters, in the court's view, were to be taken into account under s. 
25(1) of the MCA 1973. Accordingly, in the particular circumstances of 
the case, it was just that the respondent should be ordered to pay the 
petitioner the sum of £8, 000. 
Although the courts are able to assess what is "obvious and gross 
conduct" their view of the extent to which such conduct should affect an 
order has not been consistent. 836 In Cuzner v. Underdown831 a wife who 
had accepted a half share of the matrimonial home whilst carrying on an 
adulterous affair was ordered to forfeit her share to her husband. In 
Armstrong v. Armstrong838 a wife who had been shut out of the 
matrimonial home and who fired a gun at her husband (luckily causing no 
serious injury), was awarded a quarter of the family assets. One would 
question whether Mrs. Underdown's conduct was so much worse than 
that of Mrs. Armstrong's and yet the one was deprived of financial 
836 
837 
838 
See M.L. Parry '"Having regard to their conduct' - financial provision on 
divorce" (1975) New Law Journal 960. 
[1974] 2 All E.R. 351. 
Supra. 
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provision whilst the other was provided for. In Jones v. Jones839 a 
husband, who attacked his wife causing her permanent injury, was 
ordered to forfeit all interest in the family assets. The attack took place 
some two months after the decree absolute and eight months after the 
decree nisi. The court held that conduct was not limited to events which 
had taken place before the breakdown of the marriage or indeed before 
the decree was made absolute. 84° Furthermore, conduct in this context 
was not to be treated as being confined to matrimonial misconduct. 841 
However, in F. v. F. 842 the finding that the husband had casual sexual 
encounters, including from time to time visiting prostitutes, apparently 
did not influence the court in any way. 
These inconsistencies notwithstanding, it seems that the above cases 
represent the extreme and that in the ordinary run of cases conduct is only 
839 
840 
841 
842 
[1976] Fam. 8. See also H v. H (Financial Provision: Conduct) [1994] 2 
F .L.R. 801 where the husband was held to be guilty of brutal violent assault 
on his wife. 
[1976] Fam. 8 at p. 15 per Orr L.J. 
Ibid. at p. 16 per Megaw L.J. 
[1996] 1 F.L.R. 833. 
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rarely relevant in practice. 843 This infrequent reliance on conduct gave 
rise to some concern in Parliament during the consideration of the Bill 
which became the Family Law Act 1996.844 The Act, when fully 
operational, will therefore make an amendment to paragraph 25 (2)(g) of 
the 1973 Act by the addition of the following "whatever the nature of the 
conduct and whether it occurred during the marriage or after the 
separation of the parties or (as the case may be) dissolution or annulment 
of the marriage". The reason given for this amendment is said "to 
emphasise that conduct of the parties of whatever nature, should it be 
inequitable to disregard it, has to be taken into account and that it is not 
only conduct in the course of ancillary relief proceedings that has to be 
considered''. 845 The view has been expressed that it is difficult to predict 
what the effect of the amendment will be on the outcome of future cases 
but it could be implied from the quoted words that in future the courts 
will give greater prominence to conduct. 846 
843 
844 
845 
846 
See Cretney & Masson op. cit, at p. 450. 
See Cretney & Masson op. cit., at p. 452. 
See Jonathan Evans, Standing Committee E, Official Report, May 16, 1996, 
col. 371 cited by Cretney & Masson op. cit, at pp. 452-453 
See Cretney & Masson op. cit., at p. 453. See also Bird et al Divorce - The 
New Law Jordans, Bristol, 1996 at p. 73. 
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The procrastination of the relevant authority to bring the 1996 Act fully 
into force coupled with its disfigurement by numerous amendments and 
repeals847 make the likelihood of the coming into effect of the proposed 
amendment to s. 25(2)(g) doubtful. 
(viii) S. 25(2)(h) MCA 1973 
Job-related and insurance benefits have become increasingly important in 
financial settlement after divorce because a greater part of the wealth of 
married couples may be in the form of rights to receive pensions and 
other benefits such as insurance benefits. 848 Women are especially 
disadvantaged in relation to this form of property since pension 
entitlement depends on a steady record of contributions from earnings 
either to the State or a private pension scheme. Women who have given 
up work to care for children may not have made sufficient contributions 
to qualify.849 Thus, for many women pension entitlement and other job-
847 
848 
849 
See note 734 supra. 
See pp. 191-194 supra. 
See generally H. Joshi and H. Davies The Pension Consequences of Divorce 
Centre for Economic Policy Research Discussion paper No. 550, London, 
1991 and "Pensions, divorce and wives' double burden" (1992) 6 
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related benefits, such as group life insurance schemes, would depend on 
a husband and divorce would remove even these forms of entitlement. 850 
Pensions 
S. 25(2)(h) together with subsections 2(a) and (b) direct the court's 
attention to job-related benefits, especially pensions, in determining post-
divorce financial provision. Under these provisions, the court can make 
adjustments to other matrimonial assets to compensate for lost pension 
entitlement. The court may also delay or refuse to grant a divorce under 
ss. 5 and 10 of the MCA 1973 in a two-year or five-year separation case, 
so that the petitioner may make provision for the respondent's lost 
pension entitlements. 851 
850 
851 
International Journal of Law and the Family 289. See also A. Martin 
"Pensions and Divorce" [1996] Fam. Law 432 and J. Masson "Rights to 
divorce and pension rights" in Divorce: Where Next? M. Freeman (ed.) 
Aldershot, Dartmouth Publishing Co., 1996 at p. 107. 
See Dewar op. cit., at p. 323 and Joshi and Davies op. cit., at Ch. 2. 
See K. v. K. (Financing Relief Widow's Pension) [1997] 1 F.L.R. 35. 
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Prior to the enactment of the Pensions Act 1995, 852 subsequently amended 
by the Welfare Reform and Pensions Act 1999, 853 (WRP A 1999) the 
courts were unable to make orders directly affecting pension entitlements 
mainly because the beneficiaries' rights are usually discretionary, and 
assignment or commutation of benefits is often prohibited either by 
statute854 or the terms of the particular scheme. 855 However, it was 
sometimes possible to take pension benefits into account where, for 
example, the benefit was due in a comparatively short time such as two 
or three years. Thus, in Richardson v. Richardson856 the husband would 
be entitled on retirement some three years after the divorce to a civil 
service pension and a lump sum of £9,000. If the marriage had survived, 
852 
853 
854 
855 
856 
S. 166(1) of the Act amended the MCA 1973 by introducing new ss. 25B-
25D which sections have been amended by sched 4 to the WRP A 1999. The 
schedule came into effect on 1st December 2000. See the Welfare Reform 
and Pensions Act 1999 (Commencement No. 5) Order 2000 (S.1. No. 1116 
(C. 35). 
See s. 19 and sched. 4 to the Act which came into effect on the 1st December 
2000. See note 852 supra. 
See, for example, s. 203 of the Army Act 1955. 
See Walker v. Walker [1983] Fam. 68 and Roberts v. Roberts [1986] 2 All 
E.R. 483. 
[1978] Fam. Law 86. See also Morris v. Morris [1977] Fam. Law 224. 
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the wife would have been entitled to a widow's pension. There was other 
capital available and the court ordered the husband to pay the wife an 
enhanced lump sum to take account of her loss of these expectations. 857 
In Brooks v. Brooks858 the House of Lords held that the court had 
jurisdiction to vary the terms of a pension scheme, as the particular 
pension arrangement could be construed as a post-nuptial settlement and 
therefore was capable of adjustment under s. 24( 1 )( c) of the 1973 Act. 859 
The pension scheme in that case was a small, company-run scheme where 
the husband was marginally the majority shareholder. This decision had 
a limited impact on the court's ability to deal with pension entitlements 
although it brought into a sharp focus the need for reform. 
857 
858 
859 
Cf. Roberts v. Roberts [1986] 2 All E.R. 483 where the court was not 
prepared to take pension payments which were not due until 2003, into 
account. 
[1995] 2 F.L.R. 13. See D. Chatterton "Pension rights on divorce: The 
implications of Brooks v. Brooks" [1993] Fam. Law 423 and D. Slater 
"Pension after Brooks" [1994] Fam. Law 520. In the light of the news. 24B 
of the MCA1973, inserted by sched. 3 para. 4 of the WRPA 1999, Brooks 
v. Brooks style variation will no longer be available to the court. S. 24B 
allows the court on the grant of a divorce decree to make one or more 
pension-sharing orders. 
This subsection allows the court to vary for the benefit of the parties and of 
the children of the family or either or any of them any ante-nuptial or post-
nuptial settlement made on the parties to the marriage. See pp. 388-390 
infra. 
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The requisite reform was brought about by the Pension Act 1995, as 
amended. 860 The 1995 Act gives the court jurisdiction to "earmark" 
pensions on divorce so as to enable income to be paid to a divorced 
spouse at the time of retirement. 861 In T v. T. 862 it was held that the 
statutory provisions do not compel the court to compensate for pension 
loss. The court's obligations are limited to considering whether orders for 
periodical payments, secured provision or lump sum are appropriate and 
then to examine how pension considerations should affect the terms of the 
860 
861 
862 
Under s. 27 of the WRPA 1999, a person's shareable rights under any 
pension arrangement other than an excepted public service pension scheme 
are susceptible to a pension sharing order. Bys. 27(2) of the 1999 Act a 
person's shareable rights under a pension arrangement are any rights of his 
under the arrangement, other than rights of a description specified by 
regulation made by the Secretary of State. S. 27 came into operation on 1 •1 
December 2000. See the Welfare Reform and Pensions Act 1999 
(Commencement No. 4) Order 2000 S.I. No. 1047 (C. 29) of2000. 
The "earmarking" of pension rights to allow payment at retirement has been 
criticized as not being an ideal solution. The reasons given for this criticism 
are that there may be many uncertainties, such as, the husband becoming ill 
or being made redundant, which may affect such rights. See Burrow v. 
Burrow [1999] 1 F.L.R. 508 and Standley op. cit., at p. 180. The provisions 
of s. 16 of the Family Law Act 1996, which was designed to answer this 
criticism by empowering the court to split pension rights on divorce, has 
been repealed with effect from 151 December 2000. See Sch ed. 13 Part II to 
the WRPA 1999. See however, S.I. No. 1116 (C. 35) of2000 note 852 
supra and note 863 infra. 
[1998] 1 F.L.R. 1072. 
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orders to be made. The court may make a pension-sharing order in which 
a designated percentage value of a spouse's pension benefit will be 
transferred to the other spouse. 863 It can even order persons responsible 
for the pension arrangement864 to pay the sums involved direct to the 
spouse concerned. 865 Regulations have been made imposing on persons 
responsible for a pension arrangement866 (on notification that a pension 
sharing order or provision is likely to be made by the court) to supply 
information about the relevant pension arrangement, not only to the court 
863 
864 
865 
866 
Sees. 21A MCA 1973 inserted by sched. 3 to the WRPA 1999, s. 25B(5) 
inserted by sched. 4 to the WRP A 1999 and s. 19 of the 1999 Act. These 
sections came into operation on l 81 December 2000. See S.I. No. 1116 
(C.35) of2000. Pension-sharing orders are therefore available only on or 
after from 1st December 2000. 
The term "pension arrangement" has now replaced "pension scheme" in the 
Act. The meaning of the two terms are the same. See s. 25B( 1 ), (3) and ( 4) 
of the MCA 1973 as amended by sched. 4 to WRPA 1999 para. l. 
Sees. 25B(4)oftheMCA 1973 asamendedbysched. 4tothe WRPA 1999. 
See also note 852 supra. 
The term "person responsible for the arrangement" is now used instead of 
"trustees or managers" in the Act. See s. 25B(6) of the MCA 1973 as 
amended by sched. 4 to the WRPA 1999 para. 1(7). See also note 864 
supra. 
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but also to the spouses or former spouses. 867 The Act allows the court to 
deal with pension rights notwithstanding any statutory prov1s1on 
prohibiting assignment of attachment of such rights. 868 
The provisions of the Act have been said to be an incentive for the court 
to modify its reluctance to make orders deferred for more than a 
comparatively short period - a reluctance founded on the belief that any 
substantial deferral would be inconsistent with the "clean break" policy 
whereby financial matters were adjusted once and for all on divorce. 869 
(b) Orders that a court can make 
The MCA 1973 distinguishes between "financial provision orders" (that 
is, periodical payment orders and lump-sum orders) on the one hand, and 
"property adjustment orders" (that is, transfers and settlements of property 
867 
868 
869 
Sees. 23 of the WRPA 1999 and The Pensions on Divorce etc. (Provision 
oflnformation) Regulations 2000 (S.I. No. 1048) of2000. Both s. 23 of the 
1999 Act and the Regulations came into operation on 1st December 2000. 
See S.I. No. 1047 (C. 29)) and SJ. No. 1048 respectively. 
Sees. 166(5) of the 1995 Act. 
Cretney & Masson op. cit., p. 496. 
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and variations of settlements) on the other. 870 These orders may be made 
against either party to a marriage on or after the decree nisi of divorce. 871 
Thus it has been said that husbands and wives come to the judgement seat 
" ... upon the basis of complete equality."812 However, the realisation that 
women have, in most cases, inferior economic power has made orders 
against them an exception rather than the rule.873 The court may, in the 
exercise of its power, make only one order or a combination of orders as 
the circumstances of a particular case warrant. These orders are: 
870 
871 
872 
873 
See s. 21 of the Act. This section has been redrafted by sched. 2 para. 2 of 
the Family Law Act 1996 but the nature of the orders remain basically the 
same. The schedule is yet to come into operation. See pp. 364-365 and note 
734supra. 
Sched 2 to the Family Law Act 1996 will amend this by allowing the 
spouses' financial affairs to be settled before divorce is granted. Sees. 15(1) 
and (2) of the Act. The said schedule and sections are yet to come into 
operation. See pp. 364-365 and note 734 supra. 
Per Scarman L.J. in Calderbank v. Calderbank [1976) Fam. 93 at p. 103. 
For examples of the exercise of the court's powers in favour ofa husband, 
see Griffiths v. Griffiths [1973) 1 W.L.R. 1454 (£7,000 lump sum), B. v. B. 
(Financial Provision) [1982) 3 F.L.R. 298 (£50, 000) and Beach v. Beach 
[1995) 2 F.L.R. 160 (£60,000). 
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(a) periodical payments (secured or unsecured) and/or the payment of a 
lump sum to the other party to the marriage, 874 
(b) periodical payments (secured or unsecured) and/or payment of a lump 
sum to or for the benefit of a child of the family, 875 
( c) a transfer of property to the other party and/ or to or for the benefit of 
a child of the family, 876 
( d) a settlement of property for the benefit of the other party and/or the 
benefit of the children, 877 
874 
875 
876 
877 
Seess. 22Aand23 MCA 1973. Under sched. 2 of the Family Law Act 1996 
these orders will be called, ''periodical payments order", "secured periodical 
payments order" and "order for the payment of a lump sum" respectively. 
The said schedule is yet to come into operation. See pp. 364-365 and note 
734 supra. 
See note 874 supra. 
Ss. 23A-B and 24 MCA 1973. S. 23A has substituted s. 24 insofar as it 
dealt with property adjustment orders on divorce. See note 734 supra. 
S. 21(2)(b) MCA 1973. See note 734 supra. 
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( e) a variation of any ante-nuptial or post-nuptial settlement for the 
benefit of one or both of the parties and/or any child of the family, or an 
order extinguishing or reducing the interest of either party under such 
settlement 878 
' 
(f) an order for sale of property.879 
In the context of the thesis particular aspects of the orders for the payment 
of a lump sum and property adjustment will be highlighted below. This 
is because they are the usual orders which the court makes in giving effect 
to whatever rights have been determined to belong to a spouse in the 
matrimonial property. Orders for periodical payment are usually made for 
financial provision such as maintenance which is not dependent on the 
acquisition of rights in the matrimonial property but is by virtue of the 
marital relationship. 880 
878 
879 
880 
S. 21(2)(c) MCA 1973. See note 734 supra. 
S. 24A MCA 1973 as amended by para. 8 of sched. 8 of the Family Law Act 
1996. See note 734 supra. 
English common law imposed on a husband a duty to maintain his wife in 
accordance with his means, but imposed no corresponding duty on a wife to 
maintain her husband. See National Provincial Bank Ltd v. Ainsworth 
[1965] A.C. 1175 at p. 1219 per Lord Hodson and at p. 1229 per Lord 
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(i) Lump sum 
The court may order that one spouse to a marriage pay a lump sum of 
money to the other spouse. 881 Such a lump sum may be ordered to be paid 
by instalments and secured to the satisfaction of the court. 882 The security 
881 
882 
Upjohn. However, statutory provision now accepts equality between 
husband and wife and consequently, either of them may apply for an order 
for maintenance in the Magistrates' Court under the Domestic Proceedings 
and Magistrates' Courts Act 1978 and in the High Court during divorce 
proceedings under s. 23 of the MCA 1973. 
S. 23(l)(c) MCA 1973, as substituted by sched. 2 to the Family Law Act 
1996. The new section 23(l)(c) has a similar provision to the one it 
substituted. The said schedule is yet to come into operation. See note 734 
supra. Under the olds. 23(l)(c), it was held in Colemanv. Coleman [1973] 
Fam. 10 that only one lump-sum order can be made and that the plural 
reference to "lump sums" in the subsection is to allow the court to award one 
or more sums within the ambit of a single application. There could be an 
order for an immediate lump sum and another payable by instalments. See 
also de Lasalav. de Lasala [1980) A.C. 546. S. 23(l)(c) will be substituted 
by as. 2l(l)(c) of the Family Law Act which provides that the court may 
make an order that a party must make a payment in favour of another person 
of such lump sum or sums as may be specified. The new section is yet to 
come into operation. See note 734 supra. 
This is possible under s. 23(3)(c) of the MCA 1973 as substituted bys. 
22A(5) of the Family Law Act 1996. This subsection is yet to come into 
effect because schedule 2 of the 1996 Act which inserted it is not yet 
operational. See ~ote 734 supra. See also Penrose v. Penrose [1994] 2 
F.L.R 621 where a lump sum of £50,000 was ordered to be paid by 
instalments. 
376 
for the instalments is usually the matrimonial home883 but the court is not 
restricted in the kind of property it can direct to provide the security. 
What it is not permitted to do is to order the security over all the assets of 
the person paying the instalments. 884 The court must specify the particular 
assets over which the security is to operate. 885 A necessary precondition 
for such an order is that the parties should be relatively wealthy, 886 in 
which case it might be used to compensate for a property transfer, for 
example, of the matrimonial home. 887 But the making of the order should 
not cripple the earning capacity of the spouse against whom it is made.888 
The general characteristics of the order are that: 
883 
884 
885 
886 
887 
888 
See Foardv. Foard [1967] 2 All E.R. 660. 
See Baker v. Baker [1952] P. 184 at p. 190 per Jenkins L.J. 
Ibid. 
See Potter v. Potter [1982] 3 All E.R. 321, Preston v. Preston supra, 
Leadbeater v. Leadbeater supra, Gojkovic v. Gojkovic supra, R. v. R. 
(Financial Provision: Reasonable Needs) supra and Dart v. Dart supra. 
See Wachtel v. Wachtel supra at p. 841, Smith v. Smith [1970] 1 All E.R. 
244, Hector v. Hector [1973] 3 All E.R. 1070, Backhouse v. Backhouse 
[ 1978] 1 W.L.R. 243 and Mortimer v. Mortimer-Griffin supra. 
See Wachtel v. Wachtel supra at p. 841. 
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1. The payment is made "once and for all".889 Only one such order can 
be made and the recipient cannot come back for more, at any rate in the 
absence of fraud or non-disclosure of assets by the person against whom 
it was made. 890 In order to avoid possible injustice caused by the finality 
of the lump sum order, the court has a discretion to· adjourn the 
proceedings but usually not for more than four or five years. 891 
2. The order cannot be varied if circumstances change. 892 For example, 
the lump sum is not returnable if the recipient remarries after receiving it, 
or on any contingency, at least in the absence of the conditions included 
889 
890 
891 
892 
See Coleman v. Coleman supra at p. 17. 
Coleman v. Coleman supra and Vicary v. Vicary [1992] 2 F.L.R. 271. 
See Davies v. Davies [1986] 1 F.L.R. 497 and MT. v. MT. (Financial 
Provision: Lump Sum) supra. 
The power given to the court by s. 31 of the MCA 1973 to vary certain 
orders made under the Act does not apply to lump sums. However, s.3 lA 
of the 1973 Act, inserted by sched. 2 para. 8 of the Family Law 1996 Act, 
gives the court the power to vary or discharge lump sum or property 
adjustment orders on the application of the parties made before the grant of 
a divorce order. S. 3 lA is yet to come into operation. See note 734 supra. 
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in the original order.893 However, if the lump sum is ordered to be paid by 
instalments, such instalments may be varied. 894 
Since the decision in Wachtel v. Wachtel895 lump sum payment has 
become an important method for reallocating matrimonial assets on 
divorce. In Wachtel 's case the wife was awarded a £6,000 lump sum as 
her share in the matrimonial home. In 0 'D. v. 0 'D. 896 a wife was 
awarded a £70,000 lump sum for her indirect contribution towards the 
success of her husband's business. In Preston v. Preston897 a lump-sum 
award of £600,000 was made to a wife as her "reasonable requirements" 
in terms of need and in Gojkovic v. Gojkovic898 a lump sum of £1.3 
million was awarded to a wife to enable her to acquire a hotel which 
would provide her with a livelihood. 
893 
894 
895 
896 
897 
898 
See Coleman v. Coleman supra. 
See Penrose v. Penrose supra and Tilley v Tilley (1979) 10 Fam. Law 89. 
Supra. 
Supra. 
Supra. 
Supra. 
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A lump sum may, in a rare circumstance, be made for investment 
purposes where the parties have substantial property. If it is made, the 
recipient of the award is expected to expend it, or so much of it as is 
needed to meet future income needs, by drawing both upon the capital 
and the income it can produce. 899 
Under the Pension Act 1995, the court may order persons responsible for 
a pension arrangement to pay a lump sum from a pension right of one 
spouse to the other.900 The amount so ordered must not exceed the 
amount of the payment due at the time of payment to the pensioner. 901 In 
effect the court will have power to divert payments of all or part of the 
lump sums which are often paid under pension schemes on retirement or 
death in service from the pensioner(or his estate) to the pensioner's 
spouse.902 
899 
900 
901 
902 
See B. v. B. [1990] 1 F.L.R. 20 at p. 24 per Ward J. See also Preston v. 
Preston supra and Gojkovic v. Gojkovic supra. 
See notes 864, 866 and pp. 364-365 supra. 
S. 25B(4), (5) and 25C of the MCA 1973 as amended by sched. 4 to the 
WRPA 1999 paras. 1 and 2. See note 863 supra. 
Sees. 25C of the MCA 1973as amended by para. 2 ofsched.4totheWRPA 
1999. See also note 852 supra S. 25C gives the court a number of ancillary 
powers relating to death benefits. 
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Research has shown that lump-sum orders are not made frequently.903 
This is so because regard must be had to the effect which the lump-sum 
payment will have on the paying party and his ability to pay. 
(ii) Property transfer 
The court is empowered to order that a party to the marriage shall transfer 
to the other party such property as may be specified to which the first-
mentioned party is entitled either in possession or reversion. 904 Any 
property, such as a car, furniture or stocks and shares, can be transferred 
but, as will be seen below, the order is commonly used to transfer the 
matrimonial home from one party to the other. The transferee may be 
given a charge over the house for a fixed amount or a percentage of the 
value, which is realisable at a later date, for example, when the house is 
903 
904 
See J. Eekelaar Regulating Divorce op. cit., at p. 70 and B. Baker et al The 
Matrimonial Jurisdiction of Registrars etc. op. cit., at paras, 3.7-3.10. 
S. 24(l)(a) of the MCA 1973. This subsection will be replaced by a news. 
21(2)(a) inserted by sched. 2 to the Family Law Act 1996. The provision in 
the news. 21(2)(a) is similar to that of s. 24(l)(a). The said schedule is yet 
to come into operation. See note 734 supra. 
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sold. 905 Alternatively, the transferee may be ordered to pay the transferor 
a lump sum representing the latter's share in the property concerned906 or 
an absolute transfer may be ordered without any lump sum payment in 
lieu of the share transferred.907 
There is no clarity about the question whether the party in whose favour 
an order of transfer has been made can obtain a further order in respect of 
a different item of property. This would be important for instance, where 
further assets are acquired by the other party. The point was left open in 
Carson v. Carson, 908 a case which concerned a settlement of property. It 
is submitted that if further assets are acquired by one party after the 
divorce and if no application has previously been made by the other party 
then, subject to a bar if he or she has remarried, an application can be 
905 
906 
907 
908 
See Knibb v. Knibb [1987] 2 F.L.R. 396, Hector v. Hector supra, Browne 
(formerly Pritchard) v. Pritchard [1975] 3 All E.R. 721, Teschner v. 
Teschner [1985] F.L.R. 627 and Clutton v. Clutton supra. 
See Wachtel v. Wachtel supra, Mortimer v. Mortimer-Griffin supra, 
Backhouse v. Backhouse supra and Dopson v. Cherry (1975) 5 Fam. Law 
57. 
See Cuzner v. Underdown supra, Jones v. Jones supra, Smith v. Smith 
[ 1975] 2 All E.R. 19 and Martin v. Martin supra. 
[1981] 2 F.L.R. 352. 
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made if leave is first obtained from the court.909 Furthermore, it has not 
been settled whether if an application was made but was dismissed, a 
further application will be entertained. By analogy with applications for 
a lump sum, one may conclude that once an application has been made 
and dismissed, for example, because the financial circumstances of the 
other spouse did not justify an order, no further application will be 
entertained.910 However, the burden of establishing that there was a final 
and unequivocal dismissal of the claim is on the party asserting it and it 
has been held that the court must be slow to imply such dismissal when 
none.is expressed.911 
909 
910 
911 
Sees. 26 of the MCA 1973 which deals with commencement of proceedings 
for ancillary relief. See also r. 2.53(1) and (2) of the Family Proceedings 
Rules 1991. 
See Miller op. cit. at p. 258. On the making of a lump-sum order, see 
Coleman v. Coleman supra. 
See Brown v. Kirrage (1981) 11 Fam. Law 141 where the Court of Appeal 
held that a property adjustment order dealing with the principal asset of the 
marriage (the home) did not implicitly debar a later lump-sum application by 
the wife, on the ground that the husband had not discharged the heavy 
burden, which lay on him, of showing a dismissal. 
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The characteristics of this order are similar to those of the power to 
award a lump sum.912 Thus, a property transfer order is made "once and 
for all" and the beneficiary cannot come back for another order. 
Secondly, an order for property transfer cannot be varied if circumstances 
change. 913 Thus, the transfer of such property will not be affected by 
remarriage of the recipient. But if material facts relevant to the making 
of the order are not disclosed or are withheld from the court and the other 
party, the order may be revisited. Thus, in Livesey (formerly Jenkins) v. 
Livesey, 914 the House of Lords set aside an order for the transfer of the 
matrimonial home when the wife failed to disclose her intention to 
remarry. 
The most important use of this order has been in relation to the 
matrimonial home. Where the former matrimonial home is to be vested 
in one spouse who is in occupation then this will be achieved by an order 
that the other spouse transfer his or her interest in the home to the 
912 
913 
914 
See pp. 375-379 supra and Miller op. cit., at p. 257. 
The court's power under s. 31 of the MCA 1973 to vary certain orders made 
under the Act does not apply to property transfer orders. See note 892 
supra. 
[1985] A.C. 424. 
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occupying spouse.915 Such an order may be accompanied by a reduction 
or refusal of other payments to the resident spouse,916 the payment by the 
resident spouse of an immediate lump sum, possibly raised by mortgage 
on the property itself,917 the execution of a charge of a fixed or 
proportionate amount of the value of the house enforceable on the death 
or remarriage of the resident spouse, or on the children, if any, reaching 
a certain age, or on the sale of the property.918 Where the non-occupying 
spouse is to become a beneficiary of a transfer order, the court will have 
to take the respective needs for accommodation by the occupying spouse 
as well as the non-occupying spouse into consideration. The non-
915 
916 
917 
918 
See Wachtel v. Wachtel supra at pp. 840-841. For examples of cases in 
which such an order was made, see Hanlon v. Hanlon supra, Mortimer v. 
Mortimer-Griffith supra. and Cuzner v. Underdown supra. 
See Hanlon v. Hanlon supra. 
Backhouse v. Backhouse supra and Scipio v. Scipio [1983] 4 F.L.R. 654. It 
must be noted that where resources are limited, and this is usually the case, 
the court has stressed that a lump-sum payment should not cripple the party 
against whom it is made. See Lord Denning' s dictum in Wachtel v. Wachtel 
supra at p. 841. 
See Hectorv. Hector supra, Dunfordv. Dunford[l980] 1 All E.R. 122 and 
Simmons v. Simmons [1984] 1 All E.R. 83. On the advantages of imposing 
a charge on the home in favour of the non-resident spouse, see M. Hayes and 
G. Buttersby "Property adjustments: Further thoughts on charge orders" 
[1985] Family Law 142. 
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occupying spouse could, for example, be provided with a lump sum to be 
able to buy a house or flat or at least to pay a deposit for one.919 
The type of order adopted by the court will be determined by the other 
factors mentioned in s. 25 of the 1973 Act, such as contribution made by 
the applicant spouse or the conduct of the parties. Thus, in Poulter v. 
Pou/ter920 the wife was a wealthy woman due to the generosity of her 
father. The former matrimonial home, which was vested in the spouses' 
joint names, had been purchased with funds provided by the wife's father. 
Although the marriage had lasted for nine years, the court held that the 
husband had put nothing into the house and could have nothing out of it. 
In other words, the husband had made no contribution in terms of s. 
25(2)(f). Also in Cuzner v. Underdown, 921 the wife's interest was 
transferred to the husband because at the time of the acquisition of the 
property in their joint names, the wife was committing adultery. A few 
weeks later she left the husband to live with the co-respondent. The 
Court of Appeal, in affirming the trial judge's order, took the view that 
919 See Wachtel v. Wachtel supra. 
920 [1974] 4 Fam. Law 86. 
921 Supra. 
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the wife's conduct in accepting a half share in the matrimonial home 
while committing adultery was "obvious and gross" misconduct 
necessitating it being taken into account in terms of s. 25(2)(g). 
An outright transfer has an advantage of crystallising the parties' interests 
in the home at an early time and may thus be preferable if the court is 
willing to apply the "clean break" principle922 in a particular case. 923 It 
may also be appropriate where the sale of the house and the division of 
the proceeds at some point in the future will yield an insufficient amount 
to rehouse the resident spouse924 or where the non-resident spouse is 
adequately provided for elsewhere.925 
922 See infra p. 398. 
923 See Scipio v. Scipio supra. 
924 See Hanlon v. Hanlon supra. 
925 See Backhouse v. Backhouse supra. 
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(iii) Settlement of property926 
The court may direct that property to which a party to the marriage is 
entitled be settled for the benefit of the other spouse and/ or children of the 
family.927 The power is usually exercised in relation to the matrimonial 
home in order that it may continue to be used as a home for dependent 
children whilst preserving the financial interests of the spouses in it. This 
is the basis of the Mes her and Martin orders discussed above. 928 
The power to order a settlement is said to have several advantages over 
the other types of powers exercisable under the 1973 Act. 929 For example, 
it can be used as a means of providing members of the family with greater 
926 
927 
928 
929 
A settlement is a disposition ofland or other property, made by deed or will, 
under which trusts are created by the settlor designating the beneficiaries and 
the terms under which they are to take the property. 
See s. 24( 1 )(b) MCA 1973. This subsection will be substituted by a new s. 
21(2)(b) inserted by sched. 2 to the Family Law Act 1996. The news. 
2l(l)(b) makes a similar provision to that of s. 24(l)(b). The said schedule 
is yet to come into operation. Seep. 364-365 and note 734 supra. 
See pp. 345-348 supra. 
See Miller op. cit., at p. 260. 
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flexibility than an order for secured provision930 or it can be used to 
enable a party to have the use of property for a specified term without 
going to the length of an out-and-out transfer of the property to that 
person.931 
(iv) Variation of settlements 
The court may make an order varying for the benefit of the parties and/ or 
the children of the family any "ante-nuptial or post-nuptiaf'932 settlement 
made on the parties to the marriage.933 To constitute an "ante-nuptial or 
930 
931 
932 
933 
This order requires the person against whom it is made to provide assets 
which will secure the specified payments ordered by the court. The normal 
practice is to order a spouse to transfer specified assets to trustees to hold 
them on trust to pay the sum ordered to the spouse entitled and the balance 
to the spouse against whom the order is made. For examples of cases in 
which such an order was made see Foard v. Foard supra and Aggettv Aggett 
[1962] 1 All E.R. 190. 
Ibid See S. v. S. [1977] 1 All E.R. 56. 
These terms were described as archaic in Brooks v. Brooks [1995] 2 F.L.R. 
13 at p. 19 per Lord Nicholls. 
See s. 24( 1 )( c) and ( d) MCA 1973. These subsections will be substituted by 
a news. 21(2)(b) and (c) inserted by sched. 2 to the Family Law Act 1996. 
The new s. 21(2)(b) and (c) are similar to s. 24(l)(c) and (d). The said 
schedule is however, not in operation. Seep. 364-365 and note 734 supra. 
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post-nuptial settlement" two conditions must be satisfied, namely, there 
must be a "settlement"934 and the settlement must have the requisite 
nuptial element, that is to say, it must have been made "in contemplation 
of or because of marriage and with reference to the interests of married 
people or their children. "935 The only restriction on the court's power to 
vary the settlement is that it must be ''for the benefit" of the parties or 
their children and in this regard the court's power is not confined to 
varying the interests of the parties to the marriage, but extends to varying 
the interests of the children and other beneficiaries under the settlement. 936 
Because the court has the power to transfer property, it is now 
unnecessary to resort to the power of variation as often as in the past.937 
In any event, the popularity of the traditional marriage settlement, 
designed to protect a wife from the harsh common-law rule whereby her 
property and earnings passed to her husband, has waned and seems to 
934 
935 
936 
937 
See Prinsep v. Prinsep [ 1929] P. 225 at p. 232 and note 926 supra. 
Per Hill J. in Hargreaves v. Hargreaves [ 1926] P. 42 at p. 45. 
See Brooks v. Brooks supra at p. 20 per Lord Nicholls. 
See Miller op. cit., at p. 194. 
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belong to the "stuff of legal history". 938 However, the decision in Brooks 
v. Brooks, 939 has given the power to vary settlements some contemporary 
relevance in so far as it held that in some circumstances a pension scheme 
will fall within the definition of a nuptial settlement, and that the court 
may accordingly vary the terms of the settlement for the benefit of the 
wife or children.940 
(v) Sale of property 
The court is empowered, on making an order for financial relief in 
divorce, nullity or separation proceedings or at anytime thereafter, to 
make an order for sale of any property in which, or in the proceeds of sale 
of which, either or both of the parties have or have a beneficial interest, 
either in possession or reversion.941 The order may be made 
938 
939 
940 
941 
See Cretney & Masson op. cit., at p. 417. Despite its contemporary rarity it 
is still a suitable device, in appropriate circumstances, for making provision 
for one's children. See E. v. E. (Financial Provision) [1990] 2 F.L.R. 223. 
See p. 368 supra. 
See Cretney & Masson op. cit., at pp. 417-418. 
S. 24A{l) of the MCA 1973 as inserted by ss. 7 and 8 of the Matrimonial 
Homes and Property Act 1981 and amended by Sched. 8 Part I para. 8 of the 
Family Law Act 1996. Part I of the said schedule is yet to come into 
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notwithstanding that a third party also has an interest in the property. 
However, in such a case the third party must be given an opportunity to 
make representation to the court and the court must take that 
representation into account before making an order.942 
The court may vary the order for sale943 but this should be done only in 
exceptional circumstances so as to be consistent with the policy of the Act 
that property adjustment orders should not be varied.944 
942 
943 
944 
operation (paragraph 3 9 dealing with aspects oflegal aid has been repealed) 
but Parts II and III have been repealed by sched. 15 to the Access to Justice 
Act 1999. Seep. 364-365, note 734 supra and the Access to Justice Act 
1999 (Commencement No. 4 and Transitional Provisions) Order 2000 (S.1. 
No. 1920 of 2000) which came into operation on 31 '1 July 2000. For a 
discussion of the background to the 1981 Act see the Law Comniission's 
Report Orders for Sale of Property under the Matrimonial Causes Act 1973 
Law Com. No. 99 (1980). It must be noted that a reversion in the context of 
s. 24A of the 1973 Act means the residue of an owner's interest in land after 
he has granted some lesser interest in possession to some other person. For 
example, if A grants land to B for life, A has an interest in reversion, since 
the land reverts to him on B's death. 
S. 25(4) of the MCA 1973 as inserted bys. 8(1) of the Matrimonial Homes 
and Property Act 1981. See Levermore v. Levermore [ 1979] 1 W.L.R. 1277. 
See s. 31(2)(£) of the MCA 1973 inserted by s. 8(2) of the Matrimonial 
Homes and Property Act 1981. 
See Powys v. Powys [1971] P. 340 at p. 355. Cf Chaterjee v. Chaterjee 
[1976] Fam. 199 at p. 207 per Ormrod L.J. 
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( c) Application of the "one-third rule"945 
The so-called one-third rule is a method used by the court as a starting 
point for assessing the spouses' income and capital needs. Under this 
method the assets of both spouses are added and divided by three and the 
resulting amount is used as the starting point in determining what the 
husband should pay to his wife as maintenance. The rule originated from 
the practice by which ecclesiastical courts, in divorce proceedings, 
awarded an innocent wife a sum equal to one-third of the joint income of 
the spouses. After the introduction of judicial divorce in 1857,946 the 
same practice was followed by the Divorce Court. It was found to be 
945 
946 
For a general discussion of the rule, see Gray op. cit., at pp. 308-310, Miller 
op. cit., at pp. 222-226 and Cretney op. cit., (41h ed.) at pp. 827-833. 
This was brought about by the Matrimonial Causes Act 1857. 
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a"guide, a sound working rule ... yet not an absolute rule".941 Although it 
met with some criticism,948 it continued to be used in practice.949 
This rule was given a boost by Lord Denning in Wachtel v. Wachtel950 as 
a starting point in ascertaining a spouse's share in the joint gross income 
of the parties as well as their matrimonial assets. It regards an applicant 
spouse as entitled to one third of such resources. Lord Denning 
explained, however, that: 
947 
948 
949 
950 
" ... this so-called rule is not a rule and must never be so regarded. 
In any calculation the court has to have a starting point. If it is 
not to be a third, should it be one half or one quarter? A starting 
point of one third of the combined resources of the parties is as 
good and rational a starting point as any other, remembering that 
Per Lord Hanworth M.R. in Stibbe v. Stibbe [1931) P. 105 at p. 110. See 
also Williams v. Williams [1965) P. 125 at p. 136 per Pearson L.J. 
See for example, Sir Jocelyn Simon P. in Kershaw v. Kershaw [1964] 3 All 
E.R. 635 at p. 637 and Scarman J. in Kirke v. Kirke [1961] 1 W.L.R. 1411 
atp. 1412. 
See Sansom v. Sansom [1966] P. 52, Brister v. Brister [1970) 1 W.L.R. 644 
and Potter v. Potter supra. 
Supra at pp. 839-840. 
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the essence of the legislation is to secure flexibility to meet the 
justice of particular cases, and not rigidity, forcing particular 
cases to be fitted into some so-called principle within which they 
do not easily lie. There may be cases where more than one third 
is right. There are likely to be many others where less than one 
third is the only practicable solution. But one third as a flexible 
starting point is in general more likely to lead to the correct final 
result than a starting point of equality, or a quarter." 
The practical usefulness of the rule is to provide practitioners with an 
indication of the likely level of awards. Empirical evidence indicates that 
it is useful as a starting point only in the middle wealth range of cases 
which will be departed from according to the facts of the case.951 Since 
divorce is most likely to occur amongst low income groups,952 the rule is 
unlikely to be helpful in many of such cases. It is however, intended to 
do justice, in the words of Ormrod L.J. in S. v. S.,953 in "what one might 
call the average run of cases." These, in practice, will be cases where the 
951 
952 
953 
See B. Baker et al para. 3.22-3.29 and Slater v. Slater [1982] 3 F.L.R. 364. 
See J. Haskey "Social class and socio-economic differentials in divorce in 
England and Wales" in (1984) 38 Population Studies 419 at p. 427. 
Op. cit., at p. 57. 
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parties were neither very wealthy nor very poor954 and in exercising its 
discretion the court has tended to emphasise the needs approach, that is, 
satisfying the reasonable needs of the spouses in the light of the post-
divorce reality where the resources available to the parties may not be 
sufficient to meet the reasonable needs of both parties after the divorce. 955 
In this regard the one-third rule has become little more than a check on 
the tentative figure which emerges from the application of the statutory 
guidelines in s. 25 of the MCA 1973, and then usually only in cases in 
which neither very large nor very small sums of money are involved and 
where the court is solely concern with a husband's income liability to his 
former wife. 956 
The application of the one-third rule may not be appropriate in particular 
cases. In Cann v. Cann951 it was held that the one-third rule was 
954 
955 
956 
957 
See B. Baker et al op. cit., at para. 3.25-3.26. 
See pp. 341-344 supra, Stockfordv. Stockford [1981] 3 F.L.R. 58 and S. v. 
S. supra. 
See O'D v. O'D supra at pp. 88-89, Potter v. Potter supra at p. 324 and 
Preston v. Preston supra at p. 48. 
[1977] 1 W.L.R. 938. 
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inappropriate where the parties were of small means. In Scott v. Scott958 
the court was of the view that the rule was of no assistance where the 
dominant feature of the family finances was to provide for three young 
children. It has also been held in Potter v. Potter959 that where there were 
substantial capital assets or capital assets tied up in business the rule was 
inappropriate, especially where it would yield too high a figure and 
possibly force a spouse to sell assets that might put a business at risk. 960 
In Dart v. Dart961 the Court of Appeal held that it was wrong in principle 
to adopt a purely arithmetical approach when trying to ascertain the 
proportion of the total assets to allocate to a spouse in a case involving 
large sums of money. The proper approach, in the court's view, was to 
assess the applicant's reasonable needs in the light of the other criteria set 
out ins. 25 of the MCA 1973. 
958 
959 
960 
961 
[1978) 1 W.L.R. 723 at 728. 
Supra. See also O'D v. O'D supra. at p. 91. 
See Preston v. Preston supra. and Dew v. Dew (1986) 2 F.L.R. 341. In 
Bullock v. Bullock [1986) 1 F.L.R. 372 the one-third rule was applied to a 
capital award in a case involving substantial assets. 
Supra. 
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It must be noted that the popularity of the rule has waned because since 
the decision in Wachtel v. Wachtel the divorce courts have gained a great 
deal of experience in the working of the guidelines given in the MCA 
1973. This experience notwithstanding, the one-third rule is still a useful 
tool in the process of working through the guidelines provided by the Act 
in working out what the needs of the spouses are.962 It must however, be 
borne in mind that the rule should be viewed and only applied in 
accordance with the provisions of s. 25 of the MCA 1973 which, while 
requiring the court to take into account all the circumstances of the case 
with particular reference to the matters stated therein, makes the welfare 
of children the first consideration. 
Finally, in White v. White963 the House of Lords rejected any presumption 
of equal division of assets when the court is considering redistribution of 
assets on divorce. The House however expressed the view that a judge 
exercising his statutory discretion pursuant to s. 25 of the MCA 1973 
should, before making his final decision, check his tentative views against 
the yardstick of equality of division and depart from equality only if, and 
962 
963 
See Foley v. Foley [1981] Fam. 160 at p. 168 and Preston v. Preston supra 
at p. 4 7. See also Bullock v. Bullock supra and Dew v. Dew supra. 
Supra at p. 1579. 
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to the extent that, there is good reason for doing so. Had the principle of 
equality been upheld, the scope for the exercise of judicial discretion may 
have been eroded to the point of possible extinction. 
( d) The application of the clean break principle964 
As indicated above, 965 the powers given to the court under the MCA 1973 
to make financial orders upon divorce may be divided into those dealing 
with the provision of income (maintenance) and those dealing with the 
transfer of property or capital assets. These powers are utilised to order 
a spouse to make financial provision for the other spouse by way of 
periodical payments, a lump sum, a transfer or settlement of property, or 
by variations of settlement.966 Thus, despite the distinction between 
powers to award maintenance and those to transfer property rights, both 
964 
965 
966 
See note 4 77 supra for the various meanings which may be assigned to the 
term. See also Clutton v. Clutton op. cit., at p. 362, Cretney & Masson op. 
cit., at p. 454-467 and Dewar op. cit., at pp. 325-329. 
See pp. 371-372 supra. 
See pp. 373-374 supra. 
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powers are interrelated and complimentary.967 An award, for example, of 
a larger proportion of the capital assets to the wife may result in a 
diminution in her periodical payments, and vice versa.968 Also when 
secured provision is ordered, maintenance is clearly linked with property 
although the owner of the property providing the security is not deprived 
of it but is merely made to secure his payment on it. Prior to 1984, the 
objective of the law was that the financial position of the parties should 
so far as possible be unaffected by their divorce.969 Consequently, the 
court endeavoured to provide maintenance for a spouse (usually the wife) 
whilst in appropriate cases a lump sum was also awarded in order to 
compensate for a loss, for example, of a share in the matrimonial home. 970 
One of the objectives of the Matrimonial and Family Proceedings Act 
1984 was to introduce the principle that divorced spouses should not 
967 
968 
969 
970 
See the comments of Lord Denning in Button v. Button op. cit., at p. 462, 
Baynham v. Baynham [1968] 1 W.L.R. 1890 at p. 1894,and Gissing v. 
Gissing [1969] 2 Ch. 85 at p. 92. See also Miller "Maintenance and 
property" op. cit. at p. 67 and pp. 111-116 supra. 
See Wachtel v. Wachtel supra at p. 841. 
See pp. 324-325 supra. 
See Wachtel v. Wachtel supra., Hector v. Hector supra and Backhouse v. 
Back.house supra. 
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remain under a long-term obligation to one another after divorce. In the 
words of Waite J. in Tandy v. Tandy: 911 
"[T]he legislative purpose ... is to enable the parties to a failed 
marriage, wherever fairness allows, to go their separate ways 
without the running irritant of financial interdependence or 
dispute." 
Thus, s. 25A(l) of the MCA 1973 provides that: 
971 
972 
"Where on or after the grant of a decree of divorce ... the court 
decides to exercise its powers under section 23(1)(a), (b), or (c), 972 
Unreported (24th October 1986, CA) cited by Balcombe L.J. in his dissenting 
judgment in Whiting v. Whiting supra at p. 574. See also Minton v. Minton 
[1979] A.C. 593 at p. 608 per Lord Scarman. 
These subsections deal with secured and unsecured periodical payments 
which the court may order on a grant of divorce, nullity or judicial 
separation. Sched. 2 of the Family Law Act 1996 has substituted this section 
with a news. 22A(3) which deals with types of financial provision orders a 
court can make on divorce. Sched. 2 has not yet come into operation. See 
note 734 supra. 
401 
24 or 24A973 ••• infavour of a party to the marriage, it shall be the 
duty of the court to consider whether it would be appropriate so 
to exercise those powers that the financial obligations of each 
party towards the other wil~ be terminated as soon after the grant 
of the decree as the court considers just and reasonable."974 
This section places a duty on the court in all cases in which the court 
decides to exercise its financial powers, that is, to make financial 
provision, property adjustment, and/or sale orders.975 But this duty is only 
to "consider" whether there should be a severance at some time of the 
reciprocal financial obligations of the parties; it is not a requirement to 
973 
974 
975 
These sections deal with transfer/settlement of property and the power to 
order a sale. Sched 2 of the Family Law Act 1996 has substituted a new s. 
23A to replace s. 24 insofar as it dealt with property adjustment orders on 
divorce. Sched. 2 is yet to be operational. See note 734 supra. 
This section was inserted bys. 3 of the 1984 Act. This provision may be new 
to the statute books but it is thought to be a codification of a policy that had 
been developing in the case law from the late 1970s onwards. See Minton 
v. Minton op. cit., at p. 608 per Lord Scarman and at p. 601 per Viscount 
Dilhome. Cf Dipper v. Dipper [1981] Fam. 31 where the court held that it 
had no power to impose a "clean break" by dismissing a wife's claim for 
periodical payments, unless she agreed to that being done. 
This provision does not apply if the court's powers are only exercised to 
make orders for children of the family. See Crozier v. Crozier [1994] Fam. 
114 at p. 122 per Booth J. 
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terminate those obligations.976 For, as was said by Lloyd L.J. in C/utton 
v. C/utton, 977 there is perhaps a danger in referring to the clean break as . 
a "principle", since it might lead courts to strive for a clean break, 
regardless of all other considerations. This, in his view, is not what s. 
25A of MCA 1973 requires. It is submitted that this view is in 
consonance with the policy that shaped s. 25A. For, as was noted by the 
Law Commission,978 the occasions on which it will be possible to arrive 
at a final, once and for all settlement between the parties on divorce will 
be comparatively few. It will be almost non-existent where there are 
young children. The duty imposed on the court to consider a clean break 
is therefore to be utilised wherever possible, for example, where there is 
adequate measure of capital available for division. 
976 
977 
978 
See the then Solicitor-General's memorandum to the House of Commons 
Special Standing Committee on the Matrimonial and Family Proceedings 
Bill- Official Report, March 201h 1984 col. IO cited by Cretney (41h ed.) op. 
cit., at p. 823. See also the Law Commission's Report - The Financial 
Consequences of Divorce, The Response to the Law Commission's 
Discussion Paper, and Recommendation on the Policy of the Law (Law 
Com. No. 112, 1981) para. 28. 
Supra at p. 362. 
See its Report on Family Law, Financial Consequences of Divorce (Law 
Com. No. 112) para. 28. 
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There is no clear indication from the case law when a "clean break" will 
be considered, in the words of the section, "just and equitable". An 
example of judicial disagreement as to when a clean break will be just and 
equitable is to be found in the decision of the Court of Appeal in Whiting 
v. Whiting. 979 In that case, a consent order was made on divorce in which 
the wife was granted, inter alia, nominal maintenance of Sp per annum. 
Later, after the husband's earnings had dropped significantly, he applied, 
inter alia, under s. 31(7) of the MCA 1973980 to have the nominal 
maintenance order discharged, with a direction that his wife should not 
be entitled to make any further application for maintenance. Their three 
children were financially independent. The wife's earnings were£ 10,500 
per annum. The husband's were £4,358 per annum. The trial judge 
dismissed the husband's application on the ground that the nominal 
maintenance order should continue as a "last backstop" for the wife. The 
979 
980 
Supra. 
This subsection allows the court to have regard to all the circumstances of 
the case, first consideration being given to the welfare of any child under 18 
years, when considering a variation of an order made in terms ofs. 31 of the 
MCA 1973. S. 31 gives the court jurisdiction to vary an order for 
maintenance pending suit, any interim maintenance order, any periodical 
payments order, and an order for the sale of property. Orders for lump-sum 
payment (except where such lump sum is permitted to be paid by 
instalments) and property adjustment orders may not be varied. See notes 
892 and 913 supra. 
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husband appealed. The Court of Appeal, by a majority, held that as the 
court had a discretion under s. 31 (7) of the MCA 1973 to direct that the 
original order continue on a nominal basis as a backstop for the payee, the 
judge had been entitled on the facts to take the view that the nominal 
maintenance order should be kept alive lest unforseen circumstances (e.g. 
illness or redundancy) would deprive the wife of her ability to provide for 
herself. 
In a dissenting judgment, Balcombe L.J., after tracing the history and 
policy reasons behind the 1984 Act, held981 that to make mutual orders for 
periodical payments in nominal amounts just in case something should 
happen to either party or as the trial judge put it as "a last backstop" was 
to negate the entirely the principle of the "clean break". In his view the 
husband's position was such that "short of his winning the pools", he was 
not likely to be in a position to support the ex-wife in the future. 
Consequently, he would discharge the nominal maintenance order.982 
981 
982 
At pp. 576-577. 
For commentaries on the case, see B. Walsh "Whiting v. Whiting: Whither 
the clean break principle?" [1989] Fam. Law 157 and M. Mears "The clean 
break v. the courts: The illogical backstop" [1989] Fam. Law 398. 
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It must be pointed out that this difference of opinion is to be expected 
because of the unfettered discretion given to the courts to determine when 
to apply the "clean break". Much leeway is given to trial judges when 
they are exercising the discretion and unless such exercise "exceeds the 
generous ambit within which reasonable disagreement is possible, and 
is, plainly wrong'',983 an appellate court is unlikely to interfere. 
Furthermore, as demonstrated by Whiting's case itself, the term may mean 
different things to different people and this again leaves room for 
differences of opinion as to when to apply it. Thus, in Clutton v. 
Clutton, 984 the trial judge apparently refused to make a Martin order,985 
under which the former matrimonial home would have been settled on 
trust for the wife until her death, remarriage or cohabitation with another 
man, on the basis that such an order would off end against the clean break 
principle. The Court of Appeal however held that a provision under 
which the husband's interest could not be realised except on the wife's 
983 
984 
985 
Per Asquith L.J. in Bellenden (formerly Satterthwaite) v. Satterthwaite 
[1948] 1 All E.R. 343 at p. 345 cited with approval by Lord Fraser in G. v. 
G. (Minors: Custody Appeal) [1985] 1W.L.R.647 at pp. 651-652. See also 
B. v. W. (Wardship: Appeal) [1979] 1 W.L.R. 1041 at p. 1055. 
Supra. 
See pp. 347-348 supra. 
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death or remarriage "could only be said to offend against the clean break 
principle in the most extended sense of that term."986 
Despite this lack of unanimity as to what the clean break principle is and 
when a "clean break" will be considered "just and equitable'', there are 
pointers in the case law as to circumstances in which it will be considered 
appropriate/inappropriate to apply it. In Ashley v. Blackman, 987 for 
example, it was held that a classic instance for applying the clean break 
principle was where the parties had only small incomes and some degree 
of reliance on welfare benefits was inevitable. In the court's opinion: 
986 
987 
"[N]o humane society could tolerate - even in the interest of 
saving its public purse - the prospect of a divorced couple of 
acutely limited means remaining manacled to each other 
indefinitely by the necessity to return at regular intervals to court 
for no other purpose than to thrash out at public expense the 
precise figure, which the one should pay the other, not for any 
benefit to either of them, but solely for the relief of the tax-paying 
Per Lloyd L.J. at p. 363. 
[1988] Fam. 85. 
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section of the community, to which neither of them has sufficient 
means to belong."988 
In B. v. B. 989 the application of the clean break was thought to be 
appropriate where the parties had significant means and it was possible 
to meet the applicant's future needs by means of a lump sum arrived at 
according to the "Duxbury calculation."990 Such a lump sum may 
represent "capitalised maintenance" which can be invested to provide the 
recipient with an income.991 However, in M v. M (Property Adjustment: 
Impaired Life Expectancy)992 the existence of significant means did not 
influence the court to impose a clean break. In that case the husband had 
988 
989 
990 
991 
992 
At pp. 92-93 per Waite J. 
[1990] 2 F.L.R. 180. 
Derived from Duxbury v. Duxbury supra. The calculation produces a figure 
which, if invested on the assumptions as to life expectancy, rates of inflation, 
return on investments, growth of capital, and incidence of income tax, will 
produce enough to meet the recipient's needs for the future. In Gojkovic v. 
Gojkovic op. cit., at p. 88 it was said that such a calculation provides a useful 
reference base but cannot be anything other than a guide to the court. See 
also B. v. B. (Financial Provision) [1990] F.L.R. 20 and F. v. F (Duxbury 
Calculation: Rate of Return) [ 1996] 1 F .L.R. 833. 
See Preston v. Preston supra, Gojkovic v. Gojkovic supra and B. v. B. supra. 
[1993] 2 F.L.R. 723. 
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earnings of some £54,000 per annum; the former matrimonial home was 
valued at £180,000; and there were insurance policies worth over 
£80,000. The wife had cancer and a life expectancy of only five to ten 
years. She had a limited earning capacity which would get less over the 
years. The wife's circumstances, in the view of the trial judge, made it 
inappropriate to terminate the financial obligations between the spouses. 
The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's order of substantial 
periodical payments instead of ordering a clean break. In Seaton v. 
Seaton993 it was held that where, owing to a serious physical disability, 
periodical payments could do little to enhance the quality of the life of the 
recipient, the clean break principle should apply. 
One would have thought that the availability of the power to order a lump 
sum or to transfer property from one spouse to the other would have 
reduced or avoided reliance on periodic maintenance, especially in the 
light of the statutory injunction to consider terminating the financial 
obligation between the parties. The case law does not show a willingness 
993 [1986] 2 F.L.R. 398. See also C. v. C. [1989] 1 F.L.R. 11 where, because 
of considerable bitterness between the parties, the clean break principle was 
thought appropriate. 
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on the part of the court to abandon the award of periodic maintenance.994 
This may be attributable to the fact that the application of the clean break 
principle is enmeshed in judicial discretion. Consequently, the decided 
cases only serve as particular examples of its application which may serve 
as guidelines for predicting what the court may do in a future case. Its 
impact, it has been said,995 has been blunted by the courts. For example, 
it has been held that the duty imposed on the courts by s. 25A(2) of the 
MCA 1973 to consider whether to impose a fixed term on an order for 
periodical payments, does not amount to a presumption in favour of 
imposing such a limit. It is only one of the factors among others to be 
considered and does not limit the court's discretion.996 Even if the court 
decides to impose a time limit, this should be done only if such a time 
limited order would enable a party to adjust "without undue hardship"991 
994 
995 
996 
997 
See Wachtel v. Wachtel supra, Waterman v. Waterman [1989] 1 F.L.R. 380 
and Richardson v. Richardson (No. 2) [1994] 2 F.L.R. 1051. 
See Dewar op. cit., at p. 327. 
See Barrett v. Barrett [1988] 2 F.L.R. 516 and Fisher v. Fisher [1989] 1 
F.L.R. 423. 
The words "undue hardship" was held in Boylan v. Boylan [1988] 1 F.L.R. 
282 at p. 289 per Booth J. to extend beyond the needs of the spouse 
concerned. He held that it was relevant to take account of the fact that the 
applicant was a former wife of a man of substantial wealth and it was by that 
standard that her reasonable requirements should be judged and an 
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to the termination of payments.998 Furthermore, it has been held in 
Waterman v. Waterman999 that the power given to the court bys. 28(1A) 
of the 1973 Act to prevent a spouse applying for an extension of an order 
for periodical payments should not be used where there is "a real 
uncertainty" about the wife's future, especially where she is caring for a 
young child and notwithstanding that a separate order has been made for 
the child. Also, as pointed out above, in Clutton 's case, 1000 it was held 
that the clean break should not be regarded as a "principle" requiring the 
court to strive to achieve regardless of all other considerations. All these 
prove the point that has been made by commentators that the legislative 
structure is complex and requires careful analysis. 1001 
998 
999 
1000 
1001 
assessment made as to whether she would suffer undue hardship on the 
termination of periodical payments. 
See MCA 1973 ss. 25A(2) (on an original application) and 31(7) (on a 
variation application). 
Supra. 
Atp. 330. 
See Cretney & Masson op. cit., at p. 456. 
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The above misgivings notwithstanding, it has been judicially claimed, 1002 
and this is supported by empirical evidence, 1003 that the modem practice 
in adjusting the financial and property rights of spouses on divorce 
favours a clean break wherever possible, and that self-sufficiency is now 
the court's primary objective. 1004 It is submitted that whilst this objective 
is in consonance with the legislative intent, 1005 it is more likely to benefit 
wealthy and/or short childless marriages when the wife has some earning 
capacity rather than low-income marriages where the wife has no earning 
capacity. Given that the latter group are more prone to divorce than the 
former, 1006 the said objective is not likely to do justice to a majority of 
married couples whose marriages come to an end. 
1002 
1003 
1004 
1005 
1006 
See Harman v. Glencross [1986] Fam. 81 at p. 96 per Balcombe L.J. 
See the 1999 Judicial Statistics Annual Report. Table 5. 7 of this Report 
shows that 9,557 applications for periodical payments were dismissed. This 
may have been done presumably in most cases as a step in a clean break 
settlement. 4678 orders were made for a fixed term. These figures give 
credence to the view that there is an increasing trend in favour of clean break 
orders. See also Cretney & Masson op. cit. p. 456 note 43 commenting on 
the 1993 Judicial Statistics Annual Report. 
See B. v. B. (Financial Provision) supra at p. 26 per Ward J. 
See Tandy v. Tandy supra. 
See note 952 supra. 
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(e) Private agreement relating to financial matters 
The discussions above give the impression that most financial matters on 
divorce are litigated upon in the courts. However, there is evidence that 
a "settlement culture"1001 has taken roots in divorce cases whereby many 
divorcing couples reach some form of agreement about the financial terms 
of their divorce. Judicial statistics in 1999 for example, reveal that about 
45,388 ancillary relief orders were made by consent.1008 In fact there is 
now an official policy to encourage private agreement between the parties 
in all aspects of the divorce process. Thus, when the Family Law Act 
1996 becomes fully operational, s. 3(1) will provide that a divorce order 
1007 
1008 
See G. Davis et al Simple Quarrels, Negotiating Money and Property 
Disputes on Divorce, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1994 at p. 211. 
See Judicial Statistics, Annual Report 1999, Table 5. 7. Consent orders are 
made by the court in pursuance of an application by the parties to make the 
terms of their agreementanorderofthecourt. Sees. 33A of the MCA 1973 
inserted bys. 7 of the Matrimonial and Family Proceedings Act 1984. The 
order may be made provided the parties have furnished the court with the 
information prescribed by r. 2.61 of the Family Proceedings Rules 1991, that 
is, the duration of the marriage, the age of the parties and any minor or 
dependent children, an estimate of the approximate value of the capital 
resources and the net income of each party and any minor child, the intended 
arrangements for accommodation for the parties and minor children, whether 
either party has remarried or has any intention to marry or cohabit, and any 
other especially significant matter. For an example of such a consent order, 
see Crozier v. Crozier supra., at pp. 118-119. 
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shall only be made if the parties, inter alia, have met the requirements of 
s. 9 of the Act with regard to arrangements for their future. 1009 Despite 
this encouragement to spouses to make private arrangements for their 
post-divorce financial matters, the courts have held1010 and a statute has 
provided1011 that any provision in such an agreement which purports to 
restrict a spouse's right to apply to the court for an order for financial 
1009 
1010 
lOIJ 
S. 9(2) of the 1996 Act provides that one of the following must be produced 
to the court as proof that the parties have made arrangements for their future: 
(a) a court order (made by consent or otherwise) dealing with their financial 
arrangements, (b) a negotiated agreement as to their financial arrangements, 
( c) a declaration by both parties that they have made their fmancial 
arrangements, (d) a declaration by one of the parties (to which no objection 
has been notified to the court by the other party) that: (i) he has no 
significant assets and does not intend to make an application for fmancial 
provision, (ii) he believes that the other party has no significant assets and 
does not intend to make an application for fmancial provision, and (iii) there 
are therefore no fmancial arrangements to be made. These sections which 
are in Part I of the Act have not yet come into operation. See pp. 364-365 
and note 734 supra. 
See Hyman v. Hyman [1929] A.C. 601 at p. 629 and Pounds v. Pounds 
[1994] 1 F.L.R.775 at p. 776. 
Sees. 34(1) of the MCA 1973 which provides: "If a maintenance agreement 
includes a provision purporting to restrict any right to apply to a court for 
an order containingfinancial arrangements, then - (a) that provision shall 
be void .. " See also Jessel v. Jessel [1979] 1 W.L.R. 1148 at p. 1152. 
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relief will be void. 1012 Thus, any private arrangement made by the spouses 
is not conclusive. It may subsequently be reopened by a spouse 
dissatisfied with the agreement. 1013 This situation is unlikely to change 
much under the Family Law Act 1996 despite the Act's avowed intention 
to encourage couples to co-operate in making financial arrangement 
before divorce and to minimise cost. 1014 Where substantial assets are 
involved, couples may seek to squeeze whatever advantage they can from 
an existing agreement and if this involves finding a way to reopen an 
otherwise concluded and binding agreement they are likely to take that 
option. 
The usual way in which a private agreement may be subject to the 
concurrence of the court is for the spouses to apply to the court to make 
1012 
1013 
1014 
There seems to be no definitive perimeters for this principle. Cf Sutton v. 
Sutton [ 1984] Ch. 184 where an agreement which purported to deal with all 
the financial consequences of the divorce was held to be unenforceable and 
Amey v. Amey [1992] 2 F.L.R. 89 where an agreement dealing with all the 
financial consequences of the divorce was held enforceable because it did 
not contain a provision prohibiting access to the court. 
See Pounds v. Pounds supra at p. 776. 
See Part I of the Act in force since 21'1 March 1997 ( S.I. No. 1077 (C. 38) 
of 1997)and Part II yet to come into operation. See also pp. 364-365 and 
note 734 supra. 
415 
it a consent order as part of the divorce proceedings. 1015 Such an order 
will only be made on the basis of the statutorily prescribed information 
furnished with the application and complying with the rules of court. 1016 
The effect of these provisions, in the words of Waite L.J.,1017 is: 
"to confine the paternal function of the court when approving 
financial consent orders to a broad appraisal of the parties' 
financial circumstances as disclosed to it in summary form, 
without descent into the valley of details ... only if that survey puts 
the court on inquiry as to whether there are other circumstances 
into which it ought to probe more deeply that any further 
investigation is required of the judge before approving the 
bargain that the spouses have made themselves." 
How the court manages to balance the role of rubber stamping what the 
spouses have agreed to and becoming what has been described as 
1015 Sees. 33A(l) of the MCA 1973. 
1016 Ibid. See also r. 2.61 of the Family Proceedings Rules 1991. 
1017 In Pounds v. Pounds supra at p. 780. 
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''forensic ferret" 1018 is a difficult question to answer. In practice judges 
may not scrutinise the agreement closely if told that the parties were 
legally represented in the negotiations but even in that circumstance the 
court may still refuse to make the order if convinced that the information 
put before it is insufficient to enable it to assess the sufficiency or 
propriety of the agreement made between the parties.1019 
As legal effect of a consent order is derived from the court order itself and 
not from the agreement, the order must be treated at par with non-
consensual orders. 1020 It follows from this that the court's power to vary 
or discharge orders for periodical payments or secured periodical 
payments under s. 31 of the MCA 1973 extends to orders made by 
consent. 1021 However, lump-sum orders (except the instalments, if any) 
and property adjustment orders may not be varied. 1022 
1018 
1019 
1020 
1021 
1022 
Per Ward J. in B-Tv. B-T (Divorce: Procedure) [1990] 2 F.L.R. 1 at p. 17. 
See also Davis et al Simple Quarrels op. cit., at pp. 261-263. 
See B v. Miller & Co. [1996] 2 F.L.R. 22. 
See de Lasala v. de Lasala op. cit., at p. 560 per Lord Diplock and Thwaite 
v. Thwaite [1982] Fam. 1 at p. 8 per Ormrod L.J. 
See Brister v. Brister [ 1968] 1 W.L.R. 390 and Whiting v. Whiting supra. 
See notes 892 and 913 supra. 
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The consent order may be set aside on a variety of grounds. 1023 In Livesey 
v. Jenkins, 1024 for example, a consent order was set aside on the ground 
that the wife had failed to reveal that she was engaged to be remarried. 1025 
In Allsop v. Allsop1026 a consent order was set aside for fraudulent 
misrepresentation, in Brister v. Brister1027 it was set aside on the ground 
of mistake of fact and in Edgar v. Edgar1028 disparity of bargaining power 
was the basis for setting aside the order. 
1023 
1024 
1025 
1026 
1027 
1028 
See B-T v. B-T supra and T. Scott & F. White "Setting aside for non-
disclosure: Practice and procedure" (1990) Family Law 326. 
[1985) A.C. 424. 
It was held in Wales v. Wadham [1977) 1 W.L.R. 199 at p. 211 that an 
agreement entered into by the spouses to deal with their fmancial 
arrangements is not a contract uberrimae fidei so that a spouse was not under 
a duty to disclose his intention to remarry. This ruling may not fit 
comfortably within the Family Proceedings Rules 1991(r.2.61) which make 
provision for all the relevant information to be given before the agreement 
can be made the subject of a consent order. 
(1981) 11 Fam. Law 18. 
Supra. 
[1980] 1W.L.R.1410 atp. 1417. 
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5. CONCLUSION 
From the above discussions it can be seen that although numerous inroads 
have been made into the separation of property concept, it still forms the 
basis of matrimonial property in England. The various attempts that have 
been made over the years to reform the separate property concept have not 
been successful although the patchwork of rules has produced certain 
important consequences, particularly as regards awards on a dissolution 
of a marriage. The courts now have an almost limitless discretionary 
power to redistribute the assets of spouses on divorce but the economic 
realities of most marriages severely restrict the exercise of the discretion. 
Where the parties are wealthy, orders of vast sums of money are made1029 
but where they are not wealthy, the court may have to consider financial 
provision and property issues in the context of State benefits. In such 
cases, the assessment of the needs of the parties will lean heavily in 
favour of the children and the parent with whom they live.1030 
1029 
1030 
See Preston v. Preston supra, Dart v. Dart supra, R .. v. R .. (Financial 
Provision: Reasonable Needs) supra and F. v. F. (Ancillary Relief 
Substantial Assets) supra. 
See Dart v. Dart supra at p. 303 per Butler-Sloss L.J. 
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Furthermore, the emphasis on the interest of children brought about by the 
Matrimonial and Family Proceedings Act 1984 and the priority given to 
child support by the Child Support Act 1991, means that in many cases 
the bulk of the resources of the marriage will be taken up by the children. 
This situation will leave the court with little or nothing to redistribute. 
The recognition of the value of domestic work as a factor to be considered 
by the court in redistribution of assets on divorce is progressive. This has 
greatly enhanced the housewife's right to share in any property acquired 
by her husband during the marriage. 
The discretionary model of allocating property on divorce has however, 
been questioned by commentators1031 despite the fact that it embodies 
sufficient flexibility to deal with the circumstances of each case. 
Alternative models, such as marriage contracts, 1032 and community of 
1031 
1032 
See for example, Davis et al Simple Quarrels op. cit., at pp. 255-256. 
Suggested by the Law Society - Memorandum: Maintenance and Capital 
Provision on Divorce - Recommendations for Reform of the Law and 
Procedure made by the Family Law Committee, 1991 para. 3.33. 
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property1033 have been suggested but none of these has gathered enough 
support to be a subject of law reform. It is submitted that in the context 
of the social circumstances of England, the discretionary model, with its 
shortcomings, has served the needs of married couples to a large extent. 
The present position of English matrimonial law is aptly summed up by 
Cretney and Masson1034 as follows: 
1033 
1034 
"The debates on matrimonial property of the last quarter of a 
century have failed to produce any consensus in favour of a 
particular reform. Indeed, it is noteworthy that in 1984 the 
Scottish Law Commission's extensive consultation and sounding 
of opinion revealed 'very little support' for major reform. The 
Scottish Law Commission concluded that the principles of the 
present law - that is, that each spouse continues to own his or her 
Ibid para. 2. See also J. Freedman et al Property and Marriage: An 
Integrated Approach, Institute of Fiscal Studies Report No. 29, 1988 at pp. 
25-26 and Freeman "Towards a rational reconstruction of family property 
law" op. cit. For a discussion of the pros and cons of introducing a 
community of property regime into English law, see the Law Commission's 
First Report on Family Property: A New Approach (Law Com. No. 52) 
1973. 
Op. cit., at pp. 230-231. 
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own property after marriage, with provision to protect a spouse 
during marriage and to ensure an equitable division on death and 
divorce - are sound. But ... this view is over-complacent. First, the 
effectiveness of the measures - resulting from case law 
development rather than legislation - intended to protect spouses 
cannot yet be fully assessed; whilst it remains an astonishing 
feature of English family property law that spouses have no right 
during marriage to know the extent of each other's assets. 
Ignorance may sometimes be bliss, but sadly this is not always the 
case." 
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CHAPTER SIX 
AN OVERVIEW OF THE MATRIMONIAL PROPERTY 
REGIMES IN GHANA 
1. INTRODUCTION 
There are two matrimonial regimes in Ghana, namely, that pertaining to 
marriage under customary law (including Mohammedan (Islamic) law)1035 
and that pertaining to marriage under the Marriage Ordinance 1884. 1036 
1035 
1036 
Mohammedan law is regarded as a special variety of customary law applied 
as a concession to those who have embraced the Islamic faith. Thus, in 
Kwakye v. Tuba [1961] G.L.R.(Pt. II) 720 at p. 724, the court was of the 
view that "In the eyes of our law, a marriage by a Mohammedan according 
to Mohammedan law is at its very best a marriage by customary law and 
does not affect his estate unless the said marriage is registered under the 
Ordinance." The ordinance referred to in the dictum is the Marriage of 
Mohammedans Ordinance [Cap. 129] which provides for the registration of 
Mohammedan marriages, divorces and the regulation of succession in these 
marriages. It does not deal with the consequences of divorce. See also 
Brimah & Cobsold v. Asana [1962] 1 G.L.R. 118 and Hausa v. Hausa 
[1963] 2 G.L.R. 212. 
Cap. 127 1951 Rev. For the history of the Ordinance, see S. Zabel 
"Legislative history of the Gold Coast and Nigerian Marriage Ordinances I 
& II" (1969) 13 Journal of African Law 64-79, 158-178 and "Legislative 
history of the Gold Coast and Lagos Marriage Ordinance III" ( 1979) 23 
Journal of African Law 10. For an examination of the extent to which the 
Ordinance has produced the intended social effect, see K.O. Adinkrah 
"Ghana's Marriage Ordinance: An inquiry into a legal transplant for social 
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Both regimes have as their fundamental concept, the principle of separate 
property of the spouses. The position has been stated as follows: 
1037 
"As regards the property rights of the parties on marriage, it has 
long been settled law that marriage has no effect on the property 
of either spouse whether they are married under customary law 
or otherwise. This is particularly true of property acquired by a 
spouse before marriage. During marriage neither spouse has had 
the right to interfere with the enjoyment and disposal of the 
property of the other."1037 
change" (1980) 18 African Law Studies 1. 
See W.C.E. Daniels "Marital family law and social policy" in Essays in 
Ghanaian Law 1876-1976 (Daniels & Woodman eds.), Legon, Faculty of 
Law, University of Ghana, 1976 92 at p. 111. See also K. Opoku The Law 
of Marriage in Ghana: A Study in Legal Pluralism, Frankfurt am Main, 
Alfred Metzner Verlag GmbH, 1976 at p. 70, A.N. Allot Essays in African 
Law with special reference to the Law of Ghana, London, Butterworths, 
1960 at p. 226, R.S. Rattray Ashanti Law and Constitution, New York, 
Negro University Press, 1969 at p. 22, Sarbah op. cit, at p. 39, W.C.E. 
Daniels "The legal position of women under our marriage laws" (1972) 9 
University of Ghana Law Journal 39 at pp. 50-51, "The ascertainment of 
property rights between husband and wife" (1978) 10 Review of Ghana Law 
13 7, "The basis for award of financial provision" (1989-90) 17 Review of 
Ghana Law 49 at p. 67, A. Kuenyehia "Women and family law in Ghana: 
An appraisal of property rights of married women" ( 1986-90) 17 University 
of Ghana Law Journal 72 at p. 79 and G. Woodman "Judicial development 
of customary law: The case of marriage law in Ghana and Nigeria" ( 1977) 
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Thus, the matrimonial regime applicable to both marriages under 
customary law and those under the Ordinance is that of out of community 
of property. However, the two types of marriages are distinguishable on 
the basis that marriages under the Ordinance are monogamous in nature 
whilst those under customary law are polygynous in nature. 1038 
Furthermore, although the legal principles applicable to the determination 
of matrimonial property during the marriage and on divorce are generally 
different, customary law, defined as the rules oflaw which by custom are 
applicable to particular communities in Ghana, 1039 is the law primarily 
1038 
1039 
14UniversityofGhanaLawJournal115 atp. 127. However, J.B. Danquah 
did state that among the Akim Abuakwa tribe, the husband was entitled to 
half the earnings of his wife, see Akan Laws and Customs, London, 
Routledge, 1928 at p. 154. This view has been criticized by Kuenyehia 
"Women and family law in Ghana ... " supra at p. 79 for being unclear and 
contradictory to the spirit of customary law. 
See Daniels"Marital family law and social change" op. cit., at pp. 92-93 and 
97 and A. Philips (ed.) Survey of African Marriage and F amity Life, Oxford, 
OUP, 1953 at pp. xi-xvii. Under Mohammedan law a husband is entitled to 
marry up to four wives. See the Koran chap. 4:3 - Surah alnisa'i and Opoku 
op. cit., at p. 39. No such limitation exists in relation to a husband of a 
customary-law marriage although he is expected to register his wives under 
the Customary Marriage and Divorce (Registration) Law 1985 (PNDCL 
112). The effect on the marriage ofnon-registration is not stated by the law. 
See Art. 11(3) of the 1992 Constitution. See also S.Y. Bimpong-Buta 
"Sources of law in Ghana" (1983-86) 15 Review of Ghana Law 129 at p. 
139. 
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used in such determination. This is because this law is the personal law 
of the overwhelming majority of Ghanaians and consequently will be 
applicable to their marriages, except that when they marry under the 
Ordinance certain aspects of customary law are abrogated and English 
common law principles are applied. Thus, it was said in Coleman v. 
Shang:1040 
1040 
" ... that a person subject to customary law who marries under the 
Marriage Ordinance, does not cease to be a native subject to 
customary law by reason only of his contracting that marriage. 
[1959] G.L.R. 390 at p. 401 per Van Lare J.A. Prior to this decision, the 
courts took the view that an Ordinance marriage altered the status of the 
parties and conferred rights and privileges entirely different from, and at 
variance with those under customary law. See Ackah v. Arinta (1893) Sar. 
F.L.R. 79 and Colev. Cole [1898] 1N.L.R.15 atp. 22, a decision of the Full 
Court of the Gold Coast Colony. One of the most important consequences 
of marriage under the Ordinance used to be the provision in s. 48. That 
section provided that on the death intestate of a person married under the 
Ordinance, two-thirds of his property (whether movable or immovable) shall 
be distributed in accordance with the English law relating to the distribution 
of the personal estate of intestates in force on the 191h of November 1884 
(the date on which the Ordinance came into effect). The remaining one-third 
was distributed in accordance with the relevant customary law. This section 
was repealed by s. 19 of the Intestate Succession Law 1985 (PNDCL 111 ). 
See G .R. Woodman "Ghana reforms the law of intestate succession" (1985) 
29 Journal of African Law 118 and E.K. Quansah "Updating family law: 
Recent developments in Ghana" (1987) 36 International and Comparative 
Law Quarterly 389 at pp. 391-394. 
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The customary law will be applied to him in all matters, save and 
except those specifically excluded by the statute, and any matters 
which are necessary consequences of the marriage under the 
Ordinance." 
A person subject to customary law who had married under that law may 
marry again under the Ordinance. 1041 This was made clear by Francis 
Smith A.CJ. in Ackah v. Arinta1042 when he said: 
" ... Now the Legislature has provided in clear and unmistakable 
terms that a person married according to native law can be again 
married according to English law." 
This situation had earlier given rise to the following comment by 
Hutchinson CJ. in Re Isaac Ammetifi1043 : 
1041 
1042 
1043 
See Cap. 127 s. 14(4). 
Op. cit., at p. 81. See also Aning v. Kingfu/ [1980] G.L.R. 404 at p. 410 per 
AmuahA.J. 
(1889) Red. 157 at p. 160. 
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"/should have thought that a person already lawfully married 
could not be married over again. The Ordinance, however, 
certainly seems to contemplate that in future such persons can be 
married over again and that the second marriage shall have 
certain important consequences in the devolution of their 
property." 
When this occurs, the customary law will continue to be applied to him 
in all matters, save and except those matters specifically excluded by the 
Ordinance and any other matters which are necessary consequences of the 
said marriage. 1044 
1044 See Coleman v. Shang supra. Under the internal conflict rules enacted by 
s. 49 of the Courts Act 1971 (Act 372) (now repealed and re-enacted under 
s. 54 of the Courts Act 1993 (Act 459) to determine the applicable law in a 
particular transaction or situation, the personal law (customary law) to which 
a person is subject is primarily intended to be applicable to the transaction 
or situation in question. It has been estimated that about 86% of marriages 
contracted in Ghana is by customary law. See Adinkrah op. cit, at p. 14 
quoting the 1970 population census. This statistical percentage should 
however, be viewed with caution as the registration of marriage, especially 
those of the customary type, is haphazard. See E.K. Quansah "Updating 
family law: Recent developments in Ghana" op. cit, at p. 395 commenting 
on the registration of customary marriages under the Customary Marriages 
and Divorce (Registration) Law 1985 (PNDCL 112). 
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The legal effect of marrying for the second time under the Ordinance is 
not specified by the Ordinance but it is generally regarded as converting 
the customary marriage into a monogamous one.1045 Thus, a person who 
converts his customary law marriage into an Ordinance marriage will 
have his obligations, rights and duties in respect of the marriage governed 
by the Ordinance and not by customary law. 1046 
Because of the application of the separate property concept to both 
matrimonial regimes, there have been a number of occasions when the 
courts have been called upon to determine the ownership of property 
which is in the name of one spouse but to which the other spouse may 
have contributed either in kind or in money towards the acquisition of the 
property. These disputes about ownership of property usually occur when 
1045 
1046 
See Graham v. Graham [1965] G.L.R. 407. See also Daniels "Marital 
family law and social policy" op. cit., at p. 105, "Towards the integration of 
the laws relating to husband and wife" in Integration of Customary and 
Modern Legal Systems in Africa, Law Faculty University oflfe, University 
oflfe Press, 1971 at pp. 359-364 and A. Phillips & H.F. Morris Marriage 
Laws in Africa, Oxford, OUP, 1971 at p. 179. In Acheampong v. 
Acheampong(1967) C.C. 59 andAfrifa v. Class-Peter [1975] 1 G.L.R. 359 
plaintiff customary-law wives successfully sued for breach of promise by 
their husbands because the latter had failed to convert their customary-law 
marriages into Ordinance ones. 
See the remarks of Aitken J. inAkwapim v. Budu [1931-37] Div. Ct. 89 at 
p. 90. See also Setse v. Setse [1959] G.L.R. 155. 
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the marital relationship has broken down and divorce is being sought. 
Two issues usually arise in the determination of such ownership. The 
first is to determine disputes between spouses or ex-spouses as to who has 
a right to a particular property at the time of the breakdown of the 
marriage. The second relates to whether the court can alter the property 
rights found to exist in one spouse in favour of the other spouse. In trying 
to resolve these issues, the type of marriage which the spouses entered 
into has not played a significant role in deciding which law is applicable 
to the dispute. The courts have applied principles of English common 
law and equity where necessary to resolve disputes involving both 
ordinance and customary marriages. The enactment of the Matrimonial 
Causes Act 1971 1047 (MCA 1971) has further strengthened the application 
of uniform provisions for the resolution of disputes involving both 
marriages. The MCA 1971 applies to all monogamous marriages 
contracted under the Marriage Ordinance and Church marnages 
conducted in accordance with the provisions of the said Ordinance1048 as 
well as to polygamous marriages, albeit, in the latter cases only on an 
1047 
1048 
Act 367. For a commentary on the Act, see W.C.E. Daniels "Ghana's 
Matrimonial Causes Act" (1971) 3 Review of Ghana Law 231 and H.F. 
Morris "Matrimonial Causes Act 1971" ( 1972) 16 Journal of African Law 
71. 
Sees. 41(1). 
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application of a spouse of that marriage. 1049 The manner in which the 
courts have been able to resolve the conflicting interests of the spouses 
will be discussed below. 
2. DETERMINATION OF MATRIMONIAL PROPERTY ON DIVORCE 
(a) Marriage under the Ordinance 
Historically, the law of matrimonial causes relating to marriages under the 
Ordinance has been linked with that of England. This linkage dates back 
to 1859 when the first Divorce and Matrimonial Causes Ordinance,1050 
which was based on English law, was passed. Subsequently, the 
jurisdiction conferred on the courts was expressed to be exercised "in 
conformity with the law and practice for the time being in force in 
England. " 1051 This provision allowed the wholesale importation of 
1049 
1050 
1051 
See s. 41 (2). The application of this subsection will be discussed in detail 
below. 
Laws of the Gold Coast No. 1of1859 repealed by No. 13of1877. 
Sees. 17 of the Courts Ordinance 1935. This section was saved bys. 154 
of the Courts Act 1960 (C.A. 9) when it repealed the 1935 Ordinance. S. 
154 was re-enacted as para. 93(2) of the Courts Decree 1966 (NLCD 84). 
These two latter enactments stated that the provisions relating to matrimonial 
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English matrimonial law into Ghana. Although the courts were given a 
discretion in the matter, they invariably determined monogamous 
marriages in accordance with English law and practice.1052 In 1971, the 
MCA1053 broke the umbilical cord that tied Ghanaian law on matrimonial 
causes to that of England by providing a "law of matrimonial causes 
which is in consonance with Ghanaian circumstances and Ghanaian 
traditions."1054 Despite this assertion of the Act's Ghanaian uniqueness, 
it is really an enactment of the English Divorce Reform Act 1969 and the 
Matrimonial Proceedings and Property Act 1970. The Ghanaian Act 
retained the progressive features of the English legislation while adapting 
1052 
1053 
1054 
causes were to continue to apply. See also Daniels "Towards the integration 
of the laws relating to husband and wife in Ghana" op. cit., at pp. 377-380. 
There were subsequent developments in the general jurisdiction of the courts 
under the Constitutions of 1969 and 1979 subject to amendments made by 
intervening military regimes in 1972, 1979 and 1981. See S.Y. Bimpong-
Buta "Sources of law in Ghana" (1983-86) 15 Review of Ghana Law 129. 
The present jurisdictions of the courts are set out generally in chapter 11 of 
the 1992 Constitution and specifically elaborated under the Courts Act 
1993(Act 459). 
SeeAshongv. Ashong(l968) C.C. 28 (C.A.) and Crabbe v. Crabbe [1971] 
2 G.L.R. 164. 
See note 1047 supra. 
See para. 3 of the Memorandum accompanying the Matrimonial Causes Bill. 
The Bill was published as a supplement to Ghana Gazette No. 28of1971 
dated the 41h day of May, 1971. 
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them to meet Ghanaian circumstances.1055 The "breakdown" concept, 
whereby blame for the failure of the matrimonial relationship is not 
apportioned, for example, was adopted in s. 1(2)1056 of the Act and the 
provisions of the Act was made applicable to customary marriages by s. 
41(2). Consequently, English statutes relating to matrimonial causes in 
force immediately before the commencement of the Act were abolished 
by s. 44( 1) of the Act. However, the case law that has built up under the 
Act has invariably adopted English legal principles in interpreting its 
prov1s1ons. 
S. 19 of the MCA 1971 conferred a discretionary power on the court to 
make, inter alia, financial provision 1057 to either spouse to a marriage 
"whenever it thinks just and equitable." Ss. 20 and 21 afford the court the 
machinery, which include the power to adjust matrimonial property rights, 
to exercise this discretion. But before a look is taken at these sections it 
1055 
1056 
1057 
See the then Attorney-General's speech on the Bill in Parliamentary 
Debates (2"d. series), vol. 7, No. 5, col. 171, 21"1 June 1971. 
The subsection provides that the sole ground for granting a petition for 
divorce is that the marriage has broken down beyond reconciliation. 
Under s. 43 of the 1971 Act, "financial provision" includes maintenance and 
all other forms of financial support provided by one spouse to the other or 
to any child of the household. 
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will be instructive to discuss the customary, English common law and 
equitable principles which the courts have used in resolving property 
disputes between spouses. This is because in applying the provisions of 
ss. 20 and 21 the courts invariably rely on these principles. 
In Achiampong v. Achiampong, 1058 for instance, the Court of Appeal 
relying on English common law /equitable principles stated that under s. 
20( 1) of the MCA 1971, property is not ordered to be transferred to a 
spouse simply because there is a divorce. For such transfer to be ordered 
there must be an agreement as to the sharing of the beneficial interest, 
failing which there must be direct or indirect financial contribution which 
can be regarded as substantial.1059 
1058 
1059 
[1982-83] G.L.R. 1017. 
Per Abban J.A. at p. 1036 relying on dicta from Wachtel v. Wachtel [1973] 
1 All E.R. 829 at p. 837 per Lord Denning M.R, Fribance v. Fribance (No. 
2) [1957] 1 W.L.R. 384 at 387 per Denning L.J. (as he then was) and 
Gissing v. Gissing [1971] A.C. 886 at pp. 904-905 per Lord Diplock. 
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(b) Customary law principles for determining matrimonial property 
The fundamental principle relied upon by the courts for the determination 
of property acquired during the subsistence of a marriage was stated by 
Ollennu J. (as he then was) in Quartey v. Martey1060 as follows: 
1060 
1061 
" ... by customary law it is the domestic responsibility of a man's 
wife and children to assist him in the carrying out of the duties of 
his station in life, e.g. farming or business. The proceeds of this 
joint effort of a man and his wife and/or children, ... are by 
customary law the individual property of the man. It is not the 
joint property of the man and the wife and/or the children. The 
right of the wife and the children is a right to maintenance and 
support from the husband andfather."1061 
[1959] G.L.R. 377 at p. 380. 
This view was reiterated by the same judge in Adam v. Kwarley [ 1962] 1 
G.L.R. 112 at p. 113. 
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The formulation of this rule has been shown to be based on doubtful 
authority. 1062 It is based on the premise that the husband is the sole 
breadwinner and that any property acquired during the marriage belongs 
to him. 1063 The court purported to be following the West African Court 
of Appeal's decision in Okwabi v. Adonu1064 which dealt with property 
rights between a father and a son and not between a husband and wife. 
The appellate court in that case endorsed the view of the trial judge that 
whatever proceeds accrued from the joint efforts of father and son was not 
their joint property but that such property was held in trust by the father 
for the son. Ollennu J., without any justification, extended this principle 
relating to children to wives. Furthermore, it has been suggested that the 
right of maintenance is not conditional upon the rendering of service. 
One has only to consider the case of babies and young children who are 
not in a position to render any service to realise the difficulties inherent 
in Ollennu's proposition.1065 Despite this shaky foundation of the rule, it 
has been followed in subsequent cases with little or no discussion of its 
1062 
1063 
1064 
1065 
See Daniels "The ascertainment of property rights between husband and 
wife" op. cit., at pp. 140-143. 
Ibid at pp. 141-142. See also A. Kuenyehia op. cit., at p. 80. 
[ 1957] 2 W.A.L.R. 268. 
See Opoku op. cit., at p. 72. 
436 
validity. In the words of a learned writer, 1066 "equity feared to tread in 
this area where customary law rules dominated". For instance, in Clerk 
v. Clerk1067 the plaintiff, who was subject to customary law and who 
married under the Marriage Ordinance, brought an action against her 
husband for an order of a perpetual injunction to restrain him from 
interfering with her occupation of a dwelling house. Her claim was 
based, inter alia, on the fact that she contributed financially and assisted 
physically in the construction of the house, thereby acquiring a beneficial 
interest therein. On the evidence, the court made the following 
observation: 
1066 
1067 
"/ therefore find that though she in fact assisted the defendant 
financially from her bakery business and also physically by 
supervising the workers the extent of her contribution is so 
indeterminate that I cannot without speculation make any findings 
as to whether her contribution was sufficiently substantial as to 
See Daniels "The legal position of women under our marriage laws" op. cit., 
atp. 52. 
(1968) C.C. 99. 
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raise the equitable interest in the building in her favour and I will 
make no such finding. "1068 
On the basis of insufficient financial contribution towards the building of 
the house, the case is supportable. However, the court further suggested 
that even if her contribution had been substantial, her claim would have 
been dismissed on the ground that according to customary law, which in 
the court's view governed the case, a wife who assisted her husband in the 
acquisition of property had no interest in that property. 1069 
(c) English common law and equitable principles for the 
determination of matrimonial property 
Clearly the customary principle formulated in Quartey v. Martey is not in 
tune with contemporary economic reality, in that, most married women 
are engaged in some gainful employment and contribute financially to the 
1068 
1069 
Interestingly, the same judge had earlier decided in United Simpson & Ayitey 
Co. v. Jeffrey & A nor. [ 1962] 1 G .L.R. 279 that there was a presumption that 
household items used by a married couple in the matrimonial home belonged 
to them in common. 
The case is criticised by A Fiadjoe in (1969) 1 Review of Ghana Law 66 and 
by Opoku op. cit., at p. 72. Quartey v. Martey was followed in Acijabeng v. 
Kwabla [1960] G.L.R. 37. 
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running of the household. 1070 Thus, the presumed premise of Quartey v. 
Martey seems to be out of place in the present scheme of things. As put 
by a learned writer: 
1070 
1071 
"The view that the proceeds of a joint effort of a husband and wife 
married under customary law become the individual property of 
the husband can only have meaning in a legal system (such as the 
English Common Law before 1870) which regarded the legal 
existence of a wife to be incorporated into that of her husband, 
and not in a system such as ours which has recognised the right 
of a woman to own property separate and apart from her husband 
since time immemorial." 1011 
See A. Kuenyehia op. cit., at p. 94. 
Daniels "Ascertainment of property rights between husband and wife" op. 
cit., at p. 142. The Married Women's Property Ordinance 1890 conferred 
on married women (those married under the Marriage Ordinance) the right 
to own property independently of their husbands. For a commentary on the 
Ordinance, see W.C.E. Daniels "Married Women's Property Ordinance" 
(1974) 6 Review of Ghana Law 143-146. The Ordinance was repealed by 
the Statute Law Revision (No. 2) Decree of 1973 (NRCD 228) without any 
clear reasons being given. Under customary law married women have always 
had the legal capacity to acquire property independent of their husbands. See 
R.S. Rattray op. cit., at p. 22; J.M. Sarbah Fanti Customary laws (3'd ed.) op. 
cit., at p. 39; A.N. Allott Essays in African Law with special reference to the 
Law of Ghana op. cit., at p. 226 and W.C.E. Daniels "Towards the 
integration of the laws relatirig to husband and wife irI Ghana" ( 1965) 2 
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The effect of the decision in Quartey v. Martey is discriminatory to wives 
who are deprived of the fruits of their labour in helping their husbands to 
acquire property. Faced with the contemporary economic reality that 
wives contribute, in diverse ways, to the acquisition of property during a 
marriage, the courts were forced, in the absence of legislative directive, 
to re-examine the self-imposed customary-law constraints. They 
embarked upon a progressive alleviation of the hardship that the strict 
application of customary law imposes on wives. In this process, English 
common law and equitable principles were freely used. In doing so the 
courts were simply applying the common law of Ghana. For under Art. 
11 (2) of the 1992 Constitution, the common law of Ghana is defined as 
"the rules of/aw generally known as the common law, the rules of equity 
and the rules of customary law including those determined by the 
Superior Court of Judicature." These rules of equity are understood to 
refer to those developed in England1072 and it will not be surprising to 
discover that the Ghanaian courts rely on the English courts' exposition 
1072 
University of Ghana Law Journal 20 at p. 38. 
See In re Abotsi, Kwao v. Nortey [1984-86] 1 G.L.R. 144 where the Court 
of Appeal emphasized this fact when considering the equitable rule that a 
trustee is in a fiduciary capacity vis-a-vis a beneficiary and as such is 
accountable to him. See also Amaning alias Angu v. Angu II [1984-86] 1 
G.L.R. 309. 
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of these equitable rules in trying to do justice to the married woman. 
Thus, in Deborah Takyiwa v. Kweku Adu1073 a divorced customary law 
wife successfully claimed one half of a cocoa farm cultivated jointly by 
her husband and herself on land owned by her. The court observed that it 
would not have hesitated to invoke the legal maxim "quicquid plantatur 
solo solo cedit"1074 in its full force by granting to the plaintiff a declaration 
of title in respect of the whole farm, had it not been for the fact that the 
plaintiff by her writ of summons asked for an order of partition of the 
farm. In Yeboah v. Yeboah 1075 Hayfron-Benjamin J. (as he then was), 
doubted whether the position of the married woman was as stated by 
Sarbah 1076 and others represented the true legal position at customary law. 
He observed that: 
1073 
1074 
1075 
1076 
Suit No. LC7 /66 unreported (l 81h May 1971 ), High Court, Sunyani cited by 
A. Kuenyehia, op. cit., at p. 80 and Daniels "Marital family and social 
policy", op. cit., at p. 54. 
This maxim means "whatever is annexed to the soil is given to the soil." In 
Berchie-Badu v. Berchie-Badu [1987-88] 2 G.L.R. 260 at p. 264 the Court 
of Appeal, per Osei-Hwere J.A., however expressed the view that this 
maxim had never found a niche in matrimonial relations, particularly in 
acquisition of a matrimonial home. 
[1974]2G.L.R.114atp.121. 
Op. cit. 
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"There is, however, no positive rule of customary law which 
prohibited the creation of joint interests in property between 
persons not connected by blood. Where there is clear evidence 
that the parties intended to hold the property as joint tenants, the 
law would give effect to such an intention. In any event, in this 
case the parties were married under the Marriage Ordinance and 
the relations between each other are not governed exclusively by 
customary law. English legal concepts cannot be completely 
excluded in the determination of this case. "1077 
In Abebreseh v. Kaah1078 Sarkodee J. approved of the above dictum. He 
was asked to determine whether the plaintiff, a widow, had any beneficial 
interest in their matrimonial home which she had financially assisted her 
late husband to build. The learned judge asked the following questions: 
1077 
1078 
" ... Will it be right to say in the face of all the evidence before me 
that the intention of the husband and the wife was other than to 
See Coleman v. Shang supra at p. 401. The view expressed in Yeboah v. 
Yeboah supra was reiterated in Etu v. Sika Kyere-Abusua [1982-83] 1 
G.L.R. 781. 
[1976] 2 G.L.R. 46. 
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create joint interests? Will it be right to say that a wife who had 
her own property and who made sacrifices and such massive 
contribution towards the construction of a house is to be deprived 
of the fruits of her labour, and to stamp what she did as mere 
assistance to her husband and hold that she has no claim to the 
building? Surely, good conscience alone will not permit that. " 1079 
He therefore held that talcing the evidence as a whole he was of the view 
that the part played by the plaintiff in the construction of the house 
amounted to more than mere assistance given by a wife married under 
customary law to her husband. Consequently, the rule in Quartey v. 
Martey did not apply. 
In Bulley-Neequaye v. Acolatse1080 the evidence adduced pointed to the 
fact that the wife had provided the money for the purchase of the house 
which was registered in her husband's name. While the wife was 
temporarily away from Ghana, her husband sold the house to the plaintiff. 
On her return, the wife recovered possession of the house and the plaintiff 
1079 
1080 
Ibid. at pp. 53-54. 
(1969) c.c. 51. 
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brought the action for recovery of the house. The judge at first instance 
gave judgment in his favour but on appeal, the Court of Appeal held that 
where a wife buys property and puts it in the name of her husband, he 
generally holds it on resulting trust for her. The court relied on the 
equitable principles laid down in the English case of Dyer v. Dyer1081 
where Eyre C.B. said: 
1081 
1082 
"The clear result of all the cases without a single exception, is 
that the trust of a legal estate, whether freehold, copyhold, or 
leasehold; whether taken in the names of the purchasers and 
others jointly, or in the names of others without that of the 
purchaser; whether in one name or several; whether jointly or 
successive - results to the man who advances the purchase-
money. ,,1082 
(1788) 2 Cox Eq. Cas. 92. 
Ibid at p. 93: cited with approval by Lord Upjohn in Pettitt v. Pettitt [ 1970] 
A.C. 777 at p. 814. 
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Similarly, in Reindorf v. Reindorf083 the plaintiff asked for a declaration 
that she was the sole beneficial owner of two houses, the titles to which 
were conveyed into the joint names of her and her husband. The plaintiff 
had provided the purchase money for the acquisition of the houses. The 
husband denied the wife's claim and contended that the houses had been 
built by him alone. Hayfron-Benjamin J., (as he then was), found that the 
wife was financially capable of acquiring the properties without the 
husband's aid. He accepted the wife's parol evidence to negative an 
intention to make a gift to her husband and held that the legal interest was 
held by them jointly on a resulting trust for the wife alone. 
In Quartey v. Armar1084 the parties were married in Scotland. On their 
return to Ghana they bought two houses which were conveyed into the 
name of the plaintiff wife in the words of the husband, "to ensure in case 
of my death intestate that my wife would have possession of the house for 
my children." After the dissolution of the marriage, the wife brought an 
action for a declaration that she was the sole beneficial owner of the two 
houses. The wife did not base her claim on the doctrine of presumption 
1083 
1084 
[1974] 2 G.L.R. 38. See also Quistv. George [1974] 1G.L.R.1 and Yeboa 
v. Yeboa supra and Abebreseh v. Kaah supra. 
[1971] 2 G.L.R. 231. See also Domfe v. Adu [1984-86] 1 G.L.R. 653. 
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of advancement1085 but rather on the basis that she had provided the funds 
for their purchase. There was evidence that the entire purchase money for 
one of the houses had been provided by the husband. The wife had 
contributed part of the purchase money for the second house. Based on 
this evidence, the court held that the wife held the house of which the 
purchase money had been entirely contributed by the husband, on a 
resulting trust for the husband. With regards to the other house, the court 
held that she held it as a trustee on a resulting trust jointly on behalf of 
herself and her husband. 
In Domfe v. Adu1086 the equitable principle of implied/resulting trust was 
again used to determine a wife's share of matrimonial property because 
of her "substantial contribution". The couple married under customary 
law and operated a joint business. The wife, who was illiterate, provided 
the initial capital and travelled extensively, buying goods for the shop, 
1085 
1086 
This doctrine arises where X is the father of Y or stands in loco parentis 
(patris) to Y or is the husband ofY. IfX were to purchase property in the 
name ofY, a presumption arises that X meant to make a gift of the property 
to Y. In Quist v. George op. cit., at p. 11, Abban J. (as he then was), held 
that equity dislikes and distrusts gifts by a wife to a husband. Therefore no 
presumption of advancement arises when a wife puts property in the name 
of her husband. 
Supra. 
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which was kept by the husband. The business proved successful and out 
of the profits made, they built a house for their child, acquired two other 
houses and seven cars, built up a substantial inventory for the shop and 
a large bank balance in their joint account. On an extra-judicial 
divorce1087 being obtained by the husband, the wife brought an action in 
the High Court, claiming an equal share in the properties. The evidence 
showed that the wife had made a substantial contribution towards the 
establishment of the business which was being ran as a joint enterprise. 
Notwithstanding that the business was registered in the name of the 
1087 Judicial dissolution of a customary-law marriage is not obligatory although 
the spouse may take their case to the Community Tribunals which have 
jurisdiction in divorce and other matrimonial causes where the applicable 
law is exclusively customary law (sees. 47(1 )(t) Courts Act 1993). Usually 
though, a spouse who seeks divorce would bring his or her case before 
representatives of their families or the elders of the community who will 
attempt to reconcile the parties. If this fails, the matter is then brought 
before a board of arbitrators consisting of the families of both spouses and 
other relatives. If the arbitrators fail to achieve a reconciliation, they hear 
the case on its merits to determine fault. Divorce is then granted to the 
spouse found not to be responsible for the breakdown of the marriage. See 
Opoku, op. cit., Chap. 13, Sarbah, op. cit., at p. 53, Daniels "The legal 
position of women under our marriage laws" op. cit. at p. 60 and Danquah 
Akan Laws and Customs, op. cit., at p. 156. 
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husband as the sole owner, the court held that he held it on resulting trust 
for himself and the wife as the real beneficiaries of the business.1088 
In Achiampong v. Achiampong1089 the wife made what was held to be 
substantial contribution, that is, channelling all her earnings and resources 
towards feeding her husband and his relatives and generally for the 
upkeep of the household. This made it possible for the husband to pay the 
instalments on the disputed property. She also contributed financially 
towards the extensions and renovations of the said property which 
brought considerable improvement to the property. Although the case 
was decided on the basis that there was actual agreement that the wife 
should have a beneficial interest in the house, the court held that if there 
had been no evidence of a specific agreement, it would have given a 
beneficial interest to the wife on account of her substantial contribution. 
1088 
1089 
See also Abobor v. Abobor unreported High Court, Accra cited by U. 
Wanitzek "Integration of personal laws and the situation of women in 
Ghana: The Matrimonial Causes Act of 1971 and its application by the 
courts" (1991) Third World Legal Studies 75 at pp. 94-95. 
Supra. 
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In Ramia v. Ramia 1090 an attempt was made to limit the application of the 
equitable doctrine of advancement exclusively to monogamous marriages 
in a case where the couple had married first customarily and then under 
the Marriage of Mohammedans Ordinance. The court held that: 
"The doctrine .. .is equitable, based not on the type of marriage 
contracted by the parties but on [a] recognized legal relationship 
which exists between the person providing the money in acquiring 
the property and the one in whose name the property is taken. In 
the instant case between husband and wife whether married 
customarily, under the Ordinance or otherwise, it is such 
relationship which forms the essential basis of the doctrine and 
not the type of marriage as was urged on us by counsel. "1091 
In the above cases, it is clear that for a spouse to acquire a share in a 
property acquired by the other, he must show that he has made substantial 
1090 
1091 
[1981] G.L.R. 275 (C.A.). For a commentary on the case, see G.R. 
Woodman "Purchase by a husband in the name of his wife - deviousness or 
generosity" (1981 & 1982) 13 & 14 Review of Ghana Law 195. See also the 
English cases of Tinker v. Tinker [1970] P. 136 and Silver v. Silver [1958] 
1 W.L.R. 259. 
At p. 283 per Wiredu J.A. 
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financial contribution to the acquisition of the said property. In the words 
of Abban J.S.C. inAchiampong v. Achiampong: 1092 
"Divorce per se does not confer on a spouse any interest 
beneficial or otherwise in property, movable or immovable, of the 
other spouse ... Apart.from agreement, direct or indirect financial 
contribution which can be regarded as substantial is a necessary 
requirement ... " 
The crucial determinant therefore is whether the financial contribution is 
"substantial", a word which has not acquired a definite meaning in this 
context. What is clear though, is that the contribution will be looked at 
in the context of the facts of the particular case in order to determine 
whether or not it was "substantial". Such a determination will enable the 
court to ascertain the proportion of the property which the claimant 
spouse is to have. Thus inAchiampong v. Achiampong, 1093 for instance, 
the financial contribution of the wife was found to be substantial and 
consequently, she was granted a half share in the matrimonial home. On 
1092 Op. cit., at p. I 036. 
1093 Supra. 
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the other hand, in Berchie-Badu v. Berchie-Badu1094 the wife's 
contribution, the purchase for C 150 of the plot ofland on which the house 
was built, was held to be the proportion that amount bore to the total cost 
of the construction of the house. The estimated cost was given by the 
parties to be either C65, 000 or C80, 000. On either estimate, the wife's 
share in the house would have been negligible. The Court of Appeal 
however, was of the view that although the wife's claim was based on s. 
21(1) of MCA 1971, which entitled the court to order the transfer to a 
spouse of only the property due to that spouse, and which in the instant 
case would be the negligible fraction, the court nevertheless was not 
inhibited from applying the wide powers given to it under s. 20(1) to 
make an order for financial provision. 1095 Since on the evidence the 
disputed house was the only asset of the parties had and since the wife 
paid for the plot and no financial provision was ordered on her behalf, the 
court awarded her half of the beneficial interest in the house. 
It is submitted that the undue reliance on financial contribution will in 
most cases not meet the justice of the case. It is an unduly restrictive 
1094 
1095 
Supra. 
For a detailed discussion of ss. 20 and 21 of the MCA 1971, see pp. 460-480 
infra. 
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view of contribution which leaves out indirect contribution, such as 
domestic services, which is not quantifiable in terms of money. Such 
indirect contribution to the acquisition of matrimonial property is 
progressively being given prominence in other jurisdictions in the 
determination of disputes over matrimonial property. 1096 However, the 
Ghanaian courts have not taken any serious cognisance of this factor in 
determining the ownership of the matrimonial property. In Clerk v. 
Clerk, 1097 the couple had married in 1929 and were, at the time of the 
proceeding, eighty and seventy years old respectively. They had been 
living apart for fifteen years and had several adult children. The wife 
applied for an order for property settlement for the matrimonial home. 
She had been a housewife and claimed a beneficial interest in the 
matrimonial home "because she had given [the] husband moral and 
material support in the acquisition of the home." The court held that her 
entitlement to a share in the matrimonial home depended on the question 
of whether she had actually given up a salaried job in order to look after 
the home and family. Since this was not the case, and since "she was not 
1096 
1097 
See for example, s. 25(2)(f) of the English Matrimonial Causes Act ands. 
7(4) of the South African Divorce Act 70of1979. 
[1981] G.L.R. 583. 
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a woman who had a job or would have worked," she did not get a share 
in the matrimonial home. 
In Bentsi-Enchill v. · Bentsi-Enchill, 1098 a wife's claim for an order that she 
should stay in a flat, bought by her former husband, until their infant child 
attained maturity was dismissed by the court. The court, whilst conceding 
that there was a trend to give credit to a wife's domestic services, held 
that if one spouse bought property with his own money for the common 
use of the spouses, the other spouse did not necessarily acquire a 
proprietary interest in it. 1099 This position was reiterated in Odoteye v. 
Odoteye 1100 where the wife, after a divorce, brought an action for ancillary 
relief and for a transfer into her name of a house for herself and the 
children. There was no evidence as to her financial contribution to the 
acquisition of the property. The court held that in the absence of evidence 
of the wife's actual financial contribution to the cost of the acquisition of 
the house, it could not order a transfer of the house to her. Also, in Gyang 
1098 
1099 
1100 
[1976] 2 G.L.R. 303. 
See also Jonas v. Ofori unreported (11th January 1988), High Court, Accra 
and Abobor v. Abobor unreported ( l 61h February 1987), High Court, Accra 
cited by Wanitzel op. cit., at pp. 94-95. 
[1984-86] 1 G.L.R. 519. 
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v. Gyang1101 the couple married in England in 1972. The matrimonial 
home was purchased by the husband, apparently without the financial 
support from the wife. The court held that: 
"The woman may not contribute substantially financially but she 
may contribute through her services in the house and by giving 
comfort and encouragement to the husband to acquire the 
properties of the marriage. The law however is that such wifely 
duties do not make her a joint owner of the properties which the 
husband has acquired." 
Finally, in Ribeiro v. Ribeiro1102 Francois J.S.C., inadissentingjudgment, 
reiterated the prevailing view of the judiciary towards the domestic 
services of a wife. He opined that the argument that domestic services of 
a wife enabled a husband a free leash to pursue money-winning ventures, 
is a recent concept which modem legislation elsewhere has sought to 
stamp on the marital relationship. He argued that Ghana has not as yet 
passed any comparable legislation and consequently, a wife cannot press 
1101 Unreported but cited by Wanitzek op. cit at p. 95. 
1102 [1989-90]2 G.L.R. 109 atp. 118. 
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with any degree of optimism an interest in her husband's properties by 
virtue of mere domestic services in the house. Only the clear, 
unambiguous words of a statute, in his view, can extend a woman's 
dominion over marital property. Although the High Court in that case 
came close to recognising domestic services as a relevant contribution, 
the Court of Appeal did not take the same view of the case. That court 
and the majority of the Supreme Court were rather of the view that the 
case was one of mere financial provision for the ex-wife rather than 
property settlement. An opportunity was therefore lost for a definitive 
statement on a wife's domestic contribution as a relevant factor in 
acquiring a right in the self-acquired property of her husband. 
Some ray of hope for the recognition of a wife's domestic services can be 
found in the decision of the High Court in Oparebea v. Mensah. 1103 In 
that case the wife, who was married under customary law, asked for 
financial provision to be made for her under s. 20 of the MCA 1971 and 
a declaration that she had a beneficial interest in the family assets. 1104 The 
1103 
1104 
D & MC 1608/88 unreported (141h December 1989), High Court, Accra, 
cited by A. Kuenyehia & E. Ofei-Aboagye "Family law in Ghana and its in 
implications for women" in Women & Law in West Africa A. Kuenyehia 
(ed.), WaLWA, 1998 at p. 34. 
This is possible under s. 41(2) of the Act. See infra pp. 490-500. 
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husband had other wives and children in addition to the petitioner and her 
five children. She adduced evidence that for 28 years of their marriage, 
she worked in the husband's stores in addition to keeping house and 
taking care of the children. She was paid no wages, salary or allowances 
beyond normal housekeeping money for the household. Several 
properties, vehicles etc., were acquired out of their joint efforts in 
business. The husband admitted that his wife did work in his store and 
that she was not paid for her efforts. He however, argued that what his 
wife did was no more than what was expected of a wife because by 
customary law a married woman was under an obligation to assist her 
husband in his business. Such assistance, he submitted, was never 
rewarded with wages or allowances. He further argued that during the 
marriage his wife had obtained sufficient cash with which she had bought 
a lot of personal property. Consequently, he did not think his wife was 
entitled to any more assets from the marriage. 
In the opinion of the court four issues fell to be determined, namely, 
1. Whether or not there was any contribution by the petitioner to the 
acquisition of the properties; 
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2. What the extent of the contribution was; 
3. Whether or not the wife had established sufficient grounds to justify 
her claims, and 
4. What the appropriate matrimonial relief would be in order to do justice 
between the parties, having regard to the particular circumstances of the 
case. 
In answer to the first issue, the court held that even if the assistance of the 
petitioner was not financial in nature, what she did during the marriage 
amounted to a contribution worthy of consideration in deciding on 
financial provisions or declaration of her interest in the acquired assets. 
It is true that the extent of the contribution was more easily determined 
where such contribution was financial or an agreed share in a company or 
a settled role had been played in a business, but in the instant case it could 
not be denied that the wife's contribution did help the business to 
flourish. Consequently, in answer to the second issue, the wife's 28-year 
service could be quantified to be a substantial proportion thereby making 
it a substantial contribution to the acquisition of the assets. It followed, 
therefore, in answer to the third issue that the wife had established 
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sufficient grounds for an award of financial provision in her favour and 
had established a beneficial interest in the assets acquired during the 
marriage. In determining the appropriate relief however, the court took 
into account the fact that the husband had five other wives and numerous 
other children apart from the petitioner and her children. The court 
therefore awarded the wife the house in which she lived with some of her 
children, which belonged to the husband. This the court considered 
sufficient in the circumstances and did not award any financial provision 
for her. 
An aspect of this case which is of particular importance is the court's 
remarks that times have changed and the courts should have the courage 
and conviction to change with the times. In its view, the notion that a 
wife's domestic services need not be remunerated was probably no longer 
valid in its entirety. Where, as in the instant case, the wife worked in the 
business of the husband, helping in and keeping the shop, it was an 
affront to common sense and a gross violation of all notions of equity, 
justice and fair play to deny such a woman a share in the property 
acquired over 28 years because of"custom which is unsteadily rooted in 
anachronism." These remarks show a rare willingness on the part of the 
courts to recognise the domestic services of a wife as a "contribution" for 
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the purpose of acquiring an interest in the self-acquired property of her 
husband. One suspects though that the wife working gratuitously in the 
husband's store for 28 years may have influenced the decision. 
Furthermore, there was a clear show of willingness to jettison custom 
which had become anachronistic in contemporary circumstances. One 
may hope that more judges will take such bold steps in the march to 
liberate wives from the yoke placed on them by customary law. 
In the light of the case law, it would seem that the courts' application of 
English common law and equitable principles have gone some way to 
alleviate the hardship imposed on wives by the rule in Quartey v. 
Martey. 1105 The application of the principles however, lends itself to the 
whims of individual judges and their understanding of the principles, 
especially those of equity, in their contemporary context. This is so 
because some of the presumptions underlying the equitable principles are 
based on life of a bygone generation 1106 and need to be adapted to suit 
contemporary reality. This is clearly evident by the court's attitude to a 
wife's domestic contribution to the upkeep of the family. This is usually 
1105 
1106 
See Quansah "Determination of proprietary rights ... " op. cit., at p. 393. 
See dicta per Lords Upjohn and Dip lock in Pettitt v. Pettitt op. cit. at pp. 813 
and 824. 
459 
undocumented and unquantifiable and yet contributes to the family's 
wealth. The courts have generally refused to acknowledge this as a 
"contribution" in determining property rights of the spouses on the 
assumption, which is no longer valid, that the husband is the sole provider 
for the family. Married women in Ghana have played, and continue to 
play, a pivotal role in the welfare and well-being of their families and it 
is time for due recognition to be given to their contribution. 1107 
Furthermore, the situation created by the non-recognition of a wife's 
domestic services as a "contribution", has been exacerbated by the courts' 
undue reliance upon "substantial" financial contribution. Most of these 
contributions from wives may be difficult to prove although such 
contribution may have gone some way towards helping in the acquisition 
of the disputed property. Wives, as some of the cases above indicate, are 
thereby deprived of their just deserts. There is a need for legislative 
intervention to rectify the injustice being suffered by wives since the 
courts have not been able to come up with a satisfactory solution to their 
plight. 
1107 See generally A Kuenyehia & E Ofei-Aboagye "Family law in Ghana and 
its implication for women" in Women and Law in West Africa, A Kuenyehia 
(ed.) Accra, WaLWA, 1998 at pp. 36-37. 
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( d) Determination and settlement of property under sections 20 and 
21 of the MCA 1971 
As mentioned above, these two sections of the MCA 1971 provide the 
machinery for the court to exercise the power given to it by s. 19 of the 
Act to "whenever it thinks just and equitable" to award maintenance 
pending suit or financial provision to either party to the marriage after it 
"has considered the standard of living of the parties and their 
circumstances." 
Section 20 (1) provides: 
"The court may order either party to the marriage to pay the 
other party such sum of money or convey to the other party such 
movable or immovable property as settlement of property or in 
lieu thereof or as part of financial provision as the court thinks 
just and equitable. " 
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The scope of ss. 19 and 20 is intended to bring about a shift of emphasis, 
like legislation in England, 1108 from the old concept of "maintenance" of 
the wife and children by the husband to one of re-distribution of assets 
and what has been described as "purchasing power".1109 This will entail 
a disregard of the question "Whose is this?" and deal rather with the 
question "To whom shall this be given?"1110 But as will be evident from 
the following discussions, the question "Whose is this?" has tended to 
dominate the question "To whom shall this be given?" and in determining 
the former question the principles for the determination of ownership of 
property discussed above are invariably relied upon. 1111 
1108 
1109 
IJIO 
1111 
See pp. 323-326 supra. 
Per Onnrod Jin Wachtel v. Wachtel [1973] 1 All E.R. 113 at p. 116. See 
also W. C Ek ow Daniels "The basis for award of financial provision" ( 1989-
90) 17 Review of Ghana Law 49 at p. 58. 
See Pettitt v. Pettitt [ 1970] AC 777 at p. 798 per Lord Morris and note 641 
supra. 
See for example, Achiampong v. Achiampong supra at p. 1035. 
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In the leading case of Ribeiro v. Ribeiro1112 the Supreme Court held, by 
a majority of 3-2, that s. 20(1) has two limbs. The first limb empowers 
the court to pay money or convey property, movable or immovable to 
either spouse to a divorce suit as settlement of property rights. The 
second limb, on the other hand, empowers the court to make financial 
provision for either party to a divorce suit and in doing so, can order the 
conveyance of property, movable or immovable, as part of the financial 
provision. The object of the section (especially the first limb) being to 
provide an informal method or procedure whereby property disputes 
between husband and wife can be determined and in a summary manner, 
either of the spouses can bring an application in an appropriate case under 
1112 Supra. Subsequent to the appeal, the appellant brought an application before 
the court for review of its decision to dismiss the appeal. The application 
was refused by a 3-2 majority. See Ribeiro v. Ribeiro (No. 2) [1989-90] 2 
G.L.R. 130. The Supreme Court only reviews its own decision where there 
are special circumstances such as the discovery of new and important 
evidence which, after the exercise of due diligence, was not within a party's 
knowledge or could not be produced by him at the time when the judgment 
was given. See Ord. 39 r. 1 High Court (Civil Procedure) Rules 1954, 
Practice Direction (Reviews in the Supreme Court) [1987-88] 2 G.L.R. 274, 
Swaniker v. Adotei Twi II [1966] G.L.R. 151, Ase/car v. Karam [1972] 1 
G.L.R. 1 and S.Y. Bimpong-Buta "The supreme court and the power of 
review" {1989-90) 17 Review of Ghana Law 192. 
463 
the section, praying for an order that property or some beneficial interest 
therein be given to him or her. 1113 
In exercising its power under the second limb of the section to make 
financial provision, the majority was of the view that it is not necessary 
to make a determination as to whether or not a spouse has an interest in 
the disputed property by way of contributions made towards its 
acquisition. The court merely examines the needs of the parties and 
makes reasonable provision for their satisfaction out of the money, goods 
or immovable property of his or her spouse. This limb was succinctly 
paraphrased by Adade J.S.C. in Ribeiro v. Ribeiro (No. 2)1 114 as follows: 
"The court may order [the husband] to convey to the [wife} such 
... {house/building] ... as part of financial provision as the court 
thinks just and equitable." 
It will seem therefore that the court may only make a determination of the 
property rights of the spouses if one is seeking a property settlement but 
1113 
1114 
SeeAchiampongv. Achiampong supra at p. 1034 per Abban J.A. (as he then 
was). 
Supra at p. 136. 
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where one is asking for financial provision there is no need for such 
determination. In the earlier case of Achiampong v. Achiampong, 1115 the 
Court of Appeal had expressed the view that property is not ordered to be 
transferred to a spouse under s. 20(1) of the 1971 Act simply because 
there is a divorce. Apart from agreement, direct or indirect financial 
contribution which can be regarded as substantial is a necessary 
requirement. The court therefore held that it would not be a proper 
exercise of discretion under s. 20 (1) to order the transfer of property to 
a spouse who had not contributed substantially in money or money's 
worth towards the acquisition of that property.1116 This seemingly 
contradictory view of s. 20(1) was explained by the Supreme Court in 
Ribeiro v. Ribeiro (No. 2) to be limited to that part of the subsection 
dealing with settlement of property rights. It was that court's view that 
it would be erroneous to extend it to cover the portion which relates to 
applications for financial provision. 1117 
1115 Supra. 
1116 See pp. 380-386 supra. 
1117 Per Adade J.S.C. in Ribeiro v. Ribeiro (No. 2) op. cit., at p. 136. 
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The couple in Ribeiro had been married for thirty-four years. The wife 
had been a housewife throughout the marriage and had looked after both 
the children she had with her husband and those he had by other women. 
This enabled the husband to concentrate fully on his business. During the 
subsistence of the marriage he had become a well-known printer and 
owned a printing press, more than ten houses and stocks and shares. 
When the marriage was dissolved at the instance of the wife, she claimed 
ancillary relief, inter alia maintenance and "one of the houses .. for her 
accommodation." Subsequent to the marriage being dissolved, the ex-
husband married his mistress with whom he had children and conveyed 
three of his houses, two of which were conveyed during the currency of 
the ex-wife's application, to his new wife. One of the houses conveyed 
to his new wife was a commercial property popularly known as "Haulage 
House" because the Ghana Road Haulage Association had offices there. 
In determining the ex-wife's ancillary relief the High Court held: 
"Even though there is no direct evidence of contribution by the 
applicant for the acquisition of these houses, I think her 
devotedness to her duties as a housewife and her invaluable 
services rendered to the respondent [husband] in looking after 
the home, the children, some of whom were not the children of the 
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marriage, entitled her to enjoyment of the houses which her 
husband acquired during the marriage."1118 
The High Court rescinded the conveyance to the new wife of "Haulage 
House" on the ground that it had been made in bad faith and to defeat the 
ends of justice and ordered it to be given to the ex-wife by way of 
settlement. The court further awarded her a lump sum ofC150 000. The 
High Court's decisions were confirmed by the Court of Appeal1119 but in 
relation to the award of "Haulage House" to the ex-wife, it was the 
opinion of the court that: 
1118 
1119. 
" ... the issue was not whether or not the wife-petitioner had made 
or had not made a 'substantial contribution '. The issue was 
simply whether she was entitled to be provided with decent 
accommodation by the appellant as part of financial provision. .. It 
was not a case of a wife-petitioner wanting to have a share in the 
properties of her husband after divorce in which case she would 
Quoted by the Court of Appeal in [1987-88] 2 G.L.R. 464 at p. 466. 
[1987-1988] 2 G.L.R. 464. 
467 
be compelled to establish that she made 'substantial financial 
contribution' towards their acquisition."1120 
On a subsequent appeal by the husband to the Supreme Court challenging 
the vesting of"Haulage House" in his ex-wife, the majority of that court 
agreed with the Court of Appeal. In the majority's view, in making an 
order for financial provision under the subsection it is not necessary to 
make a determination as to whether or not the wife has an interest in the 
property because of the contribution she had made towards its acquisition. 
The court is empowered in that circums~ance to transfer property to her 
even though she made no claim to title. On this view, determination of 
the contribution of the benefiting spouse becomes relevant only where an 
order for the conveyance of immovable property from the other spouse in 
settlement of property rights is asked for. 
In the view of the minority however, s. 20( 1) does not authorise the court 
to order the conveyance of immovable property to a spouse without 
making a determination as to what contribution, if any, was made by the 
spouse claiming the property towards the acquisition of it. This will be 
1120 Per Abban J.S.C. at p 474. 
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the case irrespective of whether the claim is for property settlement or 
financial provision. In the words of Francois J.S.C.: 
"I think it is all agreed that section 20 of Act 367 does not pretend 
to entrust the courts with powers arbitrarily to re-align 
proprietary rights where there is no claim to title in the recipient 
party. I do not think also that the facts allow the wife to press 
with any degree of optimism an interest in the husband's 
properties by virtue of mere domestic services in the house. The 
argument that such services enabled a husband a free leash to 
pursue money-winning ventures, is a recent concept which 
modern legislation elsewhere has sought to stamp on matrimonial 
relationship ... No such legislation exists here."1121 
Later on in his judgement the learned Justice of Appeal said that: 
1121 
" ... the reasoning of the Court of Appeal, justifying the award on 
grounds of contribution in toil in the acquisition ofher husband's 
properties, and the inequity of depriving her of her deserts, is as 
[1989-1990] 2 G.L.R. 109 at p. 118. 
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emotive as it is contradictory to their earlier stance that a claim 
to title did not arise."1122 
The other dissentient judge, Wuaku J.S.C., expressed his view thus: 
" ... the court has no power under section 20(1) to order that the 
Haulage House of which the husband is the undisputed legal 
owner be conveyed to the wife without first establishing her title, 
as required by section 21 (l)." 
The conclusion that can be drawn from the views expressed in the case by 
the Court of Appeal and the majority of the Supreme Court is· that 
contribution by a spouse becomes relevant only where a spouse is seeking 
an order under s. 20(1) MCA 1971 for the conveyance of property which 
is not in his name in pursuance of settlement of property rights. The 
minority thought the determination of property rights is a condition 
precedent to the exercise of the powers conferred by the subsection 
irrespective of the order sought. It is submitted that the general liberal 
position taken by the majority of the Supreme Court is to be preferred. 
1122 At p. 121. 
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However, ifthe inference drawn from the majority decision, to the effect 
that the determination of a spouse's contribution to acquisition of 
property is dependent on the type of order being sought under the 
subsection is correct, it will mean that the exercise of the liberal 
interpretation of the subsection will depend on the ingenuity of counsel 
for the non-contributing spouse. Counsel will have to appreciate the 
importance of applying for financial provision instead of property 
settlement where, on the evidence before him, his client will be unable to 
satisfactorily prove substantial financial contribution towards the 
acquisition of the property, part of which he is claiming. This will be a 
most unsatisfactory outcome of the majority's decision. 1123 It is submitted 
that the majority would have done greater service to a downtrodden 
spouse if the liberal interpretation was made applicable to the two limbs 
of the subsection and some guidelines furnished as to when, for example, 
a court may order a transfer of property movable or immovable in lieu of 
a lump sum payment. An important opportunity was missed by the 
appellate court to articulate such guidelines. 
1123 It must be noted that in Berchie-Badu v. Berchie-Badu supra the Court of 
Appeal utilized the provisions of s. 20( 1) to do justice to the wife although 
her claim was based on s. 21(1). See pp. 475- 479 infra. 
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Notwithstanding the above misgivings, the majority's interpretation of the 
subsection will allow a court, assuming financial provision is asked for, 
to exercise a discretion by giving an interest in disputed property to a 
spouse who would otherwise be constrained by evidence in proving an 
interest in such property. Although the criteria for the exercise of the 
discretion were not spelt out, it is hoped that, if exercised with prudence, 
decisions such as that reached in Otoo v. Otoo1124 will in future be 
avoided. In that case the couple had married under customary law for 19 
years before remarrying under the Ordinance in 1972. Both were 
employed and the wife did petty trading to supplement her income. The 
husband acquired a house with a loan from his employer. In her evidence, 
the wife stated: 
(1) that she made contributions towards the house, 
(2) the husband did not give her any housekeeping money, but 
(3) he asked her to pay the children's school fees and 
1124 Unreported (26th June 1984), High Court, Accra cited by Wanitzek op. cit., 
atp. 99. 
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( 4) she paid money to the workmen who were building the house. 
The husband admitted the first three statements but disputed the fourth. 
The wife stated that she did not get any receipts from the workers, but 
informed her husband each time she paid money to them. No refunds 
were made for these payments, and she did not expect it because the 
husband had told her that he was building the house for her and the 
children. In a divorce proceeding, the High Court refused her claim for 
a half share in the house. The court held: 
"Failure by the [husband] to give housekeeping money at the time 
the building was being put up, and the [wife] providing the 
house-keeping money and also payments of the workmanship to 
the workers who were constructing the building are not enough 
grounds to enable the [wife) to have [a] half share of the 
matrimonial home." 
Furthermore, it was the court's view that since the wife could neither 
produce any receipts nor mention the names of the workers to whom she 
had paid the money, she had no concrete evidence that she had actually 
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paid money to the workers. It therefore concluded that the wife did not 
contribute to the purchase of the matrimonial home. 
A similar conclusion was reached in Adai v. Sackey1125 where the couple 
had been married under customary law for nearly 50 years. The marriage 
was dissolved extra-judicially and the wife subsequently claimed a house 
as her share of the matrimonial property. Her claim was based on the fact 
that she ''forewent her entitlements as a wife, and also helped her 
husband to trade in Akpeteshie {a local alcohol], without any pay to 
enable {him] to use whatever income he had from the cocoa farm to put 
up ... the house in dispute in Accra." The court, however, found that there 
was no evidence to support these allegations and consequently, held that 
there was no proof of a "substantial contribution" by the wife, apart from 
the performance of her "normal wifely duties of cooking and washing the 
clothes" of the husband, which did not count in this context. She was 
only granted a right to live in the house with her children subject to good 
behaviour for her life or until she remarries. 1126 
1125 
1126 
Unreported, (91h April 1986) High Court, Accra cited by Wanitzek op. cit., 
at p. 100. 
Similar problems of proof arose in Odoteye v. Odoteye supra and Abobor v. 
Abobor unreported, (161h February 1987), High Court, Accra cited by 
Wanitzek op. cit., at p. 94. 
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In the light of the wide range of activities undertaken by women in the 
contemporary situation in Ghana to improve the well-being of their 
families a distinction between "substantial contribution" and "mere 
house-work and childcare" seem to be outdated and need to be jettisoned. 
Marriage should be looked upon as a partnership with each partner 
contributing his or her quota, be it financial or otherwise, to the well-
being of the partners and their off springs. 
In conclusion, it will be noted that the general application of the minority 
view in Ribeiro v. Ribeiro will create injustice in many cases where the 
contributing spouse, usually the wife, cannot lead satisfactory evidence 
of her contribution or that the contribution was in the form of domestic 
services. As seen above, the courts have not given credit to a wife's 
domestic services in the determination of interests in matrimonial 
property. 
The other power given to the court to adjudicate in disputes over 
matrimonial property is s. 21 (1 ). That section provides as follows: 
"When a decree for divorce or nullity is granted, if the court is 
satisfied that either party to the marriage holds title to movable 
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or immovable property part or all of which rightfully belongs to 
the other, the court shall order transfer or conveyance of the 
interest to the party entitled to it upon such terms as the court 
thinks just and equitable. " 
The subsection deals with contested title to property acquired during a 
marriage, that is, whether a particular property was in fact acquired by the 
husband, or the wife, or by both of them jointly. It would seem that it is 
aligned to the first limb of s. 20(1) in that when the court under that 
subsection determines who owns the disputed property, it will then utilise 
s. 21(1) to give effect to its decision. Alternatively, a spouse can ask for 
conveyance of property directly under s. 21(1) as happened in Berchie-
Badu v. Berchie-Badu. 1127 In that case the ownership of the matrimonial 
property was in dispute and as part of the divorce proceedings, the wife 
applied under the subsection for the transfer of the house to her in trust 
for their children. The wife had purchased the land on which the house 
was built for C 150 but there was no satisfactory evidence of her 
contribution towards its construction. The trial judge granted her 
1127 Supra. 
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application but on appeal, the Court of Appeal on the available evidence 
found, inter alia, that: 
(a) the trial judge had ignored the inconsistent evidence from the wife on 
the financing of the construction of the house; 
(b) the husband, who had children with some other women, kept his 
name on the building plans and refused the wife's suggestion to change 
it into their children's names and 
(c) the total cost of construction of the house, given as C65, 000 by the 
husband and C80, 000 by the wife, had been borne mainly by the 
husband. 
The only contribution from the wife was the money for the acquisition of 
the land. The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and held that where 
spouses jointly acquired property but the legal estate was vested solely in 
one spouse, the amount of the share of the other spouse in the beneficial 
interest in cases where he had made a direct or identifiable contribution 
to the acquisition, had to be proportionate to the payment made. But 
where the contributing spouse made indirect or unidentifiable 
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contributions, although his share then would be less to evaluate, the 
difficulty in the evaluation did not in itself justify the application of the 
maxim "equality is equity" if the fair estimate of the intended share might 
be some fraction other than one half. Since, on the evidence, the wife was 
only able to prove that she paid for the plot ofland, her beneficial interest 
in the matrimonial home should be the proportion that C 150 bore to the 
total cost of construction, that is, C65, 000 or CS0,000. In either case her 
beneficial interest would be negligible. 
The court however, was of the view that when the High Court assumed 
its divorce jurisdiction it was, under the provisions of s. 20(1) of the 
MCA 1971, armed with sufficient powers to make provision for the wife 
on the breakdown of the marriage. In the exercise of the court's 
discretion to award ancillary relief under that section, the overriding 
consideration was that the order had to be "just and equitable". But in the 
instant case, counsel for the wife did not address the court for ancillary 
relief by way of financial provision under s. 20(1); he restricted himself 
to s. 21 ( 1) which entitled the court to order the transfer to a spouse of only 
the property due to that spouse and which in the case of the wife would 
be the negligible fraction of the total cost. This notwithstanding, the 
Court was of the view that the High Court was not inhibited from 
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applying the wide powers under s. 20(1) to serve the ends of justice. On 
the evidence, the matrimonial home seemed to be the only capital asset 
of the spouses. Since the wife paid for the plot of land and no financial 
provision was ordered on her behalf, her beneficial share in the 
matrimonial home should be half and that of the husband, the other half. 
The decision in this case again shows the court's willingness to uses. 
20(1) to achieve a purpose which, in the circumstances, appeared to it 
just and equitable. Although there was a finding that she had no interest 
in the matrimonial home, this did not deter the court from using s. 20(1) 
to give her an interest in the house. This position taken by the court puts 
pay to the suggestion that has been made to the effect that in interpreting 
s. 21 (1) the court should be guided by legal principles which were 
developed under the English Married Women's Property Act 1882 rather 
than case law which have grown out of the operation of the English 
Matrimonial Proceedings and Property Act 1970.1128 The said principles 
were developed mainly under the provisions of s. 17 of the 1882 Act. 
That section provides that "in any question between husband and wife as 
1128 See Daniels "The basis for award of financial provision" op. cit., at p. 67. 
On the principles developed under the Matrimonial Proceedings and 
Property Act 1970 (later consolidated under Part II of the Matrimonial 
Causes Act 1973), see chap. five supra. 
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to the title to or possession of property, either party ... may apply, in a 
summary way to any judge of the High Court ... or ... of the county 
court ... and the judge ... may make such order in respect of the property in 
dispute ... as he thinks fit." In the leading English case of Pettitt v. 
Pettitt1129 all the members of the House of Lords agreed that the section 
was purely procedural. The question which the court had to answer was 
"Whose is this?" and not "To whom shall this be given?"1130 In other 
words, the task of the court was to ascertain the rights of the parties. It 
has no power to vary established rights. It is submitted that the 
application of these principles would hamper the court in doing justice 
in a great number of cases as is evidenced by the majority of the case law 
discussed above. A majority of wives have been unfairly disadvantaged 
by the undue reliance on the answer to the question "Whose is this? 
Their domestic contributions of generally looking after the well-being of 
their husband and children have not been given the necessary recognition 
they deserve. 
1129 
1130 
Op. cit. supra. See note 641 supra. 
Per Lord Morris at p. 798. 
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Although the MCA 1971 was enacted with the avowed aim ofimproving 
the. situation of women, the interpretation given to sections 20( 1) and 
21 ( 1) has not significantly advanced the cause of women. The way those 
sections have been formulated leaves the court groping for guidelines to 
interpret their provisions. This has led to the reliance on principles of 
customary and common law and equity relating to the determination of 
ownership of property instead of the development of fair criteria for 
settlement of property. The use of the common law and equitable 
principles has nonetheless gone some way to alleviate the hardship of 
women but the excessive reliance on substantial financial contribution 
from a spouse as opposed to contribution in domestic services have 
stunted the growth of a fair deal for non-contributing spouses, especially 
women, in the acquisition of rights in matrimonial property. There must 
be a recognition that unless a wife plays her part in looking after the 
family a husband cannot play his. The courts' attention must specifically 
be directed by legislation to the importance of contribution by way of 
domestic services in order to "break the shackles of constraint and 
extend a woman's dominion over marital property."1131 
1131 Per Francois J.S.C. in Ribeiro v. Ribeiro supra at p. 120. See also Ribeiro 
Ribeiro (No. 2) supra at pp. 143-144 per Francois J.S.C. 
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( e) Orders that a court can make for financial provision for spouses 
under the MCA 1971 
The orders which the court can make for the financial provision of a 
spouse after divorce are similar to those available to the English courts 
in a similar situation. S. 20(2) of the Act permits financial provision to 
be made either in gross or by instalments. Thus, orders for (a) periodical 
payments and (b) for the payment of a lump sum may be made, so also 
may ( c) property settlement/adjustment orders be made. These orders 
may be made if the court "thinks [it] just and equitable" to do so. If the 
court is minded to make any of these orders it must take into account the 
peculiar circumstances of the parties and their standard of living. The 
orders, in terms of s. 19 of the Act, may be awarded to either the husband 
or the wife. Thus, like under English law, it is "abundantly plain that 
husbands and wives come to the judgment seat in matters of money and 
property upon the basis of complete equality."1132 However, economic 
1132 Per Scarman L.J. in Calderbank v. Ca/derbank (1976] Fam. 93 at p. 103. 
See Erskine v. Erskine (1984-86] 1 G.L.R. 249 where it was held that 
husbands and wives were placed on equal footing as far as costs in 
matrimonial causes were concerned and were subject to the general 
discretion of the court in respect of award and payment of costs. See also 
s. 16 of the MCA 1971 under which either party to a marriage may petition 
for an order for maintenance. 
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realities usually dictate that it would be the wife who will be the 
beneficiary of the court orders particularly where her claim for a share in 
the matrimonial property has been rejected by the court. 1133 
(i) Periodical payments 
This type of order will usually be made where the resources of the parties 
are limited. The order is usually made for the maintenance of the wife 
but the case law indicates that it is only in a few cases that such an order 
is made and in those few cases, it seems that the existence of children of 
the marriage was crucial in making the award. 1134 The amount awarded 
is usually one-third of the joint income of the spouses. This is done by 
adding the incomes of the spouses and dividing it into three; the wife's 
income is then deducted from the dividend and the balance is what the 
husband is required to pay. 1135 Where the court has reason to believe that 
1133 
1134 
1135 
See for example, Beckley v. Beckley [1974] 1 G .L.R. 393, Happee v. Happee 
[1974] 2 G.L.R. 186 and Gyang v. Gyang supra. 
See Wanitzek op. cit. at p. 102 citing the unreported cases of Abobor v. 
Abobor High Court, Accra (16th February 1987) and Ahmed v. Ahmed High 
Court, Accra ( 41h October 1988) as typical examples. 
See Clerk v. Clerk [1981] G.L.R. 583. 
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the payer may default or may be unwilling to pay, it may ask the payer to 
give reasonable security for the payment ordered. 1136 
A drawback to the use of this order is that it perpetuates the financial 
dependence ofthe recipient on the payer thus exacerbating any bitterness 
that would have been generated by the divorce. Furthermore, its 
enforcement may be problematic, hence it has not been frequently 
utilised. 
Under s. 28(2) of the MCA 1971, the death of a party for whose benefit 
an order for financial provision has been made, or the death of the party 
adversely affected by such order, shall automatically terminate the order. 
Consequently, periodical payments automatically cease when the spouse 
entitled to it remarries1137 or the paying spouse dies. 
1136 Sees. 23 of the 1971 Act. 
1137 Sees. 28(1) of the 1971 Act. 
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(ii) Lump sum 
This order is unlikely to be made unless the husband has capital assets 
out of which to pay without crippling his earning power. It is one way 
of removing the bitterness often associated with divorce and to afford a 
"clean break" of the financial relationship between the spouses. 1138 This 
order is, inter alia, intended "to help the wife to resettle in her new 
life. "1139 Thus, in Ribeiro v. Ribeiro1140 the High Court awarded the wife 
a lump sum of C150, 000 which the Court of Appeal thought was 
"woefully inadequate" having regard to the wealth of the appellant and 
the circumstances of the wife-respondent who was in her old age. 1141 On 
the evidence the couple had lived an affluent married life and the 
1138 
1139 
1140 
1141 
See note 4 77 supra. 
See Gyang v. Gyang supra where the wife, though found not to have 
contributed "substantially" to the acquisition of her husband's property, was 
awarded a lump sum ofC150, 000 to enable her to settle down fully to her 
new way of life. See also Okang v. Okang unreported (3rd September 1985) 
High Court, Accra cited by Wanitzek op. cit. at p. 103. 
Supra pp. 462-470. The appeal to the Court of Appeal and the Supreme 
Court was against the order to convey a house to the wife in addition to the 
lump sum ordered. 
Per Abban J.S.C. [1987-88] 2 G.L.R. 464 at pp. 475-476. The Court 
however, did not interfere with the award because there was no cross-
petition by the wife against it. 
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husband had sufficient capital assets out of which he could pay the sum 
awarded. 
Such an order when granted is not affected by the subsequent re-marriage 
of the recipient and it cannot be varied when circumstances change. For 
as stated in Ribeiro v. Ribeiro (No. 2), "Where a court orders a package 
of a lump sum together with immovable property as financial 
provision ... that package cannot be reached by section 28(2) 1142 of Act 
367 ... "1143 
Under s. 41 (2) of the 1971 Act, 1144 when the court is applying the 
provisions of the Act to a customary (including a Mohammedan) 
marriage, a lump-sum payment is referred to as "customary 
1142 
1143 
1144 
See p. 483 supra. 
Per Adade J.S.C. [1989-90) 2 G.L.R 130 at p. 140 citing, with approval, the 
dictum ofSarkodee J. in Aikins v. Aikins [1979) G.L.R. 223 atp. 231. See 
also s. 27(2)(b) of the 1971 Act which provides that where a decree provides 
for a monetary or property settlement in lieu of financial provision and that 
settlement has been executed, the court shall not have the power to review 
or vary the order subsequently in the event of the remarriage of the payee or 
after the death of the payer. 
For further discussion of the subsection, see pp. 490-500 infra. 
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compensation" or "send-off' money1145 in compliance with the 
subsection's injunction "to grant any form of relief recognised by the 
personal law of the parties, either in addition to, or in substitution for, 
the matrimonial reliefs afforded by this Act." 
(iii) Property adjustment/settlement 
The nature of the power to order transfer of property is similar to the 
power to award a lump sum. It is often utilised as an alternative to a 
lump-sum order but the terms of s. 20 of the 1971 Act are such that the 
two orders may be made together as exemplified by the case of Ribeiro 
v. Ribeiro1146 where property belonging to the husband was given to the 
wife in addition to a grant of a lump sum. 
Property settlement orders are seldom made but a possible use of it may 
be to secure an order for periodic payment. The court's power to vest 
property under s. 20( 1) of the 1971 Act is not contingent upon proof that 
the recipient either was the owner of the property or made a substantial 
1145 For further discussion of this payment, see pp. 489-490 infra. 
1146 Supra. 
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contribution towards its acquisition. A submission, based upon English 
and Ghanaian authority, to this effect was rejected by the majority in 
Ribeiro v. Ribeiro. The exercise of the power, in the view of the 
majority, could be part of a package of financial provision which the 
court considered the wife was entitled to. 1147 
A property adjustment or settlement order, like that of a lump sum, is a 
one-off order. It is incapable of variation and is unaffected by the re-
marriage of the recipient and the death ·of either the recipient or the 
spouse against whom the order was made. 1148 
(t) Marriage under customary law 
Under customary law, extra-judicial divorce is the usual mode by which 
a marriage is terminated. Such a process involves the two families of the 
spouses or their representatives who sit to adjudicate on the problems of 
the couple. They would only grant a divorce if they are convinced that 
1147 See pp. 462-470 supra. 
1148 See p. 485 supra. 
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there is no possibility for reconciliation. 1149 Thus, in Attah v. Annan1150 
it was held that a customary marriage can only be terminated after an 
arbitration, to which members of the family of each spouse and neutral 
persons must be invited, had been conducted to find out whether any of 
the spouses had committed any marital offence. If an offence was 
proved, it was the duty of the arbitrators to try their utmost to effect 
reconciliation between the spouses in a genuine attempt to salvage the 
marriage. If the arbitrators ruled that the situation called for a divorce, 
the spouses must then be given an opportunity to ~how whether any of 
them owed any amount or had any property belonging to the other. After 
settling all legitimate accounts between them, the final act of divorce was 
then performed by the husband releasing the wife from conjugal 
1149 See Kuenyehia & Ofei-Aboagye op. cit., at p. 38 and note 1087 supra. 
1150 [1975] I G.L.R. 366. 
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obligation, either by "chalking" her1151 or saying so in the presence of the 
gathering. 1152 
Because of the operation of the rule in Quartey v. Martey1 153 ancillary 
relief in post-extra-judicial divorce, has tended generally to revolve 
around the payment of"send-off'' money. This is a monetary award to 
enable the wife to settle down in her new way of life. In Abobor v. 
Abobor1154 for instance, the court said: 
1151 
1152 
1153 
1154 
In Penin v. Duncan (1869) Sar.F.L.R. 118, one of the assessors in the case 
explained that "chalking" is done by marking with chalk on the shoulders of 
the wife. This was proved by the wife going to neighbours and showing the 
marks and telling them "my husband has chalked me." 
See also Ginbuuro & Anor. v. Kaba [ 1971] 2 G.L.R. 416 where it was held 
that Frafra customary-law marriage is dissolved when the husband's family 
returns to the wife's family their "calabash" (an euphemism for their 
daughter). 
Supra. 
Supra. The extract in the text can be found in Wanitzek op. cit. at p. 104. 
Cf Adai v. Sackey unreported (9th April 1986), High Court, Accra cited by 
Wanitzek op. cit. at p. 104 where the marriage had been dissolved 
customarily out of court and the wife claimed send-off money in the High 
Court. The court held that the proper place to claim send-off is at the place 
or time of the dissolution of the marriage. In the court's view, under 
customary law the guilty party is not entitled to any send-off. 
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"Customarily when a marriage is dissolved, it is part of the 
arrangements of the dissolution to grant "send-off" to the 
innocent party. It has not been possible to ascertain the innocent 
party in the case since both agreed that the marriage has broken 
down beyond reconciliation. .. Looking at the evidence as a whole 
I am satisfied that the petitioner is entitled to some compensation 
for the contribution she has made so far to the marriage. [She is] 
entitled to some financial compensation to resettle her in her new 
way of life. Accordingly, looking at the financial means of the 
couple and the responsibilities placed on them in this judgment 
I will order ... C60, 000 as a lump sum financial provision." 
A spouse to a customary marriage may however resort to a formal 
judicial process for the dissolution of his marriage, in which case he has 
a choice of going to the Community Tribunal 1155 which applies only 
customary law in dissolving the marriage or to apply to the High Court 
under s. 41(2) of the MCA 1971 for the provisions of the Act to be 
applied to his divorce. 1156 This latter provision was a novelty introduced 
1155 
1156 
Sees. 47(1)(t) of the Courts Act 1993. 
See G .R. Woodman "The adaptation of customary law to the Matrimonial 
Causes Act" (1981 & 82) 13 & 14 Review of Ghana Law 218. 
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by the Act as "a bold step which will enable the reliefs and benefits 
afforded by the Act to be made available to persons married under 
customary law or to the children of such marriages."1151 
The enactment of the subsection is a partial attempt to integrate the 
customary laws and statutory laws regarding matrimonial proceedings 
though not the laws regarding the marriages themselves. 1158 However, 
empirical evidence indicates that very few matrimonial proceedings 
relating to customary law marriages are brought under the MCA 1971.1159 
On assumption of jurisdiction over a customary marriage, the High Court 
must apply the provisions of the Act to the said customary marriage, 
though in doing so it is at liberty to modify the provisions to suit the 
peculiar incidents of that marriage. This is subject to the overall 
1157 
1158 
1159 
See 7 Parliamentary Debates (2nd Ser.) 1971 at p. 5 per Victor Owusu, the 
then Minister of Justice. 
See Parliamentary Debates supra at p. 223 and Morris op. cit. 
Wanitzek, op. cit.,at pp. 84-85 states that of 61 High Court cases evaluated 
in 1989, only 9 were concerned with customary-law marriages. This writer's 
own perusal of judicial statistics in the High Court in Accra in November 
1999 supports the paucity of customary-law marriage cases before the High 
Court. 
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requirements of justice, equity and good conscience. In Adjei v. 
Foriwa1160 the plaintiff was the customary-law wife of the defendant, by 
whom he had six children. There was a deterioration in their 
relationship, and the defendant married another woman. The plaintiff 
brought an action claiming, inter alia, a declaration that a certain house 
was the joint property and matrimonial home of the parties and an 
injunction restraining the defendant from ejecting her from the house. 
The defendant also initiated an action against the plaintiff and her parents 
for an order to compel them to dissolve the marriage customarily, or 
alternatively an order of dissolution, and an order ejecting the plaintiff 
from the house. As a result of the defendant's action the plaintiff and her 
children were ordered to be ejected from the house. Subsequently, the 
two actions were consolidated, and the defendant was ordered, pending 
the final determination, to reinstate the plaintiff and her children to the 
section of the house which they previously occupied. The plaintiff chose 
not to return but the children did. 
In applying the peculiar incidents of the marriage in terms of s. 41 (2) of 
the MCA 1971, the court held that Akan customary law knew no 
1160 [1981] G.L.R. 378. 
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personal right of occupation of the matrimonial home by the wife, and 
that since the children in this case belonged to their mother's family they 
also could have no such personal right. 1161 No authority was cited by the 
court for these conclusions but as pointed out by Woodman, 1162 case law 
relating to the rights of wives and children in the matrimonial home after 
the man's death intestate, is to the effect that obligations owed by him to 
his wife and children during his lifetime pass to the family which inherits 
his estate. Such rights were expressed in terms of entitlement to 
accommodation, albeit, not specifically in the matrimonial home.1163 In 
the absence of any customary right of occupation in the matrimonial 
home, the court felt uninhibited in exercising its discretion in the context 
of justice, equity and good conscience. It was the court's view that the 
conditions in the house had become such that the children should be 
1161 
1162 
1163 
The Akan-speaking people are matrilineal, that is, they trace their lineage 
from a common female ancestor. Thus, every married woman who has 
children originates a family which becomes part of the wider family to which 
she belongs. For a description of the matrilineal family see Mills v. Addy 
[1958] 3 W.A.L.R. 357, Sarbah op. cit., at pp. 33-36 and Ollennu op. cit., 
pp. 139-143, 171-174. 
"Adaptation of customary law to the Matrimonial Causes Act, 1971" op. cit., 
atp. 220. 
See for example, Amamoo v. Clement (1871) Sar.F.C.L. 180, Boham v. 
Marshal/(1892) Sar.F.C.L. 193 andMemav. Krakue(1894) Sar.F.C.L. 86. 
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compelled to leave. Although the defendant did not ask for their 
ejectment, the court held it had power to make such order as good 
conscience dictated and the justice of the case demanded. It 
consequently ordered the children to vacate the house within 28 days. 1164 
In Abobor v. Abobor1165 the customary "send-off' money was awarded 
to the wife as part of a lump-sum payment made under s. 19 of the MCA 
1971. The same position was taken by the court in Jonas v. Ofori1166 and 
Mensah v. Berkoe. 1167 
The court is also enjoined to have regard to the peculiar incidents of that 
marriage in determining appropriate relief, financial provision and child 
custody arrangements. Thus, in applying the provisions of the Act to a 
customary marriage, the court must have regard to the interests of other 
wives, if any, where the application has been brought by one of them. 
The existence of other wives will qualify as a peculiar incident of the 
marriage in question meriting consideration in determining the 
1164 
1165 
1166 
1167 
See also Mensah v. Bekoe [1975] 2 G.L.R. 347. 
Supra. 
Unreported (11th January 1988), High Court, Accra cited by Wanitzek op. 
cit. at p. 104. 
Supra. 
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appropriate relief. In Oparebea v. Mensah1168 the court, in considering 
financial provision and a declaration of interest in the matrimonial assets 
of a marriage, in which there were five other wives and children, awarded 
the wife, who brought the action, one of the houses which belonged to 
the husband and refused to make any financial provision. This was 
because the court took into accaunt the interests of the other wives and 
children of the husband. The court considered that the award of the 
house was sufficient for her needs in light of the circumstances of the 
case. The decision was made easy because there were several other 
properties available. There was no indication in the judgment as to how 
the court would have exercised its discretion if, for instance, there was 
only one house or one farm and all the wives had contributed in the same 
way as the wife who brought the action. Presumably in such a 
circumstance, the appropriate relief would have been financial provision 
in the form of a lump-sum payment or perhaps periodic monthly 
payments, which the court may order the husband to provide reasonable 
security for their payment in terms of s. 23 of the Act. 
1168 Supra. 
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One of the questions ansmg from s. 41 (2), which has not been 
satisfactorily answered, is whether the court can assume jurisdiction to 
grant relief under the Act in the case of a polygamous marriage, merely 
because a party to such a marriage has filed a petition for divorce there, 
or whether the party has to apply to the court, before the petition for 
divorce is filed, for leave to apply the provisions of the Act to the 
case. 1169 In Adjei v. Foriwaa1170 the court adopted the former view when 
it held that any party to a polygamous marriage who seeks relief from the 
High Court must be deemed to have made an application to the court to 
apply the provisions of the Act to the marriage. It is submitted that this 
is the correct approach as it is in consonance with the desire to integrate 
the customary law on matrimonial causes with that of the marriage under 
the Ordinance. Besides, it is not in the interest of justice to unnecessarily 
put impediments in the way of litigants in the form of leave to apply to 
the court before the provisions of the Act can be applied to the customary 
marriage in question. If the goal of giving a customary wife a fair deal 
is to be achieved then it is desirable to encourage her to take advantage 
1169 
1170 
See W.C.E. Daniels "Dissolution of customary law marriages by the court" 
( 1977) 9 Review of Ghana Law 71. 
Supra. 
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of the more favourable provisions of the Act. 1171 The less impediments 
in her way, the better the prospect of her benefiting from the provisions 
of the Act. In the light of evidence of infrequent use of the Act by 
spouses of customary man:iages, this is the way to proceed.1172 
A second question in relation to the subsection that has not been 
satisfactorily answered is whether a party whose customary marriage has 
already been dissolved extra-judicially can nevertheless still come within 
the ambit of the subsection and raise post-divorce claims under the Act? 
Although there have been cases1173 in which post-divorce ancillary 
matters of customary inarriages that have been dissolved extra-judicially 
have been dealt with, the court in other cases did not apply the provisions 
of the Act. Instead, the principles of the law of trusts in combination 
with customary law were utilised. In Domfe v. Adu1174 for example, the 
1171 
1172 
1173 
1174 
Research has not disclosed a single case in which a husband of a customary-
law marriage has opposed the application of the provisions of the Act to his 
marriage on the ground that the application of customary law will be more 
advantageous to him. See Wanitzek op. cit. at p. 80 note 26. 
See further Wanitzek op. cit. p. 80. 
See for example, Adai v. Sackey supra, Abobor v. Abob'Or supra, Jonas v. ' 
Ofori supra, Mensah v. Berkoe supra and Domfe v. Adu supra. 
Supra. 
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court held that the appellant was the sole proprietor of a business 
registered in his name but "pierced through the veil" to find out who 
were the real beneficiaries of the business. On the evidence, the court· 
found that the respondent contributed the initial capital for the business 
and contributed in kind, working without wages. Consequently, even 
though the business stood in the appellant's name as the sole owner, he 
held it as well as the other profits and the proceeds accruing therefrom in 
trust for himself and the respondent. Abban J.A said: 
"In my view, this was a proper case where the court should 
invoke equitable principles and refer to decided cases, both 
English and local, to elucidate or explain how the parties stood 
to each other in relation to the business itself as well as the 
profits and the proceeds realised therefrom."1175 
The court did not give any reason why the provisions of the Act were not 
applied. However, as seen from cases such as Abobor v. Abobor, 1176 the 
power given to the court to grant any form of relief recognised by the 
1175 Atp. 665. 
1176 Supra. 
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personal law of the parties to the proceedings, either in addition to or in 
substitution for the matrimonial reliefs afforded by the Act, 1177 has been 
used to provide "send off' money as a financial relief to enable a wife to 
settle down in her new way oflife. One can therefore conclude from this 
that a spouse whose customary-law marriage has been dissolved extra-
judicially can still apply to the High Court for the provisions of the Act 
to be used for post-divorce ancillary reliefs. 
The efficacy of the subsection has been said1178 to be minimal because of 
the limitation of the jurisdiction to the higher courts, and the application 
of the provisions of the Act only on application of a party. Other factors 
militating against frequent use of the provisions of the Act by customary-
law spouses are the lack of knowledge among rural dwellers about the 
possibility of applying for relief under the Act, the lack of resources to 
obtain the services of a lawyer even if such knowledge exists, 1179 and the 
1177 
1178 
1179 
Sees. 41(2)(b) of the Act. 
See Wanitzek op. cit. at p. 81. 
The impact of lack of resources on women in taking legal actions against 
their husbands or paramours is seen from the experience gathered from the 
Legal Services Centre of the Ghana Chapter of the International Federation 
of Women Lawyers, known by its Spanish acronym as FIDA. Experience 
at the Centre shows that women are unable to seek maintenance for their 
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constraints placed on such dwellers by customary insistence on 
matrimonial disputes being settled extra-judicially by the families of the 
spouses. Furthermore, local cultural practices may militate against a wife 
bringing an action against her husband in court. 1180 Despite the minimal 
impact of the subsection on customary marriages, it is submitted that it 
has been generally beneficial to women who have used it because the 
rights conferred by the 1971 Act are not available under the various 
customary laws. What is needed to further enhance its efficacy is 
sustained information on its availability to those for whom it was 
intended, namely women married under customary law. To this end, 
non-Governmental Organisations such as Women & Law in West 
Africa1181 are urged to take up the challenge. 
1180 
1181 
children in the Family Tribunal unless offered free legal assistance. See 
Kuenyehia & Ofei-Aboagye op. cit at p. 49. 
For example, it has been found among the Anlo-Ewe tribe that a woman 
would not sue her children's father for maintenance of the children for fear 
of being accused by the community that she is lazy or cannot find a way of 
caring for the children. See P.W. Jones-Quartey "The effects of the 
Maintenance of Children Act on Akan and Ewe notions of parental 
responsibility" in Domestic Rights and Duties in Southern Ghana, C. 
Oppong (ed.), Legon, Institute of African Studies, University of Ghana, 
1974. 
This Organisation is based in the Human Rights Centre of the Faculty of 
Law, University of Ghana. It carries out research on specific areas of law 
that affect the lives of women. 
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3. CONCLUSION 
The shortcomings of the separate matrimonial property regime in Ghana 
have been tackled vigorously by the courts with the aid of the legislature. 
However, like the position in England, the attempts have been patchy and 
the outcome has not always been satisfactory. Of particular note is the 
general lack of recognition of a wife's domestic services as a contribution 
to the acquisition of matrimonial property. It is rather arbitrary and unfair 
that in the modem cash economy, where almost every activity has a 
monetary value, a wife is denied her just deserts for her contribution in 
kind to the upkeep of the family. As pointed out by a learned writer, 1182 
1182 
" ... in view of the socio-economic realities of the Ghanaian 
situation, it is not possible to assert that there are many 
households where the woman does nothing but domestic chores. 
There may be a few such cases. Even in those situations, the 
domestic skills of the woman ought to be quantified We suggest 
therefore that legislation be introduced to rectify the situation." 
Kuenyehia "Distribution of matrimonial property ... " op. cit. at p. 107. 
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Despite the lofty intentions behind the Matrimonial Causes Act 1971 to 
ensure an equitable readjustment of the property rights of spouses on 
divorce, there are still problems, such as the absence of guidelines for the 
exercise of the court's discretion, to be resolved. Factors such as: 
(a) the length of the marriage, 
(b) the kind of economic activity engaged in by the spouses, and 
( c) the domestic services of a spouse 
must be legislated as factors a court must take into account in determining 
rights to matrimonial property on divorce. The lack of such guidelines 
has given rise to the courts resorting to customary, common-law and 
equitable principles in applying the provisions of the Act to the 
determination of the spouses' proprietary rights. The result has not been 
satisfactory. It is submitted that the legislature should provide a clear 
statutory basis for the right of a divorced woman to a fair share of 
matrimonial property.1183 This right to a fair share of matrimonial 
1183 Ibid 
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property has been enshrined in the Constitution as a right of every 
Ghanaian.1184 Article 22 of the 1992 Constitution provides that: 
"(1) A spouse shall not be deprived of a reasonable provision out 
of the estate of a spouse whether or not the spouse died having 
made a will. 
(2) Parliament shall, as soon as practicable after the coming into 
force of this Constitution, enact legislation regulating the 
property rights of spouses. 
(3) With a view to achieving the full realisation of the rights 
referred to in clause (2) of this article - (a) Spouses shall have 
equal access to property jointly acquired during marriage; (b) 
assets which are jointly acquired during marriage shall be 
distributed equitably between the spouses upon dissolution of the 
marriage." 
These provisions are emphatic declaration of equitable distribution of 
matrimonial property and taking into account the primacy of the 
1184 See W.C.E. Daniels "The impact of the 1992 Constitution on family rights 
in Ghana" ( 1996) Journal of African Law 183. 
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Constitution, should override any principle of law or custom to the 
contrary. It is hoped that the legislature will sooner rather than later fulfil 
the constitutional obligation imposed on it by Article 22 of the 
Constitution.1185 
1185 The then Attorney-General, Dr. Obed Asamoah, was reported as saying the 
enactment of a law to regulate the property rights of spouses has not been 
neglected by the government. The Law Reform Commission has been asked 
to submit proposals for consideration. See the Free Press, Friday March 121h 
- Thursday March 18th 1999 at p. 12. The new government that assumed 
power in January 2001 is yet to make a pronouncement on the issue. 
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
A COMPARATIVE SUMMARY OF THE MATRIMONIAL 
PROPERTY REGIMES IN SOUTH AFRICA, ENGLAND AND 
GHANA 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The general survey in the preceding three chapters of the matrimonial 
regimes in the selected countries shows progressive attempts to improve 
those regimes in the light of changing social and economic circumstances. 
The fundamental thrust of the improvements in these countries is the need 
to better the lot of married women. 1186 Two types of approaches are 
discernible, namely the discretionary approach and the fixed rule 
approach. In this chapter a comparative look will be taken at these 
approaches to see what lessons can be learnt from them in order to 
1186 In South Africa for instance, a view has been expressed that although the 
Matrimonial Property Act 88 of 1984 does not distinguish between husband 
and wife, the introduction of the accrual system by that Act is especially to 
enable a wife, who is married out of community of property and out of 
community of profit and loss, and who is not economically active, to share 
in the economic wealth of her ex-husband. See Visser & Potgieter op. cit., 
at p. 146. 
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indicate in which direction the Botswana law on matrimonial property 
rights should develop. 
2. THE DISCRETIONARY APPROACH TO DETERMINING 
MATRIMONIAL PROPERTY RIGHTS 
The discretionary approach takes the form of a conferment of a discretion 
on the court to redistribute the matrimonial property on divorce as it 
thinks the justice of the particular case warrants. The discretionary 
approach features prominently in England and Ghana and to a very 
limited extent in South Africa. In England and Ghana, the courts are 
given wide and flexible discretionary powers to distribute and reallocate 
the parties' resources irrespective of the rights of ownership but according 
to specified statutory criteria.1187 The discretion is exercisable in these 
two countries mainly in regard to monogamous marriages but on 
application of a party to a polygamous marriage, the court can exercise its 
statutory discretion with regard to that marriage. 1188 
1187 
1188 
In Ghana no such statutory criteria exist. See Achiampong v. Achiampong 
[1982-83) G.L.R. 1017 atp. 1035. 
In England, the discretion may be exercised in regard to a polygamous 
marriage under s. 47(1) of the MCA 1973. That section allows the court to 
grant any matrimonial relief existing under the 1973 Act where the marriage 
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In South Africa on the other hand, the courts do not have a general 
discretion to redistribute matrimonial property. The limited discretion 
that exists applies only to a limited category of monogamous marriages 1189 
which category will eventually disappear altogether1190 although the 
Recognition of Customary Marriages Act 120of1998 has extended it to 
1189 
1190 
was entered into under a law which permits polygamy. The effect of this 
statutory provision is to make available to spouses of such marriages all 
forms of relief which can be classified as matrimonial. See Re Sehota 
[1978]3 All E.R. 385 at p. 389. In Ghana, s. 41(2) of the MCA 1971 gives 
. the court the requisite power to apply the provisions of the Act to 
polygamous marriages. Despite the fact that the majority of marriages 
contracted in Ghana is potentially polygamous, only a few of them are dealt 
with under the MCA 1971. See pp. 490-500 supra. 
Sees. 7(3) of the Divorce Act 70of1979 (applied only to some marriages 
out of community of property). Under s. 7(9) of the Act a South African 
court may exercise a discretion to order a redistribution of assets in a 
marriage subject to a foreign system ifthat system allows the court to order 
a redistribution in that country. However, Cronje & Heaton op. cit. at pp. 
157-158 have asserted that this amendment achieved little as it merely 
restated the already existing rule that the proprietary consequences of a 
marriage are governed by the lex loci domicilli (the law of the place where 
the husband is domiciled at the time of the marriage). It still does not answer 
the question whether s. 7(3) of Act 70of1979 can also be invoked in respect 
of a foreign marriage, they added. 
See N.D.C. Dillon "The financial consequences of divorce ... " op. cit., at pp. 
275-276. 
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cover polygamous customary marriages. 1191 In exercising this limited 
discretion the courts in South Africa, like their English counterparts, are 
guided by statutory criteria.1192 
(a) Highlights of the application of the statutory criteria 
In applying the statutory framework for the determination of the 
proprietary rights of the spouses the rights of ownership are secondary to 
the needs of the spouses.1193 Nevertheless, it is still important in some 
cases to determine ownership of a particular property especially where 
one spouse is claiming a definite interest in the said property as opposed 
to asking the court for a discretionary benefit. In England and Ghana the 
principle of separate property by which each spouse may acquire and deal 
1191 
1192 
1193 
Sees. 8(4)(b) of the 1998 Act which gives a court dissolving a polygamous 
customary marriage, inter alia, all the powers contemplated under s. 7( 4) (5), 
(6) or (7) of the 1979 Act. 
Sees. 7(5) of Act 70of1979 ands. 8(4) of the 1998 Act. 
Seethe English cases of Browne v. Pritchard[1915] 3 AllE.R. 721 atp. 724 
and S. v. S. [1976] l All E.R. 56 at p. 60. Although it may be argued that 
since the enactment of the Matrimonial and Family Proceedings Act 1984, 
the emphasis has shifted to the needs of children, the financial needs of the 
spouses are still regarded as a pre-eminent factor under s. 25 of the English 
MCA 1973. 
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with his or her property as if he or she were single, is of fundamental 
importance. 1194 With a few exceptions, 1195 the fact that two people are 
married makes no difference to their ownership· of property. The 
marriage relationship gives rise to certain obligations, including that of 
support,1196 which may directly or indirectly affect a spouse's liberty to 
\ 
deal freely with his or her property. 1197 But neither these obligations nor 
1194 
1195 
1196 
1197 
In South Africa, the principle is also important in marriages out of 
community of property and out of community of profit and loss as well as 
those out of community of property but with the accrual system. See pp. 
205-243 supra. 
For example, in England under s. 37 the Matrimonial Proceedings and 
Property Act 1970, a spouse who has contributed substantially to the 
improvement of the other spouses' s property may thereby acquire an interest 
in the property. See pp. 315-320 supra. 
A husband for instance, has an obligation to support his wife according to 
his economic circumstances. See the English case of Povey v. Povey [ 1972] 
Fam. 40. A similar obligation is thrust upon Ghanaian husbands. See 
Kuenyehia & Ofei-Aboagye op. cit., at p. 31. In South Africa, spouses owe 
each other a reciprocal duty of support. See Jodaiken v. Jodaiken 1978 ( 1) 
S.A. 784 (W) at p. 788. 
In England, s. 30 of the Family Law Act 1996 gives the non-owning spouse 
certain "matrimonial home rights" such as the right not to be evicted or 
excluded, if in occupation, from the matrimonial home by the other spouse 
except with the leave of the court. This section of the 1996 Act is in 
operation. See The Family Law Act 1996 (Commencement No. 2) Order 
1997. See also note 734 supra. Also in South Africa, s. 8 of the 
Matrimonial Property Act 88 of 1984 allows a spouse in a marriage out of 
community with the accrual system to apply to the court for an order of 
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the marriage relationship itself directly changes the ownership of 
property. English and Ghanaian law have no concept of community of 
property whereby property is owned in equal shares during marriage and 
divided equally on divorce. The statutory discretion given to the court in 
these countries does not alter the legal rules which determine the 
ownership of property. For instance, the statutory injunction in England 
to take into account a spouse's contribution by looking after the home1198 
does not confer upon such a spouse a legal right in the assets of the other 
spouse. It only empowers the court to have regard to such contribution in 
deciding whether or not to transfer to the claimant spouse some or any 
part of the other spouse's property. In Ghana, it has been asserted that 
divorce per se does not confer on a spouse any beneficial interest or 
otherwise in the property, movable or immovable, of the other spouse. 
The spouse claiming a share in the other spouse's property must either 
1198 
immediate division of the accrual of the marriage. The order is granted ifhe 
can show that his share in the accrual of the estate of the other spouse at the 
dissolution of the marriage is being or will probably be seriously prejudiced 
by the conduct or proposed conduct of the other spouse. See pp. 237-241 
supra. 
See pp. 351-356 supra. 
511 
prove an agreement to share or have made a substantial contribution 
towards the acquisition of the property in dispute.1199 
Similarly, in South Africa the statutory provision for the exercise of the 
limited discretion for redistribution of matrimonial ass~ts does not alter 
the law of ownership pertaining to marriages (including customary 
marriages) which come within the scope of the court's discretion .. Like 
the position in England, it only allows the court to order what it deems 
just in the circumstances of the case. This is to be done by taking account 
of stated factors which have been described as "remarkably brief' in view 
of the importance of the subject.1200 
(i) Determining ownership of matrimonial property 
Because most claimants cannot prove that they have a legal right to the 
disputed property, the courts in England and Ghana have relied upon the 
equitable doctrines of implied, resulting or constructive trust in 
1199 
1200 
See Achiampong v. Achiampong supra at p. I 036 and also pp. 448-452 
supra. 
See Dillon op. cit. at p. 283. 
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determining beneficial interest in such disputed property. 1201 The 
underlying principle of all three doctrines is that it would in the 
circumstances be unconscionable to allow the legal owner to assert the 
absolute ownership which appears on the deed of conveyance. However, 
although unconscionability may be a necessary pre-requisite for asserting 
an equitable interest by way of these equitable doctrines, it is not 
sufficient merely to show that denial of a beneficial interest would be 
unfair to the claimant. For, as it was put by Slade L.J. in the English case 
of Thomas v. Fuller-Brown: 1202 
1201 
1202 
" ... under English law the mere fact that A expends money or 
labour on B's property does not by itself entitle A to an interest in 
the property. In the absence of agreement or a common intention 
to be inferred from all the circumstances or any question of 
estoppel, A will normally have no claim whatever on the property 
in the circumstances." 
See pp. 287-307 and 437-448 supra. 
[1988] I F.L.R. 237 at p. 240. 
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The circumstances in which a claimant would be successful in asserting 
an equitable interest were clarified by the decision of the House of Lords 
inL/oyds Bank Pie. v. Rosset.1203 This case, which dealt with constructive 
trust, 1204 reiterated the law to be that there must be an express or implied 
agreement, arrangement or understanding that the claimant has an interest 
in the property and in either case he or she has acted to his/her detriment. 
Where there is no such agreement, arrangement or understanding, the 
court may infer an intention to share the property beneficially from the 
conduct of the parties. In this latter circumstance, direct contribution to 
the purchase price by the claimant would readily justify the necessary 
inference. Despite this clarification, one cannot state the law in this area 
with any measure of confidence because practical difficulties do arise 
which cannot be reconciled with the case law. 1205 
These equitable doctrines have not featured in the case law of South 
Africa because, one suspects, of the dominance of the fixed rules for 
determining matrimonial property and also because the division of 
1203 
1204 
1205 
Supra. 
The distinction between the three types of trusts is not always clear. See 
Gissing v. Gissing supra. 
See dictum of Mustill L.J. in Grant v. Edwards supra at p. I 0 I. 
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matrimonial assets, of those spouses married out of community of 
property, had not been a function of the courts prior to the introduction of 
s. 7(3) of Act 70 of 1979. The matter had hitherto been governed 
exclusively by antenuptial contract. 1206 
The situation in England and Ghana is in contrast with that of South 
Africa where the basic premise is that the type of marriage contracted by 
the spouses determine the matrimonial property consequences of the 
marriage.1207 Accordingly, matrimonial property must be divided 
according to the rules governing the type of marriage contracted that is, 
community of property, the accrual system, or complete separation of 
property (unless the spouses enter into a settlement agreement). 1208 Thus, 
the South African matrimonial property regimes provide extreme points 
in a range of options with a linking bridge between the two extremes. On 
the one hand there is the universal community of property, and on the 
other, the contractual alternative of complete separation. Sandwiched 
between these two extremes is the marriage out of community of property 
1206 
1207 
1208 
See pp. 160-162 supra. 
See pp. 145-147 supra. 
See pp. 177-243 supra. 
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and out of community of profit and loss but with the accrual system. The 
object of this latter system is to cause some of the advantages of a 
marriage in community of property to apply to a marriage out of 
community of property, a system that can be described as deferred 
community of gains. 1209 
(ii) Domestic contribution by a spouse 
One significant criterion for determining the beneficial interest in the 
disputed property is the intangible domestic contribution of the married 
woman. Legislation in England, for instance, enjoins the court to take 
into account "contributions made by looking after the home or caringfor 
the family". 1210 Similarly, in South Africa the court is enjoined to take 
into account the contribution made "directly or indirectly during the 
1209 
1210 
See Hahlo "Husband and Wife" op. cit., at p. 304. 
Sees. 25(2)( f) of the English Matrimonial Causes Act 1973. The subsection 
does not distinguish between husband and wife but in practice it is the wife 
who will usually benefit from its provisions. In Daly v. General Steam 
Navigation Ltd [1981] l W.L.R. 120, the English Court of Appeal 
recognised the economic cost and value of house work as a separate head of 
damage in an action for negligence. See also K. O'Donovan "Legal 
recognition of the value of housework" (1978) 8 Family Law 215 and M. 
Brazier "The cost of 'women's' work" (1981) 44 Modern Law Review 725. 
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subsistence of the marriage to the maintenance or increase of the estate 
of the other spouse". 1211 But this is restricted to a very limited category 
of marriages, such as, marriages entered into in terms of antenuptial 
contract prior to 1984 excluding community of property and profit and 
loss and any form of accrual system.1212 In marriages outside this limited 
category, for instance, marriage in community of property, the wife's 
services in managing the joint household and caring for the children are 
taken into account when the court is determining whether or not to grant 
a forfeiture of benefit order.1213 Thus, a wife who has been ordered to 
forfeit the benefits of the marriage would be allowed to keep what she had 
contributed to the joint estate.1214 However, in the case of a customary 
marriage, such contribution of a wife is unlikely to be taken into account 
1211 
1212 
1213 
1214 
Sees. 7(4) of the South African Divorce Act 70of1979. This subsection, 
like s. 25(2)(f) of the English MCA 1973, does not distinguish between 
husband and wife. However, it is the wife of a marriage to which the 
subsection applies who will usually benefit from its provisions. See 
Beaumont v. Beaumont supra pp. 209-210 where it was held that the mere 
fact that a wife has fulfilled her traditional role as wife and mother amounts 
to a contribution to her husband's estate. 
Seep. 205 and note 439 supra. 
See pp. 194-200 supra. See also Gatesv. Gates 1940N.P.D. 361 at pp. 365-
366. 
See Singh v. Singh 1983 (1) S.A. 781 (C). 
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because of the view taken by customary law that whatever a wife 
contributes towards the well-being of the family belongs to the 
husband. 1215 
The rationale behind these statutory injunctions seems to be the increasing 
recognition that marriage is a special partnership, the economic 
dimension of which is expressed in terms of purposive interaction 
between the spouses. Thus, in the words of Gray,1216 
1215 
1216 
"[W]here there is an internal division of labour between a wage-
earner and a home-maker, the respective roles of the spouses are 
rightly perceived to be complementary. The wife's domestic effort 
is regarded as a dynamic causal factor in the acquisition of 
matrimonial property, since the performance of her supportive 
and complimentary role is functional sine qua non of the viability 
of her family as an economic unit." 
Seep. 252 supra. 
Rea/location of Property on Divorce op. cit., at p. 35. 
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The same view was reiterated by Sir Jocelyn Simon P. when he said: 1217 
"In the generality of marriages the wife bears and rears children 
and minds the home. She thereby frees her husband for his 
economic activities. Since it is her performance of her function 
which enables the husband to perform his, she is in justice 
entitled to share in its fruits." 1218 
This type of contribution comes in various forms, such as providing 
"general and moral support to a man sometimes hard pressed by business 
1217 
1218 
In an extra-judicial lecture to the English Law Society titled "The seven 
pillars of divorce reform" (1965) 62 Law Society Gazette at p. 345. 
See also para. 69 of the English Law Commission's Report on Financial 
Provision in Matrimonial Proceedings (1969) Law Com. No. 25 which 
recommended the recognition of the contribution made (normally by the 
wife) in looking after the home and the family and para. 644 of the Report 
of the Royal Commission on Marriage and Divorce op. cit. See further B.A. 
Rwezaura "Division of matrimonial assets under the Tanzania marriage law" 
(1984) 17 VerfassungundRechtin Ubersee 177atp.181 andthedictumof 
Van den Heever J. in the South African case of Edelstein v. Edelstein supra 
at p. 14. 
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worries that a good wife does" 1219 or for being an "excellent mother"1220 
or supplying "the infrastructure and support by which [the husband] was 
able to work hard, prosper and accumulate his wealth". 1221 An attempt 
in South Africa to restrict the wife's contribution to those made over and 
above her normal domestic functions was rejected by the then Appellate 
Division in Beaumont v. Beaumont, the court saying: 1222 
1219 
1220 
1221 
1222 
"there can be no doubt that the plain meaning of these words is 
so wide that they embrace the performance by the wife of her 
ordinary duties of looking after the home and caring for the 
family." 
See the English case of Trippas v. Trippas [1973) Fam. 134 per Scarman 
L.J. See also the South African case of Beaumont v. Beaumont 1987 (1) 
S.A. 967 (A) at p. 997 per Botha J.A. 
See the English case of Wachtel v. Wachtel [1973) 1 All E.R. 829 at p. 831. 
Seethe English case of Vicaryv. Vicary [1992) 2 F.L.R. 271. See also Page 
v. Page [1981) 2 F.L.R. 198 at p. 205 where the court held that the wife had 
contributed by being ''practically involved and has participated in a family 
business project, whether farming, industry, or otherwise ... " 
1987 (1) S.A. 967 (A) atp. 997 per Botha J.A. 
......... ------------~- • 
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In Ghana however, there is no legislative injunction for the courts to take 
indirect contribution into account. The law of separate property, which 
applies in that country, does not have any means for measuring, in terms 
of property rights, the value of a wife's contribution as a homemaker. 1223 
Consequently, the courts in the absence of a legislative injunction have 
generally ignored this type of contribution in assessing a wife's share in 
matrimonial property. 1224 
The recognition of a wife's domestic services as a contribution in 
determining the proprietary rights of spouses on divorce is a welcome 
development. It accords with legitimate expectations of wives, who in 
most cases, after diligently looking after the husband and children expect 
to benefit from property acquired during the marriage. It is true that the 
underlying assumption for the recognition of a wife's domestic services, 
that is, a wife is not normally engaged in economic activity outside the 
1223 
1224 
See further the views of the Canadian Law Reform Commission expressed 
in their Working Paper No. 8 on Family Law (1975) at pp. 9-10. 
SeethedictaofFrancois J.S.C. inRibeirov. Ribeiro [1989-90] 2 G.L.R. 109 
at pp. 118-120. However, some attempts have been made in a few cases to 
recognize a wife's domestic contributions. See for example, Bentsi-Enchill 
v. Bentsi-Enchi// supra, Odoteye v. Odoteye and Oparebea v. Mensah supra. 
521 
home, has changed over the years. m5 Nevertheless, it is still important 
that her domestic services be recognised within the context of the family's 
economic well-being. For even where she is engaged in economic 
activity outside the home, her earnings are comparatively smaller than 
those of her husband. In addition to her economic activity outside the 
home, she is still, in many cases, expected to discharge the household 
responsibilities as well. 1226 These tremendous responsibilities of the wife 
deserve the recognition accorded them in legislation in England and 
South Africa. 
(iii) The one-third rule 
In the exercise of their discretion, the English courts tended initially to 
rely on the one-third rule, by which, as a starting point, a wife is regarded 
1225 
1226 
For example, in England it was reported in 1994 that the majority of married 
women had paid employment and more than three-quarters of all women 
aged between 35 and 45 were economically active, albeit often in low-paid 
and part-time jobs. See (1994) 24 Social Trends 57, 59-60 cited by Cretney 
& Masson op. cit., at p. 219. There has also been an increase over the years 
in the economic activities of wives outside the matrimonial home in Ghana. 
See A. Kuenyehia op. cit., at p. 94 and p. 391 supra. 
See Cretney & Masson op. cit., at p. 220. 
• 
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as entitled to one third of the combined resources of the parties.1227 
Subsequently, the popularity of this rule waned and is now regarded as 
just one of the factors the court will take into account in assessing the 
post-divorce needs of the spouses. This so-called rule was held by the 
then Appellate Division to be inapplicable to South African law1228 
although there had been occasions when lower courts had utilised it.1229 
It is only meant to be a rational starting point in the court's exercise of its 
discretion, 1230 but it is not an appropriate starting point in all cases.1231 It 
will be better, as suggested by the then South African Appellate Division, 
not to curtail the court's discretion by placing judicial glosses on it. 1232 
Despite this criticism, the one-third rule seems to have worked fairly well 
1227 
1228 
1229 
1230 
1231 
1232 
See Wachtel v. Wachtel supra at p. 839 per Lord Denning M.R. See also 
Bullock v. Bullock supra, Dew v. Dew supra and White v. White supra. 
See Beaumont v. Beaumont supra at p. 991. 
See Van Gysen v. Van Gysen 1986 (1) S.A. 56 (C), MacGregor v. 
MacGregor 1986 (3) S.A. 644 (C) and Kroon v. Kroon 1986 (4) S.A. 616 
(E). 
Wachtel v. Wachtel supra at p. 839. In view of the decision in Beaumont's 
case, the one-third rule may not even be used as a starting point in South 
Africa. 
See O'D v. O'D supra at p. 91. 
Beaumont v. Beaumont supra at p. 991 . 
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in England even though it has been repeatedly emphasised that any such 
starting point must give way to the peculiar circumstances of individual 
cases and the specific statutory factors. 1233 
The Ghanaian courts have not utilised the one-third rule and there is 
hardly any discussion of it in the case law. 1234 They have rather 
concentrated on trying to alleviate the harsh effects on married women of 
the application of customary law. The Ghanaian courts' attitude in this 
regard has been summarised as follows: 
1233 
1234 
" ... [J]t is fairly clear that in dealing with disputes between 
husband and wife as to title to property jointly acquired with the 
assistance of each other, the proper function of the court is to 
decide the case on the footing of the agreement of the parties at 
the time of the transaction, and their intention or inferences that 
can be drawn from their conduct, e.g. contribution to the 
See Burgess v. Burgess [1996] 2 F.L.R. 33 (CA). 
In Clerk v. Clerk [1981] G.L.R. 583 the court used the one-third rule in 
assessing the maintenance payable by the husband. Kuenyehia "Distribution 
of matrimonial property ... " op. cit. at p. 107 has suggested that legislation 
should guarantee one-third of all matrimonial property to the wife should the 
marriage break up. This, according to her, is the absolute minimum which 
any woman faced with divorce should be entitled to. 
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purchase price. In the absence of any evidence as to what was 
agreed or intended the doctrine of resulting trust may be invoked 
to arrive at a just and equitable decision." 1235 
Once a spouse has been found to have acquired a share in the other 
spouse's property by a contribution, it has been suggested that the best 
formula for determining the beneficial interest is for the Ghanaian courts 
to draw a prima facie inference that they are entitled to an equal share, at 
any rate where the respective contributions are substantial.1236 It is 
submitted that this inference should give way to the peculiar 
circumstances of individual cases. Thus, for instance, where the 
contribution is neither substantial nor financial, the court should be able 
to adopt a different formula for the distribution of the matrimonial 
property. 
1235 
1236 
Daniels "The ascertainment of property rights between husband and wife" 
op. cit., at p. 151. 
Ibid. at p. 147 relying on the dictum of Lord Denning M.R. in Gissing v. 
Gissing supra. Cf White v. White supra. 
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(iv) Conduct of the spouses during the marriage 
Another factor that has featured in the courts' exercise of their discretion 
is the conduct of the parties. In both England and South Africa conduct 
is one of the factors the court is enjoined to take into account in the post-
divorce adjustment of matrimonial property. 1237 This factor, it is 
submitted, is antithetical to the "no fault" principle underlying the divorce 
law of both countries. In realisation of this, it has been held in England 
that conduct should only be taken into account in determining financial 
provision on divorce if it is "both obvious and gross". 1238 The statutory 
framework for the exercise of the discretion is designed essentially as a 
financial and not a moral exercise. Therefore, a spouse's conduct should 
generally be ignored except where in the court's opinion it would be 
inequitable to ignore the said conduct. 1239 Similarly, in South Africa the 
1237 
1238 
1239 
Sees. 25(2)(g) of the 1973 English statute ands. 7(2) of the South African 
Divorce Act 70 of 1979 with regard to maintenance order. In Beaumont v. 
Beaumont supra, it was held that the wording of s. 7(5)( d) ("any other factor 
which should in the opinion of the court be taken into account') is wide 
enough to take a party's misconduct into account when a redistribution order 
is being considered under s. 7(3) of the Act. 
See Wachtel v. Wachtel supra at p. 835. 
See pp. 356-365 supra. 
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courts have been urged to take a conservative approach in assessing a 
party's conduct as a relevant factor and where there is no conspicuous 
disparity between the conduct of one party and that of the other, the court 
should not indulge in an exercise to apportion the fault of the parties, and 
thus nullify the advantages of the "no fault" system of divorce. 1240 
In contrast to England and South Africa, Ghana has no statutory provision 
regarding the taking into account of the parties' conduct in determining 
their proprietary rights. However, during the parliamentary debates on the 
Bill which was eventually passed as the Matrimonial Causes Act 1971, 
the then Attorney-General expressed the following view on the possible 
role conduct will play under the Act. 
1240 
"We would expect a certain standard of decorum from the woman 
whilst she is living on the charity of the former husband. I think 
it unwise to allow the woman to continue to draw this permanent 
alimony in spite of this open conduct. When it has become clear 
that the woman is flirting openly with a gentleman or gentlemen, 
it will be proper for the paying party to go to court ... to say that 
Beaumont v. Beaumont supra at p. 994 and pp 222-224 supra. 
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because of certain circumstances the court should rescind or vary 
such order for the payment of the alimony."1241 
This view clearly relates to an order for periodical payments which may 
last until a remarriage of the recipient spouse or for the joint lives of the 
spouses unless varied or rescinded by the court. This, it is submitted, is 
an appropriate case where conduct should be a relevant factor. But in the 
absence of a clear statutory guideline on the point and taking into account 
the "no fault" principle underlying the Act, it is submitted that conduct 
should not, as a rule, be a factor in determining the post-divorce 
proprietary rights of the spouses. There may however, be occasions when 
the conduct of a spouse is so "obvious and gross" that the justice of the 
case would warrant its consideration as a factor in determining his/her 
proprietary right. 
(v) The "clean break" principle 
The "clean break" principle, which incorporates the notion that divorced 
spouses should not remain under a long-term financial obligation to one 
1241 Parliamentary Debates (2nd Series), Vol. 7, No. 10, col. 348, 281h June 1971. 
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another after divorce, features in all the jurisdictions. This is more 
pronounced in England and South Africa than in Ghana. The rationale 
behind the principle is to enable the spouses to a failed marriage, 
wherever fairness allows, to go their separate ways without the running 
irritant of financial interdependence or dispute. 1242 The desired 
termination of the financial obligations of the spouses is achieved by 
either an award of a capital sum or a commutation of the right to be 
maintained on a periodical basis. But this is usually feasible only where 
there are sufficient assets to make the order fair. The presence of children 
of the marriage is not an obstacle to the termination of the spouses' 
financial obligation to each other. This is because within the statutory 
framework the welfare of children is only a "first" and not a "paramount" 
consideration. 1243 
1242 
1243 
See the English case of Tandy v. Tandy (unreported) per Waite J. cited with 
approval in Whiting v. Whiting supra. 
See pp. 327-329 and note 756 supra. 
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(b) Advantages and disadvantages of the discretionary approach 
The main advantage of the discretionary approach is its flexibility. 1244 It 
provides a flexible response to individual circumstances and is adaptable 
to changing socio-economic circumstances as well. This very attribute 
has led to criticism of this approach as creating uncertainty in forecasting 
what the court is likely to do in a particular case1245 and may lead to 
subjective justice in some cases. 1246 But as was noted by Sinclair, 1247 if 
the guidelines and principles upon which the discretionary decision must 
be based are realistic and workable, the apparent disadvantage of 
uncertainty may be outweighed by the fact that the preservation by the 
1244 
1245 
1246 
1247 
See M. Maclean and J. Johnson "Alimony or compensation" (1990) Family 
Law 20 and H.R. Hahlo "Recent trends in family law: A global survey" 1983 
Acta Juridica 1 at p. 13. 
See for example, G. Davis et al Simple Quarrels, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 
1994 pp. 255-256 and E. Jackson et al "Financial support on divorce: The 
right mixture of rules and discretion" [1993] 7 International Journal of Law 
and the Family230, Hahlo "Recent trends in family law ... " op. cit., at p. 13 
and Sinclair "Financial provision on divorce ... " op. cit., at p. 481. 
See B. Baker et al op. cit., para. 3.30. Cf J.M. Eekelaar "Some principles 
of financial and property adjustment on divorce" (1979) 95 Law Quarterly 
Review 253 at p. 254 who argues that discretionary justice is not 
synonymous with subjective justice. 
"Financial provision on divorce" op. cit., at pp. 481-482. 
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court of"the utmost elasticity to deal with each case on its ownfacts"1248 
will be conducive to a more equitable resolution of family conflicts. 
Furthermore, the discretionary approach is criticised on the basis that the 
claimant spouse does not have a right to a share in the matrimonial 
property but only a hope of obtaining a share. 1249 It can also impose high 
costs upon litigants as it encourages them to appeal against awards which 
they may consider unfair. 1250 It is submitted that whilst these are 
legitimate criticisms, they are the necessary prices to pay for flexibility of 
this approach. The discretion given to the courts, though extensive, is not 
limitless. The courts must consider certain statutory criteria and 
objectives, the highlights of which have been indicated above, in their 
attempt to determine the matrimonial property rights of the spouses. 1251 
The statutory criteria and objectives have allowed the court to exercise the 
1248 
1249 
1250 
1251 
Per Onnrod L.J. in the English case of Martin v. Martin [1978] Fam. 12 at 
p. 20. 
See the Canadian Law Reform Commission's Working Paper No. 8 on 
Family Property (1975) op. cit. at p. 18. 
See Van Wyk "Matrimonial property systems in contemporary perspective" 
op. cit at p. 63 quoting S.J. Brake (1981-1982) 23 Boston College Law 
Review 761 at p. 788. In the English cases of Dart v. Dart supra, the wife's 
costs were stated to be £406, 000 whilst in F. v. F. [1995] 2 F.L.R. 45, the 
wife's costs were £733, 000 and the husband's £777, 182. 
See pp. 508-528 supra. 
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discretion within the statutory framework with a measure of success 
although empirical evidence in England indicates an imperfect 
achievement of the statutory objectives. 1252 This led to the abandonment 
of the "principle of minimum loss" by which the court was to exercise its 
discretion in such a way as to place the parties in the position they would 
have been had the marriage not broken down. 
3. THE FIXED RULE APPROACH TO DETERMINING MATRIMONIAL 
PROPERTY RIGHTS 
The discretionary approach in England and Ghana to the determination of 
matrimonial property rights is in sharp contrast with the South African 
approach which deals mainly with fixed rules for the distribution of such 
property with a judicial discretion, as discussed above, only in respect of 
a limited category of cases. The fixed rule approach has its major 
influence in marriages in community of property. This form of marriage 
is the primary form of marriage in South African. There is a rebuttable 
presumption that all marriages are in community of property. 1253 In other 
1252 
1253 
See J.M. Eekelaar "Some principles of financial and property adjustment on 
divorce" (1979) 95 Law Quarterly Review 253. 
Seep. 178-179 supra., Hahlo op. cit., at p. 157, Edelstein v. Edelstein supra 
and Brummund v. Brummund's Estate 1993 (2) S.A. 494 at pp. 498-499. 
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words, if spouses have not expressly selected a different marriage form 
in the prescribed manner, their marriage will automatically be in 
community of property. The community ends on divorce or death of a 
spouse and in either event the joint property is divided equally after the 
liabilities have been paid. 1254 
In marriages out of community but to which the accrual system applies, 
the accrual is determined when the marriage is dissolved. On the 
occurrence of that event, if one spouse's estate has shown no accrual or 
a smaller accrual than the other spouse's estate, the former spouse 
acquires the right to payment of half of the difference between the accrual 
of the respective estates of the spouses. 1255 
(a) Advantages and disadvantages of the fixed rule approach 
The main advantage of the fixed rule approach is that a spouse with fewer 
assets would not have to depend on the court's discretion to obtain 
1254 
1255 
See pp. 185-188 supra. 
See pp. 233-234 supra. 
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property rights on divorce. 1256 Such property rights would arise not from 
any financial contribution, nor from any contribution to the welfare of the 
family, nor from any other factors to be assessed by the court, but from 
the marriage relationship itself. It also gives security and status to a 
spouse (usually a wife) who, because of marital and family ties, is unable 
to acquire an interest in assets of the other spouse by a financial 
contribution. It does not treat such a spouse as a dependant who must 
apply to the court for a possible discretionary benefit but rather as an 
equal partner in marriage, entitled to claim an equal share in the net assets 
acquired during the marriage. It is in tune with the contemporary trend 
of a "clean break" on divorce by enabling a spouse to be self-reliant and 
independent of his or her former spouse. Furthermore, the fixed rule 
approach provides a property division method that is inexpensive, 
predictable, and able to minimise the need for litigation. 1257 
On the other hand, this approach has the disadvantage of not being able 
to take account of the special circumstances of individual cases. 1258 For 
1256 
1257 
1258 
See Hahlo "Recent trends in family law ... " op. cit., at p. 13. See also pp. 
186-188 supra. 
See Van Wyk "matrimonial property systems ... " op. cit., at p. 63. 
See Hahlo "Recent trends in family law ... " op. cit., at p. 13. 
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example, it might give an undeserved benefit to a spouse whose 
contribution to the marriage had been nil, and who had failed to fulfil his 
matrimonial obligations. A situation that springs to mind in which the 
application of the fixed rule will not be appropriate is Professor 
Rheinstein's example of"a short-lived marriage of .. a highly paid movie 
star to a lazy bum"1259 • 
A variant of the fixed rule approach, the accrual system, introduced in 
South Africa has the advantage of preserving the independence and 
equality of the spouses during the marriage. Although it does not change 
the ownership of property during the marriage, it does give a spouse who 
has little or no assets or earnings some measure of security and certainty 
that he will share in the accrual of the other spouse's estate at some future 
time. This system thus recognises the partnership element in marriage 
and does away with the necessity of the spouse with little or no assets 
relying on the court's limited discretion to secure an interest in the 
1259 See (1973) 68 North Western University Law Review463 atp. 476 cited by 
Hahlo "Husband and Wife" op. cit., at p. 312 in the context of an 
observation that the accrual system by no means guarantees equitable results. 
Sinclair "Financial provision on divorce ... " op. cit., at p. 480 also cited the 
statement in justification ofher call for the introduction of judicial discretion 
to distribute property on divorce. 
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matrimonial property. However, as stated above, the accrual system also 
has flaws. 1260 
4. CONCLUSION 
The reforms in the three jurisdictions tend to address particular 
shortcomings of the operating matrimonial regimes. In England and 
Ghana for instance, the separate property regime made it difficult for a 
wife who was not economically active or who, though economically 
active, earned substantially less than her economically active husband, to 
acquire a right to share in any property that such economically active 
husband may acquire during the marriage. This difficulty was 
ameliorated by the application of equitable doctrines ofimplied, resulting 
or constructive trusts in both countries and in addition, in England, by the 
statutory recognition of the contribution made in looking after the home 
or caring for the family. Furthermore the court was given a wide 
discretion in both countries to redistribute the matrimonial assets on 
divorce. 
1260 See pp. 241-243 supra. 
536 
In South Africa, the shortcoming in the community of property regime, 
namely, the sole control by the husband over the joint estate by virtue of 
his having the marital power, was remedied by the abolition of that power 
and the establishment of legal equality of husband and wife in the 
administration of their joint estate. In marriages out of community of 
property, limited discretion was given to the court to redistribute the 
assets of the spouses if certain conditions are fulfilled. The legislature 
went further by offering potential parties to a marriage out of community 
of property the option of the accrual system. 
In determining the property rights of the spouses on divorce, the exercise 
of the judicial discretion to adjust those rights are similar in all the 
jurisdictions because it is exercised on similar criteria.1261 The difference 
that emerges is that in South Africa, where the fixed rule predominates, 
the discretion has limited scope of operation. The two approaches 
discernible from the selected countries have both advantages and 
disadvantages. It is however not easy to determine which one is better 
than the other because they are adopted to solve problems which are 
1261 In relation to customary marriages however, there is a difference of 
approach. Whilst in South Africa the court is enjoined to take certain factors 
into account, there is no such injunction in Ghana where the court has 
struggled to find an acceptable criteria. 
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peculiar to the particular country. Nevertheless, it seems that a 
combination of the two approaches within a single country as found in 
South Africa is preferable, although with some reservations. 1262 This dual 
approach has resulted in some convergence of the effects of marriage out 
of community of property (complete separation) with that of marriage in 
community in that there is sharing of matrimonial assets on divorce even 
if in a limited manner in the case of the former type of marriage. It is 
submitted that the view of Sinclair to the effect that judicial discretion 
equitably to redistribute assets on divorce should apply to all marriages, 
must be given serious consideration as a further means of doing 
substantial justice to married couples.1263 For, as she rightly points out, 
equal apportionment of property is too rigidly built into marriages based 
on sharing whilst it is absent from those based on complete separation of 
property. There is the need to empower the court, where the circumstance 
permits, to either prevent automatic equal sharing or to impose a form of 
sharing where none exists. In the latter case, it is further submitted that 
the present limited power to redistribute the assets of pre-1984 marriages 
out of community of property should be extended to all marriages. "More 
1262 
1263 
For example, the exclusion of some marriages out of community of property 
from the judicial discretion to redistribute assets on divorce. 
See "Financial provision on divorce ... " op. cit., at pp. 481-482 and 485. 
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justice may be achieved if we can minimize that age-old tension between 
total discretion and total certainty. "1264 
Finally, what lessons can be drawn from the situation in these three 
countries for the improvement of the matrimonial regimes in Botswana? 
The clear lessons that emerge from the situation in the three countries are: 
(a) That the law cannot remain static in the face of socio-economic 
changes in society. 
(b) That socio-economic changes have helped to reassess a wife's 
traditional role as a home-maker and as such a dependent domestic. Her 
home-maker role is now seen as different but equal to that of her husband 
and deserving of recognition in the form of a right to share in the 
matrimonial property. The quantum of such right however, is not fixed 
but is subject to the exercise of a discretionary power by the court. 
1264 Ibid. at p. 485. 
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( c) That it is possible to combine the fixed rule approach to determining 
matrimonial property rights with a discretionary approach within the same 
jurisdiction. 
(d) That the court's power to determine matrimonial property rights on 
divorce has been significantly stripped of its previous overtone of moral 
censure. A marriage breakdown is a misfortune which befalls the parties 
to the marriage and carries no stigma but only sympathy. The parties' 
conduct in the breakdown of the marriage therefore is not generally a 
significant factor in the determination of their matrimonial property 
rights. 
( e) That a reform of matrimonial property rights must take into account 
customary rules and practices. 
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CHAPTER EIGHT 
REFORM OF THE MATRIMONIAL PROPERTY REGIMES IN 
BOTSWANA 
1. THE CASE FOR REFORM 
In Chapters Two and Three of this study the inadequacies and 
shortcomings of the existing matrimonial regimes were discussed. It was 
shown that in the case of marriages in community of property the intrinsic 
value of equal apportionment of the joint estate when the community 
comes to an end cannot be faulted. However, its efficacy is dependent on 
the prudent and judicious management of the joint estate by the husband, 
factors which cannot too often be relied upon with any measure of 
certainty and confidence. Consequently, it was argued that its admitted 
fairness is in danger of being illusory if the husband continues to have 
unrestricted administrative powers over the joint estate.1265 This is more 
so if one takes into account the court's reluctance to protect the wife of 
1265 See pp. 133-134 supra. See also A. Armstrong et al "Uncovering reality: 
Excavating women's rights in African family law" (1993) 7 International 
Journal of Law and the Family 314 at pp. 342-346. 
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such a marriage from the proclivity of a husband to do what he likes with 
the joint estate. 
Furthermore, there is a need to re-examine the present approach to the 
scope of the joint estate. It is important that job-related benefits should 
be included within the scope of the joint property. Job-related benefits 
such as pensions and gratuities, the so called "new property", 1266 are 
presently not regarded as property for inclusion in the joint estate or in 
determining the mutual property rights of the spouses married out of 
community of property or under customary law. The accumulated sums 
of money in a spouse's pension fund, for example, may turn out to be 
considerable and although may not be available to such a spouse at the 
time of the divorce, it represents a sizeable capital asset. 1267 This capital 
asset accrues only to the spouse who had been in paid employment and is 
generally not assignable or transferable. 1268 However, it is a legitimate 
expectation of married couples that such pensions or gratuity will ensure 
some financial security in the future when hopefully they are in the 
1266 
1267 
1268 
See pp. 128-130 and 191-194'supra. 
Under s. 7(1) of the Pensions Act 1966, 2/3rd of a public officer's highest 
emoluments are payable as pension on his retirement. 
See s. 8 of the Pension Act 1966. 
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twilight of their lives. When a marriage comes to an end, a spouse, 
(usually the wife) stands to lose the value of such expectations, 
consequently, there must be a mechanism in place for the realisation of 
this expectation. Under s. 8 of the Pension Act 1966 it is possible for a 
court to order that a husband's pension be used for periodic payment of 
sums of money by way of maintenance of a former wife or a minor child. 
However, there is no reported case in which the court has utilized this 
power. As stated earlier, discussions of pension rights have not featured 
in the case law at all. There must be an expressed statutory recognition 
of pension and other job-related benefits as a specie of property capable 
of being included in the joint estate of the spouses for the purpose of the 
division of their estate or in determining the proprietary rights of spouses 
in marriages out of community or under customary law. The present 
situation whereby these benefits are ignored needs to be looked at in the 
light of the rudimentary nature of social security payments from the State 
to supplement an otherwise meagre income in one's old age. 1269 This can 
only be done by legislative intervention because of the uncertainty which 
surrounds the common law's position with regards to this type of property 
in 'Botswana. 
1269 Under the old age pension scheme, persons of 65 years and over are entitled 
to P 117 per month as old age pension. See note 229 supra. 
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In the case of marriages out of community of property and those under 
customary law, the separate property concept underlying them ensures 
that a spouse, usually the wife, who has a weak economic power base 
because she has no formal job, is unable to share in the property acquired 
during the marriage by the other spouse with a strong economic power. 
This is so irrespective of any indirect contribution made towards the 
acquisition of the said property by the spouse with the weak economic 
power. Even where there has been a direct contribution towards the 
acquisition of the property, such contribution must be "substantial" to 
warrant a share in the acquired property. 127° Furthermore, such a spouse 
cannot count on the courts for support because the courts have imposed 
a restrictive interpretation on their power to determine the mutual 
property rights of spouses on divorce. 1271 
The situation is further complicated by the application of the common law 
to the personal consequences of the marriage of persons subject to 
customary law who marry under the Marriage Act, whilst the proprietary 
1270 
1271 
See pp. 104-106 supra. 
See pp. 81-82 supra. 
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consequences are generally governed by customary law.1272 The spouses 
can only opt out of customary law if they complete a special form prior 
to the celebration of the marriage indicating a choice in favour of 
common law.1273 In this connection, empirical evidence suggests that the 
procedure for opting out of customary law is cumbersome for both the 
parties wishing to opt out and the Marriage Officers who are obliged to 
explain the procedure to the parties.1274 
This situation notwithstanding, there seems to be some evidence that in 
practice there is interchange of principles between the customary law and 
the common/statutory law in the determination of the proprietary rights 
of spouses on divorce. 1275 Thus, it has been asserted 1276 that'" customary' 
and 'common ' law in the context of marriage, divorce and division of 
property are intimately linked both in theory and practice so that any 
1272 
1273 
1274 
1275 
1276 
See pp. 82-83 supra. 
See pp. 44-45 supra. 
See Molokomme "Disseminating family law reforms ... " op. cit., supra at p. 
311. 
Seep. 71 supra. 
A. Griffiths "Legal duality: Conflict or concord in Botswana" op. cit., supra 
at p. 161. 
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attempt at appositional labelling fails." This conclusion was arrived at 
from analysis of property division cases in the Customary and High 
Courts in which similar results were reached using either system. Despite 
this evidence of possible integration of the principles of 
statutory/common law with those of the customary law, the joint 
application of thestf"principles has proved to be wholly inadequate to 
satisfy the legitimate aspirations of spouses married out of community 
and those married under customary law. The lack of discretion to readjust 
or divide the proprietary rights of spouses of these marriages on divorce 
has the potential to do grave injustice. There should be a more ready 
acknowledgement of the multiplicity of the matrimonial regimes and a 
definite attempt made to integrate their consequences as far as practically 
possible. 
Despite the above shortcomings, little or no reforms of the matrimonial 
property regimes have taken place for nearly three decades. Law reform 
in general and particularly in the area of family law, has not been a regular 
feature of the Botswana legal system. 1277 The mechanism for law reform 
1277 See A.J .G .M. Sanders "Ten years of the Botswana Matrimonial Causes Act -
Further proposals for divorce reform" (1982) 26 Journal of African Law 163 
at pp. 163-167. 
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is, at best, rudimentary and at worst, non-existent. The Law Reform 
Committee, a Parliamentary Standing Committee of nine members, 1278 is 
the body that has been instrumental in the piecemeal reforms that have 
been undertaken by the Legislature. The impact of the Committee on law 
reform has been minimal. It has no specialised staff at its disposal and it 
meets and reports on an ad hoc basis since its members have to double 
their duties on the Committee with those of their parliamentary duties and 
responsibilities to their constituents.1279 
The law reform situation in Botswana contrasts sharply with those in the 
jurisdictions selected above for comparative perspectives. In those 
jurisdictions there are formal designated bodies entrusted solely with the 
task of law reform. 1280 There is a similar need to set up a full-time Law 
Reform Commission consisting oflegal experts charged with the overall 
1278 
1279 
1280 
Appointed under Parliamentary Standing Order 85C. 
Their last published report was in 1986 on: (i) The Marriage Act, (ii) The 
Law of Inheritance, (iii) The Electoral Law and (iv) The Citizenship Act. 
See Report of the Law Reform Committee (June-December 1986), 
Government Printer, Gaborone, 1986. 
See the Law Commission Act 1965 of England, the South African Law 
Commission Act 19of1973 and the Law Reform Commission Decree 1975 
(NRCD 325) of Ghana. 
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reform of the laws of Botswana. The Commission should be able to set 
out a scheduled law reform programme and be able to take up specific 
proposals emanating from the Government or any interest groups. 
Furthermore, the method of disseminating proposed reforms and 
substantive reforms for general information must be enhanced to enable 
the widest publicity possible to be given to them. 
In order for the proposed reforms to be meaningful, there is the need also 
to strengthen the existing structural weakness in the legal system. Allott 
has identified four such weaknesses which may lead to the failure oflegal 
reforms in a given legal system. 1281 These are, firstly, failures in the 
communication system, secondly, the norms and institutions themselves 
may be inappropriate because of their character, expression, the way they 
fit with others, or simply because they are out of step with the social 
context, thirdly, law reform may fail at the stage of application and 
implementation and fourthly, there may be failure in monitoring and 
scrutinising them. Some of these weaknesses no doubt exists in 
Botswana, a country where, in the words of Molokomme, 
1281 See The Limits of Law, London, Butterworths, 1980 and "Reforming the law 
in Africa - aims, difficulties and techniques" in Southern Africa in need of 
Law Reform A.J.G.M. Sanders (ed.), Durban, Butterworths 1981atp.228. 
548 
"a multiplicity of traditional personal laws operates side by side 
with those received during the colonial period. Traditional 
personal laws are not always affected by state reform 
programmes, and even where they are, their relationship with the 
state law is not always made clear, as the state reforms are 
usually couched in technical language most people do not 
understand. "1282 
It has already been pointed out above1283 that the institutional framework 
for law reform is weak and therefore needs strengthening. Molokomme 
has suggested, inter alia, the following means for enhancing reforms in 
family law: 
(a) The setting up of appropriate machinery for the study of social 
problems so that policy makers are properly informed about the nature 
and dimensions of the problems they seek to deal with. It is only on the 
basis of such information that they can even begin to work out ways of 
dealing with family law problems. 
1282 
"Disseminating family law reforms in Botswana ... " op. cit., supra at p. 304. 
1283 See p. 546 supra. 
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(b) Once the appropriate legal provisions are worked out, they must fit 
together with those already available, and the relationship between the 
existing and the new law must be made clear. The legislature must 
recognise the real importance of customary law in the lives of most 
people, and seek to incorporate their values in planned reforms of the law. 
( c) The institutions which administer the law must be properly staffed 
and managed, and the enforcement mechanisms strengthened in order to 
give real meaning to the rights conferred on individuals. Special 
institutions such as family courts should be constituted to deal specifically 
with family problems. 
( d) Dissemination oflaw to the public must be given official recognition 
and priority, and should go beyond mere publication in the government 
Gazette or the occasional workshop. 
It is submitted that these suggestions, if implemented, will go some way 
to enhance the development and modernisation of family law in general 
and the matrimonial property regimes in particular. 
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2. ATTEMPTS AT REFORMING FAMILY LAW 
Apart from the enactment of the Matrimonial Causes Act 1973, an Act 
which revolutionised divorce law without any attendant change in the 
financial consequences of divorce, the few statutes that have attempted 
reform in the area of family law have been piecemeal without any 
significant impact on the area of law intended to be reformed. 1284 For 
example, the Deserted Wives and Children Protection Act 1963 lays 
down a procedure by which married women who have been deserted may 
obtain maintenance for themselves and their children. Traditional 
practices militate against the frequent use of the provision of the Act by 
women. It has been said that: 
1284 
"Women are traditionally socialised into being good wives, which 
means enduring maltreatment by their husbands 'for the sake of 
the family'. In times of crisis a good wife must report the matter 
to her in-laws even before she consults her own parents. To 
expect a deserted wife from such an environment to enlist the 
See Molokomme "Disseminating family law reforms ... " op. cit., supra at pp. 
308-317. 
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assistance of a total stranger such as a court official is rather 
unrealistic." 1285 
Thus, married women are reluctant to take advantage of the options 
provided by the Act. 
The Affiliation Proceeding Act 1970 (as amended)1286 provides for proof 
of paternity and a procedure for the maintenance of children born to 
single women in the Magistrate Court. A glaring shortcoming of the Act 
before its amendment was the maximum payment of P40 for the 
maintenance of an illegitimate child. 1287 This led to single mothers 
applying to the High Court for relief. The attendant high legal costs of 
High Court actions were disincentives to most single parents pursuing 
remedy in that court. In fact the cases which were able to go to the High 
1285 
1286 
1287 
Molokomme "Disseminating family law reforms ... " op. cit., supra at p. 316. 
See Affiliation Proceedings (Amendment) Act 1999 which has increased, 
inter alia, the maximum amount a court can award for maintenance under 
the 1970 Act from P40 to Pl 00. See E.K. Quansah "Botswana's Affiliation 
Proceedings (Amendment) Act 1999" (2000) 44 Journal of African Law 
119. 
S. 7(2) of the 1999 Amendment has increased the P40 to PlOO. 
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Court were financed by a local non-government organisation. 1288 
Although the amount the Magistrate Court is empowered to award has 
been increased by the Amendment Act, the problem of enforcement of 
awards, which bedevils the Act still remains. 1289 
The Succession (Rights of the Surviving Spouse and Family Provisions) 
Act 1970 provides, inter alia, that a surviving spouse is entitled to a share 
in the estate of a deceased spouse, a right which did not exist under 
Botswana common law. This Act however, does not apply to estates 
which fall under customary law. 1290 Thus, the Act effectively excludes a 
vast majority of Batswana, whose estates fall under customary law, from 
its innovatory provisions. 
The Married Persons Property Act 1970 sought to address some of the 
criticisms that have been levelled against the community of property 
regime. It relegated that regime from being the primary matrimonial 
1288 
1289 
1290 
See Quansah "Botswana's Affiliation Proceedings (Amendment) Act 1999" 
op. cit., supra at p. 122. 
See Beyond Inequalities: Women in Botswana, Gaborone/Harare 
Ditshwanelo/SARDC, 1998 at p. 52 and Botswana/UNICEF Report op. cit, 
supra. 
See s. 3 of the Act. 
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property regime for civil marriages to that of a secondary regime and 
replaced it with the out of community regime. However, the marital 
power of the husband, which was considered as the ugly face of the 
community of property regime, was left intact. The avowed aim that the 
1970 Act would raise the status of women married in community was 
thus rendered nugatory. 1291 
Finally, the Deeds Registry (Amendment) Act 1996 was enacted 
principally to enable women, whether married in or out of community of 
property, and whether or not the marital power had been excluded, to 
execute deeds and other documents required or permitted to be registered 
in the Deeds Registry without their husband's assistance. 
Apart from the above limited reforms, no comprehensive reform offamily 
law has been undertaken. 
The lackoflegislative initiative in the area of family law reform has been 
compounded by the judiciary's reluctance to adapt the existing law to 
ameliorate hardships in particular cases. In contrast to the courts in 
1291 See p. 43 supra. 
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England and Ghana for instance, the Botswana courts have shown no 
appetite for creativity or innovation in trying to adapt the existing law to 
changing circumstances. 1292 The few opportunities that presented 
themselves for the court to be innovative or creative were wasted by 
restrictive interpretation of the power given to them to determine the 
mutual property rights of parties on divorce. One may wonder whether 
this attitude is an example of a particular application of the fiction that 
judges do not make law but merely declare law?1293 The courts should by 
now have overcome this "childish fiction"1294 for, in spite of the 
protestation of judges to the contrary, it is generally accepted that judges 
do make law occasionally. In the words of Van den Reever J.A.:"Judges 
while purporting merely to expound and apply the law sometimes make 
1292 
1293 
1294 
The South African courts have had very few opportunities for innovation in 
this regard. Very few cases on the division of property in marriages in 
community and those subject to the accrual system have been reported. 
See the English cases of Willis v. Baddeley [1892] 2 Q.B. 324 at p. 326 and 
Home Office v. Dorset Yacht Co. Ltd [1970] AC 1004 at 1045, 1051. 
The term used by the eminent English jurist John Austin. See Jurisprudence 
(51h ed.) II at p. 655. See also R.W.M. Dias Jurisprudence 5th ed. London, 
Butterworths, 1985 at pp.151-152, Lord Reid "The judge as law maker" 
(1972) 12 Journal of the Society of Public Teachers of Law 22, Hahlo & 
Kahn The South African Legal System and its Background, Kenwyn, Juta & 
Co, 1973 at p. 306 and Justice Holmes in the American case of Southern 
Pacific Co. v. Jensen 244 U.S. 205 (1916) at p. 221. 
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law in the process". 1295 The Botswana courts should have taken 
advantage of the few opportunities that have presented themselves to 
undertake some creative judicial legislation in the area of determining 
matrimonial property rights, especially in marriages out of community of 
property and those under customary law, in the face of the inherent 
unfairness of these regimes and the legislature's inertia. The unfairness 
of the said matrimonial regimes has been attributed to the increase in 
relationship outside the bounds of matrimony especially among educated 
women. 1296 
However, even if a judge is willing to be creative, there can be no 
meaningful change unless there is some kind of judicial consensus on 
desirable social change. Sadly this consensus has been lacking among 
1295 
1296 
See the South African case of Sachs v. Donges N.O. 1950 (2) S.A. 265 
(A.D.) at p. 312. See also the South African case of Daniels v. Daniels 1958 
(1) S.A. 513 (A.D.) at p. 522 per Schreiner J.A., the English case of Indyka 
v. Indyka [1967] 2 All E.R. 689 (H.L.) at p. 701 per Lord Reid and T.O. 
Elias" Judicial development of customary law" in African Indigenous Laws 
T.O. Elias et al (eds.) Nsukka, Institute of African Studies, University of 
Nigeria, 1975 Chap. 7. 
See Beyond Inequalities: Women in Botswana op. cit., at p. 56. On the 
prevalence of cohabitation in Botswana, see the Report of the Botswana Law 
Reform Committee on Marriage, Inheritance, Electoral Law and Citizenship 
Law 1989 at p. 5. 
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Botswana judges. 1297 This unsatisfactory situation notwithstanding, it is 
submitted that the courts and the legislature cannot continue to ignore the 
significant changes that are occurring in the socio-economic life of 
Batswana. One hopes that with increased public pressure on an otherwise 
conservative legislature, from organisations such as, the Botswana Centre 
for Human Rights (Ditshwanelo ), Women and Law in Southern Africa, 
Emang Basadi and Metlhaetsile Women's Information Centre, requisite 
reforms will be carried out in the not too distant future to accord with the 
legitimate aspirations of married couples. 
1297 See for example, the valiant attempts by Hayfron-Benjamin C.J. in the late 
1970s and early 1980s to instil constitutionalism in the judicial system. 
These are documented by A.J.G.M. Sanders in "Constitutionalism in 
Botswana: A valiant attempt at judicial activism" (1983) XVI Comparative 
and International Law Journal of Southern Africa 350 and (1984) XVII 
Comparative and International Journal of Southern Africa 49. The lack of 
consensus on desirable social changes may be explained on the basis that 
until 1991, when the first Motswana was appointed as Chief Justice, the 
High Court bench was dominated by non-citizens from diverse backgrounds 
with diverse social ethos than those prevailing in Botswana. 
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3. OPTIONS FOR REFORM 
Any attempt to reform the matrimonial property regimes must take into 
account the pluralism of the existing laws. 1298 The predominance of the 
received law in relation to the indigenous customary law has the effect 
that in reality plurality oflaws means essentially, dualism oflaws, that is, 
a choice between the received law and customary law. 1299 In the sphere 
of private law, the customary law governs the lives of the vast majority 
ofBatswana. 130° Consequently, as noted above, customary law generally 
governs the proprietary consequences of a marriage of a person subject to 
1298 
1299 
1300 
A discussion on legal pluralism can be found in J. Griffiths "What is legal 
pluralism?" (1986) 24 Journal of Legal Pluralism 1. 
For the origin and nature of legal dualism in Botswana, see note 31 supra 
and A.J.G.M. Sanders "The internal conflict of laws in Botswana" (1985) 
17 Botswana Notes & Records 77, "Legal dualism in Lesotho, Botswana and 
Swaziland: A general survey" (1985) 1 Lesotho Law Journal 47and A. 
Molokomme "The reception and development of Roman-Dutch law in 
Botswana" (1985) 1 Lesotho Law Journal 121. 
See A. Molokomme "Children of the Fence": The maintenance of extra-
marital children under law and practice in Botswana Ph.D. thesis University 
of Leiden, 1991 at p. 40 and Beyond Inequalities: Women in Botswana op. 
cit., supra at p. 46. 
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customary law (a "tribesman"1301), who marries under the Marriage Act1302 
whilst the personal consequences of such marriage are governed by the 
common law. It will therefore be convenient to attempt to incorporate the 
salient aspects of the two main systems which will advance reform in the 
matrimonial property regimes. This will not only give legitimacy to the 
reforms but it will also help to bring them within the prevailing social 
context. 
Also any attempt at reform of the matrimonial law must first address two 
preliminary questions namely, (1) is it desirable to enact a uniform 
matrimonial regime applicable to all types of marriages? and (2) is the 
way forward to integrate or harmonise the rules of the existing regimes? 
The difference between these two questions can be illustrated by Allott's 
definition of the terms unification and integration: 
1301 
1302 
"Unification is different from integration. Unification imposes a 
uniform law; integration creates a law which brings together, 
without totally obliterating, laws of different 
For a definition of the term, seep. 63 supra. 
See s. 7(1) Married Persons Property Act 1970. 
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origins .. .Integration. .. implies that variant laws remain in being, 
but there is an attempt to standardise their effects and remove 
conflicts between them. Thus one may get married by customary 
law or by statute law, but the end result - a marriage - will be the 
same in either case ... " 1303 
Commenting on this definition, Woodman has said that "standardisation" 
of the effects of the different constituent systems would seem to amount 
to unification of the norms determining their effects. The "removal of 
conflicts" may mean the removal of instances of mutually contradictory 
norms. On the other hand, it may mean ensuring that the norms of the 
constituent systems have identical or "standardised' effects. He 
concludes by saying that in any event, integration would seem to mean 
partial unification, an interpretation which accords with the common use 
1303 A.N. Allott "What is to be done with African customary law?" (1984) 28 
Journal of African Law 56 at p. 65. See also A.N. Allott "The codification 
of the law of civil wrongs in common law African legal systems", a paper 
delivered at a conference for the integration of customary and modern legal 
systems, Ibadan, Nigeria in 1964 and cited by D.A. ljalaye in "Marriage laws 
in Nigeria - Harmonisation or unification" ( 197 4) XII Nigerian Bar Journal 
21 at p. 22, and "Towards the unification of laws in Africa" (1965) 14 
International and Comparative Law Quarterly 366 at pp. 376-377. See also 
E. Cotran & N. Rubin Readings in African Law Vol. I London, Frank Cass, 
1970 at pp. xxii-xxiv. 
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of the term. 1304 This meaning of integration is also accepted by Prinsloo 
who contends that integration embodies a practical approach to the 
question of unification, namely that unification can be achieved gradually 
or by a cumulative process, unifying rules where this is possible and 
leaving matters which cannot be unified to the personal laws of the 
parties. 1305 Harmonisation may however be taken as different from 
integration. It seeks to eliminate points of friction between the different 
legal systems but leaves the systems to continue to exist separately. 1306 
It is submitted that a positive answer to the first question will be too 
revolutionary. This will entail the creation of a new uniform legal regime 
entirely replacing the pre-existing regimes which will cease to exist as 
self-sufficient systems or as systems incorporated in the larger whole. 
Nevertheless, the new system may well draw its rules from any of the pre-
existing systems which it has replaced. The law of marriage and its 
1304 
1305 
1306 
G.R. Woodman "Unification or continuing pluralism in family law in 
Anglophone Africa: Past experience, present realities, and future 
possibilities" (1988) 4 Lesotho Law Journal 33 at p. 52. 
See "Pluralism or unification in family law in South Africa"(l990) XXIII 
Comparative and International Law Journal of Southern Africa 324 at p. 
325. 
Ibid. 
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attendant consequences deal with personal behaviour that has been 
followed for many years and any reform geared towards a drastic change 
in such ingrained behaviour will bring more problems than it will solve. 
An example of such ingrained behaviour is the prevailing practice of 
couples who intend to marry under the Marriage Act, first going through 
the customary marriage formalities before marrying under the Act. 1307 
This practice is adhered to despite the fact that a valid customary marriage 
is not a pre-requisite for a valid statutory marriage and that both marriages 
are legally recognised in their own right. 1308 Law reform, it has been 
said, 1309 has most chance of success when it has the consensus of the 
people behind it, when it confirms attitudes and patterns which people, by 
their behaviour, have demonstrated that they hold and value. Any 
attempted reform to the contrary may prove to be futile. 
1307 
1308 
1309 
Griffiths "Legal duality ... " op. cit., supra at p. 153 states that a survey in 
Molepolole revealed that 60% of married couples were married under both 
customary law and the Marriage Act. See also Molokomme "Disseminating 
family law reforms ... " op. cit., supra at p. 309, A.J.G.M. Sanders "The 
internal conflict of laws in Botswana" (1985) 17 Botswana Notes and 
Records 77 at p. 80. 
See s. 2 of the Marriage Act 1917, Molokomme "Disseminating family law 
reforms ... " op. cit., supra at p. 309 and B. Otlhogile "Is customary marriage 
a 'union'?" (1987) 21 Botswana Notes and Records 61 at p. 62. 
See Allott "Reforming the law in Africa - aims, difficulties and techniques" 
in Southern Africa in need of Law Reform op. cit., supra at p. 229. 
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The futility of changing established behaviour is graphically demonstrated 
by the practice of husbands of statutory marriages, who are subject to 
customary law, tal<lng additional wives, a practice permissible under 
customary marriages but prohibited under statutory marriages. These 
husbands are then subjected to criminal proceedings for bigamy.1310 Such 
proceedings, though rare, do take place but when the offence is proved, 
the penalty imposed is comparatively lenient. 1311 The contemporary social 
relevance of the offence is debatable. The offence is honoured more by 
its breach than by its observance. 
1310 
131! 
See s. 173 of the Botswana Penal Code 1964 which provides for such an 
offence and a penalty of 5 years imprisonment. See also Molokom.me 
Disseminating family law reforms ... " op. cit., supra at p. 309. On the 
effectiveness of the prosecution of the offence of bigamy in Nigeria, a 
country with plurality of marriage laws like Botswana, see Ijalaye op. cit., 
supra at pp. 28-29 and C.O. Okonkwo "Bigamy in a polygamous society 
(Nigeria)" (1976) 1 Nigerian Juridical Review 76. 
See State v. Groenewald Review case 308/1972 unreported (8th June 1972) 
High Court, Lobatse (3 months imprisonment), State v. Mmusi Review case 
382/1973 (281h December 1973) High Court, Lobatse (6 months 
imprisonment), Petros Modise v. The State Crim. App. 5711983 unreported 
{l l1h May 1983) High Court, Francistown (suspended sentence) and Bele 
Maje v. The State Crim. App. F152/1984 unreported (28th January 1985) 
High Court, Francistown (binding over to be of good behaviour for a year). 
See also Okonkwo op. cit., supra at p. 82, Marriage Laws in Africa A. 
Phillips & H.F. Morris (eds.) London, Oxford University Press, 1971 at p. 
152 and M.L. Marasinghe "Monogamy, polygamy and bigamy" (1968) 2 
Journal of Islamic and Comparative Law 54 at p. 71. 
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A further objection to a positive answer to the first question can be found 
in the view expressed by Lord Denning, the then Master of the Rolls of 
the English High Court, some years ago, that although uniformity oflaws 
in Africa is desirable, it may prove impracticable at the personal law level 
because of the varieties of these laws. 1312 The same view was reiterated 
at a conference on Local Courts and Customary law held in 1963 in Dar 
es Salaam, Tanzania. The conference generally agreed that: 
1312 
1313 
"In the present state of African society it was difficult if not 
impossible to devise a single system of marriage law replacing 
these different (statutory, customary and Islamic) kinds of 
marriage."1313 
See A.N. Allott "What is to be done with African customary law?" (1984) 
28 Journal of African Law 56 at p. 64 quoting Lord Denning's remarks at a 
conference in 1960 on the future of law in Africa. For details of that 
conference, see A.N. Allott, (ed.) The Future of Law in Africa (Record of 
Proceedings of the London Conference) (1960). See also Sinclair assisted 
by Heaton The Law of Marriage op. cit., supra Chap. 3, Woodman 
"Unification or continuing pluralism in family law ... "op. cit., supra and 
Prinsloo op. cit., supra. 
See E. Cotran "Integration of the laws of marriage and divorce in Kenya" a 
paper presented at the conference on integration of customary and modem 
legal system in Ibadan, Nigeria in 1964 cited by D.A. Ijalaye in "Marriage 
laws in Nigeria - Harmonisation or unification" (1974) 12 Nigerian Bar 
Journal 21 at p. 27. For excerpts of the recommendation of the Dar es 
Salaam conference, see Allott "What is to be done with African customary 
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The conference recommended that a general regulatory enactment should 
be passed to deal with, inter alia, the elimination so far as possible, of the 
variable consequences attaching to different kinds of marriages. m 4 
These views still hold true today and may be used as further arguments to 
buttress the point that unification of the marriage laws will be too drastic 
to undertake in Botswana. The different types of marriages that exist 
have different ways by which they are entered into and it will not be 
desirable to impose a uniform procedure which will upset established 
behaviour. However, the imposition of a judicial discretion to interfere 
with proprietary consequences of the different marriages will be desirable 
in order to eliminate to a considerable extent, the present differences 
between the proprietary consequences of the different marriages. 
A positive answer to the second question however, will keep the present 
regimes intact whilst removing, as far as possible, any conflicts between 
them. As discussed above, s. 7 of the Married Person's Property Act 
provides that when the parties to a marriage under the Marriage Act are 
law? op. cit., supra and (1963) 7 Journal of African Law 133-135. 
1314 The variable consequences are concerned with property rights. 
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subjected to customary law, 1315 their matrimonial property regime will, in 
the absence of a prior arrangement between them, be governed by 
customary law. Therefore, upon divorce, the matrimonial property will 
be divided according to customary law. It has also been shown that in 
some cases, the customary courts apply common-law principles in 
dividing matrimonial property subject to customary law. 1316 It will 
therefore be appropriate to harmonise or integrate the principles for 
determining and dividing matrimonial property of both systems while 
maintaining their intrinsic nature. This will be of particular help to 
spouses of customary marriages, especially the wife who suffers from a 
dominantly male-oriented attitude to access to property under customary 
law. 1317 It will also be in consonance with the fact that it is inevitable that 
the monogamous and polygamous marriages will continue to co-exist and 
that the immediate practical thing to do is to make such co-existence as 
1315 
1316 
1317 
See p. 55 supra. 
Seep. 71 supra. 
See P.E. Kidd et al Botswana Families & Women's Rights in a changing 
Environment, Gaborone, The Women and Law in Southern Africa Research 
Trust, 1997 at pp. 47-57, 0. Gulbrandssen Access to Agricultural Land and 
Communal Land Management in Eastern Botswana, Ministry of Local 
Government and Lands, Gaborone, 1984 and G. C. Motlhasedi "Women and 
the law - a brief overview of issues affecting women in customary law" in 
Women and the Law in Botswana Gaborone, Emang Basadi, 1987 pp. 13-17. 
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conflict free as possible. Harmonisation or integration of the principles 
for determining and dividing matrimonial property in the various regimes 
is one sure way of avoiding such conflicts. 1318 Botswana already has 
uniformity of marital status as far as recognition of the various marriages 
is concerned. What remains to be done, is to find some uniformity in the 
proprietary consequences. 
It must be remarked here that the various tribes found in Botswana are not 
as diverse as may be found in other African countries.1319 The tribes that 
exist in Botswana are variants of the same Tswana ethnological and 
linguistic group that can be found in Southern Africa and as such have 
generally the same language and marital practices. 1320 They are therefore 
more homogeneous than heterogeneous, consequently, the differences 
1318 
1319 
1320 
See Allott "The unification of laws in Africa" ( 1968) 16 American Journal 
of Comparative Law 51 at p. 72 who argues that a cautious approach should 
be taken with regard to unification of laws in Africa due to, inter alia, the 
variety of the tribal societies existing in African countries. 
Compare for example, the situation in Nigeria where there are 300 distinct 
clans moulded into 12 or so different linguistic groups. See B.O. Nwabueze 
Constitutional Law of the Nigerian Republic London, Butterworths, 1964 at 
pp. 145-146. 
See I. Schapera The Tswana, London, International African Institute, 1953 
at p. 9. The homogeneity of the customary family law is evident from 
Robert's Restatement of those rule in Tswana Family Law op. cit. 
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between the customary laws of these tribes are minimal. That being the 
case, there will be no major upheaval or disruption in established 
behaviour if a reform is made to the proprietary consequences of 
customary marriages. 
The attractiveness of this second option is that it not only maintains 
stability of the existing systems but it also creates an opportunity to 
rationalise their effects. 1321 It is submitted that this mode of reform should 
be adopted in an attempt to reform the existing regimes in the future. 
(a) Should the fixed or discretionary system be adopted? 
In Chapter Seven, the discretionary and fixed rule systems for determining 
matrimonial property on divorce were evaluated. It was there pointed out 
that each has advantages and disadvantages and that the operation of both 
systems within the same jurisdiction is preferred. The Botswana legal 
system already incorporates a fixed system in the form of community of 
property which, since 1971, has been relegated to the status of a secondary 
1321 See, for example, the Tanzanian attempt in its Marriage and Divorce Act 
1971. See J.S. Read "A milestone in the integration of personal laws: The 
new law of marriage and divorce in Tanzania" ( 1972) 16 Journal of African 
Law 19. 
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matrimonial property system. The primary matrimonial property system 
is that of marriage out of community of property and of profit and loss. 
Consequently, it would be expected that the discretionary approach should 
also be in operation. However, though the discretionary system is 
sanctioned by law, 1322 it has had a minimal impact in determining the 
matrimonial property on divorce. As has been shown earlier, the High 
Court has given a restricted interpretation to the power to determine the 
matrimonial property of spouses on granting a divorce decree of a civil 
marriage. This has led to little or no discretion being exercised in order 
to effect an equitable distribution of matrimonial property. The customary 
courts which, invariably, determine the matrimonial property of persons 
subject to customary law and who marry under the Marriage Act as well 
as those who marry under customary law, have followed the example set 
by the High Court by also exercising little or no discretion in determining 
and distributing matrimonial property. The situation in the customary 
courts is exacerbated by the patriarchal nature of customary law itself 
which leads to women being discriminated against in the event of sharing 
property in general. 1323 
1322 See s. 13 of the Matrimonial Causes Act 1973. 
1323 See note 1317 supra. 
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The cumulative effect of all these is that women who marry under 
customary law or who marry out of community of property under civil law 
face a harsh financial situation on the dissolution of the marriage. Their 
counterparts who marry in community of property only fare a little better 
for although they may hope to gain from the industry of their husbands at 
the end of the marriage, "the archaic subjection of them to the virtually 
unbridled marital power of their husbands"1324 coupled with the 
concomitant power to solely administer the joint estate, may turn this hope 
into a forlorn one. For the husband may dissipate the joint estate by 
reckless administration of it to such an extent that, at best, by the time it 
is up for distribution there will be little or none left and at worse she may 
be saddled with debts. It is therefore submitted that the discretionary 
approach should be expressly made applicable to all marriages irrespective 
of the matrimonial property regime governing the marriage. The 
sentiments expressed by Sinclair about the use of judicial discretion in this 
regard in South Africa are apposite to the Botswana situation. She said: 1325 
1324 
1325 
Sinclair "The financial consequences of divorce in South Africa ... " op. cit., 
supra at p. 796. This statement, though made in relation to the then situation 
in South Africa, still has a forceful application in Botswana where the 
marital power is still applicable to marriages in community of property. See 
pp. 42-43 supra. 
See "The financial provision on divorce ... " op. cit., supra at p. 485. 
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"My belief that the judicial discretion equitably to redistribute 
assets on divorce should apply to all marriages stems from the fact 
that equal apportionment of property is too rigidly built into 
unions based on sharing and is absent from those based on 
complete separation of goods. Equity must surely be the necessary 
corrective of legal justice when laws are defective in their very 
universality. At times it will be necessary for the courts to use the 
discretion to prevent automatic equal division, and at other times, 
where no sharing would otherwise take place, it will be necessary 
for them to impose a form of sharing. In this way we can bring 
together the disparate forms of marriage that are (undesirably, 
perhaps) available in South Africa." 
The type of discretion being advocated here is not an unstructured 
discretion but one structured by a clear basic statutory policy as to the 
financial consequences of divorce. The policy must aim at enabling "the 
empty legal shell to be destroyed with the maximum fairness. and the 
minimum bitterness, distress and humiliation. "1326 (Emphasis added.) The 
1326 This was said by the English Law Commission to be the aim of a good 
divorce law. See its Reform of the Grounds of Divorce - The Field of Choice 
Cmnd.3123, 1966,para. 15. 
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statutory policy must be based generally on the "property approach" to 
financial provision on divorce, that is, that the financial affairs of the 
spouses are to be resolved generally by means of readjustment of property 
rather than the "support approach" which calls for some form of 
permanent or long-term maintenance in favour of a spouse. 1327 The 
present post-divorce financial provisions in Botswana are heavily tilted 
towards the "support approach" and exclusively for the benefit of a 
wife. 1328 S. 25(2) of the Matrimonial Causes Act 1973 for instance, 
empowers the court to order a husband to secure to his ex-wife, a gross 
1327 
1328 
See Gray op. cit., supra at pp. 282-292, Eekelaar "Some principles of 
financial and property adjustments on divorce" op. cit., supra at pp. 261-265 
and Sinclair "Financial provision on divorce - need, compensation or 
entitlement?" op. cit., supra at p. 476. 
Himsworth has criticized this exclusive support for a wife on divorce on the 
ground that during the marriage the Roman-Dutch common law does not 
distinguish between the husband's right to be maintained and the wife's 
rights to the same. A reciprocal duty of support is imposed on both spouses. 
Therefore to introduce a notion, as does s. 25 of MCA 1973, that the prime 
responsibility for maintenance following a "breakdown" falls exclusively on 
the husband is quite wrong. See "Effects of matrimonial causes legislation 
in Botswana" (1974) 18 Journal of African Law 173 at p. 177. The only 
apparent concession is found ins. 25(3) where on a grant of divorce to a 
wife on the "ground" of her husband's insanity, such a wife may be ordered 
to maintain her ex-husband. This concession is illusory as the only ground 
for granting a divorce is proof of the irretrievable breakdown of the marriage 
under s. 14 o( the Act. Insanity, if it is to feature at all in divorce 
proceedings, must give rise to behaviour which, in terms of s. 15( I )(b) of the 
Act, a spouse cannot reasonably be expected to live with. 
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sum of money or an annual sum of money for a term not exceeding her 
life. Furthermore, the court may order a husband to pay to his ex-wife, 
during their joint lives, such periodical sum for the maintenance and 
support of the wife as the court may think reasonable. 1329 The rationale 
behind this apparent women-centred approach is rooted deeply in cultural 
conservatism. This is borne out by the contribution made by the then 
Attorney-General to the debate on the Bill which became the 1973 Act. 
He said 1330 that Botswana as a nation did not expect a husband ever to ask 
financial support from his wife. The man was the bread winner and ifhe 
was incapable of winning bread, he should not get married in order to be 
subsidised by the wife and her family. Although he conceded that there 
may be occasions when the wife would be richer than the husband, he did 
not think in those circumstances the man should be supported by his wife. 
A few parliamentarians thought the Attorney-General's view was 
wrong1331 but the majority seemed to have sided with him as the said 
provisions became part of the Act. 
1329 
1330 
1331 
See pp. 111-114 supra. 
See p. 112 supra and A.J.G.M. Sanders "Ten years of the Botswana 
Matrimonial Causes Act - Further proposals for divorce reform" ( 1982) 26 
Journal of African Law 163 at pp. 173-174. 
See the contributions of the Messrs. Steinberg, Monwela and Tshane in 
Hansard vol. 41 Part I (1972) at pp. 22, vol. 42 (1972) pp. 93 and 95. 
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Despite the legislature taking the support approach to financial provision 
on divorce, the courts have not lent their weight to it. They have shown 
no enthusiasm (perhaps influenced by customary law ideas of a divorced 
wife being looked after by her family group )1332 to award maintenance to 
ex-wives. Payments of lump sums have also not materialised due 
generally to non-availability of capital assets. This situation reinforces the 
argument that the "property approach" should dominate the exercise of 
judicial discretion in these circumstances to enable an equitable 
distribution of whatever assets that may be available to satisfy the future 
needs of the spouses. The "support approach" should only be utilised as 
an interim measure in circumstances where the court is minded to provide 
some support for a spouse to enable him or her to adjust to the post-
divorce reality of having to fend for himself or herself. In this regard, 
fairness demands the abandonment of the present discriminatory non-
reciprocal maintenance provision in the MCA 1973.1333 The 1973 Act 
1332 
1333 
Seep. 115 supra. 
However, it seems thats. 15( 4 )( c) of the Constitution permits discriminatory 
laws in the area of divorce. That subsection excludes from the ambit of the 
protection against laws that are discriminatory by themselves or in their 
effect afforded bys. 15(1), any law which makes provision with respect to 
inter alia, marriage and divorce. In the light of the liberal approach to the 
interpretation of s. 15 adopted by the Court of Appeal in Attorney-Genera/ 
of Botswana v. Unity Dow [1992] B.L.R. 119, it cannot be taken that the 
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should be amended by making express provision for the exercise of a 
gender-neutral judicial discretion based upon the statutory policy 
suggested above. 
The present absence of judicial discretion to determine and redistribute 
matrimonial property on divorce seriously undermines the realisation of 
the legitimate expectation of spouses married out of community of 
property. A spouse of such a marriage, who does not earn an independent 
income outside the home and thus has a relatively weak economic base 
(usually the wife), faces a bleak future without the support, that was 
forthcoming during the marriage, of the other spouse with a strong 
economic base. Urbanisation and labour migration have eroded the built-
in insurance mechanism of the extended family group without putting 
anything in its place. 1334 A divorced woman with a weak economic base 
is therefore unlikely to find financial or material support from that group 
1334 
framers of the Constitution intended that discriminatory laws should be 
enacted in the areas of marriage and divorce. For a commentary on the case, 
see E.K. Quansah "Unity Dow v. Attorney-General of Botswana- One more 
relic of a woman's servitude removed?" (1992) 4 African Journal of 
International and Comparative Law 195 and "Unity Dow v. Attomey-
General of Botswana - The sequel" {1993) 5 African Journal of 
International and Comparative Law 189. 
See Beyond Inequalities: Women in Botswana op. cit., supra at pp. 55-56. 
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which used to serve as a safety net in the event of need. The existence of 
judicial discretion will go some way to alleviate the plight of such a wife 
in that the court may allocate a portion of the matrimonial property to her 
use. 
Although a spouse married in community of property does not need 
judicial discretion to acquire a share of the joint estate, equal division of 
the joint estate may not always be desirable. 1335 Consequently, the 
exercise of judicial discretion in marriages in community of property may 
enable the court to interfere with equal division of such assets where the 
circumstances of a particular marriage warrant it. 
Furthermore, the introduction of judicial discretion to determine and 
redistribute matrimonial property on divorce in all marriages will also 
make it unnecessary to introduce the accrual system in Botswana. The 
accrual system as shown above, allows spouses the freedom associated 
with a marriage out of community of property whilst on dissolution of the 
marriage, it gives the spouse whose estate shows no accrual or a smaller 
accrual than the estate of the other spouse, a claim against the other spouse 
1335 See p. 534 supra. 
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for an amount equal to half of the difference between the accrual of the 
respective estates of the spouses. The calculation of the accrual can be a 
complicated matter but the exercise of judicial discretion will simplify 
matters by dividing the available assets in such a way as to meet the justice 
of the particular case. However, one may argue that a spouse married out 
of community of property may frustrate the division of assets on divorce 
by disposing of a large proportion of his assets before the court has the 
opportunity to exercise its discretion, whilst under the accrual system the 
spouse who stands to benefit from the accrual of the other spouse's estate 
may take steps during the marriage to safeguard his interest.1336 It is 
conceded that the possibility of a spouse married out of community of 
property, who has no assets of his own, not getting a share of the other 
spouse's property is a legitimate concern. But it is submitted that this will, 
hopefully, be the exception rather than the rule and that in a vast majority 
of cases there will be some asset against which the court may exercise its 
discretion. In England where marriage out of community is the 
matrimonial property regime, such dissipation of assets st ante matrimonio 
1336 See for example, s. 8 of the Matrimonial Property Act 88of1984 of South 
Africa which permits a spouse, whose marriage. is subject to the accrual 
system, to take legal action for immediate division of the accrual where the 
conduct of the other spouse seriously prejudices his right to share in the 
accrual of the other spouse's estate. See pp. 237-241 supra. 
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to frustrate a possible exercise of the court's discretion on divorce is rarely 
encountered. 
4. THE EXERCISE OF JUDICIAL DISCRETION 
The argument in favour of the exercise of judicial discretion in 
determining and redistributing matrimonial property on divorce is that it 
provides flexibility to enable the court to take into account the peculiar 
circumstances of the case before it.1337 Commenting on the wide 
discretion given to English courts by the Matrimonial Causes Act 1973 to 
adjust matrimonial property on divorce, Ormrod L.J said in Martin v. 
Martin1338 
1337 
1338 
"It is the essence of such a discretionary situation that the court 
should preserve, so far as it can, the utmost elasticity to deal with 
each case on its facts. Therefore it is a matter of trial and error 
and imagination on the part of those advising clients. It equally 
means that decisions of this court can never be better than 
See pp. 529-531 supra. 
[1978] Fam. 12 atp. 20. See also Hanlon v. The Law Society op. cit., supra 
and note 344 supra. 
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guidelines. They are not precedents in the strict sense of the word. 
There is bound to be an element of uncertainty in the use of the 
wide discretionary powers given to the court ... and no doubt there 
always will be, because as social circumstances change so the 
court will have to adapt the ways in which it exercises discretion." 
This dictum highlights both the strength and weakness of judicial 
discretion. It gives the court the much needed flexibility to treat each case 
on its own peculiar facts and to adapt the law to socio-economic changes 
in society. On the other hand, judicial discretion in this context creates 
uncertainty, as one cannot predict with any measure of exactitude what the 
court's reaction will be in a particular case. Furthermore, it may lead to 
judicial arbitrariness and subjectivity. This latter aspect of the exercise of 
discretionary power was found by the English Law Commission to be a 
fundamental cause of dissatisfaction of the powers given to the court 
under the Matrimonial Causes Act 1973. 1339 However, it has been 
demonstrated that discretionary decisions, in the judicial context, can be 
1339 See Working Paper No. 42 op. cit., at para. 0.22. 
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(and are) controlled by the operation oflegal principles.1340 The possibility 
of subjective justice is avoided by the legislature setting out the 
considerations to be taken into account by the courts in the exercise of 
their discretion and the objectives they are to seek to achieve. 1341 It 
follows that the essentially discretionary nature of the "matrimonial 
acijustive jurisdiction" need not and should not be an occasion for sliding 
into subjective justice.1342 
The discretionary approach is further criticised for its high legal costs and 
the lengthy time it takes for a court to hear a case and make a decision. 
Despite the criticisms levelled against using judicial discretion to adjust 
matrimonial property, it is submitted that the strengths of discretionary 
1340 
1341 
1342 
See R. Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously, London, Duckworth, 1977 at pp. 
31-39 relied upon by J.M. Eekelaar "Some principles of financial and 
property adjustment on divorce" ( 1979) 95 Law Quarterly Review 253 at p. 
254. 
See for example s. 25 (I) of the English Matrimonial Causes Act 1973 as 
amended by the Matrimonial and Family Proceedings Act 1984, s.7 (5) of 
the South African Divorce Act 70of1979 ands. 7(3) of the Zimbabwean 
Matrimonial Causes Act 1986. 
See Eekelaar "Some principles of financial and property adjustment on 
divorce" op. cit., supra at p. 254. 
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matrimonial adjustive power outweigh the perceived weakness it may 
have. If the legislature sets realistic and workable perimeters within which 
the court is to exercise the discretion, this will go a long way to bringing 
about the realisation of the legitimate expectations of spouses on divorce. 
The general outcome should be one of fairness. But fairness, like beauty, 
lies in the eye of the beholder. 1343 Consequently, there must be perimeters 
within which the judicial discretion should be exercised. To help achieve 
this goal, the following guidelines are proposed for the guidance of the 
court. 
(a) Guidelines for the exercise of judicial discretion 
The first guideline in the adjustment of the matrimonial property must be 
one that presumes equality of sharing. This will be in line with treating a 
marriage as a "partnership"1344 of equals in which each spouse contributes, 
economic or otherwise, to the general welfare of the family. Sharing does 
not however mean complete equality under any circumstance, for there 
may be particular cases in which the peculiar circumstances of a particular 
1343 
1344 
See the remark of Lord Nicholls in the English case of White v. White op. cit 
at p. 1573. 
On what is meant by this type of partnership, see note 230 supra. 
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marriage may dictate otherwise. In this regard the contribution made by 
a wife towards looking after the home or caring for the family must be 
accorded the significance it deserves notwithstanding the fact that she is 
unable to show that she made a financial contribution towards the 
acquisition of the property in question. This is a most important 
consideration in the Botswana context where women, married or 
unmarried, form a minority of the labour force although they form the 
majority of the population.1345 It follows from this that very few women 
will be able to show any significant financial contribution towards the 
acquisition of matrimonial property, and consequently be able to claim an 
interest in such property as a right. 
The evaluation of a spouse's indirect contribution towards the acquisition 
of matrimonial property should not be quantified in monetary terms· but 
rather on " ... the relative approach of differential equality between 
financial and non-financial contributions to the acquisition of 
matrimonial assets."1346 There should be no requirement that the non-
1345 
1346 
See note 217 supra. 32% of women as opposed to 72% of men are in paid 
employment. See Beyond Inequalities - Women in Botswana op. cit., supra 
at p. 36. 
Gray op. cit., supra at p. 71. 
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financial contribution must be shown to have had an impact upon the 
value or to have assisted materially in the acquisition of the property in 
question. It is submitted that to fully acknowledge the economic 
importance of a spouse's non-financial contribution, a contribution of a 
general nature, not specifically referable to the acquisition of a particular 
property, should be held sufficient to warrant the spouse concerned to be 
given a share in the said property .1347 
The peculiar circumstances of particular cases will of course determine 
whether the presumptive equality of sharing will apply or will be rebutted 
and a different formula of sharing applied. For example, the duration of 
the marriage will affect this presumption of equality. In a short marriage 
where there are no children, it will be highly inappropriate to adhere to the 
presumption. Rather, it will be appropriate, for instance, to award a lump 
sum or periodical payments of a limited duration to enable the spouse in 
a weaker financial position to adjust to the new situation. However, the 
following view, expressed by a New Zealand judge with regard to a wife's 
domestic services, should find no place in the envisaged exercise of 
judicial discretion. He said: 
1347 See the similar view of Botha J.A. on s. 7 ( 4) of South African Divorce Act 
70 of1979 inBeaumontv. Beaumont 1987 (1) S.A. 967 (A) at pp. 996-997. 
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"The contribution claimed for the purposes of this Act must be a 
contribution which results in some appreciation in value of the 
asset, and the competent performance of housewifely duties does 
not do that. "1348 
This portrayed an assumption on the part of the court that, even when fully 
and faithfully discharged, the domestic duties of the housewife are 
intrinsically ofless value than the income-earning activity of a husband.1349 
This undermines the concept of matrimonial partnership which is being 
advocated for Botswana and should not be countenanced in the envisaged 
reform. 
1348 
1349 
Per Wilson J. inA/lely v. Allely(1973) unreported but cited by Gray op. cit., 
at p. 81. The judge was construing s. 6(1A) of that country's Matrimonial 
Property Act 1963, introduced by the Matrimonial Property (Amendment) 
Act 1968. The section empowered the court to make an order in favour of 
a spouse notwithstanding that he or she made no contribution to the property 
in the form of money payments or that his or her contribution in any other 
form was of a usual and not an extraordinary character. See furthers. 11 ( 1) 
of the Matrimonial Property Act 1976 which provides equal sharing of the 
matrimonial home and the family chattels and Gray op. cit., supra at pp. 91-
96. 
See Gray op. cit., supra at p. 84. 
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Secondly, conduct, which features as a factor in the award of a gross sum 
of money to an ex-wife under s. 25(2) of the MCA 1973, should not be 
considered a significant factor in deciding the share of a spouse in the 
property of the other spouse. It should only play a part if the conduct has 
adversely affected the financial well-being of the couple or it is such that 
it would be inequitable to ignore. The court's approach to the issue of 
conduct in apportioning the matrimonial property should be modelled on 
the dictum ofOrmrod Jin the English case of Wachtel v. Wachtel. 1350 He 
said: 
1350 
"The court can only approach this issue in a broad way. It should 
bear in mind the new basis of divorce which recognises that, 
generally speaking, the causes of breakdown are complex and 
rarely to be found wholly or mainly on one side, and that the 
forensic process is not well-adapted to fine assessments or 
evaluations of behaviour, and that it is not only conduct in 
relation to the breakdown which may affect the discretion of the 
court in many ways, e.g. the appearance of signs of financial 
recklessness in the husband or of some form of socially 
[1973] 1 All E.R. 113 at 119. 
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unacceptable behaviour by the wife which would suggest to a 
reasonable person that in justice some modification to the order 
ought to be made. In my experience, however, conduct in these 
cases usually proves to be marginal issue which exerts little effect 
on the ultimate result unless it is both obvious and gross. "1351 
Thus, for conduct to be a significant factor, it must be one of exceptional 
gravity, for example, "of a kind that would cause an ordinary mortal to 
throw up his hands and say, 'surely that woman is not going to be given 
any money' ... " 1352 
Thirdly, the welfare of children of the marriage, if any, must be taken into 
account in adjusting the matrimonial property. Thus, where there are 
minor children of the marriage, the spouse who is granted custody would 
1351 
1352 
See further elucidation of this dictum by Denning M.R. when the case went 
on appeal in Wachtel v. Wachtel [1973] 1 All E.R. 829 at pp. 835-836. A 
similar view of conduct is taken by the South African courts under s. 7 of the 
Divorce Act 70 of 1979 - see for example, Beaumont v. Beaumont 1987 (1) 
S.A. 967 (A) at pp. 994-995 per Botha J.A. 
Per Sir George Baker in the English case of W. v. W. (Financial Provision: 
Lump Sum) [1976] Fam. 107 at p. 110. See also pp. 356-365 supra. 
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generally be favoured. 1353 However, it must be remarked here that if this 
guideline is not applied equitably, it could be detrimental to the wife's 
right to share in the matrimonial property. This is because in custody 
cases there is a general tendency on the part of the courts to recognise the 
father's right as superior to that of the mother. 1354 This is despite the fact 
that the courts are enjoined to make the welfare of the child the paramount 
consideration in custody cases. 1355 This tendency of the courts is a 
1353 
1354 
1355 
See for example, Molomo v. Molomo [1980] B.L.R. 250 where although the 
couple were given joint custody of the minor children, the wife was awarded 
the matrimonial home because the children were residing with her. 
This is a common law principle reiterated, for example, in the South African 
case of Calitz v. Calitz 1939 A.D. 56 at p. 61-63 per Tindall J.A. See also 
M. Sornarajah "Parental custody: The recent trends" ( 1973) 9 South African 
Law Journal 13. It must be noted that the above common law principle no 
longer applies in South Africa. The current primary guideline used by the 
court in deciding which parent should be awarded custody is what is in the 
child's best interest. Sees. 28(2) of the 1996 Constitution and McCall v. 
McCall l 994 (3) S.A. 201 (C) at p. 205. 
S. 6 of the Customary law Act 1969 provided that in " ... any case relating to 
the custody of children the welfare of the children shall be the paramount 
consideration irrespective of which law or principle is applied." This statute 
was subsequently consolidated into the Common Law and Customary Law 
Act 1969 but s. 6 was omitted. The said omission has been rectified recently 
by the Rectification of Laws (No. 5) Order, 2000 (1-r" November 2000) S.I. 
No. 74 of2000. This Order inserts immediately afters. 9 of the Common 
Law and Customary Law Act, a new s. 10 which reproduces the provision 
ofs. 6 of the Customary law Act 1969. Dicta in cases such asPeterv. Peter 
[1975] 2 B.L.R. 18, Ex parte Veen [1978] B.L.R. 43, Verona v. Verona 
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hangover from the customary law which confers that superiority on the 
husband by virtue of his having paid "bogadi"1356 for the wife. One of the 
consequences of such payment is to transfer the reproductive power of the 
woman from her own family to that of her husband's. 1357 It is submitted 
that the proper application of the welfare principle will enable the court to 
deal equitably with both spouses depending on the peculiar circumstances 
of the case. 
Fourthly, the court must strive to adhere to the "clean break" principle in 
terms of which the financial relationship between the spouses is severed 
as fully as possible if the circumstances permit. Currently, there is no 
expressed statutory provision enjoining the court to attempt to sever the 
financial relationship between the spouses as soon as possible after 
divorce. Rather, the existing statutory provisions rely heavily on 
1356 
1357 
[1983] B.L.R. 9 and Rangaka v. Rangaka Misca. No. 29/1996, unreported 
(13th January 1997) High Court, Lobatse reiterate the welfare principle in 
custody cases. 
This is cattle delivered by a man's family to a woman's family after 
agreement to marry. For further details of the significance of bogadi in a 
customary marriage, see Schapera op. cit., supra at p. 138, Roberts Tswana 
Family Law op. cit., supra at p. 34, and Nsereko op. cit., supra at p. 682. See 
also note 546 supra. 
See Schapera op. cit. supra at p. 139. 
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permanent maintenance for a wife and this would have to be jettisoned in 
favour of a provision that will enable the court where possible to sever the 
financial relationship between the spouses on divorce. 1358 
Although it has been suggested above that the law should move away from 
the present "support approach" to post-divorce financial arrangement and 
that the court should strive for a clean break of the financial obligations 
between the spouses, there may be situations where a spouse may still 
need the financial support of an ex-spouse. Therefore in exercising its 
discretion to redistribute matrimonial property, the court must make a 
conscious effort to relate the discretion to the award of maintenance for a 
spouse. 1359 Thus, if in the view of the court some form of maintenance is 
to be given to the wife, then this should be taken into account in 
determining the nature and extent of the redistribution of the matrimonial 
property under the proposed dispensation. A limited order for 
maintenance may be necessary in order to help the wife who was formerly 
dependent to become self-sufficient while making the transition from 
being married to being single. It must be of such duration as to facilitate 
1358 See note 477 supra. 
1359 See pp. 115-116 supra. 
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the transition instead of the present duration of the joint lives of the 
spouses. Alternatively, where this is possible, such limited maintenance 
can be computed into a lump sum payable forthwith in order to lessen the 
post-divorce dependency of the recipient spouse on the paying spouse. 
Fifthly, the court should also be empowered to take into account any 
relevant factor which the justice of the case may warrant. This may be 
apposite in the exercise of discretion not to allow an equal division of the 
joint estate in marriages in community of property. 
A question that arises in connection with the exercise of the court's 
discretion is the delineation of what constitutes property for post-divorce 
readjustment? The perimeters of such property have already been 
delineated at the beginning of this study to comprise of those assets 
"intended to be a continuing provision for [the spouses and their 
children] during their joint lives ... acquired, by their joint efforts during 
the marriage .. . "1360 Since the emphasis for the acquisition of these assets 
is the joint effort of the spouses, one will take it that any antenuptial assets 
will not be included in them. So also will property acquired separately in 
1360 See Wachtel v. Wachtel [1973] 1 All E.R. 829 (C.A.) at p. 836 per Lord 
Denning M.R. quoted in full at p. 1 supra. 
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consequence of a gift or inheritance from a third party not be included. In 
both cases, it is conceivable that these individually acquired assets will be 
the only ones that a spouse possesses on divorce. In which case, it will be 
unfair not to treat them as property in relation to which the discretion that 
is being advocated for the Botswana courts can be exercised - especially 
where the said property has been used for the provision of the other spouse 
and children, if any, during the subsistence of the marriage. 
5. REFORM OF SPECIFIC ASPECTS OF THE MATRIMONIAL REGIMES 
(a) Marriage in community of property 
(i) Abolition of the marital power 
The disadvantages that the exercise of the marital power entails for a wife 
are sufficiently detailed elsewhere. 1361 It is only necessary to note here that 
women regard the marital power not only as a restriction on their 
contractual capacity but also as a personal humiliation because they are 
placed in a position ofinferiority to their husbands. Furthermore, the main 
1361 See pp. 39-41 supra and the South African Law Commission's Report on 
matrimonial property law, op. cit. at paras. 13.1.3 - 13.1.4. 
591 
reason advanced for the justification of the marital power, that is, the 
natural superiority of a man and the innate weakness of a woman, cannot 
seriously be sustained in the contemporary scheme of things in Botswana. 
Batswana women are increasingly holding their own in a male dominated 
society and the abolition of the marital power will go a long way to 
advance the course of their emancipation from male subjugation. 1362 
Although one of the avowed rationales behind the enactment of the 
Married Persons Property Act 1970 was "to place women in the same 
position as any other adult", 1363 this could not be achieved because the 
marital power was not abolished. Instead what the Act did was to reverse 
the then existing presumption in favour of community of property in 
statutory marriages to that of a presumption in favour of separation of 
property.1364 This reversal was prospective rather than retrospective and 
although an opportunity was given to couples married in community of 
1362 
1363 
1364 
An example of women's advancement in the socio-economic life of the 
country is the recent appointment of Miss Linah K. Mohohlo as the 
Governor of Bank of Botswana, the country's Central Bank. 
See Official Report of the Parliamentary Debates (Hansard) vol. 34 1970 
at p. 16. See also p. 43 supra. 
Sees. 3 (1) of the Act. 
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property prior to the coming into force of the Act to change to the new 
dispensation, there are still many marriages in which the wives are subject 
to the marital power of their husbands. In the light of its restrictive effect 
on the legal capacity of wives subject to this power, it is submitted that the 
time has come for the marital power to be abolished by statute in order to 
enhance the legal status of women married under the community of 
property regime. 1365 
(ii) Consequence of the abolition of the marital power 
The main consequence of the abolition of the marital power and which in 
the context of this study is germane, will be the restoration of full legal 
capacity to a wife of a marriage in community of property. This will make 
it possible for her to partake in the administration of the joint estate. Such 
participation will be achieved by the imposition of equal and concurrent 
administration of the joint estate on the spouses, thus giving the wife a say 
1365 A tentative step has been taken by the Deeds Registry (Amendment) Act 
1996 which has abolished restrictions imposed on married women in 
registering documents under the Act. Seep. 553 supra. 
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in the administration of an estate in which she has a vested interest. 1366 
This will rectify the present position whereby the wife lacks the capacity 
to deal with the joint estate. The aim of imposing equal contractual and 
administrative capacity on the spouses is not for them to act jointly in all 
transactions, for if that is the case commercial activities will unduly be 
impeded and the administration of the joint estate will become too 
unwieldy. Rather the aim will be that a juristic act of either of them in 
relation to the joint estate will be valid subject to the requirement that 
certain important acts cannot be performed by one spouse without the 
consent of the other spouse.1367 Thus, the system of equal management in 
effect consists of two elements, namely (a) equal or concurrent 
(independent) management by which both spouses have the power to 
perform acts binding on the joint estate without the consent of the other 
spouse and (b) joint management by which a spouse may perform certain 
defined important acts affecting the joint estate only with the consent of 
1366 
1367 
An alternative device ofrestricting the husband's powers of administration 
vis a vis the joint estate will not solve the problem of giving the wife a share 
of the power to administer the joint estate. Hence the proposal to impose 
equal contractual and administrative capacity on the spouses. 
See for example, s. 15(2) of the Matrimonial Property Act 88of1984 of 
South Africa. 
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the other spouse. This will reflect the general situation in most marriages 
because in order to maintain marital harmony major family decisions are 
usually based on a consensus.1368 The question that will need to be 
addressed is what will constitute these important acts for which the 
consent of the other spouse must be sought. A general answer to this 
question will be those acts considered to be so important that a unilateral 
action on the part of either spouse may lead to serious friction between 
them. Typical examples in Botswana of such acts over which consent will 
be required are the acquisition, disposition or mortgaging of immovable 
property forming part of the joint estate, 1369 and the buying and selling of 
cattle, a specie of movable property that plays a very important part in the 
life of Batswana. 1370 Apart from these, it will be up to the legislature to 
1368 
1369 
1370 
This fact was taken into account by the South African Law Commission in 
recommending the equal administration of the joint estate by spouses 
married in community of property. See para. 19 .1 of its Report op. cit. 
The Deeds Registry (Amendment) Act 1996 has taken the first step in 
allowing married women, irrespective of whether they are subject to the 
marital power, to execute deeds at the Registry without their husband's 
consent. Seep. 553 supra .. 
See The National Development Plan 8 1997198 - 200213 Ministry ofFinance 
and Development Planning, Gaborone, August 1997 at p. 243 and N.H. 
Fidzani "Land reform and primitive accumulation: A closer look at the 
Botswana tribal grazing land policy" in Botswana Politics and Society (Edge 
and Lekorwe eds.) J.L. van Schaik, Pretoria, 1998, 229 at pp. 233 - 234. 
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determine which other acts will come within the ambit of the consent 
provision. It is not far-fetched to imagine that such things as furniture and 
household effects, dividends, interests and proceeds of insurance policies 
would be included in such acts. 
How is the consent of the spouses to be obtained? It is submitted that 
there should be a simple way in which the consent is to be obtained. It is 
suggested that a written consent witnessed by two competent persons 
should suffice for the different juristic acts. The South African example 
where a distinction is drawn between four types of consents will be too 
complicated to follow. 1371 
(iii) Protective measures in respect of the administration of the joint 
estate 
Since the consent provision will be aimed at protecting a spouse against 
the maladministration of the joint estate by the other spouse, any proposed 
1371 See Cronje & Heaton op. cit. at pp. 97-100 where the following consents are 
enumerated: (a) prior written consent attested by two competent witnesses 
regarding each transaction separately; (b) written consent attested by two 
competent witnesses for each separate transaction; ( c) written consent 
without any further requirements and ( d) oral or tacit consent. 
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legislation will have to deal with the consequences of non-compliance 
with the consent provision. Two alternatives are open to the legislature, 
namely, to protect the unconsulted spouse or to protect the third party with 
whom the other spouse contracts. If the first alternative is adopted, the 
logical outcome will be to declare the resultant transaction without the 
necessary consent void. This, it is submitted will not only adequately 
protect the unconsulted spouse but it will encourage consultation between 
the spouses as will be envisaged by the consent provision. However, it 
may be argued that this will unduly disrupt commercial activities by 
putting too much of a burden on the third party to ascertain the marital 
status of the person he is dealing with and whether the necessary consent 
has been obtained from the other spouse. The end result of this argument 
will be that in the interest of the sanctity of commercial contracts, the bona 
fide third party should be protected by making the transaction valid in the 
absence of any knowledge on his part of a breach of the consent 
provision. 1372 Whilst this may be a desirable thing to do, it is submitted 
that it will unduly undermine the consent provision to the extent that it 
may become ineffective. If the desire is to protect the unconsulted spouse 
then the first alternative will be best suited for the purpose. If that were 
1372 This was the position adopted by the South African legislature when it 
enacted s. 15(9)(a) of the Matrimonial Property Act 88of1984. 
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the position taken by the legislature, one will reasonably expect third 
parties to insist that the other spouse join in the transaction in order to 
protect them from subsequent avoidance of the contract. As was put by 
a commentator on the consent provisions in the South African 
Matrimonial Property Act 1984, "a certain amount of commercial 
inconvenience may be a price well worth paying in order to create a 
genuine duty to consult spouses about transactions affecting shared 
property."1313 It is therefore submitted that of the two alternatives 
available to the legislature, it should opt for the protection of the 
unconsulted spouse and leave the third party to find devices to protect 
himself. 
Since the consequence of non-compliance with the consent provision is 
being suggested to be one of avoidance of the transaction in question, the 
possibility of the joint estate suffering loss from persistent violation of the 
consent provision will not arise. Consequently, the protection afforded by 
the provision will hold until the community is terminated. In that event, 
in dividing the joint estate there will be no need for adjustment in favour 
of the unconsulted spouse for any loss that the joint estate may have 
1373 N. Zaal op. cit., supra at p. 65. 
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suffered as a result of the other spouse's violation of the consent 
provision. Furthermore, where a spouse consistently violates the consent 
provision, the unconsulted spouse should have recourse to the court to 
have the administrative powers suspended and, where need be, to ask for 
the division of the estate forthwith. This power to suspend the exercise of 
the administrative powers relating to the joint estate and the power to 
divide the joint estate forthwith will be drastic steps against the defaulting 
spouse. Consequently, provisions must be made for their exercise in a 
clear-cut manner when that is the only way out of the impasse the spouses 
find themselves. 
What happens if a spouse unreasonably refuses the requisite consent? The 
other spouse, it is submitted, should have recourse to the court to 
determine the reasonableness or otherwise of such refusal. It is however, 
appreciated that court proceedings may be too slow to resolve differences 
of opinion especially where the transaction in question needs to be 
undertaken with a measure of urgency. 1374 This notwithstanding, it is 
submitted that the appropriate arbiter in cases of disagreement as to the 
1374 Although the High Court Rules (Ord. 12 r. 13) provide for urgent 
applications to be made where this is necessary, a decision on such 
application may be delayed where the facts are disputed. 
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consent provision should be the court. The alternative of allowing the 
husband, for instance, to have a veto power will undermine the consensual 
basis of the consent provision. 
(b) Marriage out of community of property 
As noted earlier on, the most important characteristic of marriages out of 
community is the concept of separate property, that is, each spouse may 
acquire and deal with his or her property as if he or she were single. Thus, 
its advantage lies in the ability of each spouse to acquire property 
depending on his or her economic power. This regime favours the spouse 
with the superior economic power, normally the husband, to the detriment 
of the wife, whose economic power will generally be inferior. As pointed 
out by the English Law Commission, 1375 equality of power, which 
separation of property achieves, does not of itselflead to equal opportunity 
to exercise that power. It ignores the fact that a married woman, 
especially if she has young children, does not in practice have the same 
opportunity as her husband or as an unmarried woman to acquire property. 
1375 Working Paper No. 42 Family Property Law (1971) at para. 0.12. 
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Official figures1376 in Botswana show that while women account for the 
majority of the population, 1377 they do not contribute significantly to the 
work force. Data from the 1991 census show that in that year women 
accounted for just 39% of workers aged 12 years and above, less than 50% 
of the female population (excluding school children and the retired) was 
classified as labour force participants whilst 90% of their male 
counterparts were recognised as workers. These figures suggest that 
opportunities available to women to participate in economic activities 
which will empower them to be able to acquire their own property are few. 
It is therefore important that a legal mechanism be put in place to ensure 
that each spouse, especially the wife, is entitled to share in any 
matrimonial property acquired, irrespective of which spouse acquired 
it. 1378 It has been suggested above that judicial discretion, circumscribed 
by statutory guidelines, should be utilised in sharing matrimonial assets on 
1376 
1377 
1378 
See National Report for the fourth World Conference on Women: Beijing, 
China 1995, Women's Affairs Division, Ministry of Labour and Home 
Affairs at p. 13 citing figures from the 1991 Housing and Population 
Census. 
The 1991 census shows that the population is made up of 634,000 males and 
692,396 females. 
See the views of the English Law Commission in its Working Paper No. 42 -
Family Property Law (1971) at para. 0.14. 
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divorce. The basic premise being a presumption of equality, which 
presumption may be rebutted by the facts of individual cases. 
(c) Customary marriages 
As the primary law that governs the proprietary consequences of marriages 
contracted under the Marriage Act by persons subject to that law, there is 
a need to harmonise the rules of customary law relating to distribution of 
post-divorce assets with the discretion to be given to the court to readjust 
the property of the spouses married out of community and in community 
of property. In this regard it is submitted that the same discretion that is 
being proposed for the High Court be given to the Customary Courts. 
However, a drawback of this proposal will be that the presiding officers 
of these courts have no legal background and furthermore, lawyers are 
denied an audience in these courts and courts taking appeals directly from 
them, except with the permission of the latter courts. 1379 Consequently, it 
will be difficult to expect these courts to exercise discretion within some 
structured statutory criteria. For the Customary Courts to be able to 
administer the proposed discretion, it will be necessary that presiding 
1379 See 31 of the Customary Courts Act. 
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officers be given basic legal training in the running of the courts and the 
application and interpretation of statutes. Furthermore, consideration 
should be given to the appointment oflegally qualified clerks to assist the 
lay bench with matters of law during proceedings. These suggestions are 
long term solutions which may not be implemented in the foreseeable 
future .. 
As an alternative solution, the Subordinate Matrimonial Courts envisaged 
under the MCA 19731380 should be set up as a matter of urgency. Since 
these courts are intended to have the same jurisdiction as the High Court, 
they should be presided over by a legally qualified person. Thus 
constituted, these courts should be able to apply the discretion envisaged 
under the suggested reform. However, the discretion will be exercised 
using the relevant customary law. Bearing in mind the inherent unfairness 
of the customary law rules for determining property, the court should be 
alert to the statutory injunction to apply customary law "so far as it is not 
1380 See s. 5 of the Act which provides that the President may, on the 
recommendation of the Chief Justice by order published in the Gazette, 
appoint any judicial officer appointed by the Judicial Service Commission 
to hold a court, to be called "subordinate matrimonial court'' for the exercise 
of the jurisdiction and powers conferred by the Act in respect of such areas 
as may be specified in such order. 
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incompatible with the provision of any written law or contrary to morality 
humanity or natural justice."1381 The implementation of this injunction 
will no doubt encourage judicial development of customary law which, 
although it may create a divergence between "judicial customary law" and 
"practised customary law", 1382 will nevertheless not be a bad thing if some 
semblance of fairness to a customary-law wife in a divorce situation is to 
be achieved. 
As a way of reinforcing the exercise of the discretion, both the High Court 
and the Subordinate Matrimonial Court should expressly be empowered 
1381 
1382 
Sees. 2 of the Customary Courts Act ands. 4(1) of the Common Law and 
Customary Law Act. The equivalent phrase in West Africa for the 
recognition of customary law, namely, "not repugnant to natural justice, 
equity and good conscience", has given rise to difficulties of interpretation. 
See A.E.W. Park Sources of Nigerian Law, London, Sweet & Maxwell, 
1963, Chap. 5, A.O. Obilade The Nigerian Legal System, London, Sweet & 
Maxwell, 1979, Chap. 6 and W.C.E Daniels "The influence of equity in 
West African law" (1962) 11 International and Comparative Law Quarterly 
31. 
Phrases used by G.R. Woodman to describe judicial interpretation of 
customary law in West Africa: see "Some realism about customary law - the 
West African experience" (1969) Wisconsin Law Review 128. See also by 
the same writer, "Judicial development of customary law: The case of 
marriage law in Ghana and Nigeria" op. cit., supra and A.K.P. Kludze 
"Problems of intestate succession in Ghana" (1972) 9 University of Ghana 
Law Journal 89. 
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to apply the provisions of the MCA 1973 to customary marriages. This 
express power is necessary in the light of the ruling in Mafokate v. 
Mafokate1383 to the effect that the provisions of the Act do not apply to 
customary marriages, which are regulated by customary law. In that case 
an action was brought before the court to dissolve a customary-law 
marriage. The action was framed both in terms of form and substance on 
the provisions of MCA 1973 whereas, in the court's view, it ought to have 
been based on the applicable principles of customary law. The court 
dismissed the action on the ground that it was erroneously grounded and 
misconceived. The express granting of power to utilise the provisions of 
the MCA 1973 in relation to customary marriages will help to eliminate 
the discriminatory aspects of the customary law rules for determining and 
dividing property on divorce. 
1383 Op. cit. supra at p. 11 of the transcript. 
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CHAPTER NINE 
CONCLUSION 
This study set out to appraise the legal regimes for the determination of 
property rights on divorce. The objective was to analyse the present 
matrimonial property regimes and how they are applied to determine 
division of matrimonial property on divorce, to assess their efficacy as 
legal tools for the resolution of conflicts in that event, compare that 
efficacy with matrimonial regimes in comparable jurisdictions and to 
suggest measures to reform perceived shortcomings in the regimes. In 
order to do this it was necessary to determine what constituted 
"matrimonial property" for the purpose of the study. A definition based 
on co-operative or individual acquisition of property destined to be used 
for continuing provision for the spouses and their children, if any, was 
adopted. This definition was found to be inadequate in view of the fact 
that it did not include job-related benefits such as pensions which have 
currently attained significance as "property" worthy of consideration in 
determining property rights on divorce. The definition also did not 
embrace antenuptial property and property acquired by way of a gift or 
inheritance. It has therefore been proposed that job-related benefits should 
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be included in matrimonial property as delimited and be subject to the 
proposed power of the adjudicating court to divide matrimonial property 
as the justice of the case warrants. Furthermore, where antenuptial 
property or that acquired by way of gift or inheritance are the only possible 
property existing on divorce, it has been suggested that the court may 
exercise its discretion in redistributing these as the justice of the case may 
demand. 
The main finding of the appraisal of the matrimonial regimes is that there 
is a lack of flexibility in their application in determining property rights on 
divorce. The available power to determine the proprietary rights of 
spouses on divorce has been circumscribed by a restricted interpretation 
as to the ownership of matrimonial property and not as to the division or 
distribution, based on need, of the available assets irrespective of who 
owns them. This state of affairs does not augur well for the realisation of 
the legitimate expectations of married couples, especially wives who 
generally find themselves in a weak economic position during the 
marriage. It is therefore suggested that a wide discretion, circumscribed 
by definitive statutory guidelines, be introduced to remedy this 
shortcoming in the matrimonial property regimes. It is hoped that this will 
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give the law the capacity of certain determination whilst retaining a degree 
of flexibility. 
A specific shortcoming which surfaced from the appraisal of the regimes 
is the exercise of husbands of the marital power in marriages in 
community of property and its attendant restrictive consequences on wives 
of such marriages. The main disadvantage of this is the denial of wives 
of the right to partake in the administration of the joint estate. The 
rationale behind the conferment of the marital power on a husband has 
been shown to be unsupportable in the present stage of socio-economic 
development in Botswana. Consequently, it is suggested that the power 
be abolished and replaced by joint and concurrent administration of the 
joint estate. 
It also proposed that the provisions of the MCA 1973 should be extended 
to customary marriages as a way of eliminating the discriminatory rules 
for determining property on divorce. 
Finally, the reform of the matrimonial property regimes will be greatly 
enhanced in the context of a structured law reform programme. It is 
therefore suggested that a statutory body, like those existing in the 
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comparative jurisdictions discussed in the study, be set up. Under the 
auspices of such a body, periodic systematic reforms will be undertaken 
to ensure that law in general and matrimonial law in particular keep pace 
with societal changes. Botswana society has undergone tremendous socio-
economic changes in recent years which has brought pressures to bear on 
marriages culminating in increased marital breakdowns. The law should 
be responsive to these changes by adapting itself to deal with the problems 
entailed in these changes. The existing law on matrimonial property is ill-
equipped to deal with these contemporary changes. The suggested 
reforms are to be taken as the author's small contribution towards making 
matrimonial law socially responsive in order to achieve the goal of a 
compassionate, just and caring nation as envisaged in the national vision 
2016.1384 
1384 See Long Term Vision For Botswana, Gaborone, Government Printer, 1997 
pp. 49-54. 
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SUMMARY OF THE PROPOSED REFORMS OF THE MATRIMONIAL 
PROPERTY REGIMES 
(a) The courts should be given a wide discretionary power, circumscribed 
by statutory guidelines, to adjust or reallocate matrimonial property on 
divorce irrespective of the matrimonial property system that governs the 
marriage. 
(b) The statutory guidelines for the exercise of the judicial discretion 
should have, as their underlying principle, equality of sharing. Such 
principle may however be departed from where the circumstances of a 
particular case warrant it: 
( c) The court should take the following factors into account in the exercise 
of its discretion: 
(i) the contributions, directly or indirectly, financial or otherwise, of the 
spouses towards the welfare of the family, 
(ii) the conduct of the parties in relation to each other and to the marriage, 
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(iii) the welfare of the children of the marriage, 
(iv) the achievement of a "clean break" where appropriate and practicable 
and 
( v) any other factor which in the opinion of the court the justice of the case 
warrants. 
( d) The marital power should be abolished in marriages in community of 
property and be replaced with equal and concurrent administration of the 
joint estate. 
( e) The provisions of the Matrimonial Causes Act 1973 should be made 
applicable to customary marriages when such marriages are terminated by 
divorce. 
(f) The inclusion within the ambit of matrimonial property of job-related 
benefits, such as pensions, with a view of sharing them on divorce should 
be considered. 
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(g) The legislature should establish a statutory Law Reform Commission 
to enhance law reform in general and matrimonial law in particular. 
